Files
hermes-agent/tools/environments/local.py
Teknium 6a320e8bfe fix(security): block sandbox backend creds from subprocess env (#1264)
* fix: prevent infinite 400 failure loop on context overflow (#1630)

When a gateway session exceeds the model's context window, Anthropic may
return a generic 400 invalid_request_error with just 'Error' as the
message.  This bypassed the phrase-based context-length detection,
causing the agent to treat it as a non-retryable client error.  Worse,
the failed user message was still persisted to the transcript, making
the session even larger on each attempt — creating an infinite loop.

Three-layer fix:

1. run_agent.py — Fallback heuristic: when a 400 error has a very short
   generic message AND the session is large (>40% of context or >80
   messages), treat it as a probable context overflow and trigger
   compression instead of aborting.

2. run_agent.py + gateway/run.py — Don't persist failed messages:
   when the agent returns failed=True before generating any response,
   skip writing the user's message to the transcript/DB. This prevents
   the session from growing on each failure.

3. gateway/run.py — Smarter error messages: detect context-overflow
   failures and suggest /compact or /reset specifically, instead of a
   generic 'try again' that will fail identically.

* fix(skills): detect prompt injection patterns and block cache file reads

Adds two security layers to prevent prompt injection via skills hub
cache files (#1558):

1. read_file: blocks direct reads of ~/.hermes/skills/.hub/ directory
   (index-cache, catalog files). The 3.5MB clawhub_catalog_v1.json
   was the original injection vector — untrusted skill descriptions
   in the catalog contained adversarial text that the model executed.

2. skill_view: warns when skills are loaded from outside the trusted
   ~/.hermes/skills/ directory, and detects common injection patterns
   in skill content ("ignore previous instructions", "<system>", etc.).

Cherry-picked from PR #1562 by ygd58.

* fix(tools): chunk long messages in send_message_tool before dispatch (#1552)

Long messages sent via send_message tool or cron delivery silently
failed when exceeding platform limits. Gateway adapters handle this
via truncate_message(), but the standalone senders in send_message_tool
bypassed that entirely.

- Apply truncate_message() chunking in _send_to_platform() before
  dispatching to individual platform senders
- Remove naive message[i:i+2000] character split in _send_discord()
  in favor of centralized smart splitting
- Attach media files to last chunk only for Telegram
- Add regression tests for chunking and media placement

Cherry-picked from PR #1557 by llbn.

* fix(approval): show full command in dangerous command approval (#1553)

Previously the command was truncated to 80 chars in CLI (with a
[v]iew full option), 500 chars in Discord embeds, and missing entirely
in Telegram/Slack approval messages. Now the full command is always
displayed everywhere:

- CLI: removed 80-char truncation and [v]iew full menu option
- Gateway (TG/Slack): approval_required message includes full command
  in a code block
- Discord: embed shows full command up to 4096-char limit
- Windows: skip SIGALRM-based test timeout (Unix-only)
- Updated tests: replaced view-flow tests with direct approval tests

Cherry-picked from PR #1566 by crazywriter1.

* fix(cli): flush stdout during agent loop to prevent macOS display freeze (#1624)

The interrupt polling loop in chat() waited on the queue without
invalidating the prompt_toolkit renderer. On macOS, the StdoutProxy
buffer only flushed on input events, causing the CLI to appear frozen
during tool execution until the user typed a key.

Fix: call _invalidate() on each queue timeout (every ~100ms, throttled
to 150ms) to force the renderer to flush buffered agent output.

* fix(claw): warn when API keys are skipped during OpenClaw migration (#1580)

When --migrate-secrets is not passed (the default), API keys like
OPENROUTER_API_KEY are silently skipped with no warning. Users don't
realize their keys weren't migrated until the agent fails to connect.

Add a post-migration warning with actionable instructions: either
re-run with --migrate-secrets or add the key manually via
hermes config set.

Cherry-picked from PR #1593 by ygd58.

* fix(security): block sandbox backend creds from subprocess env (#1264)

Add Modal and Daytona sandbox credentials to the subprocess env
blocklist so they're not leaked to agent terminal sessions via
printenv/env.

Cherry-picked from PR #1571 by ygd58.

---------

Co-authored-by: buray <ygd58@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lbn <llbn@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: crazywriter1 <53251494+crazywriter1@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-17 02:20:42 -07:00

457 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""Local execution environment with interrupt support and non-blocking I/O."""
import glob
import os
import platform
import shutil
import signal
import subprocess
import threading
import time
_IS_WINDOWS = platform.system() == "Windows"
from tools.environments.base import BaseEnvironment
from tools.environments.persistent_shell import PersistentShellMixin
from tools.interrupt import is_interrupted
# Unique marker to isolate real command output from shell init/exit noise.
# printf (no trailing newline) keeps the boundaries clean for splitting.
_OUTPUT_FENCE = "__HERMES_FENCE_a9f7b3__"
# Hermes-internal env vars that should NOT leak into terminal subprocesses.
# These are loaded from ~/.hermes/.env for Hermes' own LLM/provider calls
# but can break external CLIs (e.g. codex) that also honor them.
# See: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/1002
#
# Built dynamically from the provider registry so new providers are
# automatically covered without manual blocklist maintenance.
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX = "_HERMES_FORCE_"
def _build_provider_env_blocklist() -> frozenset:
"""Derive the blocklist from provider, tool, and gateway config.
Automatically picks up api_key_env_vars and base_url_env_var from
every registered provider, plus tool/messaging env vars from the
optional config registry, so new Hermes-managed secrets are blocked
in subprocesses without having to maintain multiple static lists.
"""
blocked: set[str] = set()
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
for pconfig in PROVIDER_REGISTRY.values():
blocked.update(pconfig.api_key_env_vars)
if pconfig.base_url_env_var:
blocked.add(pconfig.base_url_env_var)
except ImportError:
pass
try:
from hermes_cli.config import OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS
for name, metadata in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.items():
category = metadata.get("category")
if category in {"tool", "messaging"}:
blocked.add(name)
elif category == "setting" and metadata.get("password"):
blocked.add(name)
except ImportError:
pass
# Vars not covered above but still Hermes-internal / conflict-prone.
blocked.update({
"OPENAI_BASE_URL",
"OPENAI_API_KEY",
"OPENAI_API_BASE", # legacy alias
"OPENAI_ORG_ID",
"OPENAI_ORGANIZATION",
"OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
"ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL",
"ANTHROPIC_TOKEN", # OAuth token (not in registry as env var)
"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
"LLM_MODEL",
# Expanded isolation for other major providers (Issue #1002)
"GOOGLE_API_KEY", # Gemini / Google AI Studio
"DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", # DeepSeek
"MISTRAL_API_KEY", # Mistral AI
"GROQ_API_KEY", # Groq
"TOGETHER_API_KEY", # Together AI
"PERPLEXITY_API_KEY", # Perplexity
"COHERE_API_KEY", # Cohere
"FIREWORKS_API_KEY", # Fireworks AI
"XAI_API_KEY", # xAI (Grok)
"HELICONE_API_KEY", # LLM Observability proxy
# Gateway/runtime config not represented in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.
"TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL",
"TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME",
"DISCORD_HOME_CHANNEL",
"DISCORD_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME",
"DISCORD_REQUIRE_MENTION",
"DISCORD_FREE_RESPONSE_CHANNELS",
"DISCORD_AUTO_THREAD",
"SLACK_HOME_CHANNEL",
"SLACK_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME",
"SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS",
"WHATSAPP_ENABLED",
"WHATSAPP_MODE",
"WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS",
"SIGNAL_HTTP_URL",
"SIGNAL_ACCOUNT",
"SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS",
"SIGNAL_GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS",
"SIGNAL_HOME_CHANNEL",
"SIGNAL_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME",
"SIGNAL_IGNORE_STORIES",
"HASS_TOKEN",
"HASS_URL",
"EMAIL_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_PASSWORD",
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST",
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST",
"EMAIL_HOME_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_HOME_ADDRESS_NAME",
"GATEWAY_ALLOWED_USERS",
# Skills Hub / GitHub app auth paths and aliases.
"GH_TOKEN",
"GITHUB_APP_ID",
"GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH",
"GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID",
# Remote sandbox backend credentials.
"MODAL_TOKEN_ID",
"MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET",
"DAYTONA_API_KEY",
})
return frozenset(blocked)
_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST = _build_provider_env_blocklist()
def _sanitize_subprocess_env(base_env: dict | None, extra_env: dict | None = None) -> dict:
"""Filter Hermes-managed secrets from a subprocess environment.
`_HERMES_FORCE_<VAR>` entries in ``extra_env`` opt a blocked variable back in
intentionally for callers that truly need it.
"""
sanitized: dict[str, str] = {}
for key, value in (base_env or {}).items():
if key.startswith(_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX):
continue
if key not in _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST:
sanitized[key] = value
for key, value in (extra_env or {}).items():
if key.startswith(_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX):
real_key = key[len(_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX):]
sanitized[real_key] = value
elif key not in _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST:
sanitized[key] = value
return sanitized
def _find_bash() -> str:
"""Find bash for command execution.
The fence wrapper uses bash syntax (semicolons, $?, printf), so we
must use bash — not the user's $SHELL which could be fish/zsh/etc.
On Windows: uses Git Bash (bundled with Git for Windows).
"""
if not _IS_WINDOWS:
return (
shutil.which("bash")
or ("/usr/bin/bash" if os.path.isfile("/usr/bin/bash") else None)
or ("/bin/bash" if os.path.isfile("/bin/bash") else None)
or os.environ.get("SHELL") # last resort: whatever they have
or "/bin/sh"
)
# Windows: look for Git Bash (installed with Git for Windows).
# Allow override via env var (same pattern as Claude Code).
custom = os.environ.get("HERMES_GIT_BASH_PATH")
if custom and os.path.isfile(custom):
return custom
# shutil.which finds bash.exe if Git\bin is on PATH
found = shutil.which("bash")
if found:
return found
# Check common Git for Windows install locations
for candidate in (
os.path.join(os.environ.get("ProgramFiles", r"C:\Program Files"), "Git", "bin", "bash.exe"),
os.path.join(os.environ.get("ProgramFiles(x86)", r"C:\Program Files (x86)"), "Git", "bin", "bash.exe"),
os.path.join(os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA", ""), "Programs", "Git", "bin", "bash.exe"),
):
if candidate and os.path.isfile(candidate):
return candidate
raise RuntimeError(
"Git Bash not found. Hermes Agent requires Git for Windows on Windows.\n"
"Install it from: https://git-scm.com/download/win\n"
"Or set HERMES_GIT_BASH_PATH to your bash.exe location."
)
# Backward compat — process_registry.py imports this name
_find_shell = _find_bash
# Noise lines emitted by interactive shells when stdin is not a terminal.
# Used as a fallback when output fence markers are missing.
_SHELL_NOISE_SUBSTRINGS = (
# bash
"bash: cannot set terminal process group",
"bash: no job control in this shell",
"no job control in this shell",
"cannot set terminal process group",
"tcsetattr: Inappropriate ioctl for device",
# zsh / oh-my-zsh / macOS terminal session
"Restored session:",
"Saving session...",
"Last login:",
"command not found:",
"Oh My Zsh",
"compinit:",
)
def _clean_shell_noise(output: str) -> str:
"""Strip shell startup/exit warnings that leak when using -i without a TTY.
Removes lines matching known noise patterns from both the beginning
and end of the output. Lines in the middle are left untouched.
"""
def _is_noise(line: str) -> bool:
return any(noise in line for noise in _SHELL_NOISE_SUBSTRINGS)
lines = output.split("\n")
# Strip leading noise
while lines and _is_noise(lines[0]):
lines.pop(0)
# Strip trailing noise (walk backwards, skip empty lines from split)
end = len(lines) - 1
while end >= 0 and (not lines[end] or _is_noise(lines[end])):
end -= 1
if end < 0:
return ""
cleaned = lines[: end + 1]
result = "\n".join(cleaned)
# Preserve trailing newline if original had one
if output.endswith("\n") and result and not result.endswith("\n"):
result += "\n"
return result
_SANE_PATH = "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
def _make_run_env(env: dict) -> dict:
"""Build a run environment with a sane PATH and provider-var stripping."""
merged = dict(os.environ | env)
run_env = {}
for k, v in merged.items():
if k.startswith(_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX):
real_key = k[len(_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX):]
run_env[real_key] = v
elif k not in _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST:
run_env[k] = v
existing_path = run_env.get("PATH", "")
if "/usr/bin" not in existing_path.split(":"):
run_env["PATH"] = f"{existing_path}:{_SANE_PATH}" if existing_path else _SANE_PATH
return run_env
def _extract_fenced_output(raw: str) -> str:
"""Extract real command output from between fence markers.
The execute() method wraps each command with printf(FENCE) markers.
This function finds the first and last fence and returns only the
content between them, which is the actual command output free of
any shell init/exit noise.
Falls back to pattern-based _clean_shell_noise if fences are missing.
"""
first = raw.find(_OUTPUT_FENCE)
if first == -1:
return _clean_shell_noise(raw)
start = first + len(_OUTPUT_FENCE)
last = raw.rfind(_OUTPUT_FENCE)
if last <= first:
# Only start fence found (e.g. user command called `exit`)
return _clean_shell_noise(raw[start:])
return raw[start:last]
class LocalEnvironment(PersistentShellMixin, BaseEnvironment):
"""Run commands directly on the host machine.
Features:
- Popen + polling for interrupt support (user can cancel mid-command)
- Background stdout drain thread to prevent pipe buffer deadlocks
- stdin_data support for piping content (bypasses ARG_MAX limits)
- sudo -S transform via SUDO_PASSWORD env var
- Uses interactive login shell so full user env is available
- Optional persistent shell mode (cwd/env vars survive across calls)
"""
def __init__(self, cwd: str = "", timeout: int = 60, env: dict = None,
persistent: bool = False):
super().__init__(cwd=cwd or os.getcwd(), timeout=timeout, env=env)
self.persistent = persistent
if self.persistent:
self._init_persistent_shell()
@property
def _temp_prefix(self) -> str:
return f"/tmp/hermes-local-{self._session_id}"
def _spawn_shell_process(self) -> subprocess.Popen:
user_shell = _find_bash()
run_env = _make_run_env(self.env)
return subprocess.Popen(
[user_shell, "-l"],
stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
text=True,
env=run_env,
preexec_fn=None if _IS_WINDOWS else os.setsid,
)
def _read_temp_files(self, *paths: str) -> list[str]:
results = []
for path in paths:
if os.path.exists(path):
with open(path) as f:
results.append(f.read())
else:
results.append("")
return results
def _kill_shell_children(self):
if self._shell_pid is None:
return
try:
subprocess.run(
["pkill", "-P", str(self._shell_pid)],
capture_output=True, timeout=5,
)
except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, FileNotFoundError):
pass
def _cleanup_temp_files(self):
for f in glob.glob(f"{self._temp_prefix}-*"):
if os.path.exists(f):
os.remove(f)
def _execute_oneshot(self, command: str, cwd: str = "", *,
timeout: int | None = None,
stdin_data: str | None = None) -> dict:
work_dir = cwd or self.cwd or os.getcwd()
effective_timeout = timeout or self.timeout
exec_command, sudo_stdin = self._prepare_command(command)
if sudo_stdin is not None and stdin_data is not None:
effective_stdin = sudo_stdin + stdin_data
elif sudo_stdin is not None:
effective_stdin = sudo_stdin
else:
effective_stdin = stdin_data
user_shell = _find_bash()
fenced_cmd = (
f"printf '{_OUTPUT_FENCE}';"
f" {exec_command};"
f" __hermes_rc=$?;"
f" printf '{_OUTPUT_FENCE}';"
f" exit $__hermes_rc"
)
run_env = _make_run_env(self.env)
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[user_shell, "-lic", fenced_cmd],
text=True,
cwd=work_dir,
env=run_env,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
stdin=subprocess.PIPE if effective_stdin is not None else subprocess.DEVNULL,
preexec_fn=None if _IS_WINDOWS else os.setsid,
)
if effective_stdin is not None:
def _write_stdin():
try:
proc.stdin.write(effective_stdin)
proc.stdin.close()
except (BrokenPipeError, OSError):
pass
threading.Thread(target=_write_stdin, daemon=True).start()
_output_chunks: list[str] = []
def _drain_stdout():
try:
for line in proc.stdout:
_output_chunks.append(line)
except ValueError:
pass
finally:
try:
proc.stdout.close()
except Exception:
pass
reader = threading.Thread(target=_drain_stdout, daemon=True)
reader.start()
deadline = time.monotonic() + effective_timeout
while proc.poll() is None:
if is_interrupted():
try:
if _IS_WINDOWS:
proc.terminate()
else:
pgid = os.getpgid(proc.pid)
os.killpg(pgid, signal.SIGTERM)
try:
proc.wait(timeout=1.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
os.killpg(pgid, signal.SIGKILL)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
reader.join(timeout=2)
return {
"output": "".join(_output_chunks) + "\n[Command interrupted — user sent a new message]",
"returncode": 130,
}
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
try:
if _IS_WINDOWS:
proc.terminate()
else:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), signal.SIGTERM)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError):
proc.kill()
reader.join(timeout=2)
return self._timeout_result(effective_timeout)
time.sleep(0.2)
reader.join(timeout=5)
output = _extract_fenced_output("".join(_output_chunks))
return {"output": output, "returncode": proc.returncode}