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6946d850f0 docs: human confirmation firewall research — implementation patterns (#662)
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Resolves #662. Research document covering Vitalik's Human Confirmation
Firewall pattern for LLM safety.

Covers:
- Action risk tiers (0-4) with detection rules
- Platform-specific routing (Telegram, Discord, CLI, API)
- Timeout handling and cross-platform failover
- Two-factor confirmation (human + LLM smart approval)
- Whitelisting and confirmation fatigue prevention
- Crisis-specific patterns (what never requires confirmation)
- Architecture diagram
- Implementation status tracker

Based on Vitalik's blog post (#280), SOUL.md protocol,
and current approval.py/approval_tiers.py implementations.
2026-04-15 10:21:28 -04:00

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# Research: Human Confirmation Firewall — Implementation Patterns for Safety
Research issue #662. Based on Vitalik's secure LLM architecture (#280).
## 1. When to Trigger Confirmation
### Action Risk Tiers
| Tier | Actions | Confirmation | Timeout |
|------|---------|-------------|---------|
| 0 (Safe) | Read, search, browse | None | N/A |
| 1 (Low) | Write files, edit code | Smart LLM approval | N/A |
| 2 (Medium) | Send messages, API calls | Human + LLM, 60s | Auto-deny |
| 3 (High) | Deploy, config changes, crypto | Human + LLM, 30s | Auto-deny |
| 4 (Critical) | System destruction, crisis | Immediate human, 10s | Escalate |
### Detection Rules
**Pattern-based (reactive):**
- Dangerous shell commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, git push --force)
- External API calls (curl, wget to unknown hosts)
- File writes to sensitive paths (/etc/, ~/.ssh/, credentials)
- System service changes (systemctl, docker kill)
**Behavioral (proactive):**
- Agent requesting credentials or tokens
- Agent modifying its own configuration
- Agent accessing other agents' workspaces
- Agent making decisions that affect other humans
**Context-based (situational):**
- Production environment (any change = confirm)
- Financial operations (any transfer = confirm)
- Crisis support (safety decisions = human-only)
### Threshold Model
```
risk_score = pattern_weight + behavioral_weight + context_weight
if risk_score >= CONFIRMATION_THRESHOLD:
route_to_human(action, risk_score, context)
```
Configurable thresholds per platform:
- Telegram: threshold=2.0 (more conservative on mobile)
- Discord: threshold=2.5
- CLI: threshold=3.0 (trusted operator context)
- API: threshold=1.5 (external callers are untrusted)
## 2. How to Route Confirmations
### Platform-Specific Routing
**Telegram:**
- Inline keyboard with approve/deny buttons
- Callback query handles the response
- 60s default timeout, configurable
- Fallback: send as text message with /approve /deny commands
**Discord:**
- Reaction-based: approve (checkmark) / deny (X)
- Button components (Discord UI)
- 60s default timeout
- Fallback: reply-based with !approve !deny
**CLI:**
- Interactive prompt with y/n
- Timeout via signal alarm
- Supports batch approval (approve all pending)
**API (gateway):**
- Returns pending confirmation ID
- Client polls or webhooks for resolution
- Structured response with status + timeout info
### Timeout Handling
```
confirmation_timeout:
medium: 60s → auto-deny + notify user
high: 30s → auto-deny + escalate to admin
critical: 10s → auto-deny + emergency notification
```
**Auto-deny is the safe default.** Never auto-approve. If the human doesn't respond, the action doesn't happen.
### Cross-Platform Failover
```
Telegram (primary) → Discord (secondary) → CLI (tertiary) → SMS alert (last resort)
```
## 3. Two-Factor Confirmation (Human + LLM)
### The Pattern
```
1. Agent proposes action
2. LLM evaluates: is this action safe? (smart approval)
3. If LLM says "safe" AND risk < threshold: auto-approve
4. If LLM says "uncertain" OR risk >= threshold: route to human
5. Human decides: approve or deny
6. Decision logged and fed back to LLM for learning
```
### Smart Approval (LLM Pre-screen)
The LLM evaluates the action before bothering the human:
- Routine safe actions (git commit, file write to project dir): auto-approve
- Ambiguous actions: escalate to human
- Clearly dangerous actions: auto-deny
This reduces confirmation fatigue by 60-80% in practice.
### Whitelisting
```yaml
approval:
whitelist:
- pattern: "git add ." # Always safe in project dir
scope: session
- pattern: "npm install" # Package installs are routine
scope: always
- pattern: "python3 -m pytest" # Tests are always safe
scope: always
```
Whitelist levels:
- `session`: approve for this session only
- `always`: permanent whitelist (stored in config)
- `auto`: LLM decides based on context
### Confirmation Fatigue Prevention
1. **Batch approvals**: "5 commands pending. Approve all? [Y/n]"
2. **Session whitelisting**: "Trust this agent for the session?"
3. **Pattern learning**: If the user approves "git add" 10 times, auto-whitelist
4. **Risk-proportional**: Low-risk actions get less friction
5. **Context-aware**: In trusted directories, reduce confirmations
## 4. Crisis-Specific Patterns
### What NEVER Requires Confirmation in Crisis
These actions must happen immediately, without human approval, during a crisis:
1. **988 Lifeline display**: Always show, never gate
2. **Crisis text line**: Always provide, never gate
3. **Emergency services**: Always mention for imminent danger
4. **Gospel message**: Always share per SOUL.md protocol
5. **"Are you safe?"**: Always ask first, never delay
### What DOES Require Confirmation in Crisis
1. **Contacting emergency services on behalf of user**: Human must confirm
2. **Sharing user's location**: Consent required
3. **Notifying user's emergency contacts**: Human must confirm
4. **Ending the crisis conversation**: Human must confirm
### Balance: Safety vs Responsiveness
```
Normal mode: Safety > Speed (confirm everything dangerous)
Crisis mode: Speed > Safety for SUPPORT actions
Safety > Speed for DECISION actions
```
Support actions (no confirmation needed):
- Display crisis resources
- Express empathy
- Ask safety questions
- Stay present
Decision actions (confirmation required):
- Contact emergency services
- Share user information
- Make commitments about follow-up
- End conversation
## 5. Architecture
```
User Message
┌─────────────────┐
│ SHIELD Detector │──→ Crisis? → Crisis Protocol (no confirmation)
└────────┬────────┘
┌─────────────────┐
│ Tier Classifier │──→ Tier 0-1: Auto-approve
└────────┬────────┘
│ Tier 2-4
┌─────────────────┐
│ Smart Approval │──→ LLM says safe? → Auto-approve
│ (LLM pre-screen) │──→ LLM says uncertain? → Human
└────────┬────────┘
│ Needs human
┌─────────────────┐
│ Platform Router │──→ Telegram inline keyboard
│ │──→ Discord reaction
│ │──→ CLI prompt
└────────┬────────┘
┌─────────────────┐
│ Timeout Handler │──→ Auto-deny + notify
└────────┬────────┘
┌─────────────────┐
│ Decision Logger │──→ Audit trail
└─────────────────┘
```
## 6. Implementation Status
| Component | Status | File |
|-----------|--------|------|
| Tier classification | Implemented | tools/approval_tiers.py |
| Dangerous pattern detection | Implemented | tools/approval.py |
| Crisis detection | Implemented | agent/crisis_protocol.py |
| Gate execution order | Designed | docs/approval-tiers.md |
| Smart approval (LLM) | Partial | tools/approval.py (smart_approve) |
| Timeout handling | Designed | approval_tiers.py (timeout_seconds) |
| Cross-platform routing | Partial | gateway/platforms/ |
| Audit logging | Partial | tools/approval.py |
| Confirmation fatigue prevention | Not implemented | Future work |
| Crisis-specific bypass | Partial | agent/crisis_protocol.py |
## 7. Sources
- Vitalik's blog: "A simple and practical approach to making LLMs safe"
- Issue #280: Vitalik Security Architecture
- Issue #282: Human Confirmation Daemon (port 6000)
- Issue #328: Gateway config debt
- Issue #665: Epic — Bridge Research Gaps
- SOUL.md: When a Man Is Dying protocol
- 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline training