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hermes-agent/agent/redact.py
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fix(security): extend secret redaction to ElevenLabs, Tavily and Exa API keys (#3920)
ElevenLabs (sk_), Tavily (tvly-), and Exa (exa_) keys were not covered
by _PREFIX_PATTERNS, leaking in plain text via printenv or log output.

Salvaged from PR #3790 by @memosr. Tests rewritten with correct
assertions (original tests had vacuously true checks).

Co-authored-by: memosr <memosr@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-30 08:13:01 -07:00

169 lines
6.1 KiB
Python

"""Regex-based secret redaction for logs and tool output.
Applies pattern matching to mask API keys, tokens, and credentials
before they reach log files, verbose output, or gateway logs.
Short tokens (< 18 chars) are fully masked. Longer tokens preserve
the first 6 and last 4 characters for debuggability.
"""
import logging
import os
import re
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Known API key prefixes -- match the prefix + contiguous token chars
_PREFIX_PATTERNS = [
r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # OpenAI / OpenRouter / Anthropic (sk-ant-*)
r"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (classic)
r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # GitHub PAT (fine-grained)
r"xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}", # Slack tokens
r"AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}", # Google API keys
r"pplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Perplexity
r"fal_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # Fal.ai
r"fc-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Firecrawl
r"bb_live_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # BrowserBase
r"gAAAA[A-Za-z0-9_=-]{20,}", # Codex encrypted tokens
r"AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}", # AWS Access Key ID
r"sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (live)
r"sk_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe secret key (test)
r"rk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Stripe restricted key
r"SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # SendGrid API key
r"hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # HuggingFace token
r"r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Replicate API token
r"npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # npm access token
r"pypi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # PyPI API token
r"dop_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean PAT
r"doo_v1_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # DigitalOcean OAuth
r"am_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}", # AgentMail API key
r"sk_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}", # ElevenLabs TTS key (sk_ underscore, not sk- dash)
r"tvly-[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Tavily search API key
r"exa_[A-Za-z0-9]{10,}", # Exa search API key
]
# ENV assignment patterns: KEY=value where KEY contains a secret-like name
_SECRET_ENV_NAMES = r"(?:API_?KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIAL|AUTH)"
_ENV_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
rf"([A-Z_]*{_SECRET_ENV_NAMES}[A-Z_]*)\s*=\s*(['\"]?)(\S+)\2",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# JSON field patterns: "apiKey": "value", "token": "value", etc.
_JSON_KEY_NAMES = r"(?:api_?[Kk]ey|token|secret|password|access_token|refresh_token|auth_token|bearer|secret_value|raw_secret|secret_input|key_material)"
_JSON_FIELD_RE = re.compile(
rf'("{_JSON_KEY_NAMES}")\s*:\s*"([^"]+)"',
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Authorization headers
_AUTH_HEADER_RE = re.compile(
r"(Authorization:\s*Bearer\s+)(\S+)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Telegram bot tokens: bot<digits>:<token> or <digits>:<token>,
# where token part is restricted to [-A-Za-z0-9_] and length >= 30
_TELEGRAM_RE = re.compile(
r"(bot)?(\d{8,}):([-A-Za-z0-9_]{30,})",
)
# Private key blocks: -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- ... -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
_PRIVATE_KEY_RE = re.compile(
r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"
)
# Database connection strings: protocol://user:PASSWORD@host
# Catches postgres, mysql, mongodb, redis, amqp URLs and redacts the password
_DB_CONNSTR_RE = re.compile(
r"((?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|redis|amqp)://[^:]+:)([^@]+)(@)",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# E.164 phone numbers: +<country><number>, 7-15 digits
# Negative lookahead prevents matching hex strings or identifiers
_SIGNAL_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"(\+[1-9]\d{6,14})(?![A-Za-z0-9])")
# Compile known prefix patterns into one alternation
_PREFIX_RE = re.compile(
r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])(" + "|".join(_PREFIX_PATTERNS) + r")(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])"
)
def _mask_token(token: str) -> str:
"""Mask a token, preserving prefix for long tokens."""
if len(token) < 18:
return "***"
return f"{token[:6]}...{token[-4:]}"
def redact_sensitive_text(text: str) -> str:
"""Apply all redaction patterns to a block of text.
Safe to call on any string -- non-matching text passes through unchanged.
Disabled when security.redact_secrets is false in config.yaml.
"""
if text is None:
return None
if not isinstance(text, str):
text = str(text)
if not text:
return text
if os.getenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", "").lower() in ("0", "false", "no", "off"):
return text
# Known prefixes (sk-, ghp_, etc.)
text = _PREFIX_RE.sub(lambda m: _mask_token(m.group(1)), text)
# ENV assignments: OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-abc...
def _redact_env(m):
name, quote, value = m.group(1), m.group(2), m.group(3)
return f"{name}={quote}{_mask_token(value)}{quote}"
text = _ENV_ASSIGN_RE.sub(_redact_env, text)
# JSON fields: "apiKey": "value"
def _redact_json(m):
key, value = m.group(1), m.group(2)
return f'{key}: "{_mask_token(value)}"'
text = _JSON_FIELD_RE.sub(_redact_json, text)
# Authorization headers
text = _AUTH_HEADER_RE.sub(
lambda m: m.group(1) + _mask_token(m.group(2)),
text,
)
# Telegram bot tokens
def _redact_telegram(m):
prefix = m.group(1) or ""
digits = m.group(2)
return f"{prefix}{digits}:***"
text = _TELEGRAM_RE.sub(_redact_telegram, text)
# Private key blocks
text = _PRIVATE_KEY_RE.sub("[REDACTED PRIVATE KEY]", text)
# Database connection string passwords
text = _DB_CONNSTR_RE.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}***{m.group(3)}", text)
# E.164 phone numbers (Signal, WhatsApp)
def _redact_phone(m):
phone = m.group(1)
if len(phone) <= 8:
return phone[:2] + "****" + phone[-2:]
return phone[:4] + "****" + phone[-4:]
text = _SIGNAL_PHONE_RE.sub(_redact_phone, text)
return text
class RedactingFormatter(logging.Formatter):
"""Log formatter that redacts secrets from all log messages."""
def __init__(self, fmt=None, datefmt=None, style='%', **kwargs):
super().__init__(fmt, datefmt, style, **kwargs)
def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
original = super().format(record)
return redact_sensitive_text(original)