The Docker sandbox previously used --read-only on the root filesystem and
noexec on /tmp. This broke 30+ skills that need to install packages:
- npm install -g (codex, claude-code, mcporter, powerpoint)
- pip install (20+ mlops/media/productivity skills)
- apt install (minecraft-modpack-server, ml-paper-writing)
- Build tools that compile in /tmp (pip wheels, node-gyp)
The container is already fully isolated from the host. Industry standard
(E2B, Docker Sandboxes, OpenAI Codex) does not use --read-only — the
container itself is the security boundary.
Retained security hardening:
- --cap-drop ALL (zero capabilities)
- --security-opt no-new-privileges (no escalation)
- --pids-limit 256 (no fork bombs)
- Size-limited tmpfs for /tmp, /var/tmp, /run
- nosuid on all tmpfs mounts
- noexec on /var/tmp and /run (rarely need exec there)
- Resource limits (CPU, memory, disk)
- Ephemeral containers (destroyed after use)
Fixes#189.
Introduced a new `provider_routing` section in the CLI configuration to control how requests are routed across providers when using OpenRouter. This includes options for sorting providers by throughput, latency, or price, as well as allowing or ignoring specific providers, setting the order of provider attempts, and managing data collection policies. Updated relevant classes and documentation to support these features, enhancing flexibility in provider selection.
Add comprehensive contributor guide covering:
- Development setup
- Project structure overview
- Code style guidelines
- How to add new tools
- How to add new skills
- Pull request process
- Commit message conventions
- Security considerations
