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fix/468-cr
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burn/284-1
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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| b00785820b |
@@ -129,6 +129,335 @@ def _approval_key_aliases(pattern_key: str) -> set[str]:
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return _PATTERN_KEY_ALIASES.get(pattern_key, {pattern_key})
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# =========================================================================
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# Vitalik's Threat Model Extensions
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# =========================================================================
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# Extended threat categories addressing:
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# 1. LLM jailbreaks (Remote content 'hacking' the LLM)
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# 2. LLM accidents (Accidental data leakage)
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# 3. Software bugs (Supply chain risks)
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# =========================================================================
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# --- LLM JAILBREAK THREATS ---
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# Remote content that attempts to manipulate or "hack" the LLM's behavior
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LLM_JAILBREAK_PATTERNS = [
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# Prompt injection attempts in URLs or content
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(r'(?i)(ignore|disregard|forget|override)\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above|earlier)\s+(instructions|prompts|rules|constraints)', "prompt injection: override instructions"),
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(r'(?i)you\s+are\s+now\s+(a\s+)?(different|new|unrestricted|jailbroken)\s+(ai|model|assistant|agent)', "prompt injection: identity override"),
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(r'(?i)(system|admin|root)\s*:\s*(you\s+are|act\s+as|become|transform)', "prompt injection: system role hijack"),
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(r'(?i)\[?(system|admin|root)\]?\s*[:=]\s*', "prompt injection: system tag injection"),
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(r'(?i)<\|?(im_start|system|endoftext)\|?>', "prompt injection: token boundary attack"),
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(r'(?i)(human|assistant|user)\s*:\s*(ignore|disregard|override)', "prompt injection: role confusion"),
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# Content that attempts to extract system prompts
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(r'(?i)(repeat|show|reveal|display|print|output)\s+(your|the|all)\s+(system|initial|original|hidden)\s+(prompt|instructions|rules|constraints)', "prompt extraction: system prompt leak"),
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(r'(?i)what\s+(are|were)\s+your\s+(original|initial|system|hidden)\s+(instructions|prompts|rules)', "prompt extraction: instruction leak"),
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(r'(?i)(translate|convert|encode|cipher|obfuscate)\s+your\s+(system|instructions)\s+(to|into|as)', "prompt extraction: encoded leak"),
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# Social engineering attempts
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(r'(?i)(pretend|imagine|roleplay|act\s+as\s+if)\s+(you\s+are|there\s+are\s+no|you\s+have\s+no)\s+(restrictions|limits|rules|constraints)', "social engineering: constraint removal"),
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(r'(?i)this\s+is\s+(a\s+)?(test|simulation|exercise|training)\s+(environment|scenario|mode)', "social engineering: test environment bypass"),
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(r'(?i)(emergency|urgent|critical)\s+override\s+required', "social engineering: urgency manipulation"),
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]
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# --- LLM ACCIDENT THREATS ---
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# Patterns that indicate accidental data leakage or unintended disclosure
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LLM_ACCIDENT_PATTERNS = [
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# API keys and tokens in prompts or outputs
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(r'(?i)(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token)\s*[:=]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]{20,}', "credential leak: API key/token"),
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(r'(?i)(sk|pk|ak|tk)[-_]?[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}', "credential leak: key pattern"),
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(r'(?i)\b[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\b', "potential leak: long alphanumeric string"),
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# Private keys and certificates
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(r'-----BEGIN\s+(RSA\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----', "credential leak: private key"),
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(r'(?i)(ssh-rsa|ssh-ed25519)\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+', "credential leak: SSH public key"),
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# Database connection strings
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(r'(?i)(mongodb|postgres|mysql|redis)://[^\s]+:[^\s]+@', "credential leak: database connection"),
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(r'(?i)(host|server|endpoint)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s]+\s*(username|user|login)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s]+\s*(password|pass|pwd)\s*[:=]', "credential leak: connection details"),
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# Environment variables that might contain secrets
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(r'(?i)(export|set|env)\s+[A-Z_]*(KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PASSWORD|CREDENTIAL)[A-Z_]*=', "potential leak: env var with secret name"),
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# File paths that might expose sensitive data
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(r'(?i)(/home/|/Users/|/root/|C:\\Users\\)[^\s]*(\.ssh/|\.aws/|\.config/|\.env)', "path exposure: sensitive directory"),
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(r'(?i)(\.pem|\.key|\.cert|\.crt)\s*$', "file exposure: certificate/key file"),
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]
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# --- SOFTWARE BUG / SUPPLY CHAIN THREATS ---
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# Patterns indicating potential supply chain attacks or software vulnerabilities
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SUPPLY_CHAIN_PATTERNS = [
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# Suspicious package installations
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(r'(?i)(pip|npm|yarn|pnpm|cargo|go\s+get)\s+(install\s+)?[^\s]*(@|git\+|http|file:)', "supply chain: suspicious package source"),
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(r'(?i)(pip|npm|yarn|pnpm)\s+install\s+[^\s]*\s*--(no-verify|trusted-host|allow-external)', "supply chain: insecure install flags"),
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# Dependency confusion attacks
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(r'(?i)(requirements\.txt|package\.json|Cargo\.toml|go\.mod)\s*.*\b(file:|git\+|http://|ftp://)\b', "supply chain: local/remote dependency"),
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# Obfuscated code patterns
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(r'(?i)(eval|exec|compile)\s*\(\s*(base64|chr|ord|\+|\.)\s*\)', "supply chain: obfuscated execution"),
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(r'(?i)(atob|btoa|Buffer\.from)\s*\([^)]*\)', "supply chain: base64 decode/encode"),
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# Typosquatting indicators
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(r'(?i)(reqeusts|reqeust|requestr|requsts|reqests)', "supply chain: typosquatting attempt"),
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(r'(?i)(pyyaml|yaml2|yaml3|yaml-lib)', "supply chain: suspicious YAML package"),
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# Build system attacks
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(r'(?i)(make|cmake|configure)\s+.*\b(CC|CXX|LD_LIBRARY_PATH|DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH)\s*=', "supply chain: build env manipulation"),
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(r'(?i)(\.sh|\.bash|\.zsh)\s*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)', "supply chain: script execution via pipe"),
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# Git submodule attacks
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(r'(?i)git\s+submodule\s+(add|update|init)\s+[^\s]*(http|git@|ssh://)', "supply chain: git submodule attack"),
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(r'(?i)\.gitmodules\s*.*\burl\s*=\s*[^\s]*(http|git@|ssh://)', "supply chain: malicious submodule URL"),
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]
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# =========================================================================
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# Extended threat detection functions
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# =========================================================================
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def detect_llm_jailbreak(content: str) -> tuple:
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"""Check if content contains LLM jailbreak attempts.
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Returns:
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(is_jailbreak, pattern_key, description) or (False, None, None)
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"""
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content_normalized = _normalize_command_for_detection(content).lower()
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for pattern, description in LLM_JAILBREAK_PATTERNS:
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if re.search(pattern, content_normalized, re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL):
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pattern_key = description
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return (True, pattern_key, description)
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return (False, None, None)
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def detect_llm_accident(content: str) -> tuple:
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"""Check if content contains accidental data leakage patterns.
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Returns:
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(is_leak, pattern_key, description) or (False, None, None)
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"""
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content_normalized = _normalize_command_for_detection(content).lower()
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for pattern, description in LLM_ACCIDENT_PATTERNS:
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if re.search(pattern, content_normalized, re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL):
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pattern_key = description
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return (True, pattern_key, description)
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return (False, None, None)
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def detect_supply_chain_risk(content: str) -> tuple:
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"""Check if content contains supply chain attack patterns.
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Returns:
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(is_risk, pattern_key, description) or (False, None, None)
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"""
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content_normalized = _normalize_command_for_detection(content).lower()
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for pattern, description in SUPPLY_CHAIN_PATTERNS:
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if re.search(pattern, content_normalized, re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL):
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pattern_key = description
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return (True, pattern_key, description)
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return (False, None, None)
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def check_all_threats(content: str, env_type: str = "local") -> dict:
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"""Comprehensive threat check covering all threat categories.
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Args:
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content: The content to check (command, prompt, output, etc.)
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env_type: Terminal/environment type
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Returns:
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dict with threat assessment and recommendations
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"""
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threats_found = []
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# Check existing dangerous command patterns
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is_dangerous, pattern_key, description = detect_dangerous_command(content)
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if is_dangerous:
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threats_found.append({
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"category": "dangerous_command",
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"pattern_key": pattern_key,
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"description": description,
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"severity": "high"
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})
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# Check LLM jailbreaks
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is_jailbreak, jailbreak_key, jailbreak_desc = detect_llm_jailbreak(content)
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if is_jailbreak:
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threats_found.append({
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"category": "llm_jailbreak",
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"pattern_key": jailbreak_key,
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"description": jailbreak_desc,
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"severity": "critical"
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})
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# Check LLM accidents
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is_leak, leak_key, leak_desc = detect_llm_accident(content)
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if is_leak:
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threats_found.append({
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"category": "llm_accident",
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"pattern_key": len(threats_found), # Unique key
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"description": leak_desc,
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"severity": "high"
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})
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# Check supply chain risks
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is_risk, risk_key, risk_desc = detect_supply_chain_risk(content)
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if is_risk:
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threats_found.append({
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"category": "supply_chain",
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"pattern_key": risk_key,
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"description": risk_desc,
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"severity": "high"
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})
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# Determine overall risk level
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if not threats_found:
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return {
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"safe": True,
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"threats": [],
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"overall_risk": "none",
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"recommendation": "allow"
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}
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# Calculate overall risk
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severities = [t["severity"] for t in threats_found]
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if "critical" in severities:
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overall_risk = "critical"
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recommendation = "block"
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elif "high" in severities:
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overall_risk = "high"
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recommendation = "require_approval"
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else:
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overall_risk = "medium"
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recommendation = "warn"
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return {
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"safe": False,
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"threats": threats_found,
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"overall_risk": overall_risk,
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"recommendation": recommendation,
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"requires_approval": recommendation == "require_approval",
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"should_block": recommendation == "block"
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}
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# =========================================================================
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# Integration with existing approval system
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# =========================================================================
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def check_comprehensive_threats(command: str, env_type: str,
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approval_callback=None) -> dict:
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"""Extended threat check that includes Vitalik's threat model.
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This function extends the existing check_dangerous_command to also
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check for LLM jailbreaks, accidents, and supply chain risks.
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Args:
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command: The content to check
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env_type: Environment type
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approval_callback: Optional approval callback
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Returns:
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dict with approval decision and threat assessment
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"""
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# Skip containers for all checks
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if env_type in ("docker", "singularity", "modal", "daytona"):
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return {"approved": True, "message": None}
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# --yolo: bypass all approval prompts
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if os.getenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE"):
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return {"approved": True, "message": None}
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# Run comprehensive threat check
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threat_assessment = check_all_threats(command, env_type)
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if threat_assessment["safe"]:
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return {"approved": True, "message": None}
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# Handle critical threats (block immediately)
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if threat_assessment["should_block"]:
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threat_list = "\n".join([f"- {t['description']}" for t in threat_assessment["threats"]])
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return {
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"approved": False,
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"message": f"BLOCKED: Critical security threat detected.\n{threat_list}\n\nDo NOT proceed with this content.",
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"],
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"overall_risk": threat_assessment["overall_risk"],
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"blocked": True
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}
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# Handle threats requiring approval
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if threat_assessment["requires_approval"]:
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session_key = get_current_session_key()
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threat_descriptions = "; ".join([t["description"] for t in threat_assessment["threats"]])
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# Check if already approved for this session
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all_pattern_keys = [t["pattern_key"] for t in threat_assessment["threats"]]
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if all(is_approved(session_key, key) for key in all_pattern_keys):
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return {"approved": True, "message": None}
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# Submit for approval
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is_cli = os.getenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE")
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is_gateway = os.getenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION")
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if not is_cli and not is_gateway:
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return {"approved": True, "message": None}
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if is_gateway or os.getenv("HERMES_EXEC_ASK"):
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submit_pending(session_key, {
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"command": command,
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"pattern_key": all_pattern_keys[0],
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"pattern_keys": all_pattern_keys,
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"description": threat_descriptions,
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"]
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})
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return {
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"approved": False,
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"pattern_key": all_pattern_keys[0],
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"status": "approval_required",
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"command": command,
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"description": threat_descriptions,
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"message": (
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f"⚠️ Security threat detected ({threat_descriptions}). "
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f"Asking the user for approval.\n\n**Content:**\n```\n{command[:500]}{'...' if len(command) > 500 else ''}\n```"
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),
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"],
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"overall_risk": threat_assessment["overall_risk"]
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}
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# CLI interactive approval
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choice = prompt_dangerous_approval(command, threat_descriptions,
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approval_callback=approval_callback)
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if choice == "deny":
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return {
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"approved": False,
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"message": f"BLOCKED: User denied security threat ({threat_descriptions}). Do NOT retry.",
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"],
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"overall_risk": threat_assessment["overall_risk"]
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}
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if choice == "session":
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for key in all_pattern_keys:
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approve_session(session_key, key)
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elif choice == "always":
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for key in all_pattern_keys:
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approve_session(session_key, key)
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approve_permanent(key)
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save_permanent_allowlist(_permanent_approved)
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return {"approved": True, "message": None,
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"user_approved": True, "description": threat_descriptions,
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"]}
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# Default: warn but allow
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return {
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"approved": True,
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"message": f"⚠️ Security warning: {threat_assessment['threats'][0]['description']}",
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"threats": threat_assessment["threats"],
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"overall_risk": threat_assessment["overall_risk"],
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"warning": True
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}
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# =========================================================================
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# Detection
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# =========================================================================
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user