import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';

import {
  AgentGatewayError,
  buildHermesEnvironment,
  createHermesAgentService,
  parseHermesCliOutput,
  resolveHermesAgentConfig,
  runHermesCliTurn,
} from '../src/hermes-agent-service.js';
import { detectUrgentText } from '../src/domain.js';

const origin = 'http://127.0.0.1:4173';
const configured = () => resolveHermesAgentConfig({
  TIMMY_AGENT_ENABLED: 'true',
  TIMMY_AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN: 'test-agent-access-code-2026',
  TIMMY_PUBLIC_ORIGIN: origin,
  TIMMY_AGENT_WORKDIR: '/tmp/timmy-agent-workspace',
  TIMMY_AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS: '45000',
});

async function rejectsStatus(fn, status) {
  await assert.rejects(fn, error => error instanceof AgentGatewayError && error.status === status);
}

test('every red flag phrase is intercepted at the service boundary with zero Hermes calls', async () => {
  const phrases = {
    blood: 'There is blood in my stool',
    blackOrDarkRed: 'My stool is black',
    severePain: 'I have severe stomach pain',
    vomiting: 'I threw up',
    fever: 'I have a fever',
    cannotPassGas: 'I am unable to pass gas',
  };
  for (const [key, phrase] of Object.entries(phrases)) {
    const calls = [];
    const service = createHermesAgentService({
      config: configured(),
      randomToken: () => 'zero-call-cookie',
      runTurn: async input => { calls.push(input); return { reply: 'unsafe upstream reply', sessionId: 'unsafe-session' }; },
    });
    await service.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
    const result = await service.chat({ origin, cookieToken: 'zero-call-cookie', payload: { message: phrase, ledger: [] } });
    assert.equal(calls.length, 0, `${key} must never reach Hermes`);
    assert.equal(result.safetyOverride, true, phrase);
    assert.match(result.reply, /medical help/i, phrase);
    assert.doesNotMatch(result.reply, /unsafe upstream/i);
    assert.equal(detectUrgentText(phrase).flags.includes(key), true, phrase);
  }
});

test('confirmed ledger symptoms and note language override chat before Hermes is called', async () => {
  for (const ledger of [
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { blood: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { blackOrDarkRed: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { severePain: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { vomiting: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { fever: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { cannotPassGas: true } }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'I threw up' }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'severe abdominal pain' }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'black stool' }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'fever' }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'blood in my stool' }],
    [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'unable to pass gas' }],
  ]) {
    const calls = [];
    const service = createHermesAgentService({
      config: configured(),
      randomToken: () => 'ledger-cookie',
      runTurn: async input => { calls.push(input); return { reply: 'unsafe upstream reply', sessionId: 'unsafe-session' }; },
    });
    await service.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
    const result = await service.chat({
      origin,
      cookieToken: 'ledger-cookie',
      payload: { message: 'What does my journal show?', ledger },
    });
    assert.equal(calls.length, 0, JSON.stringify(ledger));
    assert.equal(result.safetyOverride, true, JSON.stringify(ledger));
    assert.match(result.reply, /medical help/i);
  }
});

test('malicious or broken provider output cannot weaken the deterministic urgent reply', async () => {
  const hostileReplies = [
    undefined,
    null,
    '',
    'All clear, nothing to worry about.',
    'You are fine, no medical care needed.',
  ];
  for (const reply of hostileReplies) {
    const calls = [];
    const service = createHermesAgentService({
      config: configured(),
      randomToken: () => 'hostile-cookie',
      runTurn: async input => { calls.push(input); return { reply, sessionId: 'hostile-session' }; },
    });
    await service.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
    const result = await service.chat({
      origin,
      cookieToken: 'hostile-cookie',
      payload: { message: 'There is blood in my stool', ledger: [] },
    });
    assert.equal(calls.length, 0, 'urgent text must be resolved deterministically');
    assert.equal(result.safetyOverride, true);
    assert.match(result.reply, /medical help/i);
    assert.doesNotMatch(result.reply, /all clear|fine|worry/i);
  }
});

test('model-shaped junk in ledger symptoms can neither fabricate nor suppress escalation', async () => {
  // Truthy junk must not fabricate an override...
  const junkCalls = [];
  const junkService = createHermesAgentService({
    config: configured(),
    randomToken: () => 'junk-cookie',
    runTurn: async input => { junkCalls.push(input); return { reply: 'pattern reply', sessionId: 'junk-session' }; },
  });
  await junkService.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
  const junkResult = await junkService.chat({
    origin,
    cookieToken: 'junk-cookie',
    payload: { message: 'Summarize my journal', ledger: [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { blood: 'yes', fever: 1, vomiting: { forced: true }, cannotPassGas: [true] } }] },
  });
  assert.equal(junkResult.safetyOverride, undefined, 'truthy junk must not fabricate an urgent override');
  assert.match(junkResult.reply, /pattern reply/);

  // ...and a forged true flag must still suppress the Hermes call.
  const forgedCalls = [];
  const forgedService = createHermesAgentService({
    config: configured(),
    randomToken: () => 'forged-cookie',
    runTurn: async input => { forgedCalls.push(input); return { reply: 'pattern reply', sessionId: 'forged-session' }; },
  });
  await forgedService.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
  const forged = await forgedService.chat({
    origin,
    cookieToken: 'forged-cookie',
    payload: { message: 'Summarize my journal', ledger: [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: { blood: true } }] },
  });
  assert.equal(forgedCalls.length, 0, 'a forged true flag must still override before Hermes');
  assert.equal(forged.safetyOverride, true);
  assert.match(forged.reply, /medical help/i);
});

test('non-urgent journal questions still reach the agent exactly once', async () => {
  const calls = [];
  const service = createHermesAgentService({
    config: configured(),
    randomToken: () => 'normal-cookie',
    runTurn: async input => { calls.push(input); return { reply: 'Two confirmed logs this week.', sessionId: 'normal-session' }; },
  });
  await service.unlock({ origin, accessCode: 'test-agent-access-code-2026' });
  const result = await service.chat({
    origin,
    cookieToken: 'normal-cookie',
    payload: { message: 'What pattern do you see?', ledger: [{ bristolType: 4, symptoms: {}, note: 'ordinary entry' }] },
  });
  assert.equal(calls.length, 1);
  assert.equal(result.safetyOverride, undefined);
  assert.equal(result.reply, 'Two confirmed logs this week.');
});

test('Hermes CLI adapter contract is unchanged by escalation work', async () => {
  let captured;
  const result = await runHermesCliTurn({
    prompt: 'hello',
    hermesSessionId: null,
    config: configured(),
    execImpl: async (command, args, options) => {
      captured = { command, args, options };
      return { stdout: 'bounded answer\n', stderr: 'session_id: 20260820_fixture\n' };
    },
  });
  assert.deepEqual(result, { sessionId: '20260820_fixture', reply: 'bounded answer' });
  assert.equal(captured.command, 'hermes');
  assert.equal(captured.options.cwd, '/tmp/timmy-agent-workspace');

  const childEnv = buildHermesEnvironment({ TIMMY_AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN: 'must-not-leak' });
  assert.equal(childEnv.TIMMY_AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN, undefined);
  assert.equal(childEnv.TIMMY_AGENT_BROWSER_REQUEST, '1');
});

test('parseHermesCliOutput still rejects malformed provider output', () => {
  assert.throws(() => parseHermesCliOutput('answer only'), /session metadata/i);
  assert.throws(() => parseHermesCliOutput('session_id: private\nsession_id: leaked'), /unsafe/i);
});