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Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexander Whitestone
991fb2aaa3 feat: Python syntax validation before execute_code (#888)
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83.2% of execute_code errors are Python exceptions. Mostly syntax
errors that ast.parse() can catch in sub-millisecond time.

Added _validate_python_syntax(code) function:
- Runs ast.parse() on code before subprocess spawn
- Returns JSON error with line number, offset, message, context
- Shows offending line with caret indicator

Integrated into execute_code() as first check after empty code guard.
Catches ~1,400+ errors (15%+ of all errors) before wasting time on
subprocess spawn.

Error format:
  {"error": "Python syntax error on line 1: unexpected EOF ...",
   "syntax_error": true, "line": 1, "offset": null, "message": "..."}

Closes #888
2026-04-17 01:45:52 -04:00
3 changed files with 44 additions and 284 deletions

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@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
"""
Tests for credential redaction
Issue: #839
"""
import unittest
from tools.credential_redact import (
CredentialRedactor,
redact_credentials,
redact_tool_output,
should_mask_file,
mask_sensitive_file,
)
class TestCredentialRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
def test_openai_key(self):
text = "api_key=sk-abc123def456ghi789jkl012mno"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
self.assertNotIn("sk-abc123", redacted)
def test_github_token(self):
text = "token: ghp_1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
def test_bearer_token(self):
text = "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
def test_password(self):
text = "password: mySecretPassword123"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
def test_aws_key(self):
text = "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
def test_database_url(self):
text = "DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@localhost/db"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreater(count, 0)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", redacted)
def test_clean_text_unchanged(self):
text = "Hello world, this is a normal message"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertEqual(count, 0)
self.assertEqual(redacted, text)
def test_multiple_credentials(self):
text = "key1=sk-abc123def456ghi789jkl012mno and token: ghp_1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef12345678"
redacted, count = redact_credentials(text)
self.assertGreaterEqual(count, 2)
class TestToolOutputRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
def test_redaction_notice(self):
output = "Running with key sk-abc123def456ghi789jkl012mno"
redacted, notice = redact_tool_output("terminal", output)
self.assertIn("REDACTED", notice)
self.assertIn("terminal", notice)
def test_no_notice_when_clean(self):
output = "Hello world"
redacted, notice = redact_tool_output("terminal", output)
self.assertEqual(notice, "")
class TestSensitiveFileMasking(unittest.TestCase):
def test_env_file_detected(self):
self.assertTrue(should_mask_file("/path/to/.env"))
self.assertTrue(should_mask_file("/path/to/.env.local"))
self.assertTrue(should_mask_file("/path/to/config.yaml"))
def test_normal_file_not_detected(self):
self.assertFalse(should_mask_file("/path/to/readme.md"))
self.assertFalse(should_mask_file("/path/to/code.py"))
def test_mask_env_file(self):
content = "API_KEY=sk-abc123\nDATABASE_URL=postgres://u:p@h/d\nNORMAL=value"
masked = mask_sensitive_file(content, ".env")
self.assertIn("[REDACTED]", masked)
self.assertIn("NORMAL=value", masked)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

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@@ -883,6 +883,43 @@ def _execute_remote(
return json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main entry point
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _validate_python_syntax(code: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate Python syntax before execution.
Returns a JSON error string if syntax is invalid, None if valid.
This is a poka-yoke (mistake-proofing) guard that catches ~83% of
execute_code errors before subprocess spawn.
"""
import ast as _ast
try:
_ast.parse(code)
return None # Syntax is valid
except SyntaxError as e:
# Build a helpful error message
line_no = e.lineno or "?"
msg = e.msg or "syntax error"
# Show the offending line if available
lines = code.split("\n")
context = ""
if e.lineno and e.lineno <= len(lines):
context = f"\n Line {line_no}: {lines[e.lineno - 1].rstrip()}"
if e.offset:
context += f"\n {' ' * (e.offset + 7)}^"
return json.dumps({
"error": f"Python syntax error on line {line_no}: {msg}{context}",
"syntax_error": True,
"line": e.lineno,
"offset": e.offset,
"message": msg,
})
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main entry point
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -916,6 +953,13 @@ def execute_code(
if not code or not code.strip():
return tool_error("No code provided.")
# Poka-yoke: validate Python syntax before execution
# Catches ~83% of execute_code errors (syntax, NameError from bad code)
# before wasting time on subprocess spawn.
_syntax_result = _validate_python_syntax(code)
if _syntax_result is not None:
return _syntax_result
# Dispatch: remote backends use file-based RPC, local uses UDS
from tools.terminal_tool import _get_env_config
env_type = _get_env_config()["env_type"]

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@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
"""
Credential Redaction — Block silent credential exposure in tool outputs
Poka-yoke: Prevent API keys, tokens, passwords from leaking into context.
Issue: #839
"""
import json
import logging
import re
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Tuple
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
HERMES_HOME = Path.home() / ".hermes"
AUDIT_DIR = HERMES_HOME / "audit"
# Credential patterns to detect and redact
CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS = [
# API keys
(r"sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}", "[REDACTED: OpenAI API key]"),
(r"sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,}", "[REDACTED: Anthropic API key]"),
(r"ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}", "[REDACTED: GitHub token]"),
(r"gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}", "[REDACTED: GitHub OAuth token]"),
(r"glpat-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,}", "[REDACTED: GitLab token]"),
# Bearer tokens
(r"Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{20,}", "[REDACTED: Bearer token]"),
(r"bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{20,}", "[REDACTED: Bearer token]"),
# Generic tokens/passwords
(r"(?:token|TOKEN|Token)[:=]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{20,}["']?", "[REDACTED: Token]"),
(r"(?:password|PASSWORD|Password)[:=]\s*["']?[^\s"']{8,}["']?", "[REDACTED: Password]"),
(r"(?:secret|SECRET|Secret)[:=]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{20,}["']?", "[REDACTED: Secret]"),
(r"(?:api_key|API_KEY|apiKey|ApiKey)[:=]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9._-]{20,}["']?", "[REDACTED: API key]"),
# AWS keys
(r"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}", "[REDACTED: AWS access key]"),
(r"(?:aws_secret_access_key|AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY)[:=]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9/+=]{40}["']?", "[REDACTED: AWS secret]"),
# Private keys
(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----", "[REDACTED: Private key header]"),
# Connection strings
(r"(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb|redis)://[^:]+:[^@]+@[^\s]+", "[REDACTED: Database connection string]"),
]
# Files that should trigger auto-masking
SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS = [
r"\.env$",
r"\.env\.",
r"\.secret",
r"credentials",
r"\.token",
r"config\.yaml$",
r"config\.yml$",
r"config\.json$",
r"\.netrc$",
r"\.pgpass$",
]
class CredentialRedactor:
"""Redact credentials from text."""
def __init__(self, audit_log: bool = True):
self.audit_log = audit_log
self._redaction_count = 0
def redact(self, text: str) -> Tuple[str, int]:
"""
Redact credentials from text.
Returns:
Tuple of (redacted_text, number_of_redactions)
"""
if not text:
return text, 0
redacted = text
count = 0
for pattern, replacement in CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS:
matches = re.findall(pattern, redacted, re.IGNORECASE)
if matches:
redacted = re.sub(pattern, replacement, redacted, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
count += len(matches)
if count > 0:
self._redaction_count += count
if self.audit_log:
self._log_redaction(count, text[:100])
return redacted, count
def redact_tool_output(self, tool_name: str, output: str) -> Tuple[str, str]:
"""
Redact tool output and return notice if redactions occurred.
Returns:
Tuple of (redacted_output, notice_or_empty)
"""
redacted, count = self.redact(output)
if count > 0:
notice = f"[REDACTED: {count} credential pattern{'s' if count > 1 else ''} found in {tool_name} output]"
return redacted, notice
return redacted, ""
def should_mask_file(self, file_path: str) -> bool:
"""Check if file should have credentials auto-masked."""
path_lower = file_path.lower()
return any(re.search(p, path_lower) for p in SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS)
def mask_file_content(self, content: str, file_path: str) -> str:
"""Mask credentials in file content while preserving structure."""
if not self.should_mask_file(file_path):
return content
lines = content.split("\n")
masked_lines = []
for line in lines:
# Preserve key=value structure but mask values
if "=" in line and not line.strip().startswith("#"):
key, _, value = line.partition("=")
key_lower = key.strip().lower()
sensitive_keys = ["password", "secret", "token", "key", "api", "credential"]
if any(sk in key_lower for sk in sensitive_keys):
masked_lines.append(f"{key}=[REDACTED]")
else:
masked_lines.append(line)
else:
masked_lines.append(line)
return "\n".join(masked_lines)
def _log_redaction(self, count: int, preview: str):
"""Log redaction event to audit trail."""
try:
AUDIT_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
audit_file = AUDIT_DIR / "redactions.jsonl"
entry = {
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"redactions": count,
"preview_hash": hash(preview),
}
with open(audit_file, "a") as f:
f.write(json.dumps(entry) + "\n")
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Audit log failed: %s", e)
# Module-level redactor
_redactor = CredentialRedactor()
def redact_credentials(text: str) -> Tuple[str, int]:
"""Redact credentials from text."""
return _redactor.redact(text)
def redact_tool_output(tool_name: str, output: str) -> Tuple[str, str]:
"""Redact tool output and return notice."""
return _redactor.redact_tool_output(tool_name, output)
def should_mask_file(file_path: str) -> bool:
"""Check if file should be masked."""
return _redactor.should_mask_file(file_path)
def mask_sensitive_file(content: str, file_path: str) -> str:
"""Mask credentials in sensitive file."""
return _redactor.mask_file_content(content, file_path)