7f78deebe7
_load_config_files() had the same hermes_home / item pattern without containment checks. While config.yaml is user-controlled (lower threat than skill frontmatter), defense in depth prevents exploitation via config injection or copy-paste mistakes.
361 lines
13 KiB
Python
361 lines
13 KiB
Python
"""Tests for credential file passthrough and skills directory mounting."""
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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from tools.credential_files import (
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clear_credential_files,
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get_credential_file_mounts,
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get_skills_directory_mount,
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iter_skills_files,
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register_credential_file,
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register_credential_files,
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reset_config_cache,
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)
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _clean_state():
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"""Reset module state between tests."""
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clear_credential_files()
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reset_config_cache()
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yield
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clear_credential_files()
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reset_config_cache()
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class TestRegisterCredentialFiles:
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def test_dict_with_path_key(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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(hermes_home / "token.json").write_text("{}")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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missing = register_credential_files([{"path": "token.json"}])
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assert missing == []
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert len(mounts) == 1
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assert mounts[0]["host_path"] == str(hermes_home / "token.json")
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assert mounts[0]["container_path"] == "/root/.hermes/token.json"
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def test_dict_with_name_key_fallback(self, tmp_path):
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"""Skills use 'name' instead of 'path' — both should work."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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(hermes_home / "google_token.json").write_text("{}")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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missing = register_credential_files([
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{"name": "google_token.json", "description": "OAuth token"},
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])
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assert missing == []
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert len(mounts) == 1
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assert "google_token.json" in mounts[0]["container_path"]
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def test_string_entry(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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(hermes_home / "secret.key").write_text("key")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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missing = register_credential_files(["secret.key"])
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assert missing == []
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert len(mounts) == 1
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def test_missing_file_reported(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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missing = register_credential_files([
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{"name": "does_not_exist.json"},
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])
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assert "does_not_exist.json" in missing
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assert get_credential_file_mounts() == []
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def test_path_takes_precedence_over_name(self, tmp_path):
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"""When both path and name are present, path wins."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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(hermes_home / "real.json").write_text("{}")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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missing = register_credential_files([
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{"path": "real.json", "name": "wrong.json"},
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])
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assert missing == []
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert "real.json" in mounts[0]["container_path"]
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class TestSkillsDirectoryMount:
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def test_returns_mount_when_skills_dir_exists(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
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skills_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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(skills_dir / "test-skill").mkdir()
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(skills_dir / "test-skill" / "SKILL.md").write_text("# test")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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mount = get_skills_directory_mount()
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assert mount is not None
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assert mount["host_path"] == str(skills_dir)
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assert mount["container_path"] == "/root/.hermes/skills"
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def test_returns_none_when_no_skills_dir(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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mount = get_skills_directory_mount()
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assert mount is None
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def test_custom_container_base(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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(hermes_home / "skills").mkdir(parents=True)
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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mount = get_skills_directory_mount(container_base="/home/user/.hermes")
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assert mount["container_path"] == "/home/user/.hermes/skills"
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def test_symlinks_are_sanitized(self, tmp_path):
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"""Symlinks in skills dir should be excluded from the mount."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
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skills_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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(skills_dir / "legit.md").write_text("# real skill")
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# Create a symlink pointing outside the skills tree
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secret = tmp_path / "secret.txt"
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secret.write_text("TOP SECRET")
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(skills_dir / "evil_link").symlink_to(secret)
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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mount = get_skills_directory_mount()
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assert mount is not None
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# The mount path should be a sanitized copy, not the original
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safe_path = Path(mount["host_path"])
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assert safe_path != skills_dir
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# Legitimate file should be present
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assert (safe_path / "legit.md").exists()
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assert (safe_path / "legit.md").read_text() == "# real skill"
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# Symlink should NOT be present
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assert not (safe_path / "evil_link").exists()
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def test_no_symlinks_returns_original_dir(self, tmp_path):
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"""When no symlinks exist, the original dir is returned (no copy)."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
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skills_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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(skills_dir / "skill.md").write_text("ok")
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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mount = get_skills_directory_mount()
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assert mount["host_path"] == str(skills_dir)
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class TestIterSkillsFiles:
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def test_returns_files_skipping_symlinks(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
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(skills_dir / "cat" / "myskill").mkdir(parents=True)
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(skills_dir / "cat" / "myskill" / "SKILL.md").write_text("# skill")
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(skills_dir / "cat" / "myskill" / "scripts").mkdir()
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(skills_dir / "cat" / "myskill" / "scripts" / "run.sh").write_text("#!/bin/bash")
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# Add a symlink that should be filtered
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secret = tmp_path / "secret"
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secret.write_text("nope")
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(skills_dir / "cat" / "myskill" / "evil").symlink_to(secret)
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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files = iter_skills_files()
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paths = {f["container_path"] for f in files}
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assert "/root/.hermes/skills/cat/myskill/SKILL.md" in paths
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assert "/root/.hermes/skills/cat/myskill/scripts/run.sh" in paths
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# Symlink should be excluded
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assert not any("evil" in f["container_path"] for f in files)
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def test_empty_when_no_skills_dir(self, tmp_path):
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {"HERMES_HOME": str(hermes_home)}):
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assert iter_skills_files() == []
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class TestPathTraversalSecurity:
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"""Path traversal and absolute path rejection.
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A malicious skill could declare::
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required_credential_files:
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- path: '../../.ssh/id_rsa'
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Without containment checks, this would mount the host's SSH private key
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into the container sandbox, leaking it to the skill's execution environment.
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"""
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def test_dotdot_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""'../sensitive' must not escape HERMES_HOME."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / ".hermes"))
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(tmp_path / ".hermes").mkdir()
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# Create a sensitive file one level above hermes_home
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sensitive = tmp_path / "sensitive.json"
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sensitive.write_text('{"secret": "value"}')
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result = register_credential_file("../sensitive.json")
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assert result is False
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assert get_credential_file_mounts() == []
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def test_deep_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""'../../etc/passwd' style traversal must be rejected."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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# Create a fake sensitive file outside hermes_home
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ssh_dir = tmp_path / ".ssh"
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ssh_dir.mkdir()
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(ssh_dir / "id_rsa").write_text("PRIVATE KEY")
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result = register_credential_file("../../.ssh/id_rsa")
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assert result is False
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assert get_credential_file_mounts() == []
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def test_absolute_path_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Absolute paths must be rejected regardless of whether they exist."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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# Create a file at an absolute path
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sensitive = tmp_path / "absolute.json"
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sensitive.write_text("{}")
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result = register_credential_file(str(sensitive))
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assert result is False
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assert get_credential_file_mounts() == []
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def test_legitimate_file_still_works(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Normal files inside HERMES_HOME must still be registered."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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(hermes_home / "token.json").write_text('{"token": "abc"}')
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result = register_credential_file("token.json")
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assert result is True
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert len(mounts) == 1
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assert "token.json" in mounts[0]["container_path"]
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def test_nested_subdir_inside_hermes_home_allowed(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Files in subdirectories of HERMES_HOME must be allowed."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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subdir = hermes_home / "creds"
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subdir.mkdir()
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(subdir / "oauth.json").write_text("{}")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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result = register_credential_file("creds/oauth.json")
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assert result is True
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def test_symlink_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A symlink inside HERMES_HOME pointing outside must be rejected."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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# Create a sensitive file outside hermes_home
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sensitive = tmp_path / "sensitive.json"
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sensitive.write_text('{"secret": "value"}')
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# Create a symlink inside hermes_home pointing outside
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symlink = hermes_home / "evil_link.json"
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try:
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symlink.symlink_to(sensitive)
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
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pytest.skip("Symlinks not supported on this platform")
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result = register_credential_file("evil_link.json")
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# The resolved path escapes HERMES_HOME — must be rejected
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assert result is False
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assert get_credential_file_mounts() == []
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Config-based credential files — same containment checks
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestConfigPathTraversal:
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"""terminal.credential_files in config.yaml must also reject traversal."""
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def _write_config(self, hermes_home: Path, cred_files: list):
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import yaml
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config_path = hermes_home / "config.yaml"
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config_path.write_text(yaml.dump({"terminal": {"credential_files": cred_files}}))
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def test_config_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""'../secret' in config.yaml must not escape HERMES_HOME."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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sensitive = tmp_path / "secret.json"
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sensitive.write_text("{}")
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self._write_config(hermes_home, ["../secret.json"])
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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host_paths = [m["host_path"] for m in mounts]
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assert str(sensitive) not in host_paths
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assert str(sensitive.resolve()) not in host_paths
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def test_config_absolute_path_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Absolute paths in config.yaml must be rejected."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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sensitive = tmp_path / "abs.json"
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sensitive.write_text("{}")
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self._write_config(hermes_home, [str(sensitive)])
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert mounts == []
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def test_config_legitimate_file_works(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Normal files inside HERMES_HOME via config must still mount."""
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hermes_home = tmp_path / ".hermes"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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(hermes_home / "oauth.json").write_text("{}")
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self._write_config(hermes_home, ["oauth.json"])
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mounts = get_credential_file_mounts()
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assert len(mounts) == 1
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assert "oauth.json" in mounts[0]["container_path"]
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