The corpus manifest records what was ingested and whether the person still allows it; it does not
record whether the labels are right. This adds the labeling control the data-flow threat model
named: scripts/review_corpus.py, a command-line tool with no app screen.
- The review queue shows the contributor's proposal and carries no model field at all: blindness is
structural, because build_queue() never receives predictions.
- reveal() refuses a contribution with no committed review, so the model answer cannot steer the
human who labels it. Revealing appends nothing.
- A review is one append-only line carrying the proposal it judged; a correction must change it. An
adjudication is a second reviewer's line that names the record it resolves; the review it
overrules survives untouched.
- A withdrawn contribution cannot be queued, reviewed, revealed, adjudicated, or trained on, and the
refusal says it was withdrawn rather than that it is already reviewed.
- trainable_records() returns only active samples with a human decision that was not an exclusion,
so unreviewed proposals are never training data.
Tests are written first against every refusal (tests/corpus-review.test.py, 21 cases); the release
builder runs the suite and gates four on-camera captions, and the demo now runs the real queue ->
review -> reveal -> adjudicate -> withdraw sequence against the committed synthetic sample and draws
the evidence card from that output. docs/REVIEWER-TOOL.md is the contract; no model was measured.
Promote the ingest script into an auditable corpus pipeline. Each sample now
records consent (version + timestamp), source kind and raw-input digest, both
hashes, the derivation pipeline, review status, split, and lifecycle state, with
the caller's path never written down.
Withdrawal is a new `--revoke <contribution-id> --reason` operation: it deletes
the derived image and any raw pre-derivation copy, then appends a tombstone that
addresses each removed artifact by contribution id and digest while dropping
labels, subject key, and paths. History is append-only, so the original sample
record survives the withdrawal it documents.
Illegal moves are refused instead of silently applied: revoked -> active,
revoking an unknown or already-revoked contribution, an unknown state, a
duplicate contribution id, and a second label set for the same derived image.
The duplicate guard runs before any byte is written, so a refused ingest cannot
strand an image in the active dataset.
Tests written first and watched fail (tests/corpus-manifest.test.py): provenance,
tombstone + byte removal, active-record filtering, and the transition guards.
The transition helper itself passed on first write and is reported as a
hold-out check rather than a RED cycle. Wired into the quality workflow and
check:syntax; contract documented in docs/CORPUS-MANIFEST.md.
No browser surface changed, so record_release_demo.mjs is untouched and claims
nothing new: the nearest honest visible effect is the withdrawn-receipt
tombstone already recorded for #24.
Timmy
timmy