timmy-talking-turd/scripts/release_dashboard.mjs
Timmy d547b4887b
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fix: close hostile-review blockers in release observability
Strict vertical RED-GREEN TDD across eight review blockers:

- drill baseline: requires every required boundary check explicitly
  passing plus zero alerts of any severity before anything is announced
  or flipped; unknown, degraded, malformed, missing-boundary, and
  backlog-warning baselines exit 2 with switch count zero, and stdout
  stays empty whenever no drill actually ran
- manual fallback: deterministic truthful states — app-down,
  local-journal, none-required, and new app-state-unknown (availability
  null) so unknown telemetry can never render as proven availability or
  'no degradation'; runbook gains a state table with exact wording
- exact schema types: schemaVersion must be JSON number 1; counters and
  latency must be finite bounded integers (0..1e6, 0..3600000);
  generatedAtUtc must be canonical real UTC surviving round-trip;
  releaseTag/commit keep exact safe types; coercions reject
- control-safety: controlSafe strips LF/CR too, so hostile paths can no
  longer forge terminal lines (regression test ships a path embedding
  LF + forged PAGE text); read errors use fixed wording instead of
  echoing attacker-derived message bytes
- malformed checks reject the whole evidence object instead of silently
  disappearing beside healthy checks; forbidden top-level keys now fail
  closed rather than being ignored
- status/failureClass consistency: pass/unknown checks carrying any
  failureClass reject the file, so all-pass evidence can never page
  worker.outage (fail/degraded may stay classless, preserving the
  closed vocabulary and nullable schema)
- sanitization idempotence: omitted latency stays omitted on a second
  pass; explicit null latency rejects since the schema forbids it
- removed the always-false queue-depth tautology in the shared fixture
  and made the runbook contract test verify each rule's real numeric
  threshold against DEFAULT_ALERT_RULES

Preserved: closed failure-class vocabulary, queue depth 9/10/11 edges,
raw loopback-origin validation, app-down fallback, missing-boundary
rejection, transition semantics, and every independent drill case.
2026-08-22 23:40:23 +00:00

266 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// Local operator surface for release observability (issue #41).
// Consumes only sanitized evidence files or a loopback drill fixture.
// Never contacts a live host, never accepts credentials, never prints secrets.
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { sanitizeEvidence, buildDashboard, evaluateAlerts } from '../src/release-observability.js';
function argValue(args, flag) {
const index = args.indexOf(flag);
if (index === -1) return null;
return args[index + 1] || null;
}
// Terminal safety: strip C0/C1 control characters — newline and carriage
// return included — from any dynamically produced text before it reaches
// stdout/stderr. Hostile file paths or fixture payloads can therefore never
// forge additional terminal lines (e.g. a fake "PAGE worker.outage"): the
// only line boundaries in CLI output are the ones this program authors.
function controlSafe(text) {
return String(text)
.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F-\u009F]/g, '');
}
async function loadEvidence(source) {
if (source.drillOrigin) {
const response = await fetch(`${source.drillOrigin.replace(/\/$/, '')}/api/drill/checks`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`drill fixture returned ${response.status}`);
const body = await response.json();
return {
schemaVersion: 1,
releaseTag: controlSafe('daily-2026-08-22.1'),
commit: 'ca31e6d38bec649407f63880504554c59f2878ae',
generatedAtUtc: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, 'Z'),
checks: Array.isArray(body.checks) ? body.checks : [],
};
}
const raw = JSON.parse(await readFile(source.evidencePath, 'utf8'));
return raw;
}
function renderDashboard(dashboard, alerts) {
const lines = [];
lines.push('RELEASE OBSERVABILITY DASHBOARD');
lines.push(`release ${dashboard.identity.releaseTag} · commit ${dashboard.identity.commit.slice(0, 12)} · evidence ${dashboard.identity.generatedAtUtc}`);
lines.push('');
for (const boundary of ['app', 'api', 'queue', 'model']) {
const stats = dashboard.boundaries[boundary];
const latency = stats.latencyMs == null ? '' : ` · max latency ${stats.latencyMs}ms`;
const counterBits = Object.keys(stats.counters).sort()
.map(key => `${key}=${stats.counters[key]}`)
.join(' ');
const counterText = counterBits ? ` · ${counterBits}` : '';
lines.push(`${boundary.padEnd(6)}${stats.pass}/${stats.checks} pass · fail ${stats.fail} · degraded ${stats.degraded}${latency}${counterText}`);
}
lines.push('');
const failureEntries = Object.entries(dashboard.failureClasses);
if (failureEntries.length === 0) {
lines.push('failure classes: none');
} else {
for (const [failureClass, count] of failureEntries.sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])) {
lines.push(`failure class ${failureClass}: ${count}`);
}
}
lines.push('');
lines.push(`alerts (${alerts.length})`);
for (const alert of alerts) {
lines.push(`[${alert.severity.toUpperCase()}] ${alert.id} — owner ${alert.owner}, observed ${alert.count} >= threshold ${alert.threshold}`);
lines.push(` ${alert.message}`);
lines.push(` runbook: ${alert.runbook}`);
}
if (alerts.length === 0) lines.push('no alert conditions met');
return lines.join('\n');
}
async function main() {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
if (args.includes('--self-check')) {
console.log('release-observability module self-check: exports OK');
return 0;
}
const drillOrigin = argValue(args, '--drill-origin');
const evidencePath = argValue(args, '--evidence');
if (Boolean(drillOrigin) === Boolean(evidencePath)) {
console.error('usage: node scripts/release_dashboard.mjs (--evidence <sanitized-evidence.json> | --drill-origin <http://127.0.0.1:port>)');
return 2;
}
// Gate every network path before any fetch can happen: a drill may only
// ever address a validated bare loopback origin.
let validatedOrigin = null;
if (drillOrigin) {
try {
validatedOrigin = validateLoopbackOrigin(drillOrigin);
} catch (error) {
console.error(controlSafe(error.message));
return 2;
}
}
let rawEvidence;
try {
rawEvidence = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin: validatedOrigin, evidencePath });
} catch {
// Fixed wording on purpose: interpolating filesystem error messages would
// echo attacker-controlled path bytes (even sanitized) into the terminal.
console.error('release_dashboard: cannot read sanitized evidence (unreadable file or invalid JSON). No contents are echoed.');
return 2;
}
// Drill mode owns its whole flow: the baseline gate must speak with one
// voice ("not a genuine drill baseline") whether the fixture served
// unsanitizable evidence or merely unhealthy checks, and nothing may be
// rendered or flipped until the baseline proves genuinely healthy.
if (drillOrigin) return runDrill({ drillOrigin: validatedOrigin });
const validated = sanitizeEvidence(rawEvidence);
if (!validated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: evidence failed sanitization (schema mismatch, forbidden fields, or unbounded values). Nothing was rendered.');
return 2;
}
const dashboard = buildDashboard(validated.evidence);
const alerts = evaluateAlerts(dashboard);
console.log(renderDashboard(dashboard, alerts));
console.log('');
console.log(manualFallbackLine(dashboard.manualFallback));
return alerts.some(alert => alert.severity === 'page') ? 1 : 0;
}
// Truthful operator wording: the manual-fallback line is a safety statement,
// so each deterministic state says exactly what is known. Availability is
// only ever claimed from explicit passes; an unknown app boundary reads as
// unknown and demands hand verification — never as quiet health.
const FALLBACK_PHRASES = {
'none-required': 'all checks explicitly passing; no degradation observed; fallback not required',
'local-journal': 'degraded elsewhere; local journal remains usable',
'app-down': 'app boundary is down; local journal cannot be served',
'app-state-unknown': 'app state unknown; verify the local journal by hand before relying on it',
};
function manualFallbackLine(fallback, { shout = false } = {}) {
const label = fallback.available === null
? (shout ? 'UNKNOWN' : 'unknown')
: fallback.available
? (shout ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'available')
: (shout ? 'UNAVAILABLE' : 'unavailable');
return `manual fallback: ${label}${FALLBACK_PHRASES[fallback.reason] ?? fallback.reason}`;
}
// A drill may only ever talk to a throwaway fixture on 127.0.0.1. The origin
// must be a bare http URL whose host is exactly the loopback address: no
// credentials, no DNS names, no alternative IP encodings, no IPv6, no path,
// query, or fragment, and no scheme other than http.
const LOOPBACK_ORIGIN_PATTERN = /^http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:[0-9]{1,5}$/;
function validateLoopbackOrigin(rawOrigin) {
if (typeof rawOrigin !== 'string') {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: expected an http://127.0.0.1:<port> URL');
}
// Grammar gate runs on the RAW string first: the WHATWG URL parser
// canonicalizes hostile host encodings (hex octets, decimal IP integers,
// percent-encoded dots) into a clean-looking 127.0.0.1, so a normalized
// string can never be trusted on its own.
if (!LOOPBACK_ORIGIN_PATTERN.test(rawOrigin)) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: only a bare http://127.0.0.1:<port> loopback origin is permitted');
}
let parsed;
try {
parsed = new URL(rawOrigin);
} catch {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: not a valid URL');
}
// Round-trip defense in depth: the parsed form must be byte-identical to
// what was supplied, proving no hidden credentials, path, query, fragment,
// or alternative host encoding was smuggled past the grammar.
if (parsed.toString().replace(/\/$/, '') !== rawOrigin) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: URL did not round-trip as a bare loopback origin');
}
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' || parsed.hostname !== '127.0.0.1') {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: host must be exactly http://127.0.0.1');
}
const port = Number(parsed.port);
if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port < 1 || port > 65535) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: port must be between 1 and 65535');
}
return rawOrigin;
}
async function runDrill({ drillOrigin }) {
let origin;
try {
origin = validateLoopbackOrigin(drillOrigin);
} catch (error) {
console.error(controlSafe(error.message));
return 2;
}
// Genuine baseline: read the fixture's own current state BEFORE anything is
// announced or flipped. A drill may only start from proven health — every
// required boundary check must explicitly pass and zero alerts may fire.
// Unknown, degraded, malformed, missing-boundary, or warning baselines are
// refused here, so stdout stays empty whenever no drill actually ran.
const preRaw = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin });
const preValidated = sanitizeEvidence(preRaw);
if (!preValidated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: fixture evidence is unsanitizable: not a genuine drill baseline (schema mismatch, forbidden fields, or unbounded values). Nothing will be rendered or flipped.');
return 2;
}
const preDashboard = buildDashboard(preValidated.evidence);
const preAlerts = evaluateAlerts(preDashboard);
const allExplicitlyPassing = Object.values(preDashboard.boundaries).every(
boundary => boundary.checks > 0 && boundary.pass === boundary.checks,
);
if (!allExplicitlyPassing || preAlerts.length > 0) {
console.error('release_dashboard: fixture is not healthy before the drill: not a genuine drill baseline (every required boundary check must explicitly pass with zero alerts). Refusing to flip an already-down or uncertain worker.');
return 2;
}
console.log('');
console.log('WORKER OUTAGE DRILL (simulated fixture on loopback; no live host is contacted)');
console.log('pre-drill baseline: every required boundary check explicitly passing; alerts: none');
console.log('pre-drill: healthy (0 page alerts)');
try {
const response = await fetch(`${origin}/drill/outage`, { method: 'POST', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`fixture returned ${response.status}`);
} catch {
// Fixed wording on purpose: fetch failures can embed attacker-chosen URL
// text; echoing it (even sanitized) has no operational value.
console.error('release_dashboard: drill switch failed. The fixture switch was not verifiably flipped.');
return 2;
}
const postRaw = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin });
const postValidated = sanitizeEvidence(postRaw);
if (!postValidated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: post-outage evidence failed sanitization.');
return 2;
}
const postDashboard = buildDashboard(postValidated.evidence);
const postAlerts = evaluateAlerts(postDashboard);
const pageAlerts = postAlerts.filter(alert => alert.severity === 'page');
if (pageAlerts.length === 0) {
console.log('no outage observed after flip: the fixture never transitioned from healthy to outage.');
console.log('DRILL FAIL');
return 1;
}
console.log(`post-outage: exactly 1 alert expected, found ${pageAlerts.length}`);
for (const alert of pageAlerts) {
console.log(` ${alert.severity.toUpperCase()} ${alert.message.replace(/^PAGE /, '')}`);
console.log(` owner ${alert.owner} · threshold ${alert.threshold} · runbook ${alert.runbook}`);
}
console.log(manualFallbackLine(postDashboard.manualFallback, { shout: true }));
const pass = pageAlerts.length === 1
&& pageAlerts[0].id === 'worker.outage'
&& postDashboard.manualFallback.available === true;
console.log(pass ? 'DRILL PASS' : 'DRILL FAIL');
return pass ? 0 : 1;
}
process.exitCode = await main();