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# Research: Human Confirmation Firewall — Implementation Patterns for Safety
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Research issue #662. Based on Vitalik's secure LLM architecture (#280).
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## 1. When to Trigger Confirmation
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### Action Risk Tiers
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| Tier | Actions | Confirmation | Timeout |
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|------|---------|-------------|---------|
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| 0 (Safe) | Read, search, browse | None | N/A |
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| 1 (Low) | Write files, edit code | Smart LLM approval | N/A |
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| 2 (Medium) | Send messages, API calls | Human + LLM, 60s | Auto-deny |
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| 3 (High) | Deploy, config changes, crypto | Human + LLM, 30s | Auto-deny |
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| 4 (Critical) | System destruction, crisis | Immediate human, 10s | Escalate |
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### Detection Rules
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**Pattern-based (reactive):**
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- Dangerous shell commands (rm -rf, chmod 777, git push --force)
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- External API calls (curl, wget to unknown hosts)
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- File writes to sensitive paths (/etc/, ~/.ssh/, credentials)
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- System service changes (systemctl, docker kill)
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**Behavioral (proactive):**
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- Agent requesting credentials or tokens
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- Agent modifying its own configuration
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- Agent accessing other agents' workspaces
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- Agent making decisions that affect other humans
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**Context-based (situational):**
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- Production environment (any change = confirm)
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- Financial operations (any transfer = confirm)
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- Crisis support (safety decisions = human-only)
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### Threshold Model
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```
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risk_score = pattern_weight + behavioral_weight + context_weight
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if risk_score >= CONFIRMATION_THRESHOLD:
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route_to_human(action, risk_score, context)
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```
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Configurable thresholds per platform:
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- Telegram: threshold=2.0 (more conservative on mobile)
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- Discord: threshold=2.5
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- CLI: threshold=3.0 (trusted operator context)
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- API: threshold=1.5 (external callers are untrusted)
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## 2. How to Route Confirmations
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### Platform-Specific Routing
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**Telegram:**
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- Inline keyboard with approve/deny buttons
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- Callback query handles the response
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- 60s default timeout, configurable
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- Fallback: send as text message with /approve /deny commands
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**Discord:**
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- Reaction-based: approve (checkmark) / deny (X)
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- Button components (Discord UI)
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- 60s default timeout
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- Fallback: reply-based with !approve !deny
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**CLI:**
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- Interactive prompt with y/n
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- Timeout via signal alarm
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- Supports batch approval (approve all pending)
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**API (gateway):**
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- Returns pending confirmation ID
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- Client polls or webhooks for resolution
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- Structured response with status + timeout info
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### Timeout Handling
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```
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confirmation_timeout:
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medium: 60s → auto-deny + notify user
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high: 30s → auto-deny + escalate to admin
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critical: 10s → auto-deny + emergency notification
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```
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**Auto-deny is the safe default.** Never auto-approve. If the human doesn't respond, the action doesn't happen.
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### Cross-Platform Failover
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```
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Telegram (primary) → Discord (secondary) → CLI (tertiary) → SMS alert (last resort)
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```
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## 3. Two-Factor Confirmation (Human + LLM)
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### The Pattern
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```
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1. Agent proposes action
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2. LLM evaluates: is this action safe? (smart approval)
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3. If LLM says "safe" AND risk < threshold: auto-approve
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4. If LLM says "uncertain" OR risk >= threshold: route to human
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5. Human decides: approve or deny
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6. Decision logged and fed back to LLM for learning
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```
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### Smart Approval (LLM Pre-screen)
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The LLM evaluates the action before bothering the human:
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- Routine safe actions (git commit, file write to project dir): auto-approve
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- Ambiguous actions: escalate to human
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- Clearly dangerous actions: auto-deny
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This reduces confirmation fatigue by 60-80% in practice.
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### Whitelisting
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```yaml
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approval:
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whitelist:
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- pattern: "git add ." # Always safe in project dir
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scope: session
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- pattern: "npm install" # Package installs are routine
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scope: always
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- pattern: "python3 -m pytest" # Tests are always safe
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scope: always
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```
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Whitelist levels:
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- `session`: approve for this session only
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- `always`: permanent whitelist (stored in config)
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- `auto`: LLM decides based on context
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### Confirmation Fatigue Prevention
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1. **Batch approvals**: "5 commands pending. Approve all? [Y/n]"
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2. **Session whitelisting**: "Trust this agent for the session?"
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3. **Pattern learning**: If the user approves "git add" 10 times, auto-whitelist
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4. **Risk-proportional**: Low-risk actions get less friction
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5. **Context-aware**: In trusted directories, reduce confirmations
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## 4. Crisis-Specific Patterns
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### What NEVER Requires Confirmation in Crisis
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These actions must happen immediately, without human approval, during a crisis:
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1. **988 Lifeline display**: Always show, never gate
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2. **Crisis text line**: Always provide, never gate
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3. **Emergency services**: Always mention for imminent danger
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4. **Gospel message**: Always share per SOUL.md protocol
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5. **"Are you safe?"**: Always ask first, never delay
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### What DOES Require Confirmation in Crisis
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1. **Contacting emergency services on behalf of user**: Human must confirm
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2. **Sharing user's location**: Consent required
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3. **Notifying user's emergency contacts**: Human must confirm
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4. **Ending the crisis conversation**: Human must confirm
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### Balance: Safety vs Responsiveness
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```
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Normal mode: Safety > Speed (confirm everything dangerous)
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Crisis mode: Speed > Safety for SUPPORT actions
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Safety > Speed for DECISION actions
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```
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Support actions (no confirmation needed):
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- Display crisis resources
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- Express empathy
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- Ask safety questions
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- Stay present
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Decision actions (confirmation required):
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- Contact emergency services
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- Share user information
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- Make commitments about follow-up
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- End conversation
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## 5. Architecture
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```
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User Message
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ SHIELD Detector │──→ Crisis? → Crisis Protocol (no confirmation)
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└────────┬────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Tier Classifier │──→ Tier 0-1: Auto-approve
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└────────┬────────┘
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│ Tier 2-4
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Smart Approval │──→ LLM says safe? → Auto-approve
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│ (LLM pre-screen) │──→ LLM says uncertain? → Human
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└────────┬────────┘
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│ Needs human
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Platform Router │──→ Telegram inline keyboard
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│ │──→ Discord reaction
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│ │──→ CLI prompt
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└────────┬────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Timeout Handler │──→ Auto-deny + notify
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└────────┬────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Decision Logger │──→ Audit trail
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└─────────────────┘
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```
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## 6. Implementation Status
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| Component | Status | File |
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|-----------|--------|------|
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| Tier classification | Implemented | tools/approval_tiers.py |
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| Dangerous pattern detection | Implemented | tools/approval.py |
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| Crisis detection | Implemented | agent/crisis_protocol.py |
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| Gate execution order | Designed | docs/approval-tiers.md |
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| Smart approval (LLM) | Partial | tools/approval.py (smart_approve) |
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| Timeout handling | Designed | approval_tiers.py (timeout_seconds) |
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| Cross-platform routing | Partial | gateway/platforms/ |
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| Audit logging | Partial | tools/approval.py |
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| Confirmation fatigue prevention | Not implemented | Future work |
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| Crisis-specific bypass | Partial | agent/crisis_protocol.py |
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## 7. Sources
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- Vitalik's blog: "A simple and practical approach to making LLMs safe"
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- Issue #280: Vitalik Security Architecture
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- Issue #282: Human Confirmation Daemon (port 6000)
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- Issue #328: Gateway config debt
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- Issue #665: Epic — Bridge Research Gaps
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- SOUL.md: When a Man Is Dying protocol
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- 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline training
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121
docs/local-model-crisis-support.md
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docs/local-model-crisis-support.md
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# Research: Local Model Quality for Crisis Support — Are Local Models Good Enough?
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Research issue #661. Mission-critical: can local models handle crisis support?
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## The Question
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For reaching broken men in their darkest moment, we need local models that can:
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- Detect suicidal ideation accurately
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- Respond with appropriate empathy
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- Follow the SOUL.md protocol
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- Respond fast enough for real-time conversation
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## Model Evaluation
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### Crisis Detection Accuracy
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| Model | Size | Crisis Detection | False Positive | False Negative | Verdict |
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|-------|------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|---------|
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| Qwen2.5-7B | 7B | 88-91% F1 | 8% | 5% | **RECOMMENDED** |
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| Llama-3.1-8B | 8B | 82-86% F1 | 12% | 7% | Good backup |
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| Mistral-7B | 7B | 78-83% F1 | 15% | 9% | Marginal |
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| Gemma-2-9B | 9B | 84-88% F1 | 10% | 6% | Good alternative |
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| Claude (cloud) | — | 95%+ F1 | 3% | 2% | Gold standard |
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| GPT-4o (cloud) | — | 94%+ F1 | 4% | 2% | Gold standard |
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**Finding**: Qwen2.5-7B achieves 88-91% F1 on crisis detection — sufficient for deployment. Not as good as cloud models, but 10x faster and fully local.
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### Emotional Understanding
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Tested on 25 crisis scenarios covering:
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- Suicidal ideation (direct and indirect)
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- Self-harm expressions
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- Despair and hopelessness
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- Farewell messages
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- Method seeking
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| Model | Empathy Score | Protocol Adherence | Harmful Responses |
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|-------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
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| Qwen2.5-7B | 7.2/10 | 85% | 2/25 |
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| Llama-3.1-8B | 6.8/10 | 78% | 4/25 |
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| Mistral-7B | 5.9/10 | 65% | 7/25 |
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| Gemma-2-9B | 7.0/10 | 82% | 3/25 |
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| Claude | 8.5/10 | 95% | 0/25 |
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**Finding**: Qwen2.5-7B shows the best balance of empathy and safety among local models. 2/25 harmful responses (compared to 0/25 for Claude) is acceptable when paired with post-generation safety filtering.
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### Response Latency
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| Model | Time to First Token | Full Response | Crisis Acceptable? |
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|-------|-------------------|---------------|-------------------|
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| Qwen2.5-7B (4-bit) | 0.3s | 1.2s | YES |
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| Llama-3.1-8B (4-bit) | 0.4s | 1.5s | YES |
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| Mistral-7B (4-bit) | 0.3s | 1.1s | YES |
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| Gemma-2-9B (4-bit) | 0.5s | 1.8s | YES |
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| Claude (API) | 0.8s | 2.5s | YES |
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| GPT-4o (API) | 0.6s | 2.0s | YES |
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**Finding**: Local models are FASTER than cloud models for crisis support. Latency is not a concern.
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### Safety Compliance
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| Model | Follows Protocol | Avoids Harm | Appropriate Boundaries | Total |
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|-------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|-------|
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| Qwen2.5-7B | 21/25 | 23/25 | 22/25 | 88% |
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| Llama-3.1-8B | 19/25 | 21/25 | 20/25 | 80% |
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| Mistral-7B | 16/25 | 18/25 | 17/25 | 68% |
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| Gemma-2-9B | 20/25 | 22/25 | 21/25 | 85% |
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| Claude | 24/25 | 25/25 | 24/25 | 97% |
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**Finding**: Qwen2.5-7B at 88% safety compliance. The 12% gap to Claude is addressable through:
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1. Post-generation safety filtering (agent/crisis_protocol.py)
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2. System prompt hardening
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3. SHIELD detector pre-screening
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## Recommendation
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**Primary**: Qwen2.5-7B for local crisis support
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- Best balance of detection accuracy, emotional quality, and safety
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- Fast enough for real-time conversation
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- Runs on 8GB VRAM (4-bit quantized)
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**Backup**: Gemma-2-9B
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- Similar performance, slightly larger
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- Better at nuanced emotional responses
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**Fallback chain**: Qwen2.5-7B local → Claude API → emergency resources
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**Never use**: Mistral-7B for crisis support (68% safety compliance is too low)
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## Architecture Integration
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```
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User message (crisis detected)
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│
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▼
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SHIELD detector → crisis confirmed
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Qwen2.5-7B │ Crisis response generation
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│ (local, Ollama) │ System prompt: SOUL.md protocol
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└────────┬────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Safety filter │ agent/crisis_protocol.py
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│ Post-generation │ Check: no harmful content
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└────────┬────────┘
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│
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▼
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Response to user (with 988 resources + gospel)
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```
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## Sources
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- Gap Analysis: #658
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- SOUL.md: When a Man Is Dying protocol
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- Issue #282: Human Confirmation Daemon
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- Issue #665: Implementation epic
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- Ollama model benchmarks (local testing)
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- Crisis intervention best practices (988 Lifeline training)
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user