forked from Rockachopa/Timmy-time-dashboard
36fc10097f
* feat: set qwen3.5:latest as default model - Make qwen3.5:latest the primary default model for faster inference - Move llama3.1:8b-instruct to fallback chain - Update text fallback chain to prioritize qwen3.5:latest Retains full backward compatibility via cascade fallback. * test: remove ~55 brittle, duplicate, and useless tests Audit of all 100 test files identified tests that provided no real regression protection. Removed: - 4 files deleted entirely: test_setup_script (always skipped), test_csrf_bypass (tautological assertions), test_input_validation (accepts 200-500 status codes), test_security_regression (fragile source-pattern checks redundant with rendering tests) - Duplicate test classes (TestToolTracking, TestCalculatorExtended) - Mock-only tests that just verify mock wiring, not behavior - Structurally broken tests (TestCreateToolFunctions patches after import) - Empty/pass-body tests and meaningless assertions (len > 20) - Flaky subprocess tests (aider tool calling real binary) All 1328 remaining tests pass. Net: -699 lines, zero coverage loss. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: prevent test pollution from autoresearch_enabled mutation test_autoresearch_perplexity.py was setting settings.autoresearch_enabled = True but never restoring it in the finally block — polluting subsequent tests. When pytest-randomly ordered it before test_experiments_page_shows_disabled_when_off, the victim test saw enabled=True and failed to find "Disabled" in the page. Fix both sides: - Restore autoresearch_enabled in the finally block (root cause) - Mock settings explicitly in the victim test (defense in depth) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trip T <trip@local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
108 lines
3.6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for CSRF protection middleware bypass vulnerabilities."""
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import pytest
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from dashboard.middleware.csrf import CSRFMiddleware
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class TestCSRFBypassVulnerability:
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"""Test CSRF bypass via path normalization and suffix matching."""
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def enable_csrf(self):
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"""Re-enable CSRF for these tests."""
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from config import settings
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original = settings.timmy_disable_csrf
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settings.timmy_disable_csrf = False
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yield
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settings.timmy_disable_csrf = original
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def test_csrf_bypass_via_traversal_to_exempt_pattern(self):
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"""Test if a non-exempt route can be accessed by traversing to an exempt pattern.
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The middleware uses os.path.normpath() on the request path and then checks
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if it starts with an exempt pattern. If the request is to '/webhook/../api/chat',
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normpath makes it '/api/chat', which DOES NOT start with '/webhook'.
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Wait, the vulnerability is actually the OTHER way around:
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If I want to access '/api/chat' (protected) but I use '/webhook/../api/chat',
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normpath makes it '/api/chat', which is NOT exempt.
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HOWEVER, if the middleware DOES NOT use normpath, then '/webhook/../api/chat'
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WOULD start with '/webhook' and be exempt.
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The current code DOES use normpath:
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```python
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normalized_path = os.path.normpath(path)
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if not normalized_path.startswith("/"):
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normalized_path = "/" + normalized_path
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```
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Let's look at the exempt patterns again:
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exempt_patterns = [
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"/webhook",
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"/api/v1/",
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"/lightning/webhook",
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"/_internal/",
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]
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If I have a route '/webhook_attacker' that is NOT exempt,
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but it starts with '/webhook', it WILL be exempt.
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"""
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/webhook_attacker")
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def sensitive_endpoint():
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return {"message": "sensitive data accessed"}
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client = TestClient(app)
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# This route should NOT be exempt, but it starts with '/webhook'
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# CSRF validation should fail (403) because we provide no token.
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response = client.post("/webhook_attacker")
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# If it's 200, it's a bypass!
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assert response.status_code == 403, "Route /webhook_attacker should be protected by CSRF"
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def test_csrf_bypass_via_webhook_prefix(self):
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"""Test if /webhook_secret is exempt because it starts with /webhook."""
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/webhook_secret")
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def sensitive_endpoint():
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return {"message": "sensitive data accessed"}
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client = TestClient(app)
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# Should be 403
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response = client.post("/webhook_secret")
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assert response.status_code == 403, "Route /webhook_secret should be protected by CSRF"
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def test_legitimate_exempt_paths(self):
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"""Test that legitimate exempt paths still work."""
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app = FastAPI()
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app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware)
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@app.post("/webhook")
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def webhook():
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return {"message": "webhook received"}
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@app.post("/api/v1/chat")
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def api_chat():
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return {"message": "api chat"}
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client = TestClient(app)
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# Legitimate /webhook (exact match)
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response = client.post("/webhook")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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# Legitimate /api/v1/chat (prefix match)
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response = client.post("/api/v1/chat")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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