security: fix V-011 Skills Guard Bypass with AST analysis and normalization

tools/skills_guard.py

@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
 Skills Guard — Security scanner for externally-sourced skills.
 
 Every skill downloaded from a registry passes through this scanner before
-installation. It uses regex-based static analysis to detect known-bad patterns
-(data exfiltration, prompt injection, destructive commands, persistence, etc.)
-and a trust-aware install policy that determines whether a skill is allowed
-based on both the scan verdict and the source's trust level.
+installation. It uses regex-based static analysis and AST analysis to detect
+known-bad patterns (data exfiltration, prompt injection, destructive commands,
+persistence, obfuscation, etc.) and a trust-aware install policy that determines
+whether a skill is allowed based on both the scan verdict and the source's
+trust level.
 
 Trust levels:
   - builtin:   Ships with Hermes. Never scanned, always trusted.
@@ -22,12 +23,14 @@ Usage:
         print(format_scan_report(result))
 """
 
-import re
+import ast
 import hashlib
+import re
+import unicodedata
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import List, Tuple
+from typing import List, Set, Tuple
 
 
 
@@ -501,7 +504,25 @@ SUSPICIOUS_BINARY_EXTENSIONS = {
     '.msi', '.dmg', '.app', '.deb', '.rpm',
 }
 
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Input normalization for bypass detection
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
 # Zero-width and invisible unicode characters used for injection
+# These are removed during normalization
+ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS = frozenset({
+    '\u200b',  # zero-width space
+    '\u200c',  # zero-width non-joiner
+    '\u200d',  # zero-width joiner
+    '\u2060',  # word joiner
+    '\u2062',  # invisible times
+    '\u2063',  # invisible separator
+    '\u2064',  # invisible plus
+    '\ufeff',  # zero-width no-break space (BOM)
+})
+
+# Extended invisible characters for detection (reporting only)
 INVISIBLE_CHARS = {
     '\u200b',  # zero-width space
     '\u200c',  # zero-width non-joiner
@@ -522,6 +543,311 @@ INVISIBLE_CHARS = {
     '\u2069',  # pop directional isolate
 }
 
+# Unicode homoglyph mapping for common confusable characters
+# Maps lookalike characters to their ASCII equivalents
+HOMOGLYPH_MAP = str.maketrans({
+    # Fullwidth Latin
+    '\uff45': 'e', '\uff56': 'v', '\uff41': 'a', '\uff4c': 'l',  # ｅｖａｌ -> eval
+    '\uff25': 'e', '\uff36': 'v', '\uff21': 'a', '\uff2c': 'l',  # ＥＶＡＬ -> eval
+    '\uff4f': 'o', '\uff53': 's', '\uff58': 'x', '\uff43': 'c',  # ｏｓｘｃ
+    '\uff2f': 'o', '\uff33': 's', '\uff38': 'x', '\uff23': 'c',  # ＯＳＸＣ
+    # Cyrillic lookalikes
+    '\u0435': 'e',  # Cyrillic е -> Latin e
+    '\u0430': 'a',  # Cyrillic а -> Latin a
+    '\u043e': 'o',  # Cyrillic о -> Latin o
+    '\u0441': 'c',  # Cyrillic с -> Latin c
+    '\u0445': 'x',  # Cyrillic х -> Latin x
+    '\u0440': 'p',  # Cyrillic р -> Latin p
+    '\u0456': 'i',  # Cyrillic і -> Latin i (U+0456)
+    '\u0415': 'e',  # Cyrillic Е -> Latin e
+    '\u0410': 'a',  # Cyrillic А -> Latin a
+    '\u041e': 'o',  # Cyrillic О -> Latin o
+    '\u0421': 'c',  # Cyrillic С -> Latin c
+    '\u0425': 'x',  # Cyrillic Х -> Latin x
+    '\u0420': 'p',  # Cyrillic Р -> Latin p
+    '\u0406': 'i',  # Cyrillic І -> Latin I (U+0406)
+    # Greek lookalikes
+    '\u03bf': 'o',  # Greek omicron -> Latin o
+    '\u03c1': 'p',  # Greek rho -> Latin p
+    '\u03b1': 'a',  # Greek alpha -> Latin a
+    '\u03b5': 'e',  # Greek epsilon -> Latin e
+})
+
+
+def normalize_input(text: str) -> str:
+    """
+    Normalize input text to defeat obfuscation attempts.
+
+    Applies:
+    1. Removal of zero-width characters (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF, etc.)
+    2. NFKC Unicode normalization (decomposes + canonicalizes)
+    3. Case folding (lowercase)
+    4. Homoglyph substitution (Cyrillic, fullwidth, Greek lookalikes)
+
+    Args:
+        text: The input text to normalize
+
+    Returns:
+        Normalized text with obfuscation removed
+    """
+    # Step 1: Remove zero-width characters
+    for char in ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS:
+        text = text.replace(char, '')
+
+    # Step 2: NFKC normalization (decomposes characters, canonicalizes)
+    text = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', text)
+
+    # Step 3: Homoglyph substitution (before case folding for fullwidth)
+    text = text.translate(HOMOGLYPH_MAP)
+
+    # Step 4: Case folding (lowercase)
+    text = text.casefold()
+
+    return text
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# AST-based Python security analysis
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class PythonSecurityAnalyzer(ast.NodeVisitor):
+    """
+    AST visitor that detects obfuscated Python code execution patterns.
+
+    Detects:
+    - Direct dangerous calls: eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__()
+    - Dynamic access: getattr(__builtins__, ...), globals()['eval']
+    - String concatenation obfuscation: 'e'+'v'+'a'+'l'
+    - Encoded attribute access via subscripts
+    """
+
+    # Dangerous builtins that can execute arbitrary code
+    DANGEROUS_BUILTINS: Set[str] = {
+        'eval', 'exec', 'compile', '__import__',
+        'open', 'execfile',  # Python 2 compatibility concerns
+    }
+
+    def __init__(self, source_lines: List[str], file_path: str):
+        self.findings: List[Finding] = []
+        self.source_lines = source_lines
+        self.file_path = file_path
+        self.line_offsets = self._build_line_offsets()
+
+    def _build_line_offsets(self) -> List[int]:
+        """Build offset map for converting absolute position to line number."""
+        offsets = [0]
+        for line in self.source_lines:
+            offsets.append(offsets[-1] + len(line) + 1)  # +1 for newline
+        return offsets
+
+    def _get_line_from_offset(self, offset: int) -> int:
+        """Convert absolute character offset to 1-based line number."""
+        for i, start_offset in enumerate(self.line_offsets):
+            if offset < start_offset:
+                return max(1, i)
+        return len(self.line_offsets)
+
+    def _get_line_content(self, lineno: int) -> str:
+        """Get the content of a specific line (1-based)."""
+        if 1 <= lineno <= len(self.source_lines):
+            return self.source_lines[lineno - 1]
+        return ""
+
+    def _add_finding(self, pattern_id: str, severity: str, category: str,
+                     node: ast.AST, description: str) -> None:
+        """Add a finding for a detected pattern."""
+        lineno = getattr(node, 'lineno', 1)
+        line_content = self._get_line_content(lineno).strip()
+        if len(line_content) > 120:
+            line_content = line_content[:117] + "..."
+
+        self.findings.append(Finding(
+            pattern_id=pattern_id,
+            severity=severity,
+            category=category,
+            file=self.file_path,
+            line=lineno,
+            match=line_content,
+            description=description,
+        ))
+
+    def _is_string_concat(self, node: ast.AST) -> bool:
+        """Check if node represents a string concatenation operation."""
+        if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Add):
+            return self._is_string_concat(node.left) or self._is_string_concat(node.right)
+        if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
+            return True
+        if isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    def _concat_to_string(self, node: ast.AST) -> str:
+        """Try to extract the concatenated string value from a BinOp chain."""
+        if isinstance(node, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.value, str):
+            return node.value
+        if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Add):
+            return self._concat_to_string(node.left) + self._concat_to_string(node.right)
+        return ""
+
+    def visit_Call(self, node: ast.Call) -> None:
+        """Detect dangerous function calls including obfuscated variants."""
+        func = node.func
+
+        # Direct call: eval(...), exec(...), etc.
+        if isinstance(func, ast.Name):
+            func_name = func.id
+            if func_name in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                self._add_finding(
+                    f"ast_dangerous_call_{func_name}",
+                    "high", "obfuscation", node,
+                    f"Dangerous builtin call: {func_name}()"
+                )
+
+        # getattr(__builtins__, ...) pattern
+        if isinstance(func, ast.Name) and func.id == 'getattr':
+            if len(node.args) >= 2:
+                first_arg = node.args[0]
+                second_arg = node.args[1]
+
+                # Check for getattr(__builtins__, ...)
+                if (isinstance(first_arg, ast.Name) and
+                    first_arg.id in ('__builtins__', 'builtins')):
+                    self._add_finding(
+                        "ast_getattr_builtins", "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                        "Dynamic access to builtins via getattr() (evasion technique)"
+                    )
+
+                # Check for getattr(..., 'eval') or getattr(..., 'exec')
+                if isinstance(second_arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(second_arg.value, str):
+                    if second_arg.value in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                        self._add_finding(
+                            f"ast_getattr_{second_arg.value}", "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                            f"Dynamic retrieval of {second_arg.value} via getattr()"
+                        )
+
+        # globals()[...] or locals()[...] pattern when called
+        # AST structure: Call(func=Subscript(value=Call(func=Name(id='globals')), slice=Constant('eval')))
+        if isinstance(func, ast.Subscript):
+            subscript_value = func.value
+            # Check if subscript value is a call to globals() or locals()
+            if (isinstance(subscript_value, ast.Call) and
+                isinstance(subscript_value.func, ast.Name) and
+                subscript_value.func.id in ('globals', 'locals')):
+                self._add_finding(
+                    "ast_dynamic_global_access", "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                    f"Dynamic function call via {subscript_value.func.id}()[...] (evasion technique)"
+                )
+            # Also check for direct globals[...] (without call, less common but possible)
+            elif isinstance(subscript_value, ast.Name) and subscript_value.id in ('globals', 'locals'):
+                self._add_finding(
+                    "ast_dynamic_global_access", "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                    f"Dynamic function call via {subscript_value.id}[...] (evasion technique)"
+                )
+
+        # Detect string concatenation in arguments (e.g., 'e'+'v'+'a'+'l')
+        for arg in node.args:
+            if self._is_string_concat(arg):
+                concat_str = self._concat_to_string(arg)
+                normalized = normalize_input(concat_str)
+                if normalized in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                    self._add_finding(
+                        f"ast_concat_{normalized}", "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                        f"String concatenation obfuscation building '{normalized}'"
+                    )
+
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
+    def visit_Subscript(self, node: ast.Subscript) -> None:
+        """Detect globals()['eval'] / locals()['exec'] patterns."""
+        # Check for globals()[...] or locals()[...]
+        # AST structure for `globals()['eval']`: Subscript(value=Call(func=Name(id='globals')), slice=Constant('eval'))
+        subscript_target = node.value
+        globals_or_locals = None
+
+        # Check if subscript target is a call to globals() or locals()
+        if isinstance(subscript_target, ast.Call) and isinstance(subscript_target.func, ast.Name):
+            if subscript_target.func.id in ('globals', 'locals'):
+                globals_or_locals = subscript_target.func.id
+        # Also handle direct globals[...] without call (less common)
+        elif isinstance(subscript_target, ast.Name) and subscript_target.id in ('globals', 'locals'):
+            globals_or_locals = subscript_target.id
+
+        if globals_or_locals:
+            # Check the subscript value
+            if isinstance(node.slice, ast.Constant) and isinstance(node.slice.value, str):
+                slice_val = node.slice.value
+                if slice_val in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                    self._add_finding(
+                        f"ast_{globals_or_locals}_subscript_{slice_val}",
+                        "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                        f"Dynamic access to {slice_val} via {globals_or_locals}()['{slice_val}']"
+                    )
+            # String concatenation in subscript: globals()['e'+'v'+'a'+'l']
+            elif isinstance(node.slice, ast.BinOp):
+                concat_str = self._concat_to_string(node.slice)
+                normalized = normalize_input(concat_str)
+                if normalized in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                    self._add_finding(
+                        f"ast_{globals_or_locals}_concat_{normalized}",
+                        "critical", "obfuscation", node,
+                        f"String concatenation obfuscation via {globals_or_locals}()['...']"
+                    )
+
+        # Check for __builtins__[...]
+        if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id == '__builtins__':
+            self._add_finding(
+                "ast_builtins_subscript", "high", "obfuscation", node,
+                "Direct subscript access to __builtins__"
+            )
+
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
+    def visit_BinOp(self, node: ast.BinOp) -> None:
+        """Detect string concatenation building dangerous function names."""
+        if isinstance(node.op, ast.Add):
+            concat_str = self._concat_to_string(node)
+            normalized = normalize_input(concat_str)
+            if normalized in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+                self._add_finding(
+                    f"ast_string_concat_{normalized}", "high", "obfuscation", node,
+                    f"String concatenation building '{normalized}' (possible obfuscation)"
+                )
+
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
+    def visit_Attribute(self, node: ast.Attribute) -> None:
+        """Detect obj.eval, obj.exec patterns."""
+        if node.attr in self.DANGEROUS_BUILTINS:
+            self._add_finding(
+                f"ast_attr_{node.attr}", "medium", "obfuscation", node,
+                f"Access to .{node.attr} attribute (context-dependent risk)"
+            )
+        self.generic_visit(node)
+
+
+def analyze_python_ast(content: str, file_path: str) -> List[Finding]:
+    """
+    Parse Python code and analyze its AST for security issues.
+
+    Args:
+        content: The Python source code to analyze
+        file_path: Path to the file (for reporting)
+
+    Returns:
+        List of findings from AST analysis
+    """
+    lines = content.split('\n')
+
+    try:
+        tree = ast.parse(content)
+    except SyntaxError:
+        # If we can't parse, return empty findings
+        return []
+
+    analyzer = PythonSecurityAnalyzer(lines, file_path)
+    analyzer.visit(tree)
+    return analyzer.findings
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Scanning functions
@@ -529,7 +855,12 @@ INVISIBLE_CHARS = {
 
 def scan_file(file_path: Path, rel_path: str = "") -> List[Finding]:
     """
-    Scan a single file for threat patterns and invisible unicode characters.
+    Scan a single file for threat patterns, obfuscation, and invisible unicode.
+
+    Performs:
+    1. Invisible unicode character detection (on original content)
+    2. AST analysis for Python files (detects obfuscated execution patterns)
+    3. Regex pattern matching on normalized content (catches obfuscated variants)
 
     Args:
         file_path: Absolute path to the file
@@ -553,27 +884,7 @@ def scan_file(file_path: Path, rel_path: str = "") -> List[Finding]:
     lines = content.split('\n')
     seen = set()  # (pattern_id, line_number) for deduplication
 
-    # Regex pattern matching
-    for pattern, pid, severity, category, description in THREAT_PATTERNS:
-        for i, line in enumerate(lines, start=1):
-            if (pid, i) in seen:
-                continue
-            if re.search(pattern, line, re.IGNORECASE):
-                seen.add((pid, i))
-                matched_text = line.strip()
-                if len(matched_text) > 120:
-                    matched_text = matched_text[:117] + "..."
-                findings.append(Finding(
-                    pattern_id=pid,
-                    severity=severity,
-                    category=category,
-                    file=rel_path,
-                    line=i,
-                    match=matched_text,
-                    description=description,
-                ))
-
-    # Invisible unicode character detection
+    # Step 1: Invisible unicode character detection (on original)
     for i, line in enumerate(lines, start=1):
         for char in INVISIBLE_CHARS:
             if char in line:
@@ -589,6 +900,38 @@ def scan_file(file_path: Path, rel_path: str = "") -> List[Finding]:
                 ))
                 break  # one finding per line for invisible chars
 
+    # Step 2: AST analysis for Python files
+    if file_path.suffix.lower() == '.py':
+        ast_findings = analyze_python_ast(content, rel_path)
+        findings.extend(ast_findings)
+
+    # Step 3: Normalize content and run regex patterns
+    # This catches obfuscated variants like Cyrillic homoglyphs, fullwidth, etc.
+    normalized_content = normalize_input(content)
+    normalized_lines = normalized_content.split('\n')
+
+    # Map normalized line numbers to original line numbers (they should match)
+    for pattern, pid, severity, category, description in THREAT_PATTERNS:
+        for i, norm_line in enumerate(normalized_lines, start=1):
+            if (pid, i) in seen:
+                continue
+            if re.search(pattern, norm_line, re.IGNORECASE):
+                seen.add((pid, i))
+                # Show original line content for context
+                original_line = lines[i - 1] if i <= len(lines) else norm_line
+                matched_text = original_line.strip()
+                if len(matched_text) > 120:
+                    matched_text = matched_text[:117] + "..."
+                findings.append(Finding(
+                    pattern_id=pid,
+                    severity=severity,
+                    category=category,
+                    file=rel_path,
+                    line=i,
+                    match=matched_text,
+                    description=description,
+                ))
+
     return findings
 
 
@@ -598,8 +941,17 @@ def scan_skill(skill_path: Path, source: str = "community") -> ScanResult:
 
     Performs:
     1. Structural checks (file count, total size, binary files, symlinks)
-    2. Regex pattern matching on all text files
-    3. Invisible unicode character detection
+    2. Unicode normalization to defeat obfuscation (NFKC, homoglyphs, zero-width)
+    3. AST analysis for Python files (detects dynamic execution patterns)
+    4. Regex pattern matching on normalized content
+    5. Invisible unicode character detection
+
+    V-011 Bypass Protection:
+    - Unicode homoglyphs (Cyrillic, fullwidth, Greek lookalikes)
+    - Zero-width character injection (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF)
+    - Case manipulation (EvAl, ExEc)
+    - String concatenation obfuscation ('e'+'v'+'a'+'l')
+    - Dynamic execution patterns (globals()['eval'], getattr(__builtins__, 'exec'))
 
     Args:
         skill_path: Path to the skill directory (must contain SKILL.md)

tools/test_skills_guard_v011.py

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Tests for V-011 Skills Guard Bypass fix.
+
+Tests all bypass techniques:
+1. Unicode encoding tricks (fullwidth characters, Cyrillic homoglyphs)
+2. Case manipulation (EvAl, ExEc)
+3. Zero-width characters (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF)
+4. Dynamic execution obfuscation: globals()['ev'+'al'], getattr(__builtins__, 'exec')
+5. String concatenation: 'e'+'v'+'a'+'l'
+"""
+
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Add parent directory to path
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
+
+from skills_guard import (
+    normalize_input,
+    analyze_python_ast,
+    scan_file,
+    ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS,
+    HOMOGLYPH_MAP,
+)
+
+
+class TestNormalizeInput:
+    """Test input normalization for obfuscation removal."""
+
+    def test_zero_width_removal(self):
+        """Test removal of zero-width characters."""
+        # U+200B zero-width space
+        obfuscated = "ev\u200bal"
+        normalized = normalize_input(obfuscated)
+        assert normalized == "eval", f"Expected 'eval', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        # Multiple zero-width characters
+        obfuscated = "e\u200bx\u200ce\u200dc"
+        normalized = normalize_input(obfuscated)
+        assert normalized == "exec", f"Expected 'exec', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        # U+FEFF BOM
+        obfuscated = "\ufeffeval"
+        normalized = normalize_input(obfuscated)
+        assert normalized == "eval", f"Expected 'eval', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        print("✓ Zero-width character removal tests passed")
+
+    def test_case_folding(self):
+        """Test case folding (lowercase conversion)."""
+        test_cases = [
+            ("EvAl", "eval"),
+            ("EXEC", "exec"),
+            ("CoMpIlE", "compile"),
+            ("GetAttr", "getattr"),
+        ]
+        for input_str, expected in test_cases:
+            normalized = normalize_input(input_str)
+            assert normalized == expected, f"Expected '{expected}', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        print("✓ Case folding tests passed")
+
+    def test_fullwidth_normalization(self):
+        """Test fullwidth character normalization."""
+        # Fullwidth Latin characters
+        test_cases = [
+            ("\uff45\uff56\uff41\uff4c", "eval"),  # ｅｖａｌ
+            ("\uff25\uff36\uff21\uff2c", "eval"),  # ＥＶＡＬ (uppercase fullwidth)
+            ("\uff45\uff58\uff45\uff43", "exec"),  # ｅｘｅｃ
+            ("\uff4f\uff53", "os"),               # ｏｓ
+        ]
+        for input_str, expected in test_cases:
+            normalized = normalize_input(input_str)
+            assert normalized == expected, f"Expected '{expected}', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        print("✓ Fullwidth normalization tests passed")
+
+    def test_cyrillic_homoglyphs(self):
+        """Test Cyrillic lookalike character normalization."""
+        # Cyrillic е (U+0435) looks like Latin e (U+0065)
+        test_cases = [
+            ("\u0435val", "eval"),  # еval (Cyrillic е)
+            ("\u0435x\u0435c", "exec"),  # еxеc (Cyrillic е's)
+            ("\u0430\u0435\u0456\u043e", "aeio"),  # аеіо (all Cyrillic)
+            ("g\u0435tattr", "getattr"),  # gеtattr (Cyrillic е)
+        ]
+        for input_str, expected in test_cases:
+            normalized = normalize_input(input_str)
+            assert normalized == expected, f"Expected '{expected}', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        print("✓ Cyrillic homoglyph tests passed")
+
+    def test_combined_obfuscation(self):
+        """Test combined obfuscation techniques."""
+        # Mix of case, zero-width, and homoglyphs
+        obfuscated = "E\u200bV\u0430L"  # E + ZWS + V + Cyrillic а + L
+        normalized = normalize_input(obfuscated)
+        assert normalized == "eval", f"Expected 'eval', got '{normalized}'"
+
+        print("✓ Combined obfuscation tests passed")
+
+
+class TestASTAnalysis:
+    """Test AST-based security analysis."""
+
+    def test_direct_dangerous_calls(self):
+        """Test detection of direct eval/exec/compile calls."""
+        code = "eval('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("eval" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), "Should detect eval() call"
+
+        code = "exec('print(1)')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("exec" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), "Should detect exec() call"
+
+        code = "compile('x', '<string>', 'exec')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("compile" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), "Should detect compile() call"
+
+        print("✓ Direct dangerous call detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_getattr_builtins_pattern(self):
+        """Test detection of getattr(__builtins__, ...) pattern."""
+        code = "getattr(__builtins__, 'eval')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("getattr_builtins" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect getattr(__builtins__, ...) pattern"
+
+        code = "getattr(__builtins__, 'exec')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("getattr_exec" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect getattr(..., 'exec')"
+
+        print("✓ getattr(__builtins__, ...) detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_globals_subscript_pattern(self):
+        """Test detection of globals()['eval'] pattern."""
+        code = "globals()['eval']('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("globals" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect globals()['eval'] pattern"
+
+        code = "locals()['exec']('print(1)')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("locals" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect locals()['exec'] pattern"
+
+        print("✓ globals()/locals() subscript detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_string_concatenation_obfuscation(self):
+        """Test detection of string concatenation obfuscation."""
+        # Simple concatenation
+        code = "('e'+'v'+'a'+'l')('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("concat" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect string concatenation obfuscation"
+
+        # Concatenation in globals subscript
+        code = "globals()['e'+'v'+'a'+'l']('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("concat" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect concat in globals subscript"
+
+        print("✓ String concatenation obfuscation detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_dynamic_global_call(self):
+        """Test detection of dynamic calls via globals()."""
+        code = "globals()['eval']('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("dynamic_global" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "Should detect dynamic global access"
+
+        print("✓ Dynamic global call detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_legitimate_code_not_flagged(self):
+        """Test that legitimate code is not flagged."""
+        # Normal function definition
+        code = """
+def calculate(x, y):
+    result = x + y
+    return result
+
+class MyClass:
+    def method(self):
+        return "hello"
+
+import os
+print(os.path.join("a", "b"))
+"""
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        # Should not have any obfuscation-related findings
+        obfuscation_findings = [f for f in findings if f.category == "obfuscation"]
+        assert len(obfuscation_findings) == 0, \
+            f"Legitimate code should not be flagged, got: {[f.description for f in obfuscation_findings]}"
+
+        print("✓ Legitimate code not flagged tests passed")
+
+
+class TestScanFileIntegration:
+    """Integration tests for scan_file with new detection."""
+
+    def _create_temp_file(self, content: str, suffix: str = ".py") -> Path:
+        """Create a temporary file with the given content."""
+        with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix=suffix, delete=False) as f:
+            f.write(content)
+            return Path(f.name)
+
+    def test_unicode_obfuscation_detection(self):
+        """Test that obfuscated eval is detected via normalization."""
+        # Fullwidth eval
+        code = "\uff45\uff56\uff41\uff4c('1+1')"  # ｅｖａｌ
+        path = self._create_temp_file(code)
+        try:
+            findings = scan_file(path, "test.py")
+            # Should detect via regex on normalized content
+            assert any("eval" in f.pattern_id.lower() or "eval" in f.description.lower()
+                      for f in findings), \
+                f"Should detect fullwidth eval, got: {[f.pattern_id for f in findings]}"
+        finally:
+            path.unlink()
+
+        print("✓ Unicode obfuscation detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_zero_width_character_detection(self):
+        """Test detection of zero-width characters."""
+        code = "ev\u200bal('1+1')"  # eval with zero-width space
+        path = self._create_temp_file(code)
+        try:
+            findings = scan_file(path, "test.py")
+            assert any("invisible_unicode" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+                f"Should detect invisible unicode, got: {[f.pattern_id for f in findings]}"
+        finally:
+            path.unlink()
+
+        print("✓ Zero-width character detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_ast_and_regex_combined(self):
+        """Test that both AST and regex detection work together."""
+        code = """
+# Obfuscated eval via string concat
+func = ('e'+'v'+'a'+'l')
+result = func('1+1')
+
+# Also fullwidth in comment: ｅｖａｌ
+"""
+        path = self._create_temp_file(code)
+        try:
+            findings = scan_file(path, "test.py")
+            ast_findings = [f for f in findings if f.pattern_id.startswith("ast_")]
+            assert len(ast_findings) > 0, "Should have AST-based findings"
+        finally:
+            path.unlink()
+
+        print("✓ AST and regex combined detection tests passed")
+
+    def test_cyrillic_in_code_detection(self):
+        """Test detection of Cyrillic homoglyphs in code."""
+        # Using Cyrillic е (U+0435) instead of Latin e (U+0065)
+        code = "\u0435val('1+1')"  # еval with Cyrillic е
+        path = self._create_temp_file(code)
+        try:
+            findings = scan_file(path, "test.py")
+            # After normalization, regex should catch this
+            assert any("eval" in f.pattern_id.lower() or "eval" in f.description.lower()
+                      for f in findings), \
+                f"Should detect Cyrillic obfuscated eval, got: {[f.pattern_id for f in findings]}"
+        finally:
+            path.unlink()
+
+        print("✓ Cyrillic homoglyph detection tests passed")
+
+
+class TestBypassTechniques:
+    """Test specific bypass techniques mentioned in the vulnerability report."""
+
+    def test_bypass_1_unicode_encoding(self):
+        """Bypass 1: Unicode encoding tricks (fullwidth characters)."""
+        # Fullwidth characters: ｅｖａｌ
+        fullwidth_eval = "\uff45\uff56\uff41\uff4c"
+        normalized = normalize_input(fullwidth_eval)
+        assert normalized == "eval", "Fullwidth should normalize to ASCII"
+
+        # Fullwidth exec: ｅｘｅｃ
+        fullwidth_exec = "\uff45\uff58\uff45\uff43"
+        normalized = normalize_input(fullwidth_exec)
+        assert normalized == "exec", "Fullwidth exec should normalize"
+
+        print("✓ Bypass 1: Unicode encoding tricks blocked")
+
+    def test_bypass_2_case_manipulation(self):
+        """Bypass 2: Case manipulation (EvAl, ExEc)."""
+        test_cases = ["EvAl", "ExEc", "CoMpIlE", "EVA", "exec"]
+        for case in test_cases:
+            normalized = normalize_input(case)
+            expected = case.lower()
+            assert normalized == expected, f"Case folding failed for {case}"
+
+        print("✓ Bypass 2: Case manipulation blocked")
+
+    def test_bypass_3_zero_width(self):
+        """Bypass 3: Zero-width characters (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF)."""
+        # Test all zero-width characters are removed
+        for char in ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS:
+            obfuscated = f"ev{char}al"
+            normalized = normalize_input(obfuscated)
+            assert normalized == "eval", f"Zero-width char U+{ord(char):04X} not removed"
+
+        print("✓ Bypass 3: Zero-width character injection blocked")
+
+    def test_bypass_4_dynamic_execution(self):
+        """Bypass 4: Dynamic execution obfuscation."""
+        # globals()['eval']
+        code1 = "globals()['eval']('1+1')"
+        findings1 = analyze_python_ast(code1, "test.py")
+        assert len([f for f in findings1 if "globals" in f.pattern_id]) > 0, \
+            "globals()['eval'] should be detected"
+
+        # getattr(__builtins__, 'exec')
+        code2 = "getattr(__builtins__, 'exec')"
+        findings2 = analyze_python_ast(code2, "test.py")
+        assert any("getattr_builtins" in f.pattern_id for f in findings2), \
+            "getattr(__builtins__, ...) should be detected"
+
+        print("✓ Bypass 4: Dynamic execution obfuscation blocked")
+
+    def test_bypass_5_string_concatenation(self):
+        """Bypass 5: String concatenation ('e'+'v'+'a'+'l')."""
+        # AST should detect this
+        code = "('e'+'v'+'a'+'l')('1+1')"
+        findings = analyze_python_ast(code, "test.py")
+        assert any("concat" in f.pattern_id for f in findings), \
+            "String concatenation obfuscation should be detected"
+
+        # Also test via globals
+        code2 = "globals()['e'+'v'+'a'+'l']('1+1')"
+        findings2 = analyze_python_ast(code2, "test.py")
+        assert any("concat" in f.pattern_id for f in findings2), \
+            "Concat in globals subscript should be detected"
+
+        print("✓ Bypass 5: String concatenation obfuscation blocked")
+
+    def test_cyrillic_homoglyph_bypass(self):
+        """Test Cyrillic homoglyph bypass (е vs e)."""
+        # е (U+0435) vs e (U+0065)
+        cyrillic_e = "\u0435"
+        latin_e = "e"
+
+        assert cyrillic_e != latin_e, "Cyrillic and Latin e should be different"
+
+        # After normalization, they should be the same
+        normalized_cyrillic = normalize_input(cyrillic_e)
+        normalized_latin = normalize_input(latin_e)
+        assert normalized_cyrillic == normalized_latin == "e", \
+            "Cyrillic е should normalize to Latin e"
+
+        # Test full word: еval (with Cyrillic е)
+        cyrillic_eval = "\u0435val"
+        normalized = normalize_input(cyrillic_eval)
+        assert normalized == "eval", "Cyrillic eval should normalize"
+
+        print("✓ Cyrillic homoglyph bypass blocked")
+
+
+def run_all_tests():
+    """Run all tests."""
+    print("=" * 60)
+    print("V-011 Skills Guard Bypass Fix Tests")
+    print("=" * 60)
+
+    test_classes = [
+        TestNormalizeInput,
+        TestASTAnalysis,
+        TestScanFileIntegration,
+        TestBypassTechniques,
+    ]
+
+    passed = 0
+    failed = 0
+
+    for test_class in test_classes:
+        print(f"\n--- {test_class.__name__} ---")
+        instance = test_class()
+        for method_name in dir(instance):
+            if method_name.startswith("test_"):
+                try:
+                    method = getattr(instance, method_name)
+                    method()
+                    passed += 1
+                except AssertionError as e:
+                    print(f"  ✗ FAILED: {method_name}: {e}")
+                    failed += 1
+                except Exception as e:
+                    print(f"  ✗ ERROR: {method_name}: {e}")
+                    failed += 1
+
+    print("\n" + "=" * 60)
+    print(f"Results: {passed} passed, {failed} failed")
+    print("=" * 60)
+
+    if failed > 0:
+        sys.exit(1)
+    else:
+        print("\n✓ All V-011 bypass protection tests passed!")
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    run_all_tests()