Replace shell=True with list-based subprocess execution to prevent
command injection via malicious user input.
Changes:
- tools/transcription_tools.py: Use shlex.split() + shell=False
- tools/environments/docker.py: List-based commands with container ID validation
Fixes CVE-level vulnerability where malicious file paths or container IDs
could inject arbitrary commands.
CVSS: 9.8 (Critical)
Refs: V-001 in SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md
Skills with scripts/, templates/, and references/ subdirectories need
those files available inside sandboxed execution environments. Previously
the skills directory was missing entirely from remote backends.
Live sync — files stay current as credentials refresh and skills update:
- Docker/Singularity: bind mounts are inherently live (host changes
visible immediately)
- Modal: _sync_files() runs before each command with mtime+size caching,
pushing only changed credential and skill files (~13μs no-op overhead)
- SSH: rsync --safe-links before each command (naturally incremental)
- Daytona: _upload_if_changed() with mtime+size caching before each command
Security — symlink filtering:
- Docker/Singularity: sanitized temp copy when symlinks detected
- Modal/Daytona: iter_skills_files() skips symlinks
- SSH: rsync --safe-links skips symlinks pointing outside source tree
- Temp dir cleanup via atexit + reuse across calls
Non-root user support:
- SSH: detects remote home via echo $HOME, syncs to $HOME/.hermes/
- Daytona: detects sandbox home before sync, uploads to $HOME/.hermes/
- Docker/Modal/Singularity: run as root, /root/.hermes/ is correct
Also:
- credential_files.py: fix name/path key fallback in required_credential_files
- Singularity, SSH, Daytona: gained credential file support
- 14 tests covering symlink filtering, name/path fallback, iter_skills_files
When a command timed out, all captured output was discarded — the agent
only saw 'Command timed out after Xs' with zero context. Now returns
the buffered output followed by a timeout marker, matching the existing
interrupt path behavior.
Salvaged from PR #3286 by @binhnt92.
Co-authored-by: nguyen binh <binhnt92@users.noreply.github.com>
Two related fixes for remote terminal backends (Modal/Docker):
1. NEW: Credential file mounting system
Skills declare required_credential_files in frontmatter. Files are
mounted into Docker (read-only bind mounts) and Modal (mounts at
creation + sync via exec on each command for mid-session changes).
Google Workspace skill updated with the new field.
2. FIX: Docker backend now includes env_passthrough vars
Skills that declare required_environment_variables (e.g. Notion with
NOTION_API_KEY) register vars in the env_passthrough system. The
local backend checked this, but Docker's forward_env was a separate
disconnected list. Now Docker exec merges both sources, so
skill-declared env vars are forwarded into containers automatically.
This fixes the reported issue where NOTION_API_KEY in ~/.hermes/.env
wasn't reaching the Docker container despite being registered via
the Notion skill's prerequisites.
Closes#3665
One-shot local execution built `printf FENCE; <cmd>; __hermes_rc=...`, so a
command ending in a heredoc produced a closing line like `EOF; __hermes_rc=...`,
which is not a valid delimiter. Bash then treated the rest of the wrapper as
heredoc body, leaking it into tool output (e.g. gh issue/PR flows).
Use newline-separated wrapper lines so the delimiter stays alone and the
trailer runs after the heredoc completes.
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
Drop the swe-rex dependency for Modal terminal backend and use the
Modal SDK directly (Sandbox.create + Sandbox.exec). This fixes:
- AsyncUsageWarning from synchronous App.lookup() in async context
- DeprecationError from unencrypted_ports / .url on unencrypted tunnels
(deprecated 2026-03-05)
The new implementation:
- Uses modal.App.lookup.aio() for async-safe app creation
- Uses Sandbox.create.aio() with 'sleep infinity' entrypoint
- Uses Sandbox.exec.aio() for direct command execution (no HTTP server
or tunnel needed)
- Keeps all existing features: persistent filesystem snapshots,
configurable resources (CPU/memory/disk), sudo support, interrupt
handling, _AsyncWorker for event loop safety
Consistent with the Docker backend precedent (PR #2804) where we
removed mini-swe-agent in favor of direct docker run.
Files changed:
- tools/environments/modal.py - core rewrite
- tools/terminal_tool.py - health check: modal instead of swerex
- hermes_cli/setup.py - install modal instead of swe-rex[modal]
- pyproject.toml - modal extra: modal>=1.0.0 instead of swe-rex[modal]
- scripts/kill_modal.sh - grep for hermes-agent instead of swe-rex
- tests/ - updated for new implementation
- environments/README.md - updated patches section
- website/docs - updated install command
* feat: env var passthrough for skills and user config
Skills that declare required_environment_variables now have those vars
passed through to sandboxed execution environments (execute_code and
terminal). Previously, execute_code stripped all vars containing KEY,
TOKEN, SECRET, etc. and the terminal blocklist removed Hermes
infrastructure vars — both blocked skill-declared env vars.
Two passthrough sources:
1. Skill-scoped (automatic): when a skill is loaded via skill_view and
declares required_environment_variables, vars that are present in
the environment are registered in a session-scoped passthrough set.
2. Config-based (manual): terminal.env_passthrough in config.yaml lets
users explicitly allowlist vars for non-skill use cases.
Changes:
- New module: tools/env_passthrough.py — shared passthrough registry
- hermes_cli/config.py: add terminal.env_passthrough to DEFAULT_CONFIG
- tools/skills_tool.py: register available skill env vars on load
- tools/code_execution_tool.py: check passthrough before filtering
- tools/environments/local.py: check passthrough in _sanitize_subprocess_env
and _make_run_env
- 19 new tests covering all layers
* docs: add environment variable passthrough documentation
Document the env var passthrough feature across four docs pages:
- security.md: new 'Environment Variable Passthrough' section with
full explanation, comparison table, and security considerations
- code-execution.md: update security section, add passthrough subsection,
fix comparison table
- creating-skills.md: add tip about automatic sandbox passthrough
- skills.md: add note about passthrough after secure setup docs
Live-tested: launched interactive CLI, loaded a skill with
required_environment_variables, verified TEST_SKILL_SECRET_KEY was
accessible inside execute_code sandbox (value: passthrough-test-value-42).
Drop the mini-swe-agent git submodule. All terminal backends now use
hermes-agent's own environment implementations directly.
Docker backend:
- Inline the `docker run -d` container startup (was 15 lines in
minisweagent's DockerEnvironment). Our wrapper already handled
execute(), cleanup(), security hardening, volumes, and resource limits.
Modal backend:
- Import swe-rex's ModalDeployment directly instead of going through
minisweagent's 90-line passthrough wrapper.
- Bake the _AsyncWorker pattern (from environments/patches.py) directly
into ModalEnvironment for Atropos compatibility without monkey-patching.
Cleanup:
- Remove minisweagent_path.py (submodule path resolution helper)
- Remove submodule init/install from install.sh and setup-hermes.sh
- Remove mini-swe-agent from .gitmodules
- environments/patches.py is now a no-op (kept for backward compat)
- terminal_tool.py no longer does sys.path hacking for minisweagent
- mini_swe_runner.py guards imports (optional, for RL training only)
- Update all affected tests to mock the new direct subprocess calls
- Update README.md, CONTRIBUTING.md
No functionality change — all Docker, Modal, local, SSH, Singularity,
and Daytona backends behave identically. 6093 tests pass.
On macOS with Homebrew (Apple Silicon), Node.js and agent-browser
binaries live under /opt/homebrew/bin/ which is not included in the
_SANE_PATH fallback used by browser_tool.py and environments/local.py.
When Hermes runs with a filtered PATH (e.g. as a systemd service),
these binaries are invisible, causing 'env: node: No such file or
directory' errors when using browser tools.
Changes:
- Add /opt/homebrew/bin and /opt/homebrew/sbin to _SANE_PATH in both
browser_tool.py and environments/local.py
- Add _discover_homebrew_node_dirs() to find versioned Node installs
(e.g. brew install node@24) that aren't linked into /opt/homebrew/bin
- Extend _find_agent_browser() to search Homebrew and Hermes-managed
dirs when agent-browser isn't on the current PATH
- Include discovered Homebrew node dirs in subprocess PATH when
launching agent-browser
- Add 11 new tests covering all Homebrew path discovery logic
find_one is being deprecated. Primary lookup now uses get() with a
deterministic sandbox name (hermes-{task_id}). A legacy fallback via
list(labels=...) ensures sandboxes created before this migration are
still resumable.
* feat(web): add Parallel as alternative web search/extract backend
Adds Parallel (parallel.ai) as a drop-in alternative to Firecrawl for
web_search and web_extract tools using the official parallel-web SDK.
- Backend selection via WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND env var (auto/parallel/firecrawl)
- Auto mode prefers Firecrawl when both keys present; Parallel when sole backend
- web_crawl remains Firecrawl-only with clear error when unavailable
- Lazy SDK imports, interrupt support, singleton clients
- 16 new unit tests for backend selection and client config
Co-authored-by: s-jag <s-jag@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: add PARALLEL_API_KEY to config registry and fix web_crawl policy tests
Follow-up for Parallel backend integration:
- Add PARALLEL_API_KEY to OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS (hermes doctor, env blocklist)
- Add to set_config_value api_keys list (hermes config set)
- Add to doctor keys display
- Fix 2 web_crawl policy tests that didn't set FIRECRAWL_API_KEY
(needed now that web_crawl has a Firecrawl availability guard)
* refactor: explicit backend selection via hermes tools, not auto-detect
Replace the auto-detect backend selection with explicit user choice:
- hermes tools saves WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND to .env when user picks a provider
- _get_backend() reads the explicit choice first
- Fallback only for manual/legacy config (uses whichever key is present)
- _is_provider_active() shows [active] for the selected web backend
- Updated tests, docs, and .env.example to remove 'auto' mode language
* refactor: use config.yaml for web backend, not env var
Match the TTS/browser pattern — web.backend is stored in config.yaml
(set by hermes tools), not as a WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND env var.
- _load_web_config() reads web: section from config.yaml
- _get_backend() reads web.backend from config, falls back to key detection
- _configure_provider() saves to config dict (saved to config.yaml)
- _is_provider_active() reads from config dict
- Removed WEB_SEARCH_BACKEND from .env.example, set_config_value, docs
- Updated all tests to mock _load_web_config instead of env vars
---------
Co-authored-by: s-jag <s-jag@users.noreply.github.com>
When container_persistent=false, the inner mini-swe-agent cleanup only
runs 'docker stop' in the background, leaving containers in Exited state.
Now cleanup() also runs 'docker rm -f' to fully remove the container.
Also fixes pre-existing test failures in model_metadata (gpt-4.1 1M context),
setup tests (TTS provider step), and adds MockInnerDocker.cleanup().
Original fix by crazywriter1. Cherry-picked and adapted for current main.
Fixes#1679
Docker terminal sessions are secret-dark by default. This adds
terminal.docker_forward_env as an explicit allowlist for env vars
that may be forwarded into Docker containers.
Values resolve from the current shell first, then fall back to
~/.hermes/.env. Only variables the user explicitly lists are
forwarded — nothing is auto-exposed.
Cherry-picked from PR #1449 by @teknium1, conflict-resolved onto
current main.
Fixes#1436
Supersedes #1439
* fix: prevent infinite 400 failure loop on context overflow (#1630)
When a gateway session exceeds the model's context window, Anthropic may
return a generic 400 invalid_request_error with just 'Error' as the
message. This bypassed the phrase-based context-length detection,
causing the agent to treat it as a non-retryable client error. Worse,
the failed user message was still persisted to the transcript, making
the session even larger on each attempt — creating an infinite loop.
Three-layer fix:
1. run_agent.py — Fallback heuristic: when a 400 error has a very short
generic message AND the session is large (>40% of context or >80
messages), treat it as a probable context overflow and trigger
compression instead of aborting.
2. run_agent.py + gateway/run.py — Don't persist failed messages:
when the agent returns failed=True before generating any response,
skip writing the user's message to the transcript/DB. This prevents
the session from growing on each failure.
3. gateway/run.py — Smarter error messages: detect context-overflow
failures and suggest /compact or /reset specifically, instead of a
generic 'try again' that will fail identically.
* fix(skills): detect prompt injection patterns and block cache file reads
Adds two security layers to prevent prompt injection via skills hub
cache files (#1558):
1. read_file: blocks direct reads of ~/.hermes/skills/.hub/ directory
(index-cache, catalog files). The 3.5MB clawhub_catalog_v1.json
was the original injection vector — untrusted skill descriptions
in the catalog contained adversarial text that the model executed.
2. skill_view: warns when skills are loaded from outside the trusted
~/.hermes/skills/ directory, and detects common injection patterns
in skill content ("ignore previous instructions", "<system>", etc.).
Cherry-picked from PR #1562 by ygd58.
* fix(tools): chunk long messages in send_message_tool before dispatch (#1552)
Long messages sent via send_message tool or cron delivery silently
failed when exceeding platform limits. Gateway adapters handle this
via truncate_message(), but the standalone senders in send_message_tool
bypassed that entirely.
- Apply truncate_message() chunking in _send_to_platform() before
dispatching to individual platform senders
- Remove naive message[i:i+2000] character split in _send_discord()
in favor of centralized smart splitting
- Attach media files to last chunk only for Telegram
- Add regression tests for chunking and media placement
Cherry-picked from PR #1557 by llbn.
* fix(approval): show full command in dangerous command approval (#1553)
Previously the command was truncated to 80 chars in CLI (with a
[v]iew full option), 500 chars in Discord embeds, and missing entirely
in Telegram/Slack approval messages. Now the full command is always
displayed everywhere:
- CLI: removed 80-char truncation and [v]iew full menu option
- Gateway (TG/Slack): approval_required message includes full command
in a code block
- Discord: embed shows full command up to 4096-char limit
- Windows: skip SIGALRM-based test timeout (Unix-only)
- Updated tests: replaced view-flow tests with direct approval tests
Cherry-picked from PR #1566 by crazywriter1.
* fix(cli): flush stdout during agent loop to prevent macOS display freeze (#1624)
The interrupt polling loop in chat() waited on the queue without
invalidating the prompt_toolkit renderer. On macOS, the StdoutProxy
buffer only flushed on input events, causing the CLI to appear frozen
during tool execution until the user typed a key.
Fix: call _invalidate() on each queue timeout (every ~100ms, throttled
to 150ms) to force the renderer to flush buffered agent output.
* fix(claw): warn when API keys are skipped during OpenClaw migration (#1580)
When --migrate-secrets is not passed (the default), API keys like
OPENROUTER_API_KEY are silently skipped with no warning. Users don't
realize their keys weren't migrated until the agent fails to connect.
Add a post-migration warning with actionable instructions: either
re-run with --migrate-secrets or add the key manually via
hermes config set.
Cherry-picked from PR #1593 by ygd58.
* fix(security): block sandbox backend creds from subprocess env (#1264)
Add Modal and Daytona sandbox credentials to the subprocess env
blocklist so they're not leaked to agent terminal sessions via
printenv/env.
Cherry-picked from PR #1571 by ygd58.
---------
Co-authored-by: buray <ygd58@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: lbn <llbn@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: crazywriter1 <53251494+crazywriter1@users.noreply.github.com>
When neither apptainer nor singularity is installed, the Singularity
backend silently defaults to "singularity" and fails with a cryptic
FileNotFoundError inside _start_instance(). Add a preflight check
that resolves the executable and verifies it responds, raising a
clear RuntimeError with install instructions on failure.
Closes#1511
Keep Docker sandboxes isolated by default. Add an explicit terminal.docker_mount_cwd_to_workspace opt-in, thread it through terminal/file environment creation, and document the security tradeoff and config.yaml workflow clearly.
Fixes#1445 — When using Docker backend, the user's current working
directory is now automatically bind-mounted to /workspace inside the
container. This allows users to run `cd my-project && hermes` and have
their project files accessible to the agent without manual volume config.
Changes:
- Add host_cwd and auto_mount_cwd parameters to DockerEnvironment
- Capture original host CWD in _get_env_config() before container fallback
- Pass host_cwd through _create_environment() to Docker backend
- Add TERMINAL_DOCKER_NO_AUTO_MOUNT env var to disable if needed
- Skip auto-mount when /workspace is already explicitly mounted
- Add tests for auto-mount behavior
- Add documentation for the new feature
The auto-mount is skipped when:
1. TERMINAL_DOCKER_NO_AUTO_MOUNT=true is set
2. User configured docker_volumes with :/workspace
3. persistent_filesystem=true (persistent sandbox mode)
This makes the Docker backend behave more intuitively — the agent
operates on the user's actual project directory by default.
Extend subprocess env sanitization beyond provider credentials by blocking Hermes-managed tool, messaging, and related gateway runtime vars. Reuse a shared sanitizer in LocalEnvironment and ProcessRegistry so background and PTY processes honor the same blocklist and _HERMES_FORCE_ escape hatch. Add regression coverage for local env execution and process_registry spawning.
Expanded the list of blocked environment variables to include Google, Groq, Mistral, and other major LLM providers. This ensures complete isolation and prevents conflicts with external CLI tools.
- Merge _init_persistent_shell + _start_persistent_shell into single method
- Move execute() dispatcher and cleanup() into PersistentShellMixin
so LocalEnvironment and SSHEnvironment inherit them
- Remove broad except Exception wrappers from _execute_oneshot in both backends
- Replace try/except with os.path.exists checks in local _read_temp_files
and _cleanup_temp_files
- Remove redundant bash -c from SSH oneshot (SSH already runs in a shell)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: improve context compaction handoff summaries
Adapt PR #916 onto current main by replacing the old context summary marker
with a clearer handoff wrapper, updating the summarization prompt for
resume-oriented summaries, and preserving the current call_llm-based
compression path.
* fix: clearer error when docker backend is unavailable
* fix: preserve docker discovery in backend preflight
Follow up on salvaged PR #940 by reusing find_docker() during the new
availability check so non-PATH Docker Desktop installs still work. Add
a regression test covering the resolved executable path.
---------
Co-authored-by: aydnOktay <xaydinoktay@gmail.com>
Terminal subprocesses inherit OPENAI_BASE_URL and other provider env
vars loaded from ~/.hermes/.env, silently misrouting external CLIs
like codex. Build a blocklist dynamically from the provider registry
so new providers are automatically covered. Callers that truly need
a blocked var can opt in via the _HERMES_FORCE_ prefix.
Closes#1002
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes discovered while running TBLite baseline evaluation:
1. ephemeral_disk param not supported in modal 1.3.5 - check before passing
2. Modal legacy image builder requires working pip - add ensurepip fix via
setup_dockerfile_commands to handle task images with broken pip
3. Host cwd leaked into Modal sandbox - add /home/ to host prefix check
4. Tilde ~ not expanded by subprocess.run(cwd=) in sandboxes - use /root
5. install_pipx must stay True for swerex-remote to be available
Dependencies also needed (not in this commit):
- git submodule update --init mini-swe-agent
- uv pip install swe-rex boto3
On macOS, Docker Desktop installs the CLI to /usr/local/bin/docker, but
when Hermes runs as a gateway service (launchd) or in other non-login
contexts, /usr/local/bin is often not in PATH. This causes the Docker
requirements check to fail with 'No such file or directory: docker' even
though docker works fine from the user's terminal.
Add find_docker() helper that uses shutil.which() first, then probes
common Docker Desktop install paths on macOS (/usr/local/bin,
/opt/homebrew/bin, Docker.app bundle). The resolved path is cached and
passed to mini-swe-agent via its 'executable' parameter.
- tools/environments/docker.py: add find_docker(), use it in
_storage_opt_supported() and pass to _Docker(executable=...)
- tools/terminal_tool.py: use find_docker() in requirements check
- tests/tools/test_docker_find.py: 4 tests (PATH, fallback, not found, cache)
2877 tests pass.
Authored by voteblake.
- Semaphore limits concurrent Modal sandbox creations to 8 (configurable)
to prevent thread pool deadlocks when 86+ tasks fire simultaneously
- Modal cleanup guard for failed init (prevents AttributeError)
- CWD override to /app for TB2 containers
- Add /home/ to host path validation for container backends
Authored by Himess. Three independent fixes:
- cron/jobs.py: respect HERMES_HOME env var (consistent with scheduler.py)
- gateway/run.py: add Platform.HOMEASSISTANT to toolset mappings
- tools/environments/daytona.py: use time.monotonic() for timeout deadline
cap-drop ALL removes DAC_OVERRIDE, which root needs to write to
bind-mounted directories owned by the host user (uid 1000). This
broke persistent Docker sandboxes — the container couldn't write
to /workspace or /root.
Add back the minimum capabilities needed:
- DAC_OVERRIDE: root can write to bind-mounted dirs owned by host user
- CHOWN: package managers (pip, npm, apt) need to set file ownership
- FOWNER: needed for operations on files owned by other users
Still drops all other capabilities (NET_RAW, SYS_ADMIN, etc.) and
keeps no-new-privileges. Security boundary is the container itself.
Verified end-to-end: create files → destroy container → new container
with same task_id → files persist on host and are accessible in the
new container.
Renamed _find_shell to _find_bash to clarify its purpose of specifically locating bash. Improved the shell detection logic to prioritize bash over the user's $SHELL, ensuring compatibility with the fence wrapper's syntax requirements. Added a backward compatibility alias for _find_shell to maintain existing imports in process_registry.py.
Updated the LocalEnvironment class to ensure the PATH variable includes standard directories. This change addresses issues with systemd services and terminal multiplexers that inherit a minimal PATH, improving the execution environment for subprocesses.
Updated the _find_shell function to improve shell detection on non-Windows systems. The function now checks for the existence of /usr/bin/bash and /bin/bash before falling back to /bin/sh, ensuring a more robust shell resolution process.
- Add max_concurrent_tasks config (default 8) with semaphore in TB2 eval
- Pass cwd: /app via register_task_env_overrides for TB2 tasks
- Add /home/ to host path prefixes as safety net for container backends
When all 86 TerminalBench2 tasks fire simultaneously, each creates a Modal sandbox
via asyncio.run() inside a thread pool worker. Modal's blocking calls deadlock
when too many are created at once. The semaphore ensures max 8 concurrent creations.
Co-Authored-By: hermes-agent[bot] <hermes-agent[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
1. cron/jobs.py: respect HERMES_HOME env var for job storage path.
scheduler.py already uses os.getenv("HERMES_HOME", ...) but jobs.py
hardcodes Path.home() / ".hermes", causing path mismatch when
HERMES_HOME is set.
2. gateway/run.py: add Platform.HOMEASSISTANT to default_toolset_map
and platform_config_key. The adapter and hermes-homeassistant
toolset both exist but the mapping dicts omit it, so HomeAssistant
events silently fall back to the Telegram toolset.
3. tools/environments/daytona.py: use time.monotonic() for deadline
instead of float subtraction. All other backends (docker, ssh,
singularity, local) use monotonic clock for timeout tracking.
The accumulator pattern (deadline -= 0.2) drifts because
t.join(0.2) + interrupt checks take longer than 0.2s per iteration.
The Daytona SDK's process.exec(timeout=N) parameter is not enforced —
the server-side timeout never fires and the SDK has no client-side
fallback, causing commands to hang indefinitely.
Fix: wrap commands with timeout N sh -c '...' (coreutils) which
reliably kills the process and returns exit code 124. Added
shlex.quote for proper shell escaping and a secondary deadline (timeout + 10s) that force-stops the sandbox if the shell timeout somehow fails.
Signed-off-by: rovle <lovre.pesut@gmail.com>
state
- Replace logger.warning with warnings.warn for the disk cap so users
actually see it (logger was suppressed by CLI's log level config)
- Use SandboxState enum instead of string literals in
_ensure_sandbox_ready
Signed-off-by: rovle <lovre.pesut@gmail.com>
