feat: env var passthrough for skills and user config (#2807)
* feat: env var passthrough for skills and user config Skills that declare required_environment_variables now have those vars passed through to sandboxed execution environments (execute_code and terminal). Previously, execute_code stripped all vars containing KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, etc. and the terminal blocklist removed Hermes infrastructure vars — both blocked skill-declared env vars. Two passthrough sources: 1. Skill-scoped (automatic): when a skill is loaded via skill_view and declares required_environment_variables, vars that are present in the environment are registered in a session-scoped passthrough set. 2. Config-based (manual): terminal.env_passthrough in config.yaml lets users explicitly allowlist vars for non-skill use cases. Changes: - New module: tools/env_passthrough.py — shared passthrough registry - hermes_cli/config.py: add terminal.env_passthrough to DEFAULT_CONFIG - tools/skills_tool.py: register available skill env vars on load - tools/code_execution_tool.py: check passthrough before filtering - tools/environments/local.py: check passthrough in _sanitize_subprocess_env and _make_run_env - 19 new tests covering all layers * docs: add environment variable passthrough documentation Document the env var passthrough feature across four docs pages: - security.md: new 'Environment Variable Passthrough' section with full explanation, comparison table, and security considerations - code-execution.md: update security section, add passthrough subsection, fix comparison table - creating-skills.md: add tip about automatic sandbox passthrough - skills.md: add note about passthrough after secure setup docs Live-tested: launched interactive CLI, loaded a skill with required_environment_variables, verified TEST_SKILL_SECRET_KEY was accessible inside execute_code sandbox (value: passthrough-test-value-42).
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@@ -428,15 +428,28 @@ def execute_code(
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# Build a minimal environment for the child. We intentionally exclude
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# API keys and tokens to prevent credential exfiltration from LLM-
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# generated scripts. The child accesses tools via RPC, not direct API.
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# Exception: env vars declared by loaded skills (via env_passthrough
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# registry) or explicitly allowed by the user in config.yaml
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# (terminal.env_passthrough) are passed through.
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_SAFE_ENV_PREFIXES = ("PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LANG", "LC_", "TERM",
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"TMPDIR", "TMP", "TEMP", "SHELL", "LOGNAME",
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"XDG_", "PYTHONPATH", "VIRTUAL_ENV", "CONDA")
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_SECRET_SUBSTRINGS = ("KEY", "TOKEN", "SECRET", "PASSWORD", "CREDENTIAL",
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"PASSWD", "AUTH")
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try:
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from tools.env_passthrough import is_env_passthrough as _is_passthrough
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except Exception:
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_is_passthrough = lambda _: False # noqa: E731
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child_env = {}
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for k, v in os.environ.items():
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# Passthrough vars (skill-declared or user-configured) always pass.
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if _is_passthrough(k):
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child_env[k] = v
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continue
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# Block vars with secret-like names.
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if any(s in k.upper() for s in _SECRET_SUBSTRINGS):
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continue
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# Allow vars with known safe prefixes.
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if any(k.startswith(p) for p in _SAFE_ENV_PREFIXES):
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child_env[k] = v
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child_env["HERMES_RPC_SOCKET"] = sock_path
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