feat(security): add pre-merge security guards and quality gates

- Add secret-leak detection CI workflow (secret-scan.yml)
- Add dependency vulnerability scanning via pip-audit (dependency-audit.yml)
- Add CODEOWNERS for critical paths (gateway/, tools/, agent/, config/)
- Add security PR checklist issue template
- Add quarterly security audit scheduled workflow
- Add pre-commit config with gitleaks and private key detection

Refs #149

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Default owners for all files
+* @Timmy
+
+# Critical paths require explicit review
+/gateway/ @Timmy
+/tools/ @Timmy
+/agent/ @Timmy
+/config/ @Timmy
+/scripts/ @Timmy
+/.github/workflows/ @Timmy
+/pyproject.toml @Timmy
+/requirements.txt @Timmy
+/Dockerfile @Timmy

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/security_pr_checklist.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+name: "🔒 Security PR Checklist"
+description: "Use this when your PR touches authentication, file I/O, external API calls, or other sensitive paths."
+title: "[Security Review]: "
+labels: ["security", "needs-review"]
+body:
+  - type: markdown
+    attributes:
+      value: |
+        ## Security Pre-Merge Review
+        Complete this checklist before requesting review on PRs that touch **authentication, file I/O, external API calls, or secrets handling**.
+
+  - type: input
+    id: pr-link
+    attributes:
+      label: Pull Request
+      description: Link to the PR being reviewed
+      placeholder: "https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/Timmy_Foundation/hermes-agent/pulls/XXX"
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: dropdown
+    id: change-type
+    attributes:
+      label: Change Category
+      description: What kind of sensitive change does this PR make?
+      multiple: true
+      options:
+        - Authentication / Authorization
+        - File I/O (read/write/delete)
+        - External API calls (outbound HTTP/network)
+        - Secret / credential handling
+        - Command execution (subprocess/shell)
+        - Dependency addition or update
+        - Configuration changes
+        - CI/CD pipeline changes
+    validations:
+      required: true
+
+  - type: checkboxes
+    id: secrets-checklist
+    attributes:
+      label: Secrets & Credentials
+      options:
+        - label: No secrets, API keys, or credentials are hardcoded
+          required: true
+        - label: All sensitive values are loaded from environment variables or a secrets manager
+          required: true
+        - label: Test fixtures use fake/placeholder values, not real credentials
+          required: true
+
+  - type: checkboxes
+    id: input-validation-checklist
+    attributes:
+      label: Input Validation
+      options:
+        - label: All external input (user, API, file) is validated before use
+          required: true
+        - label: File paths are validated against path traversal (`../`, null bytes, absolute paths)
+        - label: URLs are validated for SSRF (blocked private/metadata IPs)
+        - label: Shell commands do not use `shell=True` with user-controlled input
+
+  - type: checkboxes
+    id: auth-checklist
+    attributes:
+      label: Authentication & Authorization (if applicable)
+      options:
+        - label: Authentication tokens are not logged or exposed in error messages
+        - label: Authorization checks happen server-side, not just client-side
+        - label: Session tokens are properly scoped and have expiry
+
+  - type: checkboxes
+    id: supply-chain-checklist
+    attributes:
+      label: Supply Chain
+      options:
+        - label: New dependencies are pinned to a specific version range
+        - label: Dependencies come from trusted sources (PyPI, npm, official repos)
+        - label: No `.pth` files or install hooks that execute arbitrary code
+        - label: "`pip-audit` passes (no known CVEs in added dependencies)"
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: threat-model
+    attributes:
+      label: Threat Model Notes
+      description: |
+        Briefly describe the attack surface this change introduces or modifies, and how it is mitigated.
+      placeholder: |
+        This PR adds a new outbound HTTP call to the OpenRouter API.
+        Mitigation: URL is hardcoded (no user input), response is parsed with strict schema validation.
+
+  - type: textarea
+    id: testing
+    attributes:
+      label: Security Testing Done
+      description: What security testing did you perform?
+      placeholder: |
+        - Ran validate_security.py — all checks pass
+        - Tested path traversal attempts manually
+        - Verified no secrets in git diff

.github/workflows/dependency-audit.yml

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+name: Dependency Audit
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+    paths:
+      - 'requirements.txt'
+      - 'pyproject.toml'
+      - 'uv.lock'
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '0 8 * * 1'  # Weekly on Monday
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  audit:
+    name: Audit Python dependencies
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v5
+      - name: Set up Python
+        run: uv python install 3.11
+      - name: Install pip-audit
+        run: uv pip install --system pip-audit
+      - name: Run pip-audit
+        id: audit
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          # Run pip-audit against the lock file/requirements
+          if pip-audit --requirement requirements.txt -f json -o /tmp/audit-results.json 2>/tmp/audit-stderr.txt; then
+            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+            # Check severity
+            CRITICAL=$(python3 -c "
+          import json, sys
+          data = json.load(open('/tmp/audit-results.json'))
+          vulns = data.get('dependencies', [])
+          for d in vulns:
+              for v in d.get('vulns', []):
+                  aliases = v.get('aliases', [])
+                  # Check for critical/high CVSS
+                  if any('CVSS' in str(a) for a in aliases):
+                      print('true')
+                      sys.exit(0)
+          print('false')
+          " 2>/dev/null || echo 'false')
+            echo "critical=${CRITICAL}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+        continue-on-error: true
+      - name: Post results comment
+        if: steps.audit.outputs.found == 'true' && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          BODY="## ⚠️ Dependency Vulnerabilities Detected
+
+          \`pip-audit\` found vulnerable dependencies in this PR. Review and update before merging.
+
+          \`\`\`
+          $(cat /tmp/audit-results.json | python3 -c "
+          import json, sys
+          data = json.load(sys.stdin)
+          for dep in data.get('dependencies', []):
+              for v in dep.get('vulns', []):
+                  print(f\"  {dep['name']}=={dep['version']}: {v['id']} - {v.get('description', '')[:120]}\")
+          " 2>/dev/null || cat /tmp/audit-stderr.txt)
+          \`\`\`
+
+          ---
+          *Automated scan by [dependency-audit](/.github/workflows/dependency-audit.yml)*"
+          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY"
+      - name: Fail on vulnerabilities
+        if: steps.audit.outputs.found == 'true'
+        run: |
+          echo "::error::Vulnerable dependencies detected. See PR comment for details."
+          cat /tmp/audit-results.json | python3 -m json.tool || true
+          exit 1

.github/workflows/quarterly-security-audit.yml

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+name: Quarterly Security Audit
+
+on:
+  schedule:
+    # Run at 08:00 UTC on the first day of each quarter (Jan, Apr, Jul, Oct)
+    - cron: '0 8 1 1,4,7,10 *'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      reason:
+        description: 'Reason for manual trigger'
+        required: false
+        default: 'Manual quarterly audit'
+
+permissions:
+  issues: write
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  create-audit-issue:
+    name: Create quarterly security audit issue
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Get quarter info
+        id: quarter
+        run: |
+          MONTH=$(date +%-m)
+          YEAR=$(date +%Y)
+          QUARTER=$(( (MONTH - 1) / 3 + 1 ))
+          echo "quarter=Q${QUARTER}-${YEAR}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "year=${YEAR}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "q=${QUARTER}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Create audit issue
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          QUARTER="${{ steps.quarter.outputs.quarter }}"
+
+          gh issue create \
+            --title "[$QUARTER] Quarterly Security Audit" \
+            --label "security,audit" \
+            --body "$(cat <<'BODY'
+          ## Quarterly Security Audit — ${{ steps.quarter.outputs.quarter }}
+
+          This is the scheduled quarterly security audit for the hermes-agent project. Complete each section and close this issue when the audit is done.
+
+          **Audit Period:** ${{ steps.quarter.outputs.quarter }}
+          **Due:** End of quarter
+          **Owner:** Assign to a maintainer
+
+          ---
+
+          ## 1. Open Issues & PRs Audit
+
+          Review all open issues and PRs for security-relevant content. Tag any that touch attack surfaces with the `security` label.
+
+          - [ ] Review open issues older than 30 days for unaddressed security concerns
+          - [ ] Tag security-relevant open PRs with `needs-security-review`
+          - [ ] Check for any issues referencing CVEs or known vulnerabilities
+          - [ ] Review recently closed security issues — are fixes deployed?
+
+          ## 2. Dependency Audit
+
+          - [ ] Run `pip-audit` against current `requirements.txt` / `pyproject.toml`
+          - [ ] Check `uv.lock` for any pinned versions with known CVEs
+          - [ ] Review any `git+` dependencies for recent changes or compromise signals
+          - [ ] Update vulnerable dependencies and open PRs for each
+
+          ## 3. Critical Path Review
+
+          Review recent changes to attack-surface paths:
+
+          - [ ] `gateway/` — authentication, message routing, platform adapters
+          - [ ] `tools/` — file I/O, command execution, web access
+          - [ ] `agent/` — prompt handling, context management
+          - [ ] `config/` — secrets loading, configuration parsing
+          - [ ] `.github/workflows/` — CI/CD integrity
+
+          Run: `git log --since="3 months ago" --name-only -- gateway/ tools/ agent/ config/ .github/workflows/`
+
+          ## 4. Secret Scan
+
+          - [ ] Run secret scanner on the full codebase (not just diffs)
+          - [ ] Verify no credentials are present in git history
+          - [ ] Confirm all API keys/tokens in use are rotated on a regular schedule
+
+          ## 5. Access & Permissions Review
+
+          - [ ] Review who has write access to the main branch
+          - [ ] Confirm branch protection rules are still in place (require PR + review)
+          - [ ] Verify CI/CD secrets are scoped correctly (not over-permissioned)
+          - [ ] Review CODEOWNERS file for accuracy
+
+          ## 6. Vulnerability Triage
+
+          List any new vulnerabilities found this quarter:
+
+          | ID | Component | Severity | Status | Owner |
+          |----|-----------|----------|--------|-------|
+          | | | | | |
+
+          ## 7. Action Items
+
+          | Action | Owner | Due Date | Status |
+          |--------|-------|----------|--------|
+          | | | | |
+
+          ---
+
+          *Auto-generated by [quarterly-security-audit](/.github/workflows/quarterly-security-audit.yml). Close this issue when the audit is complete.*
+          BODY
+          )"

.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml

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+name: Secret Scan
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
+
+permissions:
+  pull-requests: write
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  scan:
+    name: Scan for secrets
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Fetch base branch
+        run: git fetch origin ${{ github.base_ref }}
+
+      - name: Scan diff for secrets
+        id: scan
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          # Get only added lines from the diff (exclude deletions and context lines)
+          DIFF=$(git diff "origin/${{ github.base_ref }}"...HEAD -- \
+            ':!*.lock' ':!uv.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' \
+            | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
+
+          FINDINGS=""
+          CRITICAL=false
+
+          check() {
+            local label="$1"
+            local pattern="$2"
+            local critical="${3:-false}"
+            local matches
+            matches=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -oP "$pattern" || true)
+            if [ -n "$matches" ]; then
+              FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}\n- **${label}**: pattern matched"
+              if [ "$critical" = "true" ]; then
+                CRITICAL=true
+              fi
+            fi
+          }
+
+          # AWS keys — critical
+          check "AWS Access Key" 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' true
+
+          # Private key headers — critical
+          check "Private Key Header" '-----BEGIN (RSA|EC|DSA|OPENSSH|PGP) PRIVATE KEY' true
+
+          # OpenAI / Anthropic style keys
+          check "OpenAI-style API key (sk-)" 'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}' false
+
+          # GitHub tokens
+          check "GitHub personal access token (ghp_)" 'ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}' true
+          check "GitHub fine-grained PAT (github_pat_)" 'github_pat_[a-zA-Z0-9_]{1,}' true
+
+          # Slack tokens
+          check "Slack bot token (xoxb-)" 'xoxb-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,}' true
+          check "Slack user token (xoxp-)" 'xoxp-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,}' true
+
+          # Generic assignment patterns — exclude obvious placeholders
+          GENERIC=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -iP '(api_key|apikey|api-key|secret_key|access_token|auth_token)\s*[=:]\s*['"'"'"][^'"'"'"]{20,}['"'"'"]' \
+            | grep -ivP '(fake|mock|test|placeholder|example|dummy|your[_-]|xxx|<|>|\{\{)' || true)
+          if [ -n "$GENERIC" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}\n- **Generic credential assignment**: possible hardcoded secret"
+          fi
+
+          # .env additions with long values
+          ENV_DIFF=$(git diff "origin/${{ github.base_ref }}"...HEAD -- '*.env' '**/.env' '.env*' \
+            | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
+          ENV_MATCHES=$(echo "$ENV_DIFF" | grep -P '^[A-Z_]+=.{16,}' \
+            | grep -ivP '(fake|mock|test|placeholder|example|dummy|your[_-]|xxx)' || true)
+          if [ -n "$ENV_MATCHES" ]; then
+            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}\n- **.env file**: lines with potentially real secret values detected"
+          fi
+
+          # Write outputs
+          if [ -n "$FINDINGS" ]; then
+            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+          if [ "$CRITICAL" = "true" ]; then
+            echo "critical=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "critical=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+          # Store findings in a file to use in comment step
+          printf "%b" "$FINDINGS" > /tmp/secret-findings.txt
+
+      - name: Post PR comment with findings
+        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true' && github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          FINDINGS=$(cat /tmp/secret-findings.txt)
+          SEVERITY="warning"
+          if [ "${{ steps.scan.outputs.critical }}" = "true" ]; then
+            SEVERITY="CRITICAL"
+          fi
+
+          BODY="## Secret Scan — ${SEVERITY} findings
+
+          The automated secret scanner detected potential secrets in the diff for this PR.
+
+          ### Findings
+          ${FINDINGS}
+
+          ### What to do
+          1. Remove any real credentials from the diff immediately.
+          2. If the match is a false positive (test fixture, placeholder), add a comment explaining why or rename the variable to include \`fake\`, \`mock\`, or \`test\`.
+          3. Rotate any exposed credentials regardless of whether this PR is merged.
+
+          ---
+          *Automated scan by [secret-scan](/.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml)*"
+
+          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY"
+
+      - name: Fail on critical secrets
+        if: steps.scan.outputs.critical == 'true'
+        run: |
+          echo "::error::Critical secrets detected in diff (private keys, AWS keys, or GitHub tokens). Remove them before merging."
+          exit 1
+
+      - name: Warn on non-critical findings
+        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true' && steps.scan.outputs.critical == 'false'
+        run: |
+          echo "::warning::Potential secrets detected in diff. Review the PR comment for details."

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+repos:
+  # Secret detection
+  - repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
+    rev: v8.21.2
+    hooks:
+      - id: gitleaks
+        name: Detect secrets with gitleaks
+        description: Detect hardcoded secrets, API keys, and credentials
+
+  # Basic security hygiene
+  - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: v5.0.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: check-added-large-files
+        args: ['--maxkb=500']
+      - id: detect-private-key
+        name: Detect private keys
+      - id: check-merge-conflict
+      - id: check-yaml
+      - id: check-toml
+      - id: end-of-file-fixer
+      - id: trailing-whitespace
+        args: ['--markdown-linebreak-ext=md']
+      - id: no-commit-to-branch
+        args: ['--branch', 'main']