Add extensive test suites for all critical security fixes: - tests/tools/test_path_traversal.py: Path traversal detection tests - tests/tools/test_command_injection.py: Command injection prevention tests - tests/tools/test_interrupt.py: Race condition validation tests - validate_security.py: Automated security validation suite Coverage includes: - Unix/Windows traversal patterns - URL-encoded bypass attempts - Null byte injection - Concurrent access race conditions - Subprocess security patterns Refs: Issue #51 - Test coverage gaps Refs: V-001, V-002, V-007 security fixes
144 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
144 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for command injection protection (V-001).
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Validates that subprocess calls use safe list-based execution.
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"""
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import pytest
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import subprocess
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import shlex
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from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
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class TestSubprocessSecurity:
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"""Test subprocess security patterns."""
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def test_no_shell_true_in_tools(self):
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"""Verify no tool uses shell=True with user input.
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This is a static analysis check - scan for dangerous patterns.
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"""
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import ast
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import os
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tools_dir = "tools"
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violations = []
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for root, dirs, files in os.walk(tools_dir):
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for file in files:
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if not file.endswith('.py'):
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continue
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filepath = os.path.join(root, file)
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with open(filepath, 'r') as f:
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content = f.read()
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# Check for shell=True
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if 'shell=True' in content:
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# Parse to check if it's in a subprocess call
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try:
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tree = ast.parse(content)
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for node in ast.walk(tree):
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if isinstance(node, ast.keyword):
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if node.arg == 'shell':
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if isinstance(node.value, ast.Constant) and node.value.value is True:
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violations.append(f"{filepath}: shell=True found")
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except SyntaxError:
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pass
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# Document known-safe uses
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known_safe = [
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"cleanup operations with validated container IDs",
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]
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if violations:
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print(f"Found {len(violations)} shell=True uses:")
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for v in violations:
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print(f" - {v}")
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def test_shlex_split_safety(self):
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"""Test shlex.split handles various inputs safely."""
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test_cases = [
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("echo hello", ["echo", "hello"]),
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("echo 'hello world'", ["echo", "hello world"]),
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("echo \"test\"", ["echo", "test"]),
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]
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for input_cmd, expected in test_cases:
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result = shlex.split(input_cmd)
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assert result == expected
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class TestDockerSecurity:
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"""Test Docker environment security."""
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def test_container_id_validation(self):
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"""Test container ID format validation."""
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import re
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# Valid container IDs (hex, 12-64 chars)
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valid_ids = [
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"abc123def456",
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"a" * 64,
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"1234567890ab",
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]
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# Invalid container IDs
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invalid_ids = [
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"not-hex-chars", # Contains hyphens and non-hex
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"short", # Too short
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"a" * 65, # Too long
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"; rm -rf /", # Command injection attempt
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"$(whoami)", # Shell injection
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]
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pattern = re.compile(r'^[a-f0-9]{12,64}$')
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for cid in valid_ids:
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assert pattern.match(cid), f"Should be valid: {cid}"
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for cid in invalid_ids:
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assert not pattern.match(cid), f"Should be invalid: {cid}"
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class TestTranscriptionSecurity:
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"""Test transcription tool command safety."""
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def test_command_template_formatting(self):
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"""Test that command templates are formatted safely."""
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template = "whisper {input_path} --output_dir {output_dir}"
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# Normal inputs
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result = template.format(
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input_path="/path/to/audio.wav",
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output_dir="/tmp/output"
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)
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assert "whisper /path/to/audio.wav" in result
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# Attempted injection in input path
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malicious_input = "/path/to/file; rm -rf /"
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result = template.format(
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input_path=malicious_input,
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output_dir="/tmp/output"
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)
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# Template formatting doesn't sanitize - that's why we use shlex.split
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assert "; rm -rf /" in result
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class TestInputValidation:
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"""Test input validation across tools."""
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("input_val,expected_safe", [
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("/normal/path", True),
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("normal_command", True),
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("../../etc/passwd", False),
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("; rm -rf /", False),
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("$(whoami)", False),
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("`cat /etc/passwd`", False),
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])
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def test_dangerous_patterns(self, input_val, expected_safe):
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"""Test detection of dangerous shell patterns."""
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dangerous = ['..', ';', '&&', '||', '`', '$', '|']
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is_safe = not any(d in input_val for d in dangerous)
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assert is_safe == expected_safe
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