Consolidated salvage from PRs #5301 (qaqcvc), #5339 (lance0), #5058 and #5098 (maymuneth). Mem0 API v2 compatibility (#5301): - All reads use filters={user_id: ...} instead of bare user_id= kwarg - All writes use filters with user_id + agent_id for attribution - Response unwrapping for v2 dict format {results: [...]} - Split _read_filters() vs _write_filters() — reads are user-scoped only for cross-session recall, writes include agent_id - Preserved 'hermes-user' default (no breaking change for existing users) - Omitted run_id scoping from #5301 — cross-session memory is Mem0's core value, session-scoping reads would defeat that purpose Memory prefetch context fencing (#5339): - Wraps prefetched memory in <memory-context> fenced blocks with system note marking content as recalled context, NOT user input - Sanitizes provider output to strip fence-escape sequences, preventing injection where memory content breaks out of the fence - API-call-time only — never persisted to session history Secret redaction (#5058, #5098): - Added prefix patterns for Groq (gsk_), Matrix (syt_), RetainDB (retaindb_), Hindsight (hsk-), Mem0 (mem0_), ByteRover (brv_)
182 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
182 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
"""Regex-based secret redaction for logs and tool output.
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Applies pattern matching to mask API keys, tokens, and credentials
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before they reach log files, verbose output, or gateway logs.
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Short tokens (< 18 chars) are fully masked. Longer tokens preserve
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the first 6 and last 4 characters for debuggability.
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"""
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Snapshot at import time so runtime env mutations (e.g. LLM-generated
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# `export HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS=false`) cannot disable redaction mid-session.
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_REDACT_ENABLED = os.getenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", "").lower() not in ("0", "false", "no", "off")
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# Known API key prefixes -- match the prefix + contiguous token chars
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_PREFIX_PATTERNS = [
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r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # OpenAI / OpenRouter / Anthropic (sk-ant-*)
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r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (classic)
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r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (fine-grained)
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r"gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub OAuth access token
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r"ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub user-to-server token
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r"ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub server-to-server token
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r"ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub refresh token
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r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}", # Slack tokens
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r"AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}", # Google API keys
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r"pplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Perplexity
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r"fal_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # Fal.ai
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r"fc-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Firecrawl
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r"bb_live_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # BrowserBase
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r"gAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{20,}", # Codex encrypted tokens
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r"AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}", # AWS Access Key ID
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r"sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (live)
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r"sk_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (test)
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r"rk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe restricted key
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r"SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # SendGrid API key
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r"hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # HuggingFace token
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r"r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Replicate API token
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r"npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # npm access token
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r"pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # PyPI API token
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r"dop_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean PAT
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r"doo_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean OAuth
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r"am_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # AgentMail API key
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r"sk_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # ElevenLabs TTS key (sk_ underscore, not sk- dash)
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r"tvly-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Tavily search API key
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r"exa_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Exa search API key
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r"gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Groq Cloud API key
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r"syt_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Matrix access token
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r"retaindb_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # RetainDB API key
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r"hsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Hindsight API key
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r"mem0_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Mem0 Platform API key
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r"brv_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # ByteRover API key
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]
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# ENV assignment patterns: KEY=value where KEY contains a secret-like name
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_SECRET_ENV_NAMES = r"(?:API_?KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH)"
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_ENV_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
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rf"([A-Z0-9_]{{0,50}}{_SECRET_ENV_NAMES}[A-Z0-9_]{{0,50}})\s*=\s*(['\"]?)(\S+)\2",
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)
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# JSON field patterns: "apiKey": "value", "token": "value", etc.
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_JSON_KEY_NAMES = r"(?:api_?[Kk]ey|token|secret|password|access_token|refresh_token|auth_token|bearer|secret_value|raw_secret|secret_input|key_material)"
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_JSON_FIELD_RE = re.compile(
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rf'("{_JSON_KEY_NAMES}")\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"',
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# Authorization headers
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_AUTH_HEADER_RE = re.compile(
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r"(Authorization:\s*Bearer\s+)(\S+)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# Telegram bot tokens: bot<digits>:<token> or <digits>:<token>,
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# where token part is restricted to [-A-Za-z0-9_] and length >= 30
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_TELEGRAM_RE = re.compile(
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r"(bot)?(\d{8,}):([-A-Za-z0-9_]{30,})",
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)
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# Private key blocks: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- ... -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(
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r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"
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)
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# Database connection strings: protocol://user:PASSWORD@host
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# Catches postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp URLs and redacts the password
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_DB_CONNSTR_RE = re.compile(
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r"((?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|redis|amqp)://[^:]+:)([^@]+)(@)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# E.164 phone numbers: +<country><number>, 7-15 digits
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# Negative lookahead prevents matching hex strings or identifiers
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_SIGNAL_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"(\+[1-9]\d{6,14})(?![A-Za-z0-9])")
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# Compile known prefix patterns into one alternation
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_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])(" + "|".join(_PREFIX_PATTERNS) + r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])"
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)
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def _mask_token(token: str) -> str:
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"""Mask a token, preserving prefix for long tokens."""
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if len(token) < 18:
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return "***"
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return f"{token[:6]}...{token[-4:]}"
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def redact_sensitive_text(text: str) -> str:
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"""Apply all redaction patterns to a block of text.
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Safe to call on any string -- non-matching text passes through unchanged.
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Disabled when security.redact_secrets is false in config.yaml.
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"""
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if text is None:
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return None
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if not isinstance(text, str):
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text = str(text)
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if not text:
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return text
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if not _REDACT_ENABLED:
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return text
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# Known prefixes (sk-, ghp_, etc.)
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text = _PREFIX_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask_token(m.group(1)), text)
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# ENV assignments: OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-abc...
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def _redact_env(m):
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name, quote, value = m.group(1), m.group(2), m.group(3)
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return f"{name}={quote}{_mask_token(value)}{quote}"
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text = _ENV_ASSIGN_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
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# JSON fields: "apiKey": "value"
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def _redact_json(m):
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key, value = m.group(1), m.group(2)
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return f'{key}: "{_mask_token(value)}"'
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text = _JSON_FIELD_RE.sub(_redact_json, text)
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# Authorization headers
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text = _AUTH_HEADER_RE.sub(
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lambda m: m.group(1) + _mask_token(m.group(2)),
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text,
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)
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# Telegram bot tokens
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def _redact_telegram(m):
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prefix = m.group(1) or ""
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digits = m.group(2)
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return f"{prefix}{digits}:***"
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text = _TELEGRAM_RE.sub(_redact_telegram, text)
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# Private key blocks
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text = _PRIVATE_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
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# Database connection string passwords
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text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}", text)
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# E.164 phone numbers (Signal, WhatsApp)
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def _redact_phone(m):
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phone = m.group(1)
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if len(phone) <= 8:
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return phone[:2] + "****" + phone[-2:]
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return phone[:4] + "****" + phone[-4:]
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text = _SIGNAL_PHONE_RE.sub(_redact_phone, text)
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return text
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class RedactingFormatter(logging.Formatter):
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"""Log formatter that redacts secrets from all log messages."""
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def __init__(self, fmt=None, datefmt=None, style='%', **kwargs):
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super().__init__(fmt, datefmt, style, **kwargs)
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def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
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original = super().format(record)
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return redact_sensitive_text(original)
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