Timmy
9c9286b59f
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Strict RED-GREEN TDD over PR review blockers; every fix landed test-first with the failing run observed before implementation. - failureClass: closed privacy-safe vocabulary (worker.unavailable, vision.timeout, model.error) under strict dotted slug grammar. Newlines, carriage returns, ANSI/control characters, secrets, medical text, SQL, oversized values, and off-vocabulary classes fail the entire evidence file closed; nothing hostile can reach rendering. - depth: added to the counter vocabulary so queue.backlog can fire at all; bounded counters (0..1,000,000, integer) fail closed above the ceiling. 9/10/11 edge tests pin silent/at-threshold/above-threshold; backlog is suppressed while worker.outage pages (depth is residual from the same incident) and returns the moment the page clears. - drill integrity: the pre-drill baseline is now read from the fixture itself and must be genuinely healthy; already-outaged fixtures are refused with exit 2 without touching their switch, and a flip that produces no real healthy-to-outage transition reports DRILL FAIL instead of passing vacuously. - manual fallback: deterministic contract replaces the tautology. available+none-required when healthy, available+local-journal under any degradation, unavailable+app-down only when the app boundary itself is down. - fail-closed telemetry: evidence missing any of the four boundaries is rejected; unknown statuses surface as a warn telemetry.gap alert with owner/threshold/runbook instead of passing as healthy (documented in the runbook inventory). - drill origin: validateLoopbackOrigin gates every network path before any fetch. Only a bare http://127.0.0.1:<port> URL passes; credentials, DNS names, hex/decimal/percent-encoded IP encodings, IPv6 forms, paths, queries, fragments, and non-http schemes are refused pre-contact (raw-string grammar gate plus parse round-trip, because the URL parser canonicalizes hostile encodings). - terminal safety: controlSafe() strips C0/C1 control characters from all dynamically produced CLI output so hostile evidence paths cannot inject ANSI escapes into a terminal. Gates: npm test 98/98, check:syntax, npm audit (0 vulns), check:diff, deploy_staging status read-only; 30 adversarial probes against sanitizer, alert edges, and live loopback CLI all pass. No merge, no deploy. |
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| .. | ||
| fixtures | ||
| agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js | ||
| analysis.test.js | ||
| ci-workflow.test.js | ||
| domain.test.js | ||
| hermes-agent-service.test.js | ||
| photo-first.acceptance.mjs | ||
| product-decisions.test.js | ||
| release-dashboard-cli.test.js | ||
| release-dashboard.test.js | ||
| release-demo.test.js | ||
| release-observability-runbook.test.js | ||
| release-observability.test.js | ||
| selfhost-bootstrap.test.js | ||
| service-worker-runtime.test.js | ||
| sleek-chat.acceptance.mjs | ||
| staging-config.test.js | ||
| staging-deploy.test.py | ||
| staging-health.test.js | ||
| staging.acceptance.mjs | ||
| training-ingest.test.js | ||
| ui.acceptance.mjs | ||
| vision-config.test.js | ||
| vision-service.test.js | ||