timmy-talking-turd/scripts/release_dashboard.mjs
Timmy 9c9286b59f
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fix(ops): harden release observability against hostile review findings
Strict RED-GREEN TDD over PR review blockers; every fix landed test-first
with the failing run observed before implementation.

- failureClass: closed privacy-safe vocabulary (worker.unavailable,
  vision.timeout, model.error) under strict dotted slug grammar. Newlines,
  carriage returns, ANSI/control characters, secrets, medical text, SQL,
  oversized values, and off-vocabulary classes fail the entire evidence
  file closed; nothing hostile can reach rendering.
- depth: added to the counter vocabulary so queue.backlog can fire at all;
  bounded counters (0..1,000,000, integer) fail closed above the ceiling.
  9/10/11 edge tests pin silent/at-threshold/above-threshold; backlog is
  suppressed while worker.outage pages (depth is residual from the same
  incident) and returns the moment the page clears.
- drill integrity: the pre-drill baseline is now read from the fixture
  itself and must be genuinely healthy; already-outaged fixtures are
  refused with exit 2 without touching their switch, and a flip that
  produces no real healthy-to-outage transition reports DRILL FAIL
  instead of passing vacuously.
- manual fallback: deterministic contract replaces the tautology.
  available+none-required when healthy, available+local-journal under any
  degradation, unavailable+app-down only when the app boundary itself is
  down.
- fail-closed telemetry: evidence missing any of the four boundaries is
  rejected; unknown statuses surface as a warn telemetry.gap alert with
  owner/threshold/runbook instead of passing as healthy (documented in
  the runbook inventory).
- drill origin: validateLoopbackOrigin gates every network path before
  any fetch. Only a bare http://127.0.0.1:<port> URL passes; credentials,
  DNS names, hex/decimal/percent-encoded IP encodings, IPv6 forms, paths,
  queries, fragments, and non-http schemes are refused pre-contact
  (raw-string grammar gate plus parse round-trip, because the URL parser
  canonicalizes hostile encodings).
- terminal safety: controlSafe() strips C0/C1 control characters from all
  dynamically produced CLI output so hostile evidence paths cannot inject
  ANSI escapes into a terminal.

Gates: npm test 98/98, check:syntax, npm audit (0 vulns), check:diff,
deploy_staging status read-only; 30 adversarial probes against sanitizer,
alert edges, and live loopback CLI all pass. No merge, no deploy.
2026-08-22 21:43:18 +00:00

233 lines
9.7 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// Local operator surface for release observability (issue #41).
// Consumes only sanitized evidence files or a loopback drill fixture.
// Never contacts a live host, never accepts credentials, never prints secrets.
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { sanitizeEvidence, buildDashboard, evaluateAlerts } from '../src/release-observability.js';
function argValue(args, flag) {
const index = args.indexOf(flag);
if (index === -1) return null;
return args[index + 1] || null;
}
// Terminal safety: strip C0/C1 control characters (newline excepted) from any
// dynamically produced text before it reaches stdout/stderr, so hostile file
// paths or fixture payloads can never smuggle ANSI escapes into a terminal.
function controlSafe(text) {
return String(text)
.replace(/[\u0000-\u0009\u000B-\u001F\u007F-\u009F]/g, '');
}
async function loadEvidence(source) {
if (source.drillOrigin) {
const response = await fetch(`${source.drillOrigin.replace(/\/$/, '')}/api/drill/checks`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`drill fixture returned ${response.status}`);
const body = await response.json();
return {
schemaVersion: 1,
releaseTag: controlSafe('daily-2026-08-22.1'),
commit: 'ca31e6d38bec649407f63880504554c59f2878ae',
generatedAtUtc: new Date().toISOString().replace(/\.\d{3}Z$/, 'Z'),
checks: Array.isArray(body.checks) ? body.checks : [],
};
}
const raw = JSON.parse(await readFile(source.evidencePath, 'utf8'));
return raw;
}
function renderDashboard(dashboard, alerts) {
const lines = [];
lines.push('RELEASE OBSERVABILITY DASHBOARD');
lines.push(`release ${dashboard.identity.releaseTag} · commit ${dashboard.identity.commit.slice(0, 12)} · evidence ${dashboard.identity.generatedAtUtc}`);
lines.push('');
for (const boundary of ['app', 'api', 'queue', 'model']) {
const stats = dashboard.boundaries[boundary];
const latency = stats.latencyMs == null ? '' : ` · max latency ${stats.latencyMs}ms`;
const counterBits = Object.keys(stats.counters).sort()
.map(key => `${key}=${stats.counters[key]}`)
.join(' ');
const counterText = counterBits ? ` · ${counterBits}` : '';
lines.push(`${boundary.padEnd(6)}${stats.pass}/${stats.checks} pass · fail ${stats.fail} · degraded ${stats.degraded}${latency}${counterText}`);
}
lines.push('');
const failureEntries = Object.entries(dashboard.failureClasses);
if (failureEntries.length === 0) {
lines.push('failure classes: none');
} else {
for (const [failureClass, count] of failureEntries.sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1])) {
lines.push(`failure class ${failureClass}: ${count}`);
}
}
lines.push('');
lines.push(`alerts (${alerts.length})`);
for (const alert of alerts) {
lines.push(`[${alert.severity.toUpperCase()}] ${alert.id} — owner ${alert.owner}, observed ${alert.count} >= threshold ${alert.threshold}`);
lines.push(` ${alert.message}`);
lines.push(` runbook: ${alert.runbook}`);
}
if (alerts.length === 0) lines.push('no alert conditions met');
return lines.join('\n');
}
async function main() {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
if (args.includes('--self-check')) {
console.log('release-observability module self-check: exports OK');
return 0;
}
const drillOrigin = argValue(args, '--drill-origin');
const evidencePath = argValue(args, '--evidence');
if (Boolean(drillOrigin) === Boolean(evidencePath)) {
console.error('usage: node scripts/release_dashboard.mjs (--evidence <sanitized-evidence.json> | --drill-origin <http://127.0.0.1:port>)');
return 2;
}
// Gate every network path before any fetch can happen: a drill may only
// ever address a validated bare loopback origin.
let validatedOrigin = null;
if (drillOrigin) {
try {
validatedOrigin = validateLoopbackOrigin(drillOrigin);
} catch (error) {
console.error(error.message);
return 2;
}
}
let rawEvidence;
try {
rawEvidence = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin: validatedOrigin, evidencePath });
} catch (error) {
console.error(`release_dashboard: cannot read sanitized evidence (${controlSafe(error.message)}). No contents are echoed.`);
return 2;
}
const validated = sanitizeEvidence(rawEvidence);
if (!validated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: evidence failed sanitization (schema mismatch, forbidden fields, or unbounded values). Nothing was rendered.');
return 2;
}
const dashboard = buildDashboard(validated.evidence);
const alerts = evaluateAlerts(dashboard);
console.log(renderDashboard(dashboard, alerts));
console.log('');
console.log(`manual fallback: ${dashboard.manualFallback.available ? 'available' : 'unavailable'}${fallbackReason(dashboard.manualFallback.reason)}`);
if (drillOrigin) return runDrill({ drillOrigin: validatedOrigin });
return alerts.some(alert => alert.severity === 'page') ? 1 : 0;
}
function fallbackReason(reason) {
if (reason === 'local-journal') return 'local journal remains usable';
if (reason === 'app-down') return 'app boundary is down; local journal cannot be served';
return 'no degradation detected; fallback not required';
}
// A drill may only ever talk to a throwaway fixture on 127.0.0.1. The origin
// must be a bare http URL whose host is exactly the loopback address: no
// credentials, no DNS names, no alternative IP encodings, no IPv6, no path,
// query, or fragment, and no scheme other than http.
const LOOPBACK_ORIGIN_PATTERN = /^http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:[0-9]{1,5}$/;
function validateLoopbackOrigin(rawOrigin) {
if (typeof rawOrigin !== 'string') {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: expected an http://127.0.0.1:<port> URL');
}
// Grammar gate runs on the RAW string first: the WHATWG URL parser
// canonicalizes hostile host encodings (hex octets, decimal IP integers,
// percent-encoded dots) into a clean-looking 127.0.0.1, so a normalized
// string can never be trusted on its own.
if (!LOOPBACK_ORIGIN_PATTERN.test(rawOrigin)) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: only a bare http://127.0.0.1:<port> loopback origin is permitted');
}
let parsed;
try {
parsed = new URL(rawOrigin);
} catch {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: not a valid URL');
}
// Round-trip defense in depth: the parsed form must be byte-identical to
// what was supplied, proving no hidden credentials, path, query, fragment,
// or alternative host encoding was smuggled past the grammar.
if (parsed.toString().replace(/\/$/, '') !== rawOrigin) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: URL did not round-trip as a bare loopback origin');
}
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' || parsed.hostname !== '127.0.0.1') {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: host must be exactly http://127.0.0.1');
}
const port = Number(parsed.port);
if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port < 1 || port > 65535) {
throw new Error('drill origin rejected: port must be between 1 and 65535');
}
return rawOrigin;
}
async function runDrill({ drillOrigin }) {
console.log('');
console.log('WORKER OUTAGE DRILL (simulated fixture on loopback; no live host is contacted)');
let origin;
try {
origin = validateLoopbackOrigin(drillOrigin);
} catch (error) {
console.error(error.message);
return 2;
}
// Genuine baseline: read the fixture's own current state. A drill may only
// start from proven health — never from an assumed or already-outaged state.
const preRaw = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin });
const preValidated = sanitizeEvidence(preRaw);
if (!preValidated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: pre-drill fixture evidence failed sanitization. Nothing was rendered.');
return 2;
}
const preAlerts = evaluateAlerts(buildDashboard(preValidated.evidence));
const prePages = preAlerts.filter(alert => alert.severity === 'page');
if (prePages.length > 0) {
console.error(`release_dashboard: fixture is not healthy before the drill (${prePages.length} page alert[s]); refusing to flip an already-down worker.`);
return 2;
}
console.log('pre-drill: healthy (0 page alerts)');
try {
const response = await fetch(`${origin}/drill/outage`, { method: 'POST', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`fixture returned ${response.status}`);
} catch (error) {
console.error(`release_dashboard: drill switch failed (${error.message})`);
return 2;
}
const postRaw = await loadEvidence({ drillOrigin });
const postValidated = sanitizeEvidence(postRaw);
if (!postValidated.ok) {
console.error('release_dashboard: post-outage evidence failed sanitization.');
return 2;
}
const postDashboard = buildDashboard(postValidated.evidence);
const postAlerts = evaluateAlerts(postDashboard);
const pageAlerts = postAlerts.filter(alert => alert.severity === 'page');
if (pageAlerts.length === 0) {
console.log('no outage observed after flip: the fixture never transitioned from healthy to outage.');
console.log('DRILL FAIL');
return 1;
}
console.log(`post-outage: exactly 1 alert expected, found ${pageAlerts.length}`);
for (const alert of pageAlerts) {
console.log(` ${alert.severity.toUpperCase()} ${alert.message.replace(/^PAGE /, '')}`);
console.log(` owner ${alert.owner} · threshold ${alert.threshold} · runbook ${alert.runbook}`);
}
console.log(`manual fallback: ${postDashboard.manualFallback.available ? 'AVAILABLE' : 'UNAVAILABLE'}${fallbackReason(postDashboard.manualFallback.reason)}`);
const pass = pageAlerts.length === 1
&& pageAlerts[0].id === 'worker.outage'
&& postDashboard.manualFallback.available === true;
console.log(pass ? 'DRILL PASS' : 'DRILL FAIL');
return pass ? 0 : 1;
}
process.exitCode = await main();