LLM responses from browser snapshot extraction and vision analysis
could echo back secrets that appeared on screen or in page content.
Input redaction alone is insufficient — the LLM may reproduce secrets
it read from screenshots (which cannot be text-redacted).
Now redact outputs from:
- _extract_relevant_content (auxiliary LLM response)
- browser_vision (vision LLM response)
- camofox_vision (vision LLM response)
Three exfiltration vectors closed:
1. Browser URL exfil — agent could embed secrets in URL params and
navigate to attacker-controlled server. Now scans URLs for known
API key patterns before navigating (browser_navigate, web_extract).
2. Browser snapshot leak — page displaying env vars or API keys would
send secrets to auxiliary LLM via _extract_relevant_content before
run_agent.py's redaction layer sees the result. Now redacts snapshot
text before the auxiliary call.
3. Camofox annotation leak — accessibility tree text sent to vision
LLM could contain secrets visible on screen. Now redacts annotation
context before the vision call.
10 new tests covering URL blocking, snapshot redaction, and annotation
redaction for both browser and camofox backends.
Adds two Camofox features:
1. Persistent browser sessions: new `browser.camofox.managed_persistence`
config option. When enabled, Hermes sends a deterministic profile-scoped
userId to Camofox so the server maps it to a persistent browser profile
directory. Cookies, logins, and browser state survive across restarts.
Default remains ephemeral (random userId per session).
2. VNC URL discovery: Camofox /health endpoint returns vncPort when running
in headed mode. Hermes constructs the VNC URL and includes it in navigate
responses so the agent can share it with users.
Also fixes camofox_vision bug where call_llm response object was passed
directly to json.dumps instead of extracting .choices[0].message.content.
Changes from original PR:
- Removed browser_evaluate tool (separate feature, needs own PR)
- Removed snapshot truncation limit change (unrelated)
- Config.yaml only for managed_persistence (no env var, no version bump)
- Rewrote tests to use config mock instead of env var
- Reverted package-lock.json churn
Co-authored-by: analista <psikonetik@gmail.com.com>
The camofox-browser image defaults to port 3000 internally, not 9377.
Without -e CAMOFOX_PORT=9377, the -p 9377:9377 mapping silently fails
because nothing listens on 9377 inside the container.
E2E verified: -p 9377:9377 alone → connection reset,
-p 9377:9377 -e CAMOFOX_PORT=9377 → healthy and functional.
Camofox-browser is a self-hosted Node.js server wrapping Camoufox
(Firefox fork with C++ fingerprint spoofing). When CAMOFOX_URL is set,
all 11 browser tools route through the Camofox REST API instead of
the agent-browser CLI.
Maps 1:1 to the existing browser tool interface:
- Navigate, snapshot, click, type, scroll, back, press, close
- Get images, vision (screenshot + LLM analysis)
- Console (returns empty with note — camofox limitation)
Setup: npm start in camofox-browser dir, or docker run -p 9377:9377
Then: CAMOFOX_URL=http://localhost:9377 in ~/.hermes/.env
Advantages over Browserbase (cloud):
- Free (no per-session API costs)
- Local (zero network latency for browser ops)
- Anti-detection at C++ level (bypasses Cloudflare/Google bot detection)
- Works offline, Docker-ready
Files:
- tools/browser_camofox.py: Full REST backend (~400 lines)
- tools/browser_tool.py: Routing at each tool function
- hermes_cli/config.py: CAMOFOX_URL env var entry
- tests/tools/test_browser_camofox.py: 20 tests
