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hermes-agent/tools/terminal_tool.py

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Terminal Tool Module (mini-swe-agent backend)
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A terminal tool that executes commands using mini-swe-agent's execution environments.
Supports local execution, Docker containers, and Modal cloud sandboxes.
Environment Selection (via TERMINAL_ENV environment variable):
- "local": Execute directly on the host machine (default, fastest)
- "docker": Execute in Docker containers (isolated, requires Docker)
- "modal": Execute in Modal cloud sandboxes (scalable, requires Modal account)
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Features:
- Multiple execution backends (local, docker, modal)
- Background task support
- VM/container lifecycle management
- Automatic cleanup after inactivity
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Usage:
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from terminal_tool import terminal_tool
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# Execute a simple command
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result = terminal_tool("ls -la")
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# Execute in background
result = terminal_tool("python server.py", background=True)
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"""
import json
import logging
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import os
import signal
import sys
import time
import threading
import atexit
import shutil
import subprocess
import tempfile
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Optional, Dict, Any
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Global interrupt event: set by the agent when a user interrupt arrives.
# The terminal tool polls this during command execution so it can kill
# long-running subprocesses immediately instead of blocking until timeout.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_interrupt_event = threading.Event()
def set_interrupt_event(active: bool) -> None:
"""Called by the agent to signal or clear the interrupt."""
if active:
_interrupt_event.set()
else:
_interrupt_event.clear()
def is_interrupted() -> bool:
"""Check if an interrupt has been requested."""
return _interrupt_event.is_set()
# Add mini-swe-agent to path if not installed
mini_swe_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "mini-swe-agent" / "src"
if mini_swe_path.exists():
sys.path.insert(0, str(mini_swe_path))
# =============================================================================
# Custom Singularity Environment with more space
# =============================================================================
def _get_scratch_dir() -> Path:
"""Get the best directory for Singularity sandboxes - prefers /scratch if available."""
# Check for configurable scratch directory first (highest priority)
custom_scratch = os.getenv("TERMINAL_SCRATCH_DIR")
if custom_scratch:
scratch_path = Path(custom_scratch)
scratch_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return scratch_path
# Check for /scratch (common on HPC clusters, especially GPU nodes)
scratch = Path("/scratch")
if scratch.exists() and os.access(scratch, os.W_OK):
# Create user-specific subdirectory
user_scratch = scratch / os.getenv("USER", "hermes") / "hermes-agent"
user_scratch.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
logger.info("Using /scratch for sandboxes: %s", user_scratch)
return user_scratch
# Fall back to /tmp (only relevant for Singularity/HPC sandboxes)
logger.debug("/scratch not available, using /tmp for sandboxes")
return Path(tempfile.gettempdir())
def _get_apptainer_cache_dir() -> Path:
"""Get the Apptainer cache directory for SIF images."""
# Check for APPTAINER_CACHEDIR env var
cache_dir = os.getenv("APPTAINER_CACHEDIR")
if cache_dir:
cache_path = Path(cache_dir)
cache_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return cache_path
# Use user-specific subdirectory in scratch for cache
scratch = _get_scratch_dir()
cache_path = scratch / ".apptainer"
cache_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return cache_path
# Lock for SIF building to prevent race conditions
_sif_build_lock = threading.Lock()
def _get_or_build_sif(image: str, executable: str = "apptainer") -> str:
"""
Get or build a SIF image from a docker:// URL.
If the image is already a .sif file, returns it as-is.
If the image is a docker:// URL, checks for cached SIF and builds if needed.
Args:
image: Image path (docker://... URL or .sif path)
executable: apptainer or singularity
Returns:
Path to SIF file, or original image if not a docker:// URL
"""
# If already a .sif file, use it directly
if image.endswith('.sif') and Path(image).exists():
return image
# If not a docker:// URL, return as-is (could be a local sandbox or other format)
if not image.startswith('docker://'):
return image
# Generate SIF filename from docker image name
# docker://nikolaik/python-nodejs:python3.11-nodejs20 -> python-nodejs-python3.11-nodejs20.sif
image_name = image.replace('docker://', '').replace('/', '-').replace(':', '-')
cache_dir = _get_apptainer_cache_dir()
sif_path = cache_dir / f"{image_name}.sif"
# Check if SIF already exists
if sif_path.exists():
return str(sif_path)
# Build SIF with lock to prevent multiple workers building simultaneously
with _sif_build_lock:
# Double-check after acquiring lock (another thread may have built it)
if sif_path.exists():
return str(sif_path)
logger.info("Building SIF image (one-time setup)...")
logger.info(" Source: %s", image)
logger.info(" Target: %s", sif_path)
# Ensure tmp directory exists for build
tmp_dir = cache_dir / "tmp"
tmp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Set APPTAINER_TMPDIR for the build
env = os.environ.copy()
env["APPTAINER_TMPDIR"] = str(tmp_dir)
env["APPTAINER_CACHEDIR"] = str(cache_dir)
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[executable, "build", str(sif_path), image],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=600, # 10 min timeout for pulling and building
env=env
)
if result.returncode != 0:
logger.warning("SIF build failed, falling back to docker:// URL")
logger.warning(" Error: %s", result.stderr[:500])
return image
logger.info("SIF image built successfully")
return str(sif_path)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
logger.warning("SIF build timed out, falling back to docker:// URL")
# Clean up partial file
if sif_path.exists():
sif_path.unlink()
return image
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("SIF build error: %s, falling back to docker:// URL", e)
return image
# Disk usage warning threshold (in GB)
DISK_USAGE_WARNING_THRESHOLD_GB = float(os.getenv("TERMINAL_DISK_WARNING_GB", "500"))
def _check_disk_usage_warning():
"""Check if total disk usage exceeds warning threshold."""
scratch_dir = _get_scratch_dir()
try:
# Get total size of hermes directories
total_bytes = 0
import glob
for path in glob.glob(str(scratch_dir / "hermes-*")):
for f in Path(path).rglob('*'):
if f.is_file():
try:
total_bytes += f.stat().st_size
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except OSError:
pass
total_gb = total_bytes / (1024 ** 3)
if total_gb > DISK_USAGE_WARNING_THRESHOLD_GB:
logger.warning("Disk usage (%.1fGB) exceeds threshold (%.0fGB). Consider running cleanup_all_environments().",
total_gb, DISK_USAGE_WARNING_THRESHOLD_GB)
return True
return False
except Exception as e:
return False
# Session-cached sudo password (persists until CLI exits)
_cached_sudo_password: str = ""
# Optional UI callbacks for interactive prompts. When set, these are called
# instead of the default /dev/tty or input() readers. The CLI registers these
# so prompts route through prompt_toolkit's event loop.
# _sudo_password_callback() -> str (return password or "" to skip)
# _approval_callback(command, description) -> str ("once"/"session"/"always"/"deny")
_sudo_password_callback = None
_approval_callback = None
def set_sudo_password_callback(cb):
"""Register a callback for sudo password prompts (used by CLI)."""
global _sudo_password_callback
_sudo_password_callback = cb
def set_approval_callback(cb):
"""Register a callback for dangerous command approval prompts (used by CLI)."""
global _approval_callback
_approval_callback = cb
# =============================================================================
# Dangerous Command Approval System
# =============================================================================
from tools import approval as _approval
# Dangerous command patterns (regex, description)
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
(r'\brm\s+(-[^\s]*\s+)*/', "delete in root path"),
(r'\brm\s+(-[^\s]*)?r', "recursive delete"),
(r'\brm\s+--recursive\b', "recursive delete (long flag)"),
(r'\bchmod\s+(-[^\s]*\s+)*777\b', "world-writable permissions"),
(r'\bchmod\s+--recursive\b.*777', "recursive world-writable (long flag)"),
(r'\bchown\s+(-[^\s]*)?R\s+root', "recursive chown to root"),
(r'\bchown\s+--recursive\b.*root', "recursive chown to root (long flag)"),
(r'\bmkfs\b', "format filesystem"),
(r'\bdd\s+.*if=', "disk copy"),
(r'>\s*/dev/sd', "write to block device"),
(r'\bDROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE)\b', "SQL DROP"),
(r'\bDELETE\s+FROM\b(?!.*\bWHERE\b)', "SQL DELETE without WHERE"),
(r'\bTRUNCATE\s+(TABLE)?\s*\w', "SQL TRUNCATE"),
(r'>\s*/etc/', "overwrite system config"),
(r'\bsystemctl\s+(stop|disable|mask)\b', "stop/disable system service"),
(r'\bkill\s+-9\s+-1\b', "kill all processes"),
(r'\bpkill\s+-9\b', "force kill processes"),
(r':()\s*{\s*:\s*\|\s*:&\s*}\s*;:', "fork bomb"),
# Indirect execution via command launchers
(r'\b(bash|sh|zsh)\s+-c\s+', "shell command via -c flag"),
(r'\b(python[23]?|perl|ruby|node)\s+-[ec]\s+', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
# Pipe-to-shell (remote code execution)
(r'\b(curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(ba)?sh\b', "pipe remote content to shell"),
# Destructive find/xargs patterns
(r'\bxargs\s+.*\brm\b', "xargs with rm"),
(r'\bfind\b.*-exec\s+rm\b', "find -exec rm"),
(r'\bfind\b.*-delete\b', "find -delete"),
]
def _load_permanent_allowlist() -> set:
"""Load permanently allowed command patterns from config.
Also syncs them into the approval module so is_approved() works for
patterns that were added via 'always' in a previous session.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
config = load_config()
patterns = set(config.get("command_allowlist", []) or [])
if patterns:
_approval.load_permanent(patterns)
return patterns
except Exception:
return set()
def _save_permanent_allowlist(patterns: set):
"""Save permanently allowed command patterns to config."""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config, save_config
config = load_config()
config["command_allowlist"] = list(patterns)
save_config(config)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Could not save allowlist: %s", e)
def _detect_dangerous_command(command: str) -> tuple:
"""
Check if command matches any dangerous patterns.
Returns:
(is_dangerous, pattern_key, description) or (False, None, None)
"""
import re
command_lower = command.lower()
for pattern, description in DANGEROUS_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, command_lower, re.IGNORECASE):
# Use a simplified pattern key for caching (first word + key chars)
pattern_key = pattern.split(r'\b')[1] if r'\b' in pattern else pattern[:20]
return (True, pattern_key, description)
return (False, None, None)
def _is_command_approved(pattern_key: str) -> bool:
"""Check if a pattern is approved (session or permanent)."""
session_key = os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "default")
return _approval.is_approved(session_key, pattern_key)
def _prompt_dangerous_approval(command: str, description: str, timeout_seconds: int = 60) -> str:
"""
Prompt user to approve a dangerous command (CLI only).
If an _approval_callback is registered (by the CLI), delegates to it so the
prompt integrates with prompt_toolkit's UI. Otherwise falls back to the
raw input() approach (works outside the TUI, e.g. tests).
Returns: 'once', 'session', 'always', or 'deny'
"""
import sys
import threading
# Use the registered callback when available (prompt_toolkit-compatible)
if _approval_callback is not None:
try:
return _approval_callback(command, description)
except Exception:
return "deny"
# Pause spinner if one is running
os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"] = "1"
try:
print()
print(f" ⚠️ DANGEROUS COMMAND: {description}")
print(f" {command[:80]}{'...' if len(command) > 80 else ''}")
print()
print(f" [o]nce | [s]ession | [a]lways | [d]eny")
print()
sys.stdout.flush()
result = {"choice": ""}
def get_input():
try:
result["choice"] = input(" Choice [o/s/a/D]: ").strip().lower()
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except (EOFError, OSError):
result["choice"] = ""
thread = threading.Thread(target=get_input, daemon=True)
thread.start()
thread.join(timeout=timeout_seconds)
if thread.is_alive():
print("\n ⏱ Timeout - denying command")
return "deny"
choice = result["choice"]
if choice in ('o', 'once'):
print(" ✓ Allowed once")
return "once"
elif choice in ('s', 'session'):
print(" ✓ Allowed for this session")
return "session"
elif choice in ('a', 'always'):
print(" ✓ Added to permanent allowlist")
return "always"
else:
print(" ✗ Denied")
return "deny"
except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
print("\n ✗ Cancelled")
return "deny"
finally:
if "HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE" in os.environ:
del os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"]
print()
sys.stdout.flush()
def _check_dangerous_command(command: str, env_type: str) -> dict:
"""
Check if command is dangerous and handle approval.
Only applies to local/ssh backends in interactive contexts.
Args:
command: The command to check
env_type: The terminal backend type
Returns:
{"approved": True/False, "message": str or None}
"""
# Skip check for isolated environments (containers are disposable)
if env_type in ("docker", "singularity", "modal"):
return {"approved": True, "message": None}
# Detect dangerous command
is_dangerous, pattern_key, description = _detect_dangerous_command(command)
if not is_dangerous:
return {"approved": True, "message": None}
# Check if already approved
if _is_command_approved(pattern_key):
return {"approved": True, "message": None}
# Check context - only prompt in interactive modes
is_cli = os.getenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE")
is_gateway = os.getenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION")
if not is_cli and not is_gateway:
# Programmatic use - allow (user opted into local backend)
return {"approved": True, "message": None}
if is_gateway or os.getenv("HERMES_EXEC_ASK"):
# Messaging context - return approval_required so the gateway can
# prompt the user interactively instead of just blocking
session_key = os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "default")
_approval.submit_pending(session_key, {
"command": command,
"pattern_key": pattern_key,
"description": description,
})
return {
"approved": False,
"pattern_key": pattern_key,
"status": "approval_required",
"command": command,
"description": description,
"message": f"⚠️ This command is potentially dangerous ({description}). Asking the user for approval..."
}
# CLI context - prompt user
choice = _prompt_dangerous_approval(command, description)
if choice == "deny":
return {"approved": False, "message": "BLOCKED: User denied this potentially dangerous command. Do NOT retry this command - the user has explicitly rejected it."}
session_key = os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "default")
if choice == "session":
_approval.approve_session(session_key, pattern_key)
elif choice == "always":
_approval.approve_session(session_key, pattern_key)
_approval.approve_permanent(pattern_key)
_save_permanent_allowlist(_load_permanent_allowlist() | {pattern_key})
return {"approved": True, "message": None}
def _handle_sudo_failure(output: str, env_type: str) -> str:
"""
Check for sudo failure and add helpful message for messaging contexts.
Returns enhanced output if sudo failed in messaging context, else original.
"""
is_gateway = os.getenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION")
if not is_gateway:
return output
# Check for sudo failure indicators
sudo_failures = [
"sudo: a password is required",
"sudo: no tty present",
"sudo: a terminal is required",
]
for failure in sudo_failures:
if failure in output:
return output + "\n\n💡 Tip: To enable sudo over messaging, add SUDO_PASSWORD to ~/.hermes/.env on the agent machine."
return output
def _prompt_for_sudo_password(timeout_seconds: int = 45) -> str:
"""
Prompt user for sudo password with timeout.
Returns the password if entered, or empty string if:
- User presses Enter without input (skip)
- Timeout expires (45s default)
- Any error occurs
Only works in interactive mode (HERMES_INTERACTIVE=1).
If a _sudo_password_callback is registered (by the CLI), delegates to it
so the prompt integrates with prompt_toolkit's UI. Otherwise reads
directly from /dev/tty with echo disabled.
"""
import sys
import time as time_module
# Use the registered callback when available (prompt_toolkit-compatible)
if _sudo_password_callback is not None:
try:
return _sudo_password_callback() or ""
except Exception:
return ""
result = {"password": None, "done": False}
def read_password_thread():
"""Read password from /dev/tty with echo disabled."""
tty_fd = None
old_attrs = None
try:
import termios
tty_fd = os.open("/dev/tty", os.O_RDONLY)
old_attrs = termios.tcgetattr(tty_fd)
new_attrs = termios.tcgetattr(tty_fd)
new_attrs[3] = new_attrs[3] & ~termios.ECHO
termios.tcsetattr(tty_fd, termios.TCSAFLUSH, new_attrs)
chars = []
while True:
b = os.read(tty_fd, 1)
if not b or b in (b"\n", b"\r"):
break
chars.append(b)
result["password"] = b"".join(chars).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt, OSError):
result["password"] = ""
except Exception:
result["password"] = ""
finally:
if tty_fd is not None and old_attrs is not None:
try:
import termios as _termios
_termios.tcsetattr(tty_fd, _termios.TCSAFLUSH, old_attrs)
except Exception:
pass
if tty_fd is not None:
try:
os.close(tty_fd)
except Exception:
pass
result["done"] = True
try:
os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"] = "1"
time_module.sleep(0.2)
print()
print("" + "" * 58 + "")
print("│ 🔐 SUDO PASSWORD REQUIRED" + " " * 30 + "")
print("" + "" * 58 + "")
print("│ Enter password below (input is hidden), or: │")
print("│ • Press Enter to skip (command fails gracefully) │")
print(f"│ • Wait {timeout_seconds}s to auto-skip" + " " * 27 + "")
print("" + "" * 58 + "")
print()
print(" Password (hidden): ", end="", flush=True)
password_thread = threading.Thread(target=read_password_thread, daemon=True)
password_thread.start()
password_thread.join(timeout=timeout_seconds)
if result["done"]:
password = result["password"] or ""
print() # newline after hidden input
if password:
print(" ✓ Password received (cached for this session)")
else:
print(" ⏭ Skipped - continuing without sudo")
print()
sys.stdout.flush()
return password
else:
print("\n ⏱ Timeout - continuing without sudo")
print(" (Press Enter to dismiss)")
print()
sys.stdout.flush()
return ""
except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
print()
print(" ⏭ Cancelled - continuing without sudo")
print()
sys.stdout.flush()
return ""
except Exception as e:
print(f"\n [sudo prompt error: {e}] - continuing without sudo\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
return ""
finally:
if "HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE" in os.environ:
del os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"]
def _transform_sudo_command(command: str) -> str:
"""
Transform sudo commands to use -S flag if SUDO_PASSWORD is available.
This is a shared helper used by all execution environments to provide
consistent sudo handling across local, SSH, and container environments.
If SUDO_PASSWORD is set (via env, config, or interactive prompt):
'sudo apt install curl' -> password piped via sudo -S
If SUDO_PASSWORD is not set and in interactive mode (HERMES_INTERACTIVE=1):
Prompts user for password with 45s timeout, caches for session.
If SUDO_PASSWORD is not set and NOT interactive:
Command runs as-is (fails gracefully with "sudo: a password is required").
"""
global _cached_sudo_password
import re
# Check if command even contains sudo
if not re.search(r'\bsudo\b', command):
return command # No sudo in command, return as-is
# Try to get password from: env var -> session cache -> interactive prompt
sudo_password = os.getenv("SUDO_PASSWORD", "") or _cached_sudo_password
if not sudo_password:
# No password configured - check if we're in interactive mode
if os.getenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE"):
# Prompt user for password
sudo_password = _prompt_for_sudo_password(timeout_seconds=45)
if sudo_password:
_cached_sudo_password = sudo_password # Cache for session
if not sudo_password:
return command # No password, let it fail gracefully
def replace_sudo(match):
# Replace 'sudo' with password-piped version
# The -S flag makes sudo read password from stdin
# The -p '' suppresses the password prompt
return f"echo '{sudo_password}' | sudo -S -p ''"
# Match 'sudo' at word boundaries (not 'visudo' or 'sudoers')
# This handles: sudo, sudo -flag, etc.
return re.sub(r'\bsudo\b', replace_sudo, command)
class _LocalEnvironment:
"""
Local execution environment with sudo support and non-blocking stdin.
Features:
- Uses stdin=DEVNULL to prevent hanging on interactive prompts (sudo, etc.)
- Optional SUDO_PASSWORD support: if set, transforms `sudo` commands to use `sudo -S`
- Graceful failure: sudo commands fail fast with clear error if no password configured
Environment variables:
- SUDO_PASSWORD: If set, enables sudo commands by piping password via `sudo -S`
"""
def __init__(self, cwd: str = "", timeout: int = 60, env: dict = None):
self.cwd = cwd or os.getcwd()
self.timeout = timeout
self.env = env or {}
def execute(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *, timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""
Execute a command locally with sudo support.
Uses Popen + polling so the global interrupt event can kill the
process early when the user sends a new message, instead of
blocking for the full timeout.
A background reader thread drains stdout continuously to prevent
pipe buffer deadlocks. Without this, commands producing >64KB of
output would block (Linux pipe buffer = 64KB) while the poll loop
waits for the process to finish a classic deadlock.
Args:
stdin_data: If provided, piped to the process's stdin. This
bypasses shell ARG_MAX limits for large content.
"""
work_dir = cwd or self.cwd or os.getcwd()
effective_timeout = timeout or self.timeout
# Transform sudo commands if SUDO_PASSWORD is available
exec_command = _transform_sudo_command(command)
try:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
exec_command,
shell=True,
text=True,
cwd=work_dir,
env=os.environ | self.env,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
stdin=subprocess.PIPE if stdin_data is not None else subprocess.DEVNULL,
# Start in a new process group so we can kill the whole tree
preexec_fn=os.setsid,
)
# Pipe stdin_data in a background thread to avoid deadlock
# (large writes can block if the pipe buffer fills before the
# process drains it).
if stdin_data is not None:
def _write_stdin():
try:
proc.stdin.write(stdin_data)
proc.stdin.close()
except (BrokenPipeError, OSError):
pass
stdin_writer = threading.Thread(target=_write_stdin, daemon=True)
stdin_writer.start()
# Drain stdout in a background thread to prevent pipe buffer
# deadlocks. The OS pipe buffer is 64KB on Linux; if the child
# writes more than that before anyone reads, it blocks forever.
_output_chunks: list[str] = []
def _drain_stdout():
try:
for line in proc.stdout:
_output_chunks.append(line)
except ValueError:
pass # stdout closed during interrupt/timeout
finally:
try:
proc.stdout.close()
except Exception:
pass
reader = threading.Thread(target=_drain_stdout, daemon=True)
reader.start()
deadline = time.monotonic() + effective_timeout
# Poll every 200ms so we notice interrupts quickly
while proc.poll() is None:
if _interrupt_event.is_set():
# User sent a new message — kill the process tree and return
# what we have so far
try:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGTERM)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
reader.join(timeout=2)
output = "".join(_output_chunks)
return {
"output": output + "\n[Command interrupted — user sent a new message]",
"returncode": 130 # Standard interrupted exit code
}
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
# Timeout — kill process tree
try:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGTERM)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
reader.join(timeout=2)
return {"output": f"Command timed out after {effective_timeout}s", "returncode": 124}
# Short sleep to avoid busy-waiting
time.sleep(0.2)
# Process finished — wait for reader to drain remaining output
reader.join(timeout=5)
return {"output": "".join(_output_chunks), "returncode": proc.returncode}
except Exception as e:
return {"output": f"Execution error: {str(e)}", "returncode": 1}
def cleanup(self):
"""No cleanup needed for local environment."""
pass
def stop(self):
"""Alias for cleanup."""
pass
class _SingularityEnvironment:
"""
Persistent Singularity/Apptainer container environment.
Uses `apptainer instance` to create a long-running container that persists
state (files, installs, env changes) across all commands within a task.
The model experiences this as a real Linux VM.
Features:
- Persistent filesystem: files created in one command are visible in the next
- Package installs persist: pip/apt installs survive across tool calls
- Full isolation: --containall gives PID, IPC, and environment isolation
- Writable tmpfs overlay: full root filesystem is writable (RAM-backed)
- Automatic SIF caching: docker:// images converted to SIF once, reused forever
"""
def __init__(self, image: str, cwd: str = "/root", timeout: int = 60):
self.cwd = cwd
self.timeout = timeout
# Use apptainer if available, otherwise singularity
self.executable = "apptainer" if shutil.which("apptainer") else "singularity"
# Get or build SIF from docker:// URL (fast if already cached)
self.image = _get_or_build_sif(image, self.executable)
# Create unique instance name (must be alphanumeric + underscores)
self.instance_id = f"hermes_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
self._instance_started = False
# Start the persistent instance
self._start_instance()
def _start_instance(self):
"""Start a persistent apptainer instance.
The instance runs as a background process. All subsequent execute() calls
run commands inside this same instance, so state persists across calls.
"""
cmd = [
self.executable, "instance", "start",
"--writable-tmpfs", # RAM-backed writable overlay on read-only SIF
"--containall", # Full isolation: PID, IPC, environment, filesystem
str(self.image),
self.instance_id,
]
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=120, # 2 min for instance startup
)
if result.returncode != 0:
raise RuntimeError(f"Failed to start instance: {result.stderr}")
self._instance_started = True
logger.info("Singularity instance %s started (persistent container)", self.instance_id)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
raise RuntimeError("Instance start timed out")
def execute(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *, timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Execute a command in the persistent Singularity instance.
All commands run in the same container, so files, installs, and
environment changes persist between calls.
"""
if not self._instance_started:
return {"output": "Instance not started", "returncode": -1}
cmd = [self.executable, "exec"]
# Set working directory
work_dir = cwd or self.cwd
cmd.extend(["--pwd", work_dir])
# Connect to the running instance
cmd.append(f"instance://{self.instance_id}")
# Transform sudo commands if SUDO_PASSWORD is available
exec_command = _transform_sudo_command(command)
# Execute the command
cmd.extend(["bash", "-c", exec_command])
run_kwargs = {
"text": True,
"timeout": timeout or self.timeout,
"encoding": "utf-8",
"errors": "replace",
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
"stderr": subprocess.STDOUT,
}
if stdin_data is not None:
run_kwargs["input"] = stdin_data
else:
run_kwargs["stdin"] = subprocess.DEVNULL
try:
result = subprocess.run(cmd, **run_kwargs)
return {"output": result.stdout, "returncode": result.returncode}
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return {"output": f"Command timed out after {timeout or self.timeout}s", "returncode": 124}
def cleanup(self):
"""Stop the persistent instance and clean up."""
if self._instance_started:
try:
subprocess.run(
[self.executable, "instance", "stop", self.instance_id],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=30,
)
logger.info("Singularity instance %s stopped", self.instance_id)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Failed to stop Singularity instance %s: %s", self.instance_id, e)
self._instance_started = False
def stop(self):
"""Alias for cleanup."""
self.cleanup()
def __del__(self):
"""Cleanup on destruction."""
try:
self.cleanup()
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except Exception:
pass
class _SSHEnvironment:
"""
SSH-based remote execution environment.
Runs commands on a remote machine over SSH, keeping the agent code
completely isolated from the execution environment. Uses SSH ControlMaster
for connection persistence (faster subsequent commands).
Security benefits:
- Agent cannot modify its own code
- Remote machine acts as a sandbox
- Clear separation between agent and execution environment
"""
def __init__(self, host: str, user: str, cwd: str = "/tmp", timeout: int = 60,
port: int = 22, key_path: str = ""):
self.host = host
self.user = user
self.cwd = cwd
self.timeout = timeout
self.port = port
self.key_path = key_path
# Create control socket directory for connection persistence
self.control_dir = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "hermes-ssh"
self.control_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.control_socket = self.control_dir / f"{user}@{host}:{port}.sock"
# Test connection and establish ControlMaster
self._establish_connection()
def _build_ssh_command(self, extra_args: list = None) -> list:
"""Build base SSH command with connection options."""
cmd = ["ssh"]
# Connection multiplexing for performance
cmd.extend(["-o", f"ControlPath={self.control_socket}"])
cmd.extend(["-o", "ControlMaster=auto"])
cmd.extend(["-o", "ControlPersist=300"]) # Keep connection alive for 5 min
# Standard options
cmd.extend(["-o", "BatchMode=yes"]) # No password prompts
cmd.extend(["-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new"]) # Accept new hosts
cmd.extend(["-o", "ConnectTimeout=10"])
# Port
if self.port != 22:
cmd.extend(["-p", str(self.port)])
# Private key
if self.key_path:
cmd.extend(["-i", self.key_path])
# Extra args (like -t for TTY)
if extra_args:
cmd.extend(extra_args)
# Target
cmd.append(f"{self.user}@{self.host}")
return cmd
def _establish_connection(self):
"""Test SSH connection and establish ControlMaster."""
cmd = self._build_ssh_command()
cmd.append("echo 'SSH connection established'")
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=15
)
if result.returncode != 0:
error_msg = result.stderr.strip() or result.stdout.strip()
raise RuntimeError(f"SSH connection failed: {error_msg}")
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
raise RuntimeError(f"SSH connection to {self.user}@{self.host} timed out")
def execute(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *, timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Execute a command on the remote host via SSH."""
work_dir = cwd or self.cwd
effective_timeout = timeout or self.timeout
# Transform sudo commands if SUDO_PASSWORD is available
exec_command = _transform_sudo_command(command)
# Wrap command to run in the correct directory
wrapped_command = f'cd {work_dir} && {exec_command}'
cmd = self._build_ssh_command()
cmd.extend(["bash", "-c", wrapped_command])
run_kwargs = {
"text": True,
"timeout": effective_timeout,
"encoding": "utf-8",
"errors": "replace",
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
"stderr": subprocess.STDOUT,
}
if stdin_data is not None:
run_kwargs["input"] = stdin_data
else:
run_kwargs["stdin"] = subprocess.DEVNULL
try:
result = subprocess.run(cmd, **run_kwargs)
return {"output": result.stdout, "returncode": result.returncode}
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return {"output": f"Command timed out after {effective_timeout}s", "returncode": 124}
except Exception as e:
return {"output": f"SSH execution error: {str(e)}", "returncode": 1}
def cleanup(self):
"""Close the SSH ControlMaster connection."""
if self.control_socket.exists():
try:
# Send exit command to ControlMaster
cmd = ["ssh", "-o", f"ControlPath={self.control_socket}", "-O", "exit",
f"{self.user}@{self.host}"]
subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=5)
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except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
pass
# Remove socket file
try:
self.control_socket.unlink()
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except OSError:
pass
def stop(self):
"""Alias for cleanup."""
self.cleanup()
def __del__(self):
"""Cleanup on destruction."""
try:
self.cleanup()
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except Exception:
pass
class _DockerEnvironment:
"""
Docker execution environment wrapper with sudo support and non-blocking stdin.
Wraps mini-swe-agent's DockerEnvironment but adds:
- stdin=DEVNULL to prevent hanging on interactive prompts
- SUDO_PASSWORD support via _transform_sudo_command
"""
def __init__(self, image: str, cwd: str = "/", timeout: int = 60):
from minisweagent.environments.docker import DockerEnvironment
self._inner = DockerEnvironment(image=image, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
self.cwd = cwd
self.timeout = timeout
def execute(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *, timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Execute a command in the Docker container with sudo support."""
# Transform sudo commands if SUDO_PASSWORD is available
exec_command = _transform_sudo_command(command)
work_dir = cwd or self.cwd
effective_timeout = timeout or self.timeout
# Get container_id from inner environment
assert self._inner.container_id, "Container not started"
cmd = [self._inner.config.executable, "exec"]
if stdin_data is not None:
cmd.append("-i") # Enable stdin piping into the container
cmd.extend(["-w", work_dir])
for key in self._inner.config.forward_env:
if (value := os.getenv(key)) is not None:
cmd.extend(["-e", f"{key}={value}"])
for key, value in self._inner.config.env.items():
cmd.extend(["-e", f"{key}={value}"])
cmd.extend([self._inner.container_id, "bash", "-lc", exec_command])
run_kwargs = {
"text": True,
"timeout": effective_timeout,
"encoding": "utf-8",
"errors": "replace",
"stdout": subprocess.PIPE,
"stderr": subprocess.STDOUT,
}
if stdin_data is not None:
run_kwargs["input"] = stdin_data
else:
run_kwargs["stdin"] = subprocess.DEVNULL
try:
result = subprocess.run(cmd, **run_kwargs)
return {"output": result.stdout, "returncode": result.returncode}
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return {"output": f"Command timed out after {effective_timeout}s", "returncode": 124}
def cleanup(self):
"""Cleanup the Docker container."""
self._inner.cleanup()
def stop(self):
"""Alias for cleanup."""
self.cleanup()
def __del__(self):
"""Cleanup on destruction."""
try:
self.cleanup()
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except Exception:
pass
class _ModalEnvironment:
"""
Modal cloud execution environment wrapper with sudo support.
Wraps mini-swe-agent's SwerexModalEnvironment but adds:
- SUDO_PASSWORD support via _transform_sudo_command
- Automatic async-safety patches (applied once, before first use)
The patches replace SwerexModalEnvironment's asyncio.run() calls with a
background thread approach, making it safe to use inside any event loop
(e.g., Atropos). Applied here at the point of use rather than relying on
import-time side effects, so ALL callers get the fix automatically.
"""
# Class-level flag: patches only need to be applied once
_patches_applied = False
def __init__(self, image: str, cwd: str = "/root", timeout: int = 60):
# Ensure async-safety patches are applied before creating any
# SwerexModalEnvironment instance. This is the single authoritative
# place -- no other module needs to call apply_patches() for Modal.
if not _ModalEnvironment._patches_applied:
try:
from environments.patches import apply_patches
apply_patches()
except ImportError:
pass # patches module not available (standalone use)
_ModalEnvironment._patches_applied = True
from minisweagent.environments.extra.swerex_modal import SwerexModalEnvironment
# Generous startup timeout: sandbox creation can take 30-60s for cold images,
# and the SWE-ReX runtime needs another 10-30s to boot inside it.
self._inner = SwerexModalEnvironment(
image=image, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout,
startup_timeout=180.0,
runtime_timeout=3600.0,
)
self.cwd = cwd
self.timeout = timeout
def execute(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *, timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
"""Execute a command in Modal with sudo support.
Modal uses HTTP transport (no execve), so there's no ARG_MAX limit.
When stdin_data is provided, we embed it as a heredoc since there's
no process-level stdin pipe to the cloud sandbox.
"""
if stdin_data is not None:
marker = f"HERMES_EOF_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
while marker in stdin_data:
marker = f"HERMES_EOF_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
command = f"{command} << '{marker}'\n{stdin_data}\n{marker}"
# Transform sudo commands if SUDO_PASSWORD is available
exec_command = _transform_sudo_command(command)
# Delegate to inner environment with transformed command
return self._inner.execute(exec_command, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
def cleanup(self):
"""Cleanup the Modal deployment."""
if hasattr(self._inner, 'stop'):
self._inner.stop()
def stop(self):
"""Stop the Modal deployment."""
self.cleanup()
def __del__(self):
"""Cleanup on destruction."""
try:
self.cleanup()
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except Exception:
pass
# Tool description for LLM
TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION = """Execute commands on a Linux environment. Filesystem persists between calls.
Background processes: Set background=true to get a session_id, then use the 'process' tool to poll/wait/kill/write.
Working directory: Use 'workdir' for per-command cwd.
PTY mode: Set pty=true for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code, Python REPL).
Do NOT use vim/nano/interactive tools without pty=true they hang without a pseudo-terminal. Pipe git output to cat if it might page.
"""
# Global state for environment lifecycle management
_active_environments: Dict[str, Any] = {}
_task_workdirs: Dict[str, str] = {} # Maps task_id to working directory
_last_activity: Dict[str, float] = {}
_env_lock = threading.Lock()
_creation_locks: Dict[str, threading.Lock] = {} # Per-task locks for sandbox creation
_creation_locks_lock = threading.Lock() # Protects _creation_locks dict itself
_cleanup_thread = None
_cleanup_running = False
# Per-task environment overrides registry.
# Allows environments (e.g., TerminalBench2Env) to specify a custom Docker/Modal
# image for a specific task_id BEFORE the agent loop starts. When the terminal or
# file tools create a new sandbox for that task_id, they check this registry first
# and fall back to the TERMINAL_MODAL_IMAGE (etc.) env var if no override is set.
#
# This is never exposed to the model -- only infrastructure code calls it.
# Thread-safe because each task_id is unique per rollout.
_task_env_overrides: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
def register_task_env_overrides(task_id: str, overrides: Dict[str, Any]):
"""
Register environment overrides for a specific task/rollout.
Called by Atropos environments before the agent loop to configure
per-task sandbox settings (e.g., a custom Dockerfile for the Modal image).
Supported override keys:
- modal_image: str -- Path to Dockerfile or Docker Hub image name
- docker_image: str -- Docker image name
- cwd: str -- Working directory inside the sandbox
Args:
task_id: The rollout's unique task identifier
overrides: Dict of config keys to override
"""
_task_env_overrides[task_id] = overrides
def clear_task_env_overrides(task_id: str):
"""
Clear environment overrides for a task after rollout completes.
Called during cleanup to avoid stale entries accumulating.
"""
_task_env_overrides.pop(task_id, None)
# Configuration from environment variables
def _get_env_config() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Get terminal environment configuration from environment variables."""
# Default image with Python and Node.js for maximum compatibility
default_image = "nikolaik/python-nodejs:python3.11-nodejs20"
env_type = os.getenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
# Default cwd depends on backend:
# - local: host's current working directory
# - ssh: remote user's home (agent code is local, execution is remote)
# - docker: / inside the container
# - singularity/modal: /root (ephemeral cloud/container)
if env_type in ("modal", "singularity"):
default_cwd = "/root"
elif env_type == "docker":
default_cwd = "/"
elif env_type == "ssh":
default_cwd = "~"
else:
default_cwd = os.getcwd()
# Read TERMINAL_CWD but sanity-check it for non-local backends.
# If the CWD looks like a host-local path that can't exist inside a
# container/sandbox, fall back to the backend's own default. This
# catches the case where cli.py (or .env) leaked the host's CWD.
cwd = os.getenv("TERMINAL_CWD", default_cwd)
if env_type in ("modal", "docker", "singularity", "ssh") and cwd:
# Paths containing common host-only prefixes are clearly wrong
# inside a container. Also catch Windows-style paths (C:\...).
host_prefixes = ("/Users/", "/home/", "C:\\", "C:/")
if any(cwd.startswith(p) for p in host_prefixes) and cwd != default_cwd:
logger.info("Ignoring TERMINAL_CWD=%r for %s backend "
"(host path won't exist in sandbox). Using %r instead.",
cwd, env_type, default_cwd)
cwd = default_cwd
return {
"env_type": env_type,
"docker_image": os.getenv("TERMINAL_DOCKER_IMAGE", default_image),
"singularity_image": os.getenv("TERMINAL_SINGULARITY_IMAGE", f"docker://{default_image}"),
"modal_image": os.getenv("TERMINAL_MODAL_IMAGE", default_image),
"cwd": cwd,
"timeout": int(os.getenv("TERMINAL_TIMEOUT", "60")),
"lifetime_seconds": int(os.getenv("TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS", "300")),
# SSH-specific config
"ssh_host": os.getenv("TERMINAL_SSH_HOST", ""),
"ssh_user": os.getenv("TERMINAL_SSH_USER", ""),
"ssh_port": int(os.getenv("TERMINAL_SSH_PORT", "22")),
"ssh_key": os.getenv("TERMINAL_SSH_KEY", ""), # Path to private key (optional, uses ssh-agent if empty)
}
def _create_environment(env_type: str, image: str, cwd: str, timeout: int, ssh_config: dict = None):
"""
Create an execution environment from mini-swe-agent.
Args:
env_type: One of "local", "docker", "singularity", "modal", "ssh"
image: Docker/Singularity/Modal image name (ignored for local/ssh)
cwd: Working directory
timeout: Default command timeout
ssh_config: SSH connection config (for env_type="ssh")
Returns:
Environment instance with execute() method
"""
if env_type == "local":
# Use our custom LocalEnvironment with sudo support and non-blocking stdin
return _LocalEnvironment(cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
elif env_type == "docker":
# Use custom Docker wrapper with sudo support and non-blocking stdin
return _DockerEnvironment(image=image, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
elif env_type == "singularity":
# Use custom Singularity environment with better space management
return _SingularityEnvironment(image=image, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
elif env_type == "modal":
# Use custom Modal wrapper with sudo support
return _ModalEnvironment(image=image, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
elif env_type == "ssh":
if not ssh_config or not ssh_config.get("host") or not ssh_config.get("user"):
raise ValueError("SSH environment requires ssh_host and ssh_user to be configured")
return _SSHEnvironment(
host=ssh_config["host"],
user=ssh_config["user"],
port=ssh_config.get("port", 22),
key_path=ssh_config.get("key", ""),
cwd=cwd,
timeout=timeout
)
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown environment type: {env_type}. Use 'local', 'docker', 'singularity', 'modal', or 'ssh'")
def _cleanup_inactive_envs(lifetime_seconds: int = 300):
"""Clean up environments that have been inactive for longer than lifetime_seconds."""
global _active_environments, _last_activity
current_time = time.time()
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
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# Check the process registry -- skip cleanup for sandboxes with active
# background processes (their _last_activity gets refreshed to keep them alive).
try:
from tools.process_registry import process_registry
for task_id in list(_last_activity.keys()):
if process_registry.has_active_processes(task_id):
_last_activity[task_id] = current_time # Keep sandbox alive
except ImportError:
pass
# Phase 1: collect stale entries and remove them from tracking dicts while
# holding the lock. Do NOT call env.cleanup() inside the lock -- Modal and
# Docker teardown can block for 10-15s, which would stall every concurrent
# terminal/file tool call waiting on _env_lock.
envs_to_stop = [] # list of (task_id, env) pairs
with _env_lock:
for task_id, last_time in list(_last_activity.items()):
if current_time - last_time > lifetime_seconds:
env = _active_environments.pop(task_id, None)
_last_activity.pop(task_id, None)
_task_workdirs.pop(task_id, None)
if env is not None:
envs_to_stop.append((task_id, env))
# Also purge per-task creation locks for cleaned-up tasks
with _creation_locks_lock:
for task_id, _ in envs_to_stop:
_creation_locks.pop(task_id, None)
# Phase 2: stop the actual sandboxes OUTSIDE the lock so other tool calls
# are not blocked while Modal/Docker sandboxes shut down.
for task_id, env in envs_to_stop:
# Invalidate stale file_ops cache entry (Bug fix: prevents
# ShellFileOperations from referencing a dead sandbox)
try:
from tools.file_tools import clear_file_ops_cache
clear_file_ops_cache(task_id)
except ImportError:
pass
try:
if hasattr(env, 'cleanup'):
env.cleanup()
elif hasattr(env, 'stop'):
env.stop()
elif hasattr(env, 'terminate'):
env.terminate()
logger.info("Cleaned up inactive environment for task: %s", task_id)
except Exception as e:
error_str = str(e)
if "404" in error_str or "not found" in error_str.lower():
logger.info("Environment for task %s already cleaned up", task_id)
else:
logger.warning("Error cleaning up environment for task %s: %s", task_id, e)
def _cleanup_thread_worker():
"""Background thread worker that periodically cleans up inactive environments."""
global _cleanup_running
while _cleanup_running:
try:
config = _get_env_config()
_cleanup_inactive_envs(config["lifetime_seconds"])
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Error in cleanup thread: %s", e)
for _ in range(60):
if not _cleanup_running:
break
time.sleep(1)
def _start_cleanup_thread():
"""Start the background cleanup thread if not already running."""
global _cleanup_thread, _cleanup_running
with _env_lock:
if _cleanup_thread is None or not _cleanup_thread.is_alive():
_cleanup_running = True
_cleanup_thread = threading.Thread(target=_cleanup_thread_worker, daemon=True)
_cleanup_thread.start()
def _stop_cleanup_thread():
"""Stop the background cleanup thread."""
global _cleanup_running
_cleanup_running = False
if _cleanup_thread is not None:
_cleanup_thread.join(timeout=5)
def get_active_environments_info() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Get information about currently active environments."""
info = {
"count": len(_active_environments),
"task_ids": list(_active_environments.keys()),
"workdirs": dict(_task_workdirs),
}
# Calculate total disk usage
total_size = 0
for task_id in _active_environments.keys():
# Check sandbox and workdir sizes
scratch_dir = _get_scratch_dir()
for pattern in [f"hermes-*{task_id[:8]}*"]:
import glob
for path in glob.glob(str(scratch_dir / "hermes-*")):
try:
size = sum(f.stat().st_size for f in Path(path).rglob('*') if f.is_file())
total_size += size
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except OSError:
pass
info["total_disk_usage_mb"] = round(total_size / (1024 * 1024), 2)
return info
def cleanup_all_environments():
"""Clean up ALL active environments. Use with caution."""
global _active_environments, _last_activity, _task_workdirs
task_ids = list(_active_environments.keys())
cleaned = 0
for task_id in task_ids:
try:
cleanup_vm(task_id)
cleaned += 1
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Error cleaning %s: %s", task_id, e)
# Also clean any orphaned directories
scratch_dir = _get_scratch_dir()
import glob
for path in glob.glob(str(scratch_dir / "hermes-*")):
try:
shutil.rmtree(path, ignore_errors=True)
logger.info("Removed orphaned: %s", path)
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except OSError:
pass
if cleaned > 0:
logger.info("Cleaned %d environments", cleaned)
return cleaned
def cleanup_vm(task_id: str):
"""Manually clean up a specific environment by task_id."""
global _active_environments, _last_activity, _task_workdirs
# Remove from tracking dicts while holding the lock, but defer the
# actual (potentially slow) env.cleanup() call to outside the lock
# so other tool calls aren't blocked.
env = None
with _env_lock:
env = _active_environments.pop(task_id, None)
_task_workdirs.pop(task_id, None)
_last_activity.pop(task_id, None)
# Clean up per-task creation lock
with _creation_locks_lock:
_creation_locks.pop(task_id, None)
# Invalidate stale file_ops cache entry
try:
from tools.file_tools import clear_file_ops_cache
clear_file_ops_cache(task_id)
except ImportError:
pass
if env is None:
return
try:
if hasattr(env, 'cleanup'):
env.cleanup()
elif hasattr(env, 'stop'):
env.stop()
elif hasattr(env, 'terminate'):
env.terminate()
logger.info("Manually cleaned up environment for task: %s", task_id)
except Exception as e:
error_str = str(e)
if "404" in error_str or "not found" in error_str.lower():
logger.info("Environment for task %s already cleaned up", task_id)
else:
logger.warning("Error cleaning up environment for task %s: %s", task_id, e)
def _atexit_cleanup():
"""Stop cleanup thread and shut down all remaining sandboxes on exit."""
_stop_cleanup_thread()
if _active_environments:
count = len(_active_environments)
logger.info("Shutting down %d remaining sandbox(es)...", count)
cleanup_all_environments()
atexit.register(_atexit_cleanup)
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def terminal_tool(
command: str,
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background: bool = False,
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timeout: Optional[int] = None,
task_id: Optional[str] = None,
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
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force: bool = False,
workdir: Optional[str] = None,
check_interval: Optional[int] = None,
pty: bool = False,
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) -> str:
"""
Execute a command using mini-swe-agent's execution environments.
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Args:
command: The command to execute
background: Whether to run in background (default: False)
timeout: Command timeout in seconds (default: from config)
task_id: Unique identifier for environment isolation (optional)
force: If True, skip dangerous command check (use after user confirms)
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
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workdir: Working directory for this command (optional, uses session cwd if not set)
check_interval: Seconds between auto-checks for background processes (gateway only, min 30)
pty: If True, use pseudo-terminal for interactive CLI tools (local backend only)
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Returns:
str: JSON string with output, exit_code, and error fields
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Examples:
# Execute a simple command
>>> result = terminal_tool(command="ls -la /tmp")
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# Run a background task
>>> result = terminal_tool(command="python server.py", background=True)
# With custom timeout
>>> result = terminal_tool(command="long_task.sh", timeout=300)
# Force run after user confirmation
# Note: force parameter is internal only, not exposed to model API
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"""
global _active_environments, _last_activity
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try:
# Get configuration
config = _get_env_config()
env_type = config["env_type"]
# Use task_id for environment isolation
effective_task_id = task_id or "default"
# Check per-task overrides (set by environments like TerminalBench2Env)
# before falling back to global env var config
overrides = _task_env_overrides.get(effective_task_id, {})
# Select image based on env type, with per-task override support
if env_type == "docker":
image = overrides.get("docker_image") or config["docker_image"]
elif env_type == "singularity":
image = overrides.get("singularity_image") or config["singularity_image"]
elif env_type == "modal":
image = overrides.get("modal_image") or config["modal_image"]
else:
image = ""
cwd = overrides.get("cwd") or config["cwd"]
default_timeout = config["timeout"]
effective_timeout = timeout or default_timeout
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# For local environment in batch mode, create a unique subdirectory per task
# This prevents parallel tasks from overwriting each other's files
# In CLI mode (HERMES_QUIET), use the cwd directly without subdirectories
if env_type == "local" and not os.getenv("HERMES_QUIET"):
with _env_lock:
if effective_task_id not in _task_workdirs:
task_workdir = Path(cwd) / f"hermes-{effective_task_id}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
task_workdir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
_task_workdirs[effective_task_id] = str(task_workdir)
cwd = _task_workdirs[effective_task_id]
# Start cleanup thread
_start_cleanup_thread()
# Get or create environment.
# Use a per-task creation lock so concurrent tool calls for the same
# task_id wait for the first one to finish creating the sandbox,
# instead of each creating their own (wasting Modal resources).
with _env_lock:
if effective_task_id in _active_environments:
_last_activity[effective_task_id] = time.time()
env = _active_environments[effective_task_id]
needs_creation = False
else:
needs_creation = True
if needs_creation:
# Per-task lock: only one thread creates the sandbox, others wait
with _creation_locks_lock:
if effective_task_id not in _creation_locks:
_creation_locks[effective_task_id] = threading.Lock()
task_lock = _creation_locks[effective_task_id]
with task_lock:
# Double-check after acquiring the per-task lock
with _env_lock:
if effective_task_id in _active_environments:
_last_activity[effective_task_id] = time.time()
env = _active_environments[effective_task_id]
needs_creation = False
if needs_creation:
if env_type == "singularity":
_check_disk_usage_warning()
logger.info("Creating new %s environment for task %s...", env_type, effective_task_id[:8])
try:
ssh_config = None
if env_type == "ssh":
ssh_config = {
"host": config.get("ssh_host", ""),
"user": config.get("ssh_user", ""),
"port": config.get("ssh_port", 22),
"key": config.get("ssh_key", ""),
}
new_env = _create_environment(
env_type=env_type,
image=image,
cwd=cwd,
timeout=effective_timeout,
ssh_config=ssh_config
)
except ImportError as e:
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
"error": f"Terminal tool disabled: mini-swe-agent not available ({e})",
"status": "disabled"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
with _env_lock:
_active_environments[effective_task_id] = new_env
_last_activity[effective_task_id] = time.time()
env = new_env
logger.info("%s environment ready for task %s", env_type, effective_task_id[:8])
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# Check for dangerous commands (only for local/ssh in interactive modes)
# Skip check if force=True (user has confirmed they want to run it)
if not force:
approval = _check_dangerous_command(command, env_type)
if not approval["approved"]:
# Check if this is an approval_required (gateway ask mode)
if approval.get("status") == "approval_required":
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
"error": approval.get("message", "Waiting for user approval"),
"status": "approval_required",
"command": approval.get("command", command),
"description": approval.get("description", "dangerous command"),
"pattern_key": approval.get("pattern_key", ""),
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Command was blocked - return informative message
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
"error": approval.get("message", "Command denied - potentially dangerous operation"),
"status": "blocked"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Prepare command for execution
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if background:
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
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# Spawn a tracked background process via the process registry.
# For local backends: uses subprocess.Popen with output buffering.
# For non-local backends: runs inside the sandbox via env.execute().
from tools.process_registry import process_registry
session_key = os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_KEY", "")
effective_cwd = workdir or cwd
try:
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
2026-02-17 02:51:31 -08:00
if env_type == "local":
proc_session = process_registry.spawn_local(
command=command,
cwd=effective_cwd,
task_id=effective_task_id,
session_key=session_key,
env_vars=env.env if hasattr(env, 'env') else None,
use_pty=pty,
)
else:
proc_session = process_registry.spawn_via_env(
env=env,
command=command,
cwd=effective_cwd,
task_id=effective_task_id,
session_key=session_key,
)
result_data = {
"output": "Background process started",
"session_id": proc_session.id,
"pid": proc_session.pid,
"exit_code": 0,
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
2026-02-17 02:51:31 -08:00
"error": None,
}
# Transparent timeout clamping note
max_timeout = effective_timeout
if timeout and timeout > max_timeout:
result_data["timeout_note"] = (
f"Requested timeout {timeout}s was clamped to "
f"configured limit of {max_timeout}s"
)
# Register check_interval watcher (gateway picks this up after agent run)
if check_interval and background:
effective_interval = max(30, check_interval)
if check_interval < 30:
result_data["check_interval_note"] = (
f"Requested {check_interval}s raised to minimum 30s"
)
process_registry.pending_watchers.append({
"session_id": proc_session.id,
"check_interval": effective_interval,
"session_key": session_key,
"platform": os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_PLATFORM", ""),
"chat_id": os.getenv("HERMES_SESSION_CHAT_ID", ""),
})
return json.dumps(result_data, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception as e:
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
2026-02-17 02:51:31 -08:00
"error": f"Failed to start background process: {str(e)}"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
else:
# Run foreground command with retry logic
max_retries = 3
retry_count = 0
result = None
while retry_count <= max_retries:
try:
Add background process management with process tool, wait, PTY, and stdin support New process registry and tool for managing long-running background processes across all terminal backends (local, Docker, Singularity, Modal, SSH). Process Registry (tools/process_registry.py): - ProcessSession tracking with rolling 200KB output buffer - spawn_local() with optional PTY via ptyprocess for interactive CLIs - spawn_via_env() for non-local backends (runs inside sandbox, never on host) - Background reader threads per process (Popen stdout or PTY) - wait() with timeout clamping, interrupt support, and transparent limit reporting - JSON checkpoint to ~/.hermes/processes.json for gateway crash recovery - Module-level singleton shared across agent loop, gateway, and RL Process Tool (model_tools.py): - 7 actions: list, poll, log, wait, kill, write, submit - Paired with terminal in all toolsets (CLI, messaging, RL) - Timeout clamping with transparent notes in response Terminal Tool Updates (tools/terminal_tool.py): - Replaced nohup background mode with registry spawn (returns session_id) - Added workdir parameter for per-command working directory - Added check_interval parameter for gateway auto-check watchers - Added pty parameter for interactive CLI tools (Codex, Claude Code) - Updated TERMINAL_TOOL_DESCRIPTION with full background workflow docs - Cleanup thread now respects active background processes (won't reap sandbox) Gateway Integration (gateway/run.py, session.py, config.py): - Session reset protection: sessions with active processes exempt from reset - Default idle timeout increased from 2 hours to 24 hours - from_dict fallback aligned to match (was 120, now 1440) - session_key env var propagated to process registry for session mapping - Crash recovery on gateway startup via checkpoint probe - check_interval watcher: asyncio task polls process, delivers updates to platform RL Safety (environments/): - tool_context.py cleanup() kills background processes on episode end - hermes_base_env.py warns when enabled_toolsets is None (loads all tools) - Process tool safe in RL via wait() blocking the agent loop Also: - Added ptyprocess as optional dependency (in pyproject.toml [pty] extra + [all]) - Fixed pre-existing bug: rl_test_inference missing from TOOL_TO_TOOLSET_MAP - Updated AGENTS.md with process management docs and project structure - Updated README.md terminal section with process management overview
2026-02-17 02:51:31 -08:00
execute_kwargs = {"timeout": effective_timeout}
if workdir:
execute_kwargs["cwd"] = workdir
result = env.execute(command, **execute_kwargs)
except Exception as e:
error_str = str(e).lower()
if "timeout" in error_str:
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": 124,
"error": f"Command timed out after {effective_timeout} seconds"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Retry on transient errors
if retry_count < max_retries:
retry_count += 1
wait_time = 2 ** retry_count
logger.warning("Execution error, retrying in %ds (attempt %d/%d) - Command: %s - Error: %s: %s - Task: %s, Backend: %s",
wait_time, retry_count, max_retries, command[:200], type(e).__name__, e, effective_task_id, env_type)
time.sleep(wait_time)
continue
logger.error("Execution failed after %d retries - Command: %s - Error: %s: %s - Task: %s, Backend: %s",
max_retries, command[:200], type(e).__name__, e, effective_task_id, env_type)
return json.dumps({
"output": "",
"exit_code": -1,
"error": f"Command execution failed: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e)}"
}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Got a result
break
# Extract output
output = result.get("output", "")
returncode = result.get("returncode", 0)
# Add helpful message for sudo failures in messaging context
output = _handle_sudo_failure(output, env_type)
# Truncate output if too long
MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 50000
if len(output) > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS:
truncated_notice = f"\n\n... [OUTPUT TRUNCATED - showing last {MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS} chars of {len(output)} total] ..."
output = truncated_notice + output[-MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS:]
return json.dumps({
"output": output.strip() if output else "",
"exit_code": returncode,
"error": None
}, ensure_ascii=False)
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except Exception as e:
return json.dumps({
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"output": "",
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"exit_code": -1,
"error": f"Failed to execute command: {str(e)}",
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"status": "error"
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}, ensure_ascii=False)
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def check_terminal_requirements() -> bool:
"""Check if all requirements for the terminal tool are met."""
config = _get_env_config()
env_type = config["env_type"]
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try:
if env_type == "local":
from minisweagent.environments.local import LocalEnvironment
return True
elif env_type == "docker":
from minisweagent.environments.docker import DockerEnvironment
# Check if docker is available
import subprocess
result = subprocess.run(["docker", "version"], capture_output=True, timeout=5)
return result.returncode == 0
elif env_type == "singularity":
from minisweagent.environments.singularity import SingularityEnvironment
# Check if singularity/apptainer is available
import subprocess
import shutil
executable = shutil.which("apptainer") or shutil.which("singularity")
if executable:
result = subprocess.run([executable, "--version"], capture_output=True, timeout=5)
return result.returncode == 0
return False
elif env_type == "modal":
from minisweagent.environments.extra.swerex_modal import SwerexModalEnvironment
# Check for modal token
return os.getenv("MODAL_TOKEN_ID") is not None or Path.home().joinpath(".modal.toml").exists()
else:
return False
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Terminal requirements check failed: %s", e)
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return False
if __name__ == "__main__":
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# Simple test when run directly
print("Terminal Tool Module (mini-swe-agent backend)")
print("=" * 50)
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config = _get_env_config()
print(f"\nCurrent Configuration:")
print(f" Environment type: {config['env_type']}")
print(f" Docker image: {config['docker_image']}")
print(f" Modal image: {config['modal_image']}")
print(f" Working directory: {config['cwd']}")
print(f" Default timeout: {config['timeout']}s")
print(f" Lifetime: {config['lifetime_seconds']}s")
if not check_terminal_requirements():
print("\n❌ Requirements not met. Please check the messages above.")
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exit(1)
print("\n✅ All requirements met!")
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print("\nAvailable Tool:")
print(" - terminal_tool: Execute commands using mini-swe-agent environments")
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print("\nUsage Examples:")
print(" # Execute a command")
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print(" result = terminal_tool(command='ls -la')")
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print(" ")
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print(" # Run a background task")
print(" result = terminal_tool(command='python server.py', background=True)")
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print("\nEnvironment Variables:")
default_img = "nikolaik/python-nodejs:python3.11-nodejs20"
print(f" TERMINAL_ENV: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_ENV', 'local')} (local/docker/singularity/modal/ssh)")
print(f" TERMINAL_DOCKER_IMAGE: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_DOCKER_IMAGE', default_img)}")
print(f" TERMINAL_SINGULARITY_IMAGE: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_SINGULARITY_IMAGE', f'docker://{default_img}')}")
print(f" TERMINAL_MODAL_IMAGE: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_MODAL_IMAGE', default_img)}")
print(f" TERMINAL_CWD: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_CWD', os.getcwd())}")
print(f" TERMINAL_TIMEOUT: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_TIMEOUT', '60')}")
print(f" TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS: {os.getenv('TERMINAL_LIFETIME_SECONDS', '300')}")