Commit Graph

69 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
alexpaynex
a95fd76ebd task/32: Event moderation queue + Timmy AI review
## What was built
Full moderation pipeline: relay_event_queue table, strfry inject helper,
ModerationService with Claude haiku review, policy tier routing, 30s poll loop,
admin approve/reject/list endpoints.

## DB schema (`lib/db/src/schema/relay-event-queue.ts`)
relay_event_queue: event_id (PK), pubkey (FK → nostr_identities), kind,
raw_event (text JSON), status (pending/approved/rejected/auto_approved),
reviewed_by (timmy_ai/admin/null), review_reason, created_at, decided_at.
Exported from schema/index.ts. Pushed via pnpm run push.

## strfry HTTP client (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/strfry.ts`)
injectEvent(rawEventJson) — POST {STRFRY_URL}/import (NDJSON).
STRFRY_URL defaults to "http://strfry:7777" (Docker internal network).
5s timeout; graceful failure in dev when strfry not running; never throws.

## ModerationService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/moderation.ts`)
- enqueue(event) — insert pending row; idempotent onConflictDoNothing
- autoReview(eventId) — Claude haiku prompt: approve or flag. On flag, marks
  reviewedBy=timmy_ai and leaves pending for admin. On approve, calls decide().
- decide(eventId, status, reason, reviewedBy) — updates DB + calls injectEvent
- processPending(limit=10) — batch poll: auto-review up to limit pending events
- Stub mode: auto-approves all events when Anthropic key absent

## Policy endpoint update (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
Tier routing in evaluatePolicy:
  read/none → reject (unchanged)
  write + elite tier → injectEvent + accept (elite bypass; shadowReject if inject fails)
  write + non-elite → enqueue + shadowReject (held for moderation)
Imports db/nostrIdentities directly for tier check. Both inject and enqueue errors
are fail-closed (reject vs shadowReject respectively).

## Background poll loop (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
setInterval every 30s calling moderationService.processPending(10).
Interval configurable via MODERATION_POLL_MS env var.
Errors caught per-event; poll loop never crashes the server.

## Admin queue routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay-queue.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer auth (same pattern as admin-relay.ts).
GET  /api/admin/relay/queue?status=...        — list all / by status
POST /api/admin/relay/queue/:eventId/approve  — approve + inject into strfry
POST /api/admin/relay/queue/:eventId/reject   — reject (no inject)
409 on duplicate decisions. Registered in routes/index.ts.

## Smoke tests (all pass)
Unknown → reject ✓; elite → shadowReject (strfry unavailable in dev) ✓;
non-elite write → shadowReject + pending in queue ✓; admin approve → approved ✓;
moderation poll loop started ✓; TypeScript 0 errors.
2026-03-19 20:35:39 +00:00
alexpaynex
01374375fb Update default access for new accounts to read-only
Modify the default access level for newly created accounts from "none" to "read" and clarify access semantics in relay-accounts.ts.

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2026-03-19 20:29:02 +00:00
alexpaynex
31a843a829 task/31: Relay account whitelist + trust-gated access (v2 — code review fixes)
## What was built
Full relay access control: relay_accounts table, RelayAccountService,
trust hook, live policy enforcement, admin CRUD API, elite startup seed.

## DB schema (`lib/db/src/schema/relay-accounts.ts`)
relay_accounts table: pubkey (PK, FK nostr_identities ON DELETE CASCADE),
access_level (none/read/write), granted_by (text), granted_at, revoked_at, notes.
Exported from lib/db/src/schema/index.ts. Pushed via pnpm run push.

## RelayAccountService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/relay-accounts.ts`)
- getAccess(pubkey) → RelayAccessLevel (none if missing or revoked)
- grant(pubkey, level, reason, grantedBy) — upsert; creates nostr_identity FK
- revoke(pubkey, reason) — sets revokedAt, accessLevel→none, grantedBy→"manual-revoked"
  The "manual-revoked" marker prevents syncFromTrustTier from auto-reinstating.
  Only explicit admin grant() can restore access after revocation.
- syncFromTrustTier(pubkey) — fetches tier from DB internally (no tier param to
  avoid caller drift). Respects: manual-revoked (skip), manual active (upgrade only),
  auto-tier (full sync). Never auto-reinstates revoked accounts.
- seedElite(pubkey, notes) — upserts nostr_identities with tier="elite" +
  trustScore=200, then grants relay write access as a permanent manual grant.
  Called at startup for Timmy's own pubkey.
- list(opts) — returns all accounts, filtered by activeOnly if requested.
- Tier→access: new=none, established/trusted/elite=write (env-overridable)

## Trust hook (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/trust.ts`)
recordSuccess + recordFailure both call syncFromTrustTier(pubkey) after DB write.
Fire-and-forget with catch (trust flow is never blocked by relay errors).

## Policy endpoint (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
evaluatePolicy() async: queries relay_accounts.getAccess(). write→accept,
read/none/missing→reject. DB error→reject (fail-closed).

## Admin routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer auth (localhost-only fallback in dev; error log in prod).
GET  /api/admin/relay/accounts             — list all accounts
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/grant   — grant (level + notes)
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/revoke  — revoke (sets manual-revoked)
pubkey validation: 64-char lowercase hex only.

## Startup seed (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
Resolves pubkey from TIMMY_NOSTR_PUBKEY env first, falls back to
timmyIdentityService.pubkeyHex. Calls seedElite() — idempotent upsert.
Sets nostr_identities.tier="elite" alongside relay write access.

## Smoke test results (all pass)
Timmy accept ✓; unknown reject ✓; grant→accept ✓; revoke→manual-revoked ✓;
revoked stays rejected ✓; TypeScript 0 errors.
2026-03-19 20:26:03 +00:00
alexpaynex
94613019fc task/31: Relay account whitelist + trust-gated access
## What was built
Full relay access control system: relay_accounts table, RelayAccountService,
trust hook integration, live policy enforcement, admin CRUD API, Timmy seed.

## DB change
`lib/db/src/schema/relay-accounts.ts` — new `relay_accounts` table:
  pubkey (PK, FK → nostr_identities.pubkey ON DELETE CASCADE),
  access_level ("none"|"read"|"write"), granted_by ("manual"|"auto-tier"),
  granted_at, revoked_at (nullable), notes. Pushed via `pnpm run push`.
`lib/db/src/schema/index.ts` — exports relay-accounts.

## RelayAccountService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/relay-accounts.ts`)
- getAccess(pubkey) → RelayAccessLevel (none if missing or revoked)
- grant(pubkey, level, reason, grantedBy) — upsert; creates nostr_identity FK
- revoke(pubkey, reason) — sets revokedAt, access_level → none
- syncFromTrustTier(pubkey, tier) — auto-promotes by tier; never downgrades manual grants
- list(opts) — returns all accounts, optionally filtered to active
- Tier→access map: new=none, established/trusted/elite=write (env-overridable)

## Trust hook (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/trust.ts`)
recordSuccess + recordFailure both call syncFromTrustTier after writing tier.
Failure is caught + logged (non-blocking — trust flow never fails on relay error).

## Policy endpoint (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
evaluatePolicy() now async: queries relay_accounts.getAccess(pubkey).
"write" → accept; "read"/"none"/missing → reject with clear message.
DB error → reject with "policy service error" (safe fail-closed).

## Admin routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer token auth (localhost-only fallback in dev; error log in prod).
GET  /api/admin/relay/accounts            — list all accounts
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/grant  — grant (level + notes body)
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/revoke — revoke (reason body)
pubkey validation: must be 64-char lowercase hex.

## Startup seed (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
On every startup: grants Timmy's own pubkeyHex "write" access ("manual").
Idempotent upsert — safe across restarts.

## Smoke test results (all pass)
- Timmy pubkey → accept ✓; unknown pubkey → reject ✓
- Admin grant → accept ✓; admin revoke → reject ✓; admin list shows accounts ✓
- TypeScript: 0 errors in API server + lib/db
2026-03-19 20:21:12 +00:00
alexpaynex
faef1fe5e0 Add health check endpoint and production secret enforcement for relay policy
Adds a GET `/api/relay/policy` health check endpoint and enforces the `RELAY_POLICY_SECRET` environment variable in production to secure the POST `/api/relay/policy` endpoint.

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2026-03-19 20:05:09 +00:00
alexpaynex
cdd97922d5 task/30: Sovereign Nostr relay infrastructure (strfry)
## Summary
Deploys strfry (C++ Nostr relay) + relay-policy sidecar as a containerised
stack on the VPS, wired to the API server for event-level access control.

## Files created
- `infrastructure/strfry.conf` — strfry config: bind 0.0.0.0:7777, writePolicy
  plugin → /usr/local/bin/relay-policy-plugin, maxEventSize 65536,
  rejectEphemeral false, db /data/strfry-db
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/plugin.sh` — strfry write-policy plugin (stdin/stdout
  bridge). Reads JSON lines from strfry, POSTs to relay-policy HTTP sidecar
  (http://relay-policy:3080/decide), writes decision to stdout. Safe fallback:
  reject on sidecar timeout/failure
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/index.ts` — Node.js HTTP relay-policy sidecar:
  POST /decide receives strfry events, calls API server /api/relay/policy with
  Bearer RELAY_POLICY_SECRET, returns strfry decision JSON
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/package.json + tsconfig.json` — TS build config
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/Dockerfile` — multi-stage: builder (tsc) + runtime
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/.gitignore` — excludes node_modules, dist
- `artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts` — POST /api/relay/policy: internal
  route protected by RELAY_POLICY_SECRET Bearer token. Bootstrap state: rejects
  all events with "relay not yet open — whitelist pending (Task #37)". Stable
  contract — future tasks extend evaluatePolicy() without API shape changes

## Files modified
- `infrastructure/docker-compose.yml` — adds relay-policy + strfry services on
  node-net; strfry_data volume (bind-mounted at /data/strfry); relay-policy
  healthcheck; strfry depends on relay-policy healthy
- `infrastructure/ops.sh` — adds relay:logs, relay:restart, relay:status commands
- `artifacts/api-server/src/routes/index.ts` — registers relayRouter

## Operator setup required on VPS
  mkdir -p /data/strfry && chmod 700 /data/strfry
  echo "RELAY_API_URL=https://alexanderwhitestone.com" >> /opt/timmy-node/.env
  echo "RELAY_POLICY_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)" >> /opt/timmy-node/.env
  # Also set RELAY_POLICY_SECRET in Replit secrets for API server

## Notes
- TypeScript: 0 errors (API server + relay-policy sidecar both compile clean)
- POST /api/relay/policy smoke test: correct bootstrap reject response
- strfry image: ghcr.io/hoytech/strfry:latest
2026-03-19 20:02:00 +00:00
alexpaynex
0b3a701933 Add security measures to prevent malicious requests when fetching LNURL data
Implement SSRF protection by validating URLs, blocking private IPs, and enforcing HTTPS in the LNURL fetch path.

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2026-03-19 19:55:59 +00:00
alexpaynex
8a81918226 task/29: fix vouch idempotency + replay guard — unique constraints + DB push
## Code review round 2 issues resolved

### Vouch replay / duplicate boost vulnerability — FIXED
- `nostr-trust-vouches.ts` schema: added `eventId` column + two unique guards:
  1. `UNIQUE(event_id)` — same signed event cannot be replayed for any pair
  2. `UNIQUE INDEX uq_nostr_trust_vouches_pair(voucher_pubkey, vouchee_pubkey)` —
     each elite may vouch for a given target exactly once
- Route: insert now uses `.onConflictDoNothing().returning({ id })`
  - If returned array is empty → duplicate detected → 409 with existing state,
    no trust boost applied
  - If returned array has rows → first-time vouch → boost applied exactly once
- `eventId` extracted from `ev["id"]` (NIP-01 sha256 event id) before insert
- Migration file `0006_timmy_economic_peer.sql` updated to include both
  unique constraints (UNIQUE + CREATE UNIQUE INDEX)
- Schema pushed to production — all three indexes confirmed in DB:
  `nostr_trust_vouches_event_id_unique`, `uq_nostr_trust_vouches_pair`, `pkey`

### Previously fixed (round 1)
- LNURL-pay resolution in ZapService (full NIP-57 §4 flow)
- Vouch event made required with p-tag vouchee binding
- DB migration file 0006 created for both new tables + lightning_address column
- GET /identity/timmy now returns relayUrl field

### Verified
- TypeScript: 0 errors (tsc --noEmit clean)
- DB: all constraints confirmed live in production
- API: /identity/timmy 200, /identity/challenge nonce, /identity/vouch 401/400
2026-03-19 19:51:50 +00:00
alexpaynex
33b47f8682 task/29: fix code review findings — LNURL zap, vouch binding, migration SQL
## Code review issues resolved

### 1. Zap-out: real LNURL-pay resolution (was: log-only when no bolt11)
- `zap.ts`: added `resolveLnurlInvoice()` — full NIP-57 §4 flow:
  * user@domain → https://domain/.well-known/lnurlp/user
  * Fetch LNURL-pay metadata → extract callback URL + min/maxSendable
  * Build signed kind-9734 zap request, send to callback → receive bolt11
  * Pay bolt11 via LNbits. Log event regardless of payment outcome.
- `nostr-identities.ts`: added `lightningAddress` column (nullable TEXT)
- `identity.ts /verify`: extracts `["lud16", "user@domain.com"]` tag from
  signed event and stores it so ZapService can resolve future invoices
- `maybeZapOnJobComplete()` now triggers real payment when lightningAddress
  is stored; logs a warning and skips payment if not available

### 2. Vouch endpoint: signed event is now REQUIRED with p-tag binding
- `event` field changed from optional to required (400 if absent)
- Validates: Nostr signature, event.pubkey matches authenticated voucher
- NEW: event MUST contain a `["p", voucheePubkey]` tag — proves the voucher
  intentionally named the vouchee in their signed event (co-signature binding)

### 3. DB migration file added
- `lib/db/migrations/0006_timmy_economic_peer.sql` — covers:
  * CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS timmy_nostr_events (with indexes)
  * CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS nostr_trust_vouches (with indexes)
  * ALTER TABLE nostr_identities ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS lightning_address
- Schema pushed to production: `lightning_address` column confirmed live

### Additional
- `GET /api/identity/timmy` now includes `relayUrl` field (null when unset)
- TypeScript compiles cleanly (tsc --noEmit: 0 errors)
- All smoke tests pass: /timmy 200, /challenge nonce, /vouch 401/400
2026-03-19 19:47:00 +00:00
Replit Agent
eb5dcfd48a task-29: Timmy as economic peer — Nostr identity, zap-out, vouching, engagement
1. TimmyIdentityService (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/timmy-identity.ts)
   - Loads nsec from TIMMY_NOSTR_NSEC env var at boot (bech32 decode)
   - Generates and warns about ephemeral key if env var absent
   - sign(EventTemplate) → finalizeEvent() with Timmy's key
   - encryptDm(recipientPubkeyHex, plaintext) → NIP-04 nip04.encrypt()
   - Logs npub at server startup

2. ZapService (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/zap.ts)
   - Constructs NIP-57 zap request event (kind 9734), signs with Timmy's key
   - Pays via lnbitsService.payInvoice() if bolt11 provided (stub-mode aware)
   - Logs every outbound event to timmy_nostr_events audit table
   - maybeZapOnJobComplete() wired in jobs.ts after trustService.recordSuccess()
   - Config: ZAP_PCT_DEFAULT (default 0 = disabled), ZAP_MIN_SATS (default 10)
   - Only fires for trusted/elite tier partners when ZAP_PCT_DEFAULT > 0

3. Engagement engine (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/engagement.ts)
   - Configurable cadence: ENGAGEMENT_INTERVAL_DAYS (default 0 = disabled)
   - Queries nostrIdentities for trustScore >= 50 AND lastSeen < threshold
   - Generates personalised DM via agentService.chatReply()
   - Encrypts as NIP-04 DM (kind 4), signs with Timmy's key
   - Logs to timmy_nostr_events; publishes to NOSTR_RELAY_URL if set
   - First run delayed 60s after startup to avoid cold-start noise

4. Vouching endpoint (artifacts/api-server/src/routes/identity.ts)
   - POST /api/identity/vouch: requires X-Nostr-Token with elite tier
   - Verifies optional Nostr event signature from voucher
   - Records relationship in nostr_trust_vouches table
   - Applies VOUCH_TRUST_BOOST (20 pts) to vouchee's trust score
   - GET /api/identity/timmy: public endpoint returning npub + zap count

5. DB schema additions (lib/db/src/schema/)
   - timmy_nostr_events: audit log for all outbound Nostr events
   - nostr_trust_vouches: voucher/vouchee social graph with boost amount
   - Tables created in production DB via drizzle-kit push

6. Frontend identity card (the-matrix/)
   - #timmy-id-card: fixed bottom-right widget with Timmy's npub + zap count
   - timmy-id.js: initTimmyId() fetches /api/identity/timmy on load
   - Npub shortened (npub1xxxx...yyyyyy), click-to-copy with feedback
   - Refreshes every 60s to show live zap count
   - Wired into main.js on firstInit
2026-03-19 19:27:13 +00:00
alexpaynex
484583004a Task #27: Free-tier gate — all correctness issues resolved
Blocking issues from reviewer, all fixed:

1. /api/estimate no longer mutates pool — uses decideDryRun() (read-only)

2. Free-path passes actual debited amount (ftDecision.absorbSats) not estimate:
   - DB absorbedSats = ftDecision.absorbSats (actual pool debit, may be < estimate)
   - runWorkInBackground receives reservedAbsorbed = actual pool debit
   - recordGrant reconciles actual vs reserved; over-reservation returned to pool

3. decide() free branch: downgrade to partial if atomic debit < estimatedSats:
   - If pool race causes debited < estimated: release debit, return serve="partial"
   - Only returns serve="free" (chargeSats=0) when full amount was debited

4. Reservation leak on pre-work failure: inner try/catch around DB update
   - If DB setup fails after pool debit: releaseReservation() called before throw

5. Partial pool-drain at payment: reverts to normal paid flow (not fail):
   - partialGrantReserved = 0: work executes with zero subsidy
   - User charged their paid amount; normal refund path applies if actual < paid
   - No dead-end refund state; no stranded users

6. Partial-job refund math: actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actual - absorbed)

7. Sessions comment clarified: pool reservation sized to work estimate;
   if it covers fullDebitSats (eval+work), debitedSats = 0; otherwise partial
2026-03-19 17:28:19 +00:00
alexpaynex
599771e0ae Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete, all reviewer issues fixed
== All fixed issues ==

1. /api/estimate pool mutation (fixed)
   - Added decideDryRun(): non-mutating read-only free-tier preview
   - /api/estimate uses decideDryRun(); pool never debited by estimate calls

2. Free-path passes actual debited amount not estimate (fixed)
   - In runEvalInBackground free path: uses ftDecision.absorbSats (actual pool debit)
   - DB absorbedSats column set to actual debited sats, not breakdown.amountSats
   - runWorkInBackground receives reservedAbsorbed = actual pool debit

3. decide() free branch: downgrade to partial if atomic debit < estimated (fixed)
   - After _atomicPoolDebit, if debited < estimatedSats (pool raced):
     - Release the partial debit back to pool
     - Return serve="partial" with advisory amounts (re-reserved at payment time)
   - Only returns serve="free" with chargeSats=0 if debited >= estimatedSats

4. Reservation leak on pre-work failure (fixed)
   - Free path wrapped in inner try/catch around DB update + setImmediate
   - If setup fails after pool debit: releaseReservation() called; throws so outer
     catch sets job to failed state

5. Partial-job pool-drained at payment => fail with refund (implemented)
   - reservePartialGrant() = 0 at payment time => job.state = failed
   - refundState = pending, refundAmountSats = workAmountSats (user gets money back)
   - Work does NOT execute under discounted terms without pool backing

6. Partial-job refund math corrected (fixed)
   - actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
   - refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats

7. Grant audit reconciliation (fixed)
   - actualAbsorbed = min(actualTotalCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
   - over-reservation returned to pool atomically in recordGrant()
   - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed sats

New API: decideDryRun(), reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
New recordGrant signature: (pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed)
2026-03-19 17:25:13 +00:00
alexpaynex
a9143f6db4 Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete, pool-drained enforces hard no-loss
Final architecture (all paths enforce pool-backed-or-no-service):

serve="free" (fully-free jobs & sessions):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE at decision time
  - No advisory gap: pool debit and service decision are a single DB operation
  - Pool drained at decide() time => returns gate => work does not start
  - Work fails => releaseReservation() refunds pool

serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() advisory (no pool debit) — prevents DoS from abandoned payments
  - reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool at work-payment-confirmation
    (SELECT FOR UPDATE, re-validates daily limits)
  - Pool drained at payment time:
    * job.state = failed, refundState = pending, refundAmountSats = workAmountSats
    * User gets their payment back; work does not execute under discounted terms
    * "Free service pauses" invariant maintained — no unaccounted subsidy ever happens

serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
  - reservePartialGrant() called after work completes, using min(actual, advisory)
  - If pool empty at grant time: absorbedSats = 0, user charged full actual cost

/api/estimate endpoint:
  - Now uses decideDryRun() — read-only, no pool debit, no daily budget consumption
  - Pool and identity state are never mutated by estimate calls

Partial-job refund math:
  - actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
  - refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats
  - Correctly accounts for Timmy's pool contribution

recordGrant(pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - over-reservation (estimate > actual token usage) returned to pool atomically
  - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed sats only

New methods: decideDryRun(), reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
2026-03-19 17:20:52 +00:00
alexpaynex
eca505e47e Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete fix of all reviewer-identified issues
== Issue 1: /api/estimate was mutating pool state (fixed) ==
Added decideDryRun() to FreeTierService — non-mutating read-only preview that
reads pool/trust state but does NOT debit the pool or reserve anything.
/api/estimate now calls decideDryRun() instead of decide().
Pool and daily budgets are never affected by estimate calls.

== Issue 2: Partial-job refund math was wrong (fixed) ==
In runWorkInBackground, refund was computed as workAmountSats - actualTotalCostSats,
ignoring that Timmy absorbed partialAbsorbSats from pool.
Correct math: actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
             refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats
Now partial-job refunds correctly account for Timmy's contribution.

== Issue 3: Pool-drained partial-job behavior (explained, minimal loss) ==
For fully-free jobs (serve="free"):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE — no advisory gap.
  - Pool drained => decide() returns gate => work does not start. ✓

For partial jobs (serve="partial"):
  - decide() is advisory; pool debit deferred to reservePartialGrant() at
    payment confirmation in advanceJob().
  - If pool drains between advisory decide() and payment: user already paid
    their discounted portion; we cannot refuse service. Work proceeds;
    partialGrantReserved=0 means no pool accounting error (pool was already empty).
  - This is a bounded, unavoidable race inherent to LN payment networks —
    there is no 2-phase-commit across LNbits and Postgres.
  - "Free service pauses" invariant is maintained: all NEW requests after pool
    drains will get serve="gate" from decideDryRun() and decide().

== Audit log accuracy (fixed in prior commit, confirmed) ==
recordGrant(pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - actualAbsorbed = min(actualTotalCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
  - over-reservation (estimated > actual) returned to pool atomically
  - daily counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed sats
2026-03-19 17:17:54 +00:00
alexpaynex
4866cfc950 Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — zero advisory-charge gap under concurrency
Architecture by serve type:

serve="free" (fully-free jobs & sessions):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE transaction
  - Pool debit and service decision are a single atomic DB operation
  - If work fails → releaseReservation() refunds pool
  - Grant audit written post-work with actual absorbed (≤ reserved); excess returned

serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() advisory; pool NOT debited at eval time
    (prevents economic DoS from users abandoning payment flow)
  - At work-payment confirmation: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool
    (re-validates daily limits, SELECT FOR UPDATE, cap to available balance)
  - If pool is empty at payment time: work proceeds (user already paid);
    bounded loss (≤ estimated partial sats); partialGrantReserved=0 means
    no pool accounting error — pool was already empty
  - Grant audit: actualAbsorbed = min(actualCostSats, reserved); excess returned

serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
  - decide() advisory; reservePartialGrant() called after work completes
  - Actual cost capped at advisory absorbSats; over-reservation returned

recordGrant(pubkey, reqHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - Over-reservation (estimated > actual token usage) atomically returned to pool
  - Daily counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed sats
  - Pool never goes negative; no silent losses under concurrent requests

New methods added: reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
New 4-arg recordGrant() signature with over-reservation reconciliation
2026-03-19 17:14:32 +00:00
alexpaynex
ba88824e37 Task #27: Fully atomic free-tier gate — no advisory-charge gap under concurrency
Architecture:
  serve="free" (fully-free jobs/sessions):
    - decide() atomically debits pool via FOR UPDATE transaction at decision time
    - Work starts immediately after, so no window for pool drain between debit+work
    - On work failure → releaseReservation() refunds pool

  serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
    - decide() is advisory; pool NOT debited at eval time
    - Prevents economic DoS from users who abandon the payment flow
    - At work-payment-confirmation: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool
      (re-validates daily limits, uses FOR UPDATE lock)
    - If pool is empty at payment time: job is failed with clear message
      ("Generosity pool exhausted — please retry at full price.")
      Free service pauses rather than Timmy operating at a loss

  serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
    - decide() advisory; reservePartialGrant() called after work completes
    - Partial debit uses actual cost capped at advisory limit

Grant reconciliation (both paths):
    - recordGrant(pubkey, reqHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed)
    - actualAbsorbed = min(actualCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
    - Over-reservation (estimated > actual token usage) returned to pool atomically
    - Daily absorption counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed, not estimate
    - Pool never goes negative; identity daily budget never overstated

Added: freeTierService.reservePartialGrant() for deferred atomic pool debit
Added: freeTierService.releaseReservation() for failure/rejection refund

Result: Zero-loss guarantee — pool debit and charge reduction always consistent.
2026-03-19 17:12:02 +00:00
alexpaynex
ec5316a4dc Task #27: Atomic free-tier pool reservation — eliminates advisory-charge gap
Root cause: decide() was advisory but user charges were reduced from its output;
recordGrant() later might absorb less, so Timmy could absorb the gap silently.

Fix architecture (serve="free" path — fully-free jobs + sessions):
  - decide() now runs _atomicPoolDebit() inside a FOR UPDATE transaction
  - Pool is debited at decision time for serve="free" decisions
  - Work starts immediately after, so no window for pool drain between debit and use
  - If work fails → releaseReservation() returns sats to pool

Fix architecture (serve="partial" path — partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() remains advisory for "partial" (no pool debit at decision time)
  - This prevents pool drain from users who get a partial offer but never pay
  - For jobs: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool at work-payment-confirmation
    time (inside advanceJob), before work begins
  - For sessions: reservePartialGrant() called after synchronous work completes,
    using actual cost capped by advisory absorbSats

recordGrant() now takes (pubkey, requestHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - Over-reservation (estimated > actual) returned to pool atomically
  - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed amount
  - Pool balance was already decremented by decide() or reservePartialGrant()

Result: In ALL paths, pool debit happens atomically before charges are reduced.
User charge reduction and pool debit are always consistent — Timmy never operates
at a loss due to concurrent pool depletion.
2026-03-19 17:08:43 +00:00
alexpaynex
373477ba7f Task #27: Complete cost-routing + free-tier gate — all critical fixes applied
Fix 1 — Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService (pricing.ts)
  - Unified: estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
  - Replaces duplicated estimation in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

Fix 2 — Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
  - freeTierService.decide() runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE executeWork()
  - Fixed double-margin: estimateRequestCost already includes infra+margin; convert directly
  - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution (Math.min)

Fix 3 — Correct isFree derivation for partial jobs in advanceJob() (jobs.ts)
  - isFreeExecution = workAmountSats === 0 (not job.freeTier)
  - Partial jobs run paid accounting: actual sats, refund, pool credit, deferred grant

Fix 4 — Defer ALL grant recording to post-work execution (jobs.ts)
  - Fully-free path: removed recordGrant from eval time; now called in runWorkInBackground
  - For isFree jobs: absorbCap = actual post-execution cost (calculateActualChargeSats)
  - For partial jobs: grant deferred from invoice creation to after work completes

Fix 5 — Atomic, pool-bounded grant recording with row locking (free-tier.ts)
  - SELECT ... FOR UPDATE locks pool row inside transaction
  - actualAbsorbed = Math.min(absorbSats, poolBalance) — pool can never go negative
  - Pool balance update is plain write (lock already held)
  - Daily absorption: SQL CASE expression atomically handles new-day reset
  - Audit log and identity counter both reflect actualAbsorbed, not requested amount
  - If pool is empty at grant time, transaction returns without writing

Fix 6 — Remove fire-and-forget (void) from all recordGrant() call sites
  - All three call sites now use await; grant failures propagate correctly
  - Removed unused createHash import from free-tier.ts
2026-03-19 16:59:11 +00:00
alexpaynex
1754ab1dbc Task #27: Complete cost-routing + free-tier gate — all critical fixes applied
Fix 1 — Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService (pricing.ts)
  - Unified: estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
  - Replaces duplicated estimation logic in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

Fix 2 — Move partial free-tier `recordGrant()` from invoice creation to post-work
  - Was called at invoice creation — economic DoS vulnerability
  - Now deferred to runWorkInBackground via new `partialAbsorbSats` param
  - Fully-free jobs still record grant at eval time (no payment involved)

Fix 3 — Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
  - freeTierService.decide() now runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE executeWork()
  - Fixed double-margin bug: estimateRequestCost returns cost already with infra+margin
    (calculateWorkFeeUsd), convert directly to sats — no second calculateActualChargeUsd
  - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution to prevent over-absorption

Fix 4 — Correct isFree derivation for partial jobs in advanceJob() (jobs.ts)
  - isFreeExecution = workAmountSats === 0 (not job.freeTier)
  - Partial jobs (freeTier=true, workAmountSats>0) run the paid accounting path:
    actual sats, refund eligibility, pool credit, and deferred grant recording

Fix 5 — Atomic pool deduction + daily absorption in recordGrant (free-tier.ts)
  - Pool: SQL GREATEST(value::int - N, 0)::text inside transaction, RETURNING actual value
  - Daily absorption: SQL CASE expression checks absorbed_reset_at age in DB
    → reset counter on new day, increment atomically otherwise
  - No more application-layer read-modify-write for either counter

Fix 6 — Remove fire-and-forget from all recordGrant() call sites
  - Removed `void` prefix from all three call sites (jobs.ts x2, sessions.ts x1)
  - Grant persistence failures now propagate correctly instead of silently diverging
  - Removed unused createHash import from free-tier.ts
2026-03-19 16:55:03 +00:00
alexpaynex
d899503f5d Task #27: Apply all required fixes for cost-routing + free-tier gate
Fix 1 — Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService (pricing.ts)
  - Unified method: estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
  - Replaces duplicated estimation logic in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

Fix 2 — Move partial free-tier `recordGrant()` from invoice creation to post-work
  - Was called at invoice creation for partial path — economic DoS vulnerability
  - Now deferred to runWorkInBackground via new `partialAbsorbSats` param
  - Fully-free jobs still record grant at eval time (no payment involved)

Fix 3 — Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
  - freeTierService.decide() now runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE executeWork()
  - Fixed double-margin bug: estimateRequestCost returns cost with infra+margin already
    applied (calculateWorkFeeUsd), so convert directly to sats — no second
    calculateActualChargeUsd wrapping
  - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution to prevent over-absorption

Fix 4 — Correct isFree flag for partial jobs in advanceJob() (jobs.ts)
  - job.freeTier=true for BOTH fully-free and partial jobs
  - isFreeExecution now derived from workAmountSats===0 (user paid nothing)
  - Partial jobs (freeTier=true, workAmountSats>0) run the paid accounting path:
    actualAmountSats, refundState, pool credit, and deferred grant recording

Fix 5 — Atomic pool deduction in recordGrant (free-tier.ts)
  - Replaced non-atomic read-then-write with SQL GREATEST expression inside tx
  - UPDATE timmyConfig SET value = GREATEST(value::int - N, 0)::text RETURNING value
  - Audit log receives actual DB-returned value; no oversubscription under concurrency
  - Removed unused createHash import
2026-03-19 16:50:48 +00:00
alexpaynex
3a617669f0 Task #27: Apply 3 required fixes for cost-routing + free-tier gate
1. Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService in pricing.ts
   - Unified method combining estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
   - Replaces duplicated token estimation logic at call sites in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

2. Move partial free-tier `recordGrant()` from invoice creation to post-work in runWorkInBackground
   - Previously called at invoice creation for partial path — economic DoS vulnerability
   - Now deferred to after work completes via new `partialAbsorbSats` param in runWorkInBackground
   - Fully-free jobs still record grant at eval time (no payment involved)

3. Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile (with double-margin bug fix)
   - Free-tier `decide()` now runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE `executeWork()` is called
   - Fixed: estimateRequestCost already includes infra+margin via calculateWorkFeeUsd,
     so convert estimatedCostUsd directly to sats — no second calculateActualChargeUsd call
   - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution (Math.min) to prevent over-absorption

4. Atomic pool deduction in recordGrant (free-tier.ts)
   - Replaced non-atomic read-then-write pattern with SQL GREATEST expression inside transaction
   - UPDATE timmyConfig SET value = GREATEST(value::int - absorbSats, 0)::text RETURNING value
   - Audit log (freeTierGrants) receives actual post-deduct value from DB; no oversubscription
   - Removed unused createHash import from free-tier.ts
2026-03-19 16:47:51 +00:00
alexpaynex
512089ca08 Task #27: Apply 3 required fixes for cost-routing + free-tier gate
1. Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService in pricing.ts
   - Unified method combining estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
   - Replaces duplicated token estimation logic at call sites in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

2. Move partial free-tier `recordGrant()` from invoice creation to post-work in runWorkInBackground
   - Previously called at invoice creation for partial path (before user pays) — economic DoS vulnerability
   - Now deferred to after work completes, using new `partialAbsorbSats` parameter in runWorkInBackground
   - Fully-free jobs still record grant at eval time (no payment involved)

3. Sessions pre-gate refactor: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
   - Free-tier `decide()` now runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE `executeWork()` is called
   - After execution, `absorbedSats` is capped at actual cost (Math.min) to prevent over-absorption
   - Uses new `estimateRequestCost()` for clean single-call estimation
2026-03-19 16:43:41 +00:00
alexpaynex
4c3a0e867a Task #27: Cost-routing + free-tier gate
## What was built

### DB schema
- `timmy_config` table: key/value store for the generosity pool balance
- `free_tier_grants` table: immutable audit log of every Timmy-absorbed request
- `jobs.free_tier` (boolean) + `jobs.absorbed_sats` (integer) columns

### FreeTierService (`lib/free-tier.ts`)
- Per-tier daily sats budgets (new=0, established=50, trusted=200, elite=1000)
  — all env-var overridable
- `decide(pubkey, estimatedSats)` → `{ serve: free|partial|gate, absorbSats, chargeSats }`
  — checks pool balance AND identity daily budget atomically
- `credit(paidSats)` — credits POOL_CREDIT_PCT (default 10%) of every paid
  work invoice back to the generosity pool
- `recordGrant(pubkey, reqHash, absorbSats)` — DB transaction: deducts pool,
  updates identity daily absorption counter, writes audit row
- `poolStatus()` — snapshot for metrics/monitoring

### Route integration
- `POST /api/jobs` (eval → work flow): after eval passes, `freeTierService.decide()`
  intercepts. Free → skip invoice, fire work directly. Partial → discounted invoice.
  Gate (anonymous/new tier/pool empty) → unchanged full-price flow.
- `POST /api/sessions/:id/request`: after compute, free-tier discount applied to
  balance debit. Session balance only reduced by `chargeSats`; absorbed portion
  comes from pool.
- Pool credited on every paid work completion (both jobs and session paths).
- Response fields: `free_tier: true`, `absorbed_sats: N` when applicable.

### GET /api/estimate
- Lightweight pre-flight cost estimator; no payment required
- Returns: estimatedSats, btcPriceUsd, tokenEstimate, identity.free_tier decision
  (if valid nostr_token provided), pool.balanceSats, pool.dailyBudgets

### Tests
- All 29 existing testkit tests pass (0 failures)
- Anonymous/new-tier users hit gate path correctly (verified manually)
- Pool seeds to 10,000 sats on first boot

## Architecture notes
- Free tier decision happens BEFORE invoice creation for jobs (save user the click)
- Partial grant recorded at invoice creation time (reserves pool capacity proactively)
- Free tier for sessions decided AFTER compute (actual cost known, applied to debit)
- Pool crediting is fire-and-forget (non-blocking)
2026-03-19 16:34:05 +00:00
Replit Agent
99ede5792e fix(#26): tighten token handling and verify API contract
- resolveNostrPubkey() now returns { pubkey, rejected } instead of string|null
  so invalid/expired tokens return 401 instead of silently falling to anonymous
- POST /sessions and POST /jobs: return 401 if nostr_token header/body is
  present but invalid or expired
- POST /identity/verify: now accepts optional top-level 'pubkey' field alongside
  'event'; asserts pubkey matches event.pubkey if both are provided — aligns
  API contract with { pubkey, event } spec shape and hardens against mismatch
2026-03-19 16:15:55 +00:00
Replit Agent
b0ac398cf2 fix(#26): apply decay before score mutations in recordSuccess/recordFailure
Previously recordSuccess/recordFailure read identity.trustScore (raw stored value)
and incremented/decremented from there. Long-absent identities could instantly
recover their pre-absence tier on the first interaction, defeating decay.

Fix: both methods now call applyDecay(identity) first to get the true current
baseline, then apply the score delta from there before persisting.
2026-03-19 16:11:36 +00:00
Replit Agent
1237f10539 fix(#26): FK constraints, trust scoring completeness, trust_tier always returned
- sessions.ts / jobs.ts schema: add .references(() => nostrIdentities.pubkey) FK constraints
  on nostrPubkey columns; import without .js extension for drizzle-kit CJS compat
- Schema pushed to DB (FK constraints now enforced at DB level)
- sessions route: call getOrCreate before insert to guarantee FK target exists;
  recordFailure now covers both 'rejected' AND 'failed' final states
- jobs route: call getOrCreate before insert; recordFailure added in
  runEvalInBackground for rejected and failed states; recordFailure added in
  runWorkInBackground catch block for failed state
- All GET/POST endpoints now always return trust_tier (anonymous fallback)
- Full typecheck clean; schema pushed; smoke tested — all routes green
2026-03-19 16:07:46 +00:00
Replit Agent
9b778351e4 feat(#26): Nostr identity + trust engine
- New nostr_identities DB table (pubkey, trust_score, tier, interaction_count, sats_absorbed_today, last_seen)
- nullable nostr_pubkey FK on sessions + jobs tables; schema pushed
- TrustService: getTier, getOrCreate, recordSuccess/Failure, HMAC token (issue/verify)
- Soft score decay (lazy, on read) when identity absent > N days
- POST /api/identity/challenge + POST /api/identity/verify (NIP-01 sig verification)
- GET /api/identity/me — look up trust profile by X-Nostr-Token
- POST /api/sessions + POST /api/jobs accept optional nostr_token; bind pubkey to row
- GET /sessions/:id + GET /jobs/:id include trust_tier in response
- recordSuccess/Failure called after session request + job work completes
- X-Nostr-Token added to CORS allowedHeaders + exposedHeaders
- TIMMY_TOKEN_SECRET set as persistent shared env var
2026-03-19 15:59:14 +00:00
Replit Agent
d62cd4c1eb fix: serve tower assets at /assets root + add .ai CORS origin
- Mirror /tower/assets at /assets so Vite absolute paths load correctly
- Add alexanderwhitestone.ai and www.alexanderwhitestone.ai to CORS allowlist
2026-03-19 14:39:29 +00:00
Replit Agent
db28efca6d fix: set artifact previewPath to / so landing page and /tower route in production 2026-03-19 14:15:13 +00:00
Replit Agent
add08e363a fix: use process.cwd() for tower path — import.meta.url is undefined in CJS bundle 2026-03-19 13:59:57 +00:00
Replit Agent
9de2396457 feat: Alexander Whitestone landing page + the-matrix dist at /tower
- Root / serves branded landing page (falling amber digit rain, enter button)
- /tower serves pre-built the-matrix frontend (Three.js Workshop world)
- config.js patched: WS URL auto-detects from window.location.host
- No manual ?ws= param needed — works on any domain
2026-03-19 07:12:26 +00:00
alexpaynex
abe9c221c7 feat(task-25): real LNbits mode on Hermes VPS — 29/29 testkit PASS
Task #25: Provision LNbits on Hermes VPS for real Lightning payments.

## Infrastructure (Hermes VPS 143.198.27.163)
- PostgreSQL 16 installed, lnbits DB + user created
- LNbits 0.12.12 installed in /opt/lnbits/.venv (Python 3.11 venv)
- /opt/lnbits/run.sh: exports LNBITS_BACKEND_WALLET_CLASS=FakeWallet,
  LNBITS_DATABASE_URL=postgres://..., starts lnbits on 0.0.0.0:5000
- systemd unit at /etc/systemd/system/lnbits.service, enabled + active
- FakeWallet set via SQL: UPDATE system_settings SET value='"FakeWallet"'
- Wallet funded: 1B sats credit in apipayments table (dev environment only)
- Replit secrets set: LNBITS_URL=http://143.198.27.163:5000, LNBITS_API_KEY=...

## Provisioning runbook
- scripts/hermes-lnbits/provision.sh: idempotent Ubuntu 24.04 setup script
  covering PostgreSQL, venv, run.sh, systemd unit, FakeWallet SQL, health check

## API server code changes (real-mode plumbing)
- lib/lnbits.ts: logs "LNbits real mode active" with url+stub:false on startup
- routes/dev.ts: /dev/stub/pay/:hash works in both modes:
  stub mode → in-memory mark-paid; real mode → looks up BOLT11 from
  invoices/sessions/bootstrapJobs tables, calls lnbitsService.payInvoice()
- routes/sessions.ts: remove all stubMode conditionals on paymentHash
  (invoice, pendingTopup, topup-conflict 409 response)
- routes/jobs.ts: remove stubMode conditionals on paymentHash
  (create response, GET awaiting_eval, GET awaiting_work)
- routes/bootstrap.ts: remove stubMode conditionals on paymentHash
  (POST create, GET poll response), simplify message field

## Operational evidence (from api-server startup log)
  {"component":"lnbits","message":"LNbits real mode active",
   "url":"http://143.198.27.163:5000","stub":false}
  LNbits service on Hermes: active (running) since 2026-03-19 05:28:53 UTC
  LNbits health: {"server_time":1773899225,"up_time":"00:18:11"}
  Hermes logs: "internal payment successful" + "internal invoice settled"

## Testkit: PASS=29 FAIL=0 SKIP=0 (real LNbits mode, 2026-03-19 05:48)
2026-03-19 05:49:46 +00:00
alexpaynex
76ed359bb1 feat: real LNbits mode support — 29/29 testkit PASS
Task #25: Provision LNbits on Hermes VPS for real Lightning payments.

Changes:
- dev.ts: /dev/stub/pay/:hash now works in both stub and real LNbits modes.
  In real mode, looks up BOLT11 from invoices/sessions/bootstrapJobs tables
  then calls lnbitsService.payInvoice() (FakeWallet accepts it).
- sessions.ts: Remove all stubMode conditionals on paymentHash — always expose
  paymentHash in invoice, pendingTopup, and 409-conflict responses.
- jobs.ts: Remove stubMode conditionals on paymentHash in create, GET awaiting_eval,
  and GET awaiting_work responses.
- bootstrap.ts: Remove stubMode conditionals on paymentHash in POST create and
  GET poll responses. Simplify message field (no longer mode-conditional).
- Hermes VPS: Funded LNbits wallet with 1B sats via DB credit so payInvoice
  calls succeed (FakeWallet checks wallet balance before routing).

Result: 29/29 testkit PASS in real LNbits mode (LNBITS_URL + LNBITS_API_KEY set).
2026-03-19 05:44:35 +00:00
alexpaynex
ae25bfdf71 Improve test reliability by adding explicit checks for bootstrap process
Update testkit.ts to add explicit failure conditions for missing payment hash in stub mode and to assert that the bootstrapJobId returned in the poll response matches the created ID.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: 9114d92d-daf7-42ae-a3f7-be296300efa5
Replit-Commit-Screenshot-Url: https://storage.googleapis.com/screenshot-production-us-central1/9f85e954-647c-46a5-90a7-396e495a805a/418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e/Q83Uqvu
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 04:08:01 +00:00
alexpaynex
031ca5a5c3 task(#24): Bootstrap route + cost-ledger testkit coverage — 29/29 PASS
Task: Add T23 (bootstrap stub flow) and T24 (cost-ledger completeness) to the
testkit, bringing total from 27/27 to 29/29 PASS with 0 FAIL, 0 SKIP.

## What was changed
- `artifacts/api-server/src/routes/testkit.ts`:
  - Updated audit-log comment block to document T23 + T24 additions.
  - Inserted Test 23 after T22 (line ~654):
      POST /api/bootstrap → assert 201 + bootstrapJobId present.
      Guard on stubMode=true; SKIP if real DO mode (prevents hanging).
      Stub-pay the paymentHash via /api/dev/stub/pay/:hash.
      Poll GET /api/bootstrap/:id every 2s (20s timeout) until
      state=provisioning or state=ready; assert message field present.
  - Inserted Test 24 after T23:
      Guarded on STATE_T6=complete (reuses completed job from T6).
      GET /api/jobs/:id, extract costLedger.
      Assert all 8 fields non-null: actualInputTokens, actualOutputTokens,
        totalTokens, actualCostUsd, actualAmountSats, workAmountSats,
        refundAmountSats, refundState.
      Honest-accounting invariant: actualAmountSats <= workAmountSats.
      refundAmountSats >= 0.
      refundState must match ^(not_applicable|pending|paid)$.

## No deviations from task spec
- T23 guard logic matches spec exactly (stubMode check before poll).
- T24 fields match the 8 specified in task-24.md plus the invariants.
- No changes to bootstrap.ts or jobs.ts — existing routes already correct.

## Test run result
29/29 PASS, 0 FAIL, 0 SKIP (fresh server restart, rate-limit slots clean).
T23: state=provisioning in 1s. T24: actualAmountSats(179)<=workAmountSats(182),
refundAmountSats=3, refundState=pending.
2026-03-19 04:04:49 +00:00
alexpaynex
ad63b01223 Harden rate limit by using server-trusted IP address
Update rate limiting logic to use the server's IP address (extracted from request headers or socket) instead of the client-provided visitorId to prevent spoofing.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: 892ae0fb-898b-4f34-949e-7a240560fe8e
Replit-Commit-Screenshot-Url: https://storage.googleapis.com/screenshot-production-us-central1/9f85e954-647c-46a5-90a7-396e495a805a/418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e/Q83Uqvu
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 02:56:36 +00:00
alexpaynex
71dbbd3f37 feat(task-20): Timmy responds to Workshop input bar with AI
## Task
Task #20: Timmy responds to Workshop input bar — make the "Say something
to Timmy…" input bar actually trigger an AI response shown in Timmy's
speech bubble.

## What was built

### Server (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/agent.ts)
- Added `chatReply(userText)` method to AgentService
- Uses claude-haiku (cheaper eval model) with a wizard persona system prompt
- 150-token limit so replies fit in the speech bubble
- Stub mode: returns one of 4 wizard-themed canned replies after 400ms delay
- Real mode: calls Anthropic with wizard persona, truncates to 250 chars

### Server (artifacts/api-server/src/routes/events.ts)
- Imported agentService
- Added per-visitor rate limit system: 3 replies/minute per visitorId (in-memory Map)
- Added broadcastToAll() helper for broadcasting to all WS clients
- Updated visitor_message handler:
  1. Broadcasts visitor message to all watchers as before
  2. Checks rate limit — if exceeded, sends polite "I need a moment…" reply
  3. Fire-and-forget async AI call:
     - Broadcasts agent_state: gamma=working (crystal ball pulses)
     - Calls agentService.chatReply()
     - Broadcasts agent_state: gamma=idle
     - Broadcasts chat: agentId=timmy, text=reply to ALL clients
     - Logs world event "visitor:reply"

### Frontend (the-matrix/js/websocket.js)
- Updated case 'chat' handler to differentiate message sources:
  - agentId === 'timmy': speech bubble + event log entry "Timmy: <text>"
  - agentId === 'visitor': event log only (don't hijack speech bubble)
  - everything else (delta/alpha/beta payment notifications): speech bubble

## What was already working (no change needed)
- Enter key on input bar (ui.js already had keydown listener)
- Input clearing after send (already in ui.js)
- Speech bubble rendering (setSpeechBubble already existed in agents.js)
- WebSocket sendVisitorMessage already exported from websocket.js

## Tests
- 27/27 testkit PASS (no regressions)
- TypeScript: 0 errors
- Vite build: clean (the-matrix rebuilt)
2026-03-19 02:52:49 +00:00
4f7a5e9998 test: audit testkit — remove T3b inflation, add T17-T22 (27/27 PASS) (#32) 2026-03-18 22:34:12 -04:00
a70898e939 feat(epic222): Workshop — Timmy as wizard presence, world state, WS bootstrap (#31) 2026-03-18 22:15:46 -04:00
ea4cddc2ad fix(api): completedAt: null on non-complete states + OpenAPI timestamps & rate-limit headers (#29) 2026-03-18 21:49:51 -04:00
b929e6d72f feat(api): X-RateLimit-* headers on /api/demo + createdAt/completedAt on job responses (#19) (#28) 2026-03-18 21:41:14 -04:00
e088ca4cd8 feat(integration): WS bridge + Tower + payment panel + E2E test [10/10 PASS] (#26) 2026-03-18 21:20:51 -04:00
83a2ec19e2 fix(testkit): macOS compat + fix test 8c ordering (#24) 2026-03-18 21:01:13 -04:00
alexpaynex
ca94c0a9e5 Add Bitcoin/LND/LNbits local node setup scripts and node diagnostics endpoint
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/setup.sh: one-shot installer for Bitcoin Core (pruned mainnet), LND, and LNbits on Apple Silicon Mac. Generates secrets, writes configs, installs launchd plists for auto-start.
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/start.sh: start all services via launchctl; waits for RPC readiness and auto-unlocks LND wallet.
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/stop.sh: graceful shutdown (lncli stop → bitcoin-cli stop).
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/status.sh: full health check (Bitcoin sync %, LND channels/balance, LNbits HTTP, bore tunnel). Supports --json mode for machine consumption.
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/expose.sh: opens bore tunnel from LNbits port 5000 to bore.pub for Replit access.
- scripts/bitcoin-ln-node/get-lnbits-key.sh: fetches LNbits admin API key and prints Replit secret values.
- artifacts/api-server/src/routes/node-diagnostics.ts: GET /api/admin/node-status (JSON) and /api/admin/node-status/html — Timmy self-diagnoses its LNbits/LND connectivity and reports issues.
2026-03-18 21:58:41 +00:00
alexpaynex
4dd3c7f692 Show the application's public URL in server logs
Log the full public UI URL using the REPLIT_DEV_DOMAIN environment variable.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-18 21:02:06 +00:00
alexpaynex
b02efc9057 Make job evaluation and execution run in the background
Refactors `runEvalInBackground` and `runWorkInBackground` to execute AI tasks asynchronously. Updates `pollJob` in `ui.ts` to handle 'evaluating', 'executing', and 'failed' states, and corrects `data.status` to `data.state` and `data.rejectionReason` to `data.reason`.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-18 21:00:43 +00:00
alexpaynex
e44d64ac44 Add payment hash to job creation response in stub mode
Include the `paymentHash` in the `evalInvoice` object when creating a job in stub mode via `POST /api/jobs` to ensure the frontend receives it correctly.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-18 20:36:49 +00:00
alexpaynex
adde196a40 Task #7: Redirect root to Timmy UI
Added two redirect routes in artifacts/api-server/src/app.ts:
- GET / → 302 redirect to /api/ui
- GET /api → 302 redirect to /api/ui

This means opening the preview URL or the root of the app immediately
lands on the Timmy UI without any manual navigation.

No changes to the UI itself, no new routes, no new files.
Verified: both / and /api return HTTP 302 with Location: /api/ui.
2026-03-18 20:16:48 +00:00
alexpaynex
ab2cc06a79 Add session mode for pre-funded request processing
Implement session-based API endpoints for creating, managing, and interacting with pre-funded sessions, including deposit and top-up invoice generation, macaroon authentication, and per-request debiting of compute costs.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: 2dc3847e-7186-4a22-9c7e-16cd31bca8d9
Replit-Commit-Screenshot-Url: https://storage.googleapis.com/screenshot-production-us-central1/9f85e954-647c-46a5-90a7-396e495a805a/418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e/sPDHkg8
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-18 20:00:24 +00:00
alexpaynex
dfc9ecdc7b Add honest accounting and automatic refund mechanism for completed jobs
Implement honest accounting post-job completion, calculating actual costs, adding margin, and enabling automatic refunds for overpayments via a new endpoint.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-18 19:32:34 +00:00