forked from Rockachopa/Timmy-time-dashboard
* feat: upgrade primary model from llama3.1:8b to qwen2.5:14b - Swap OLLAMA_MODEL_PRIMARY to qwen2.5:14b for better reasoning - llama3.1:8b-instruct becomes fallback - Update .env default and README quick start - Fix hardcoded model assertions in tests qwen2.5:14b provides significantly better multi-step reasoning and tool calling reliability while still running locally on modest hardware. The 8B model remains as automatic fallback. * security: centralize config, harden uploads, fix silent exceptions - Add 9 pydantic Settings fields (skip_embeddings, disable_csrf, rqlite_url, brain_source, brain_db_path, csrf_cookie_secure, chat_api_max_body_bytes, timmy_test_mode) to centralize env-var access - Migrate 8 os.environ.get() calls across 5 source files to use `from config import settings` per project convention - Add path traversal defense-in-depth to file upload endpoint - Add 1MB request body size limit to chat API - Make CSRF cookie secure flag configurable via settings - Replace 2 silent `except: pass` blocks with debug logging in session.py - Remove unused `import os` from brain/memory.py and csrf.py - Update 5 CSRF test fixtures to patch settings instead of os.environ Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trip T <trip@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
74 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
74 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
"""Tests for CSRF protection middleware bypasses."""
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import pytest
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from dashboard.middleware.csrf import CSRFMiddleware
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class TestCSRFBypass:
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"""Test potential CSRF bypasses."""
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def enable_csrf(self):
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"""Re-enable CSRF for these tests."""
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from config import settings
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original = settings.timmy_disable_csrf
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settings.timmy_disable_csrf = False
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yield
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settings.timmy_disable_csrf = original
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def test_csrf_middleware_blocks_unsafe_methods_without_token(self):
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"""POST should require CSRF token even with AJAX headers (if not explicitly allowed)."""
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/test")
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def test_endpoint():
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return {"message": "success"}
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client = TestClient(app)
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# POST with X-Requested-With should STILL fail if it's not a valid CSRF token
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# Some older middlewares used to trust this header blindly.
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response = client.post(
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"/test",
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headers={"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest"}
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)
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# This should fail with 403 because no CSRF token is provided
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assert response.status_code == 403
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def test_csrf_middleware_path_traversal_bypass(self):
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"""Test if path traversal can bypass CSRF exempt patterns."""
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/test")
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def test_endpoint():
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return {"message": "success"}
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client = TestClient(app)
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# If the middleware checks path starts with /webhook,
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# can we use /webhook/../test to bypass?
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# Note: TestClient/FastAPI might normalize this, but we should check the logic.
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response = client.post("/webhook/../test")
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# If it bypassed, it would return 200 (if normalized to /test) or 404 (if not).
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# But it should definitely not return 200 success without CSRF.
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if response.status_code == 200:
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assert response.json() != {"message": "success"}
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def test_csrf_middleware_null_byte_bypass(self):
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"""Test if null byte in path can bypass CSRF exempt patterns."""
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app = FastAPI()
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middleware = CSRFMiddleware(app)
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# Test directly since TestClient blocks null bytes
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path = "/webhook\0/test"
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is_exempt = middleware._is_likely_exempt(path)
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# It should either be not exempt or the null byte should be handled
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# In our current implementation, it might still be exempt if normalized to /webhook\0/test
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# But it's better than /webhook/../test
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assert is_exempt is False or "\0" in path
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