import hmac import hashlib import base64 import pytest from timmy_serve.l402_proxy import create_l402_challenge, verify_l402_token, Macaroon, _sign def test_l402_macaroon_forgery_prevention(): """Test that knowing the hmac_secret is not enough to forge a macaroon. The forgery attempt uses the same hmac_secret found in a valid macaroon but doesn't know the server's internal _MACAROON_SECRET. """ # 1. Create a valid challenge challenge = create_l402_challenge(100, "valid") valid_token = challenge["macaroon"] # 2. Extract components from the valid macaroon valid_mac = Macaroon.deserialize(valid_token) assert valid_mac is not None # 3. Attempt to forge a macaroon for a different (unpaid) identifier # but using the same hmac_secret and the same signing logic a naive # attacker might assume (if it was just hmac(hmac_secret, identifier)). fake_identifier = "forged-payment-hash" # Naive forgery attempt: fake_signature = hmac.new( valid_mac.hmac_secret.encode(), fake_identifier.encode(), hashlib.sha256 ).hexdigest() fake_mac = Macaroon( identifier=fake_identifier, signature=fake_signature, hmac_secret=valid_mac.hmac_secret, version=valid_mac.version, location=valid_mac.location ) fake_token = fake_mac.serialize() # 4. Verification should fail because the server uses two-key derivation assert verify_l402_token(fake_token) is False def test_xss_protection_in_templates(): """Verify that templates now use the escape filter for user-controlled content.""" templates_to_check = [ ("src/dashboard/templates/partials/chat_message.html", "{{ user_message | e }}"), ("src/dashboard/templates/partials/history.html", "{{ msg.content | e }}"), ("src/dashboard/templates/briefing.html", "{{ briefing.summary | e }}"), ("src/dashboard/templates/partials/approval_card_single.html", "{{ item.title | e }}"), ("src/dashboard/templates/marketplace.html", "{{ agent.name | e }}"), ] for path, expected_snippet in templates_to_check: with open(path, "r") as f: content = f.read() assert expected_snippet in content, f"XSS fix missing in {path}" def test_macaroon_serialization_v2(): """Test that the new serialization format includes the hmac_secret.""" mac = Macaroon(identifier="id", signature="sig", hmac_secret="secret") serialized = mac.serialize() # Decode manually to check parts raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(serialized.encode()).decode() parts = raw.split(":") assert len(parts) == 5 assert parts[2] == "id" assert parts[3] == "sig" assert parts[4] == "secret" # Test deserialization restored = Macaroon.deserialize(serialized) assert restored.hmac_secret == "secret"