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Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexander Whitestone
d1fb50bf2f feat: add Anthropic transport abstraction slice (#951)
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- add transport registry, shared transport dataclasses, and AnthropicTransport
- add normalize_anthropic_response_v2 as the bridge from existing Anthropic normalization to shared transport types
- extend Anthropic stop-reason mapping for refusal and model_context_window_exceeded
- add targeted transport and v2 normalization regression tests

Closes #951
Refs #949
2026-04-22 11:20:20 -04:00
9 changed files with 863 additions and 515 deletions

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@@ -1396,6 +1396,8 @@ def normalize_anthropic_response(
"tool_use": "tool_calls",
"max_tokens": "length",
"stop_sequence": "stop",
"refusal": "content_filter",
"model_context_window_exceeded": "length",
}
finish_reason = stop_reason_map.get(response.stop_reason, "stop")
@@ -1409,3 +1411,42 @@ def normalize_anthropic_response(
),
finish_reason,
)
def normalize_anthropic_response_v2(
response,
strip_tool_prefix: bool = False,
) -> "NormalizedResponse":
"""Normalize Anthropic response to NormalizedResponse.
Wraps the existing normalize_anthropic_response() and maps its output
to the shared transport types. This allows incremental migration
without disturbing the legacy call sites.
"""
from agent.transports.types import NormalizedResponse, build_tool_call
assistant_msg, finish_reason = normalize_anthropic_response(response, strip_tool_prefix)
tool_calls = None
if assistant_msg.tool_calls:
tool_calls = [
build_tool_call(
id=tc.id,
name=tc.function.name,
arguments=tc.function.arguments,
)
for tc in assistant_msg.tool_calls
]
provider_data = {}
if getattr(assistant_msg, "reasoning_details", None):
provider_data["reasoning_details"] = assistant_msg.reasoning_details
return NormalizedResponse(
content=assistant_msg.content,
tool_calls=tool_calls,
finish_reason=finish_reason,
reasoning=getattr(assistant_msg, "reasoning", None),
usage=None,
provider_data=provider_data or None,
)

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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
"""Transport layer types and registry for provider response normalization.
Usage:
from agent.transports import get_transport
transport = get_transport("anthropic_messages")
result = transport.normalize_response(raw_response)
"""
from agent.transports.types import ( # noqa: F401
NormalizedResponse,
ToolCall,
Usage,
build_tool_call,
map_finish_reason,
)
_REGISTRY: dict = {}
def register_transport(api_mode: str, transport_cls: type) -> None:
"""Register a transport class for an api_mode string."""
_REGISTRY[api_mode] = transport_cls
def get_transport(api_mode: str):
"""Get a transport instance for the given api_mode.
Returns None if no transport is registered for this api_mode.
This allows gradual migration — call sites can check for None
and fall back to the legacy code path.
"""
if not _REGISTRY:
_discover_transports()
cls = _REGISTRY.get(api_mode)
if cls is None:
return None
return cls()
def _discover_transports() -> None:
"""Import all transport modules to trigger auto-registration."""
try:
import agent.transports.anthropic # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
pass
try:
import agent.transports.codex # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
pass
try:
import agent.transports.chat_completions # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
pass
try:
import agent.transports.bedrock # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
pass

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@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
"""Anthropic Messages API transport.
Delegates to the existing adapter functions in agent/anthropic_adapter.py.
This transport owns format conversion and normalization — NOT client lifecycle.
"""
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from agent.transports.base import ProviderTransport
from agent.transports.types import NormalizedResponse
class AnthropicTransport(ProviderTransport):
"""Transport for api_mode='anthropic_messages'."""
@property
def api_mode(self) -> str:
return "anthropic_messages"
def convert_messages(self, messages: List[Dict[str, Any]], **kwargs) -> Any:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import convert_messages_to_anthropic
base_url = kwargs.get("base_url")
return convert_messages_to_anthropic(messages, base_url=base_url)
def convert_tools(self, tools: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Any:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import convert_tools_to_anthropic
return convert_tools_to_anthropic(tools)
def build_kwargs(
self,
model: str,
messages: List[Dict[str, Any]],
tools: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None,
**params,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import build_anthropic_kwargs
return build_anthropic_kwargs(
model=model,
messages=messages,
tools=tools,
max_tokens=params.get("max_tokens", 16384),
reasoning_config=params.get("reasoning_config"),
tool_choice=params.get("tool_choice"),
is_oauth=params.get("is_oauth", False),
preserve_dots=params.get("preserve_dots", False),
context_length=params.get("context_length"),
base_url=params.get("base_url"),
fast_mode=params.get("fast_mode", False),
)
def normalize_response(self, response: Any, **kwargs) -> NormalizedResponse:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import normalize_anthropic_response_v2
strip_tool_prefix = kwargs.get("strip_tool_prefix", False)
return normalize_anthropic_response_v2(response, strip_tool_prefix=strip_tool_prefix)
def validate_response(self, response: Any) -> bool:
if response is None:
return False
content_blocks = getattr(response, "content", None)
if not isinstance(content_blocks, list):
return False
if not content_blocks:
return False
return True
def extract_cache_stats(self, response: Any):
usage = getattr(response, "usage", None)
if usage is None:
return None
cached = getattr(usage, "cache_read_input_tokens", 0) or 0
written = getattr(usage, "cache_creation_input_tokens", 0) or 0
if cached or written:
return {"cached_tokens": cached, "creation_tokens": written}
return None
_STOP_REASON_MAP = {
"end_turn": "stop",
"tool_use": "tool_calls",
"max_tokens": "length",
"stop_sequence": "stop",
"refusal": "content_filter",
"model_context_window_exceeded": "length",
}
def map_finish_reason(self, raw_reason: str) -> str:
return self._STOP_REASON_MAP.get(raw_reason, "stop")
from agent.transports import register_transport # noqa: E402
register_transport("anthropic_messages", AnthropicTransport)

61
agent/transports/base.py Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
"""Abstract base for provider transports.
A transport owns the data path for one api_mode:
convert_messages → convert_tools → build_kwargs → normalize_response
It does NOT own: client construction, streaming, credential refresh,
prompt caching, interrupt handling, or retry logic. Those stay on AIAgent.
"""
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
from agent.transports.types import NormalizedResponse
class ProviderTransport(ABC):
"""Base class for provider-specific format conversion and normalization."""
@property
@abstractmethod
def api_mode(self) -> str:
"""The api_mode string this transport handles."""
...
@abstractmethod
def convert_messages(self, messages: List[Dict[str, Any]], **kwargs) -> Any:
"""Convert OpenAI-format messages to provider-native format."""
...
@abstractmethod
def convert_tools(self, tools: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Any:
"""Convert OpenAI-format tool definitions to provider-native format."""
...
@abstractmethod
def build_kwargs(
self,
model: str,
messages: List[Dict[str, Any]],
tools: Optional[List[Dict[str, Any]]] = None,
**params,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Build the complete provider kwargs dict."""
...
@abstractmethod
def normalize_response(self, response: Any, **kwargs) -> NormalizedResponse:
"""Normalize a raw provider response to the shared NormalizedResponse type."""
...
def validate_response(self, response: Any) -> bool:
"""Optional structural validation for raw responses."""
return True
def extract_cache_stats(self, response: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
"""Optional cache stats extraction."""
return None
def map_finish_reason(self, raw_reason: str) -> str:
"""Optional stop-reason mapping. Defaults to passthrough."""
return raw_reason

58
agent/transports/types.py Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
"""Shared types for normalized provider responses."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
@dataclass
class ToolCall:
"""A normalized tool call from any provider."""
id: Optional[str]
name: str
arguments: str
provider_data: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = field(default=None, repr=False)
@dataclass
class Usage:
"""Token usage from an API response."""
prompt_tokens: int = 0
completion_tokens: int = 0
total_tokens: int = 0
cached_tokens: int = 0
@dataclass
class NormalizedResponse:
"""Normalized API response from any provider."""
content: Optional[str]
tool_calls: Optional[List[ToolCall]]
finish_reason: str
reasoning: Optional[str] = None
usage: Optional[Usage] = None
provider_data: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = field(default=None, repr=False)
def build_tool_call(
id: Optional[str],
name: str,
arguments: Any,
**provider_fields: Any,
) -> ToolCall:
"""Build a ToolCall, auto-serialising dict arguments."""
args_str = json.dumps(arguments) if isinstance(arguments, dict) else str(arguments)
provider_data = dict(provider_fields) if provider_fields else None
return ToolCall(id=id, name=name, arguments=args_str, provider_data=provider_data)
def map_finish_reason(reason: Optional[str], mapping: Dict[str, str]) -> str:
"""Translate a provider-specific stop reason to the normalized set."""
if reason is None:
return "stop"
return mapping.get(reason, "stop")

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@@ -1,515 +0,0 @@
# Human Confirmation Firewall: Research Report
## Implementation Patterns for Hermes Agent
**Issue:** #878
**Parent:** #659
**Priority:** P0
**Scope:** Human-in-the-loop safety patterns for tool calls, crisis handling, and irreversible actions
---
## Executive Summary
Hermes already has a partial human confirmation firewall, but it is narrow.
Current repo state shows:
- a real **pre-execution gate** for dangerous terminal commands in `tools/approval.py`
- a partial **confidence-threshold path** via `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
- gateway support for blocking approval resolution in `gateway/run.py`
What is still missing is the core recommendation from this research issue:
- **confidence scoring on all tool calls**, not just terminal commands that already matched a dangerous regex
- a **hard pre-execution human gate for crisis interventions**, especially any action that would auto-respond to suicidal content
- a consistent way to classify actions into:
1. pre-execution gate
2. post-execution review
3. confidence-threshold execution
Recommendation:
- use **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate** for crisis interventions and irreversible/high-impact actions
- use **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold** for normal operations
- reserve **Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review** only for low-risk and reversible actions
The next implementation step should be a **tool-call risk assessment layer** that runs before dispatch in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`, assigns a score and pattern to every tool call, and routes only the highest-risk calls into mandatory human confirmation.
---
## 1. The Three Proven Patterns
### Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate
Definition:
- halt before execution
- show the proposed action to the human
- require explicit approval or denial
Best for:
- destructive actions
- irreversible side effects
- crisis interventions
- actions that affect another human's safety, money, infrastructure, or private data
Strengths:
- strongest safety guarantee
- simplest audit story
- prevents the most catastrophic failure mode: acting first and apologizing later
Weaknesses:
- adds latency
- creates operator burden if overused
- should not be applied to every ordinary tool call
### Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review
Definition:
- execute first
- expose result to human
- allow rollback or follow-up correction
Best for:
- reversible operations
- low-risk actions with fast recovery
- tasks where human review matters but immediate execution is acceptable
Strengths:
- low friction
- fast iteration
- useful when rollback is practical
Weaknesses:
- unsafe for crisis or destructive actions
- only works when rollback actually exists
- a poor fit for external communication or life-safety contexts
### Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold
Definition:
- compute a risk/confidence score before execution
- auto-execute high-confidence safe actions
- request confirmation for lower-confidence or higher-risk actions
Best for:
- mixed-risk tool ecosystems
- day-to-day operations where always-confirm would be too expensive
- systems with a large volume of ordinary, safe reads and edits
Strengths:
- best balance of speed and safety
- scales across many tool types
- allows targeted human attention where it matters most
Weaknesses:
- depends on a good scoring model
- weak scoring creates false negatives or unnecessary prompts
- must remain inspectable and debuggable
---
## 2. What Hermes Already Has
## 2.1 Existing Pre-Execution Gate for Dangerous Terminal Commands
`tools/approval.py` already implements a real pre-execution confirmation path for dangerous shell commands.
Observed components:
- `DANGEROUS_PATTERNS`
- `detect_dangerous_command()`
- `prompt_dangerous_approval()`
- `check_dangerous_command()`
- gateway queueing and resolution support in the same module
This is already Pattern 1.
Current behavior:
- dangerous terminal commands are detected before execution
- the user can allow once / session / always / deny
- gateway sessions can block until approval resolves
This is a strong foundation, but it is limited to a subset of terminal commands.
## 2.2 Partial Confidence Threshold via Smart Approvals
Hermes also already has a partial Pattern 3.
Observed component:
- `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
Current behavior:
- only runs **after** a command has already been flagged by dangerous-pattern detection
- uses the auxiliary LLM to decide:
- approve
- deny
- escalate
This means Hermes has a confidence-threshold mechanism, but only for **already-flagged dangerous terminal commands**.
What it does not yet do:
- score all tool calls
- classify non-terminal tools
- distinguish crisis interventions from normal ops
- produce a shared risk model across the tool surface
## 2.3 Blocking Approval UX in Gateway
`gateway/run.py` already routes `/approve` and `/deny` into the blocking approval path.
This means the infrastructure for a true human confirmation firewall already exists in messaging contexts.
That is important because the missing work is not "invent human approval from zero."
The missing work is:
- expand the scope from dangerous shell commands to **all tool calls that matter**
- make the routing policy explicit and inspectable
---
## 3. What Hermes Still Lacks
## 3.1 No Universal Tool-Call Risk Assessment
The current approval system is command-pattern-centric.
It is not yet a tool-call firewall.
Missing capability:
- before dispatch, every tool call should receive a structured assessment:
- tool name
- side-effect class
- reversibility
- human-impact potential
- crisis relevance
- confidence score
- recommended confirmation pattern
Natural insertion point:
- `model_tools.handle_function_call()`
That function already sits at the central dispatch boundary.
It is the right place to add a pre-dispatch classifier.
## 3.2 No Hard Crisis Gate for Outbound Intervention
Issue #878 explicitly recommends:
- Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
- never auto-respond to suicidal content
That recommendation is not yet codified as a global firewall rule.
Missing rule:
- if a tool call would directly intervene in a crisis context or send outward guidance in response to suicidal content, it must require explicit human confirmation before execution
Examples that should hard-gate:
- outbound `send_message` content aimed at a suicidal user
- any future tool that places calls, escalates emergencies, or contacts third parties about a crisis
- any autonomous action that claims a person should or should not take a life-safety step
## 3.3 No First-Class Post-Execution Review Policy
Hermes has approval and denial, but it does not yet have a formal policy for when Pattern 2 is acceptable.
Without a policy, post-execution review tends to get used implicitly rather than intentionally.
That is risky.
Hermes should define Pattern 2 narrowly:
- only for actions that are both low-risk and reversible
- only when the system can show the human exactly what happened
- never for crisis, finance, destructive config, or sensitive comms
---
## 4. Recommended Architecture for Hermes
## 4.1 Add a Tool-Call Assessment Layer
Add a pre-dispatch assessment object for every tool call.
Suggested shape:
```python
@dataclass
class ToolCallAssessment:
tool_name: str
risk_score: float # 0.0 to 1.0
confidence: float # confidence in the assessment itself
pattern: str # pre_execution_gate | post_execution_review | confidence_threshold
requires_human: bool
reasons: list[str]
reversible: bool
crisis_sensitive: bool
```
Suggested execution point:
- inside `model_tools.handle_function_call()` before `orchestrator.dispatch()`
Why here:
- one place covers all tools
- one place can emit traces
- one place can remain model-agnostic
- one place lets plugins observe or override the assessment
## 4.2 Classify Tool Calls by Side-Effect Class
Suggested first-pass taxonomy:
### A. Read-only
Examples:
- `read_file`
- `search_files`
- `browser_snapshot`
- `browser_console` read-only inspection
Pattern:
- confidence threshold
- almost always auto-execute
- human confirmation normally unnecessary
### B. Local reversible edits
Examples:
- `patch`
- `write_file`
- `todo`
Pattern:
- confidence threshold
- human confirmation only when risk score rises because of path sensitivity or scope breadth
### C. External side effects
Examples:
- `send_message`
- `cronjob`
- `delegate_task`
- smart-home actuation tools
Pattern:
- confidence threshold by default
- pre-execution gate when score exceeds threshold or when context is sensitive
### D. Critical / destructive / crisis-sensitive
Examples:
- dangerous `terminal`
- financial actions
- deletion / kill / restart / deployment in sensitive paths
- outbound crisis intervention
Pattern:
- pre-execution gate
- never auto-execute on confidence alone
## 4.3 Crisis Override Rule
Add a hard override:
```text
If tool call is crisis-sensitive AND outbound or irreversible:
requires_human = True
pattern = pre_execution_gate
```
This is the most important rule in the issue.
The model may draft the message.
The human must confirm before the system sends it.
## 4.4 Use Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
For non-crisis operations, use Pattern 3.
Suggested logic:
- low risk + high assessment confidence -> auto-execute
- medium risk or medium confidence -> ask human
- high risk -> always ask human
Key point:
- confidence is not just "how sure the LLM is"
- confidence should combine:
- tool type certainty
- argument clarity
- path sensitivity
- external side effects
- crisis indicators
---
## 5. Recommended Initial Scoring Factors
A simple initial scorer is enough.
It does not need to be fancy.
Suggested factors:
### 5.1 Tool class risk
- read-only tools: very low base risk
- local mutation tools: moderate base risk
- external communication / automation tools: higher base risk
- shell execution: variable, often high
### 5.2 Target sensitivity
Examples:
- `/tmp` or local scratch paths -> lower
- repo files under git -> medium
- system config, credentials, secrets, gateway lifecycle -> high
- human-facing channels -> high if message content is sensitive
### 5.3 Reversibility
- reversible -> lower
- difficult but possible to undo -> medium
- practically irreversible -> high
### 5.4 Human-impact content
- no direct human impact -> low
- administrative impact -> medium
- crisis / safety / emotional intervention -> critical
### 5.5 Context certainty
- arguments are explicit and narrow -> higher confidence
- arguments are vague, inferred, or broad -> lower confidence
---
## 6. Implementation Plan
## Phase 1: Assessment Without Behavior Change
Goal:
- score all tool calls
- log assessment decisions
- emit traces for review
- do not yet block new tool categories
Files to touch:
- `tools/approval.py`
- `model_tools.py`
- tests for assessment coverage
Output:
- risk/confidence trace for every tool call
- pattern recommendation for every tool call
Why first:
- lets us calibrate before changing runtime behavior
- avoids breaking existing workflows blindly
## Phase 2: Hard-Gate Crisis-Sensitive Outbound Actions
Goal:
- enforce Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
Likely surfaces:
- `send_message`
- any future telephony / call / escalation tools
- other tools with direct human intervention side effects
Rule:
- never auto-send crisis intervention content without human confirmation
## Phase 3: General Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
Goal:
- apply Pattern 3 to all tool calls
- auto-run clearly safe actions
- escalate ambiguous or medium-risk actions
Likely thresholds:
- score < 0.25 -> auto
- 0.25 to 0.60 -> confirm if confidence is weak
- > 0.60 -> confirm
- crisis-sensitive -> always confirm
## Phase 4: Optional Post-Execution Review Lane
Goal:
- allow Pattern 2 only for explicitly reversible operations
Examples:
- maybe low-risk messaging drafts saved locally
- maybe reversible UI actions in specific environments
Important:
- this phase is optional
- Hermes should not rely on Pattern 2 for safety-critical flows
---
## 7. Verification Criteria for the Future Implementation
The eventual implementation should prove all of the following:
1. every tool call receives a scored assessment before dispatch
2. crisis-sensitive outbound actions always require human confirmation
3. dangerous terminal commands still preserve their current pre-execution gate
4. clearly safe read-only tool calls are not slowed by unnecessary prompts
5. assessment traces can be inspected after a run
6. approval decisions remain session-safe across CLI and gateway contexts
---
## 8. Concrete Recommendations
### Recommendation 1
Do **not** replace the current dangerous-command approval path.
Generalize above it.
Why:
- existing terminal Pattern 1 already works
- this is the strongest piece of the current firewall
### Recommendation 2
Add a universal scorer in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`.
Why:
- that is the first point where Hermes knows the tool name and structured arguments
- it is the cleanest place to classify all tool calls uniformly
### Recommendation 3
Treat crisis-sensitive outbound intervention as a separate safety class.
Why:
- issue #878 explicitly calls for Pattern 1 here
- this matches Timmy's SOUL-level safety requirements
### Recommendation 4
Ship scoring traces before enforcement expansion.
Why:
- you cannot tune thresholds you cannot inspect
- false positives will otherwise frustrate normal usage
### Recommendation 5
Use Pattern 3 as the default policy for normal operations.
Why:
- full manual confirmation on every tool call is too expensive
- full autonomy is too risky
- Pattern 3 is the practical middle ground
---
## 9. Bottom Line
Hermes should implement a **two-track human confirmation firewall**:
1. **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate**
- crisis interventions
- destructive terminal actions
- irreversible or safety-critical tool calls
2. **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold**
- all ordinary tool calls
- driven by a universal tool-call assessment layer
- integrated at the central dispatch boundary
Pattern 2 should remain optional and narrow.
It is not the primary answer for Hermes.
The repo already contains the beginnings of this system.
The next step is not new theory.
It is to turn the existing approval path into a true **tool-call-wide human confirmation firewall**.
---
## References
- Issue #878 — Human Confirmation Firewall Implementation Patterns
- Issue #659 — Critical Research Tasks
- `tools/approval.py` — current dangerous-command approval flow and smart approvals
- `model_tools.py` — central tool dispatch boundary
- `gateway/run.py` — blocking approval handling for messaging sessions

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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
"""Regression tests: normalize_anthropic_response_v2 vs v1.
Constructs mock Anthropic responses and asserts that the v2 function
(returning NormalizedResponse) produces identical field values to the
original v1 function (returning SimpleNamespace + finish_reason).
"""
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
from agent.anthropic_adapter import (
normalize_anthropic_response,
normalize_anthropic_response_v2,
)
from agent.transports.types import NormalizedResponse
def _text_block(text: str):
return SimpleNamespace(type="text", text=text)
def _thinking_block(thinking: str, signature: str = "sig_abc"):
return SimpleNamespace(type="thinking", thinking=thinking, signature=signature)
def _tool_use_block(id: str, name: str, input: dict):
return SimpleNamespace(type="tool_use", id=id, name=name, input=input)
def _response(content_blocks, stop_reason="end_turn"):
return SimpleNamespace(
content=content_blocks,
stop_reason=stop_reason,
usage=SimpleNamespace(input_tokens=10, output_tokens=5),
)
class TestTextOnly:
def setup_method(self):
self.resp = _response([_text_block("Hello world")])
self.v1_msg, self.v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(self.resp)
self.v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(self.resp)
def test_type(self):
assert isinstance(self.v2, NormalizedResponse)
def test_content_matches(self):
assert self.v2.content == self.v1_msg.content
def test_finish_reason_matches(self):
assert self.v2.finish_reason == self.v1_finish
def test_no_tool_calls(self):
assert self.v2.tool_calls is None
assert self.v1_msg.tool_calls is None
def test_no_reasoning(self):
assert self.v2.reasoning is None
assert self.v1_msg.reasoning is None
class TestWithToolCalls:
def setup_method(self):
self.resp = _response(
[
_text_block("I'll check that"),
_tool_use_block("toolu_abc", "terminal", {"command": "ls"}),
_tool_use_block("toolu_def", "read_file", {"path": "/tmp"}),
],
stop_reason="tool_use",
)
self.v1_msg, self.v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(self.resp)
self.v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(self.resp)
def test_finish_reason(self):
assert self.v2.finish_reason == "tool_calls"
assert self.v1_finish == "tool_calls"
def test_tool_call_count(self):
assert len(self.v2.tool_calls) == 2
assert len(self.v1_msg.tool_calls) == 2
def test_tool_call_ids_match(self):
for i in range(2):
assert self.v2.tool_calls[i].id == self.v1_msg.tool_calls[i].id
def test_tool_call_names_match(self):
assert self.v2.tool_calls[0].name == "terminal"
assert self.v2.tool_calls[1].name == "read_file"
for i in range(2):
assert self.v2.tool_calls[i].name == self.v1_msg.tool_calls[i].function.name
def test_tool_call_arguments_match(self):
for i in range(2):
assert self.v2.tool_calls[i].arguments == self.v1_msg.tool_calls[i].function.arguments
def test_content_preserved(self):
assert self.v2.content == self.v1_msg.content
assert "check that" in self.v2.content
class TestWithThinking:
def setup_method(self):
self.resp = _response([
_thinking_block("Let me think about this carefully..."),
_text_block("The answer is 42."),
])
self.v1_msg, self.v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(self.resp)
self.v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(self.resp)
def test_reasoning_matches(self):
assert self.v2.reasoning == self.v1_msg.reasoning
assert "think about this" in self.v2.reasoning
def test_reasoning_details_in_provider_data(self):
v1_details = self.v1_msg.reasoning_details
v2_details = self.v2.provider_data.get("reasoning_details") if self.v2.provider_data else None
assert v1_details is not None
assert v2_details is not None
assert len(v2_details) == len(v1_details)
def test_content_excludes_thinking(self):
assert self.v2.content == "The answer is 42."
class TestMixed:
def setup_method(self):
self.resp = _response(
[
_thinking_block("Planning my approach..."),
_text_block("I'll run the command"),
_tool_use_block("toolu_xyz", "terminal", {"command": "pwd"}),
],
stop_reason="tool_use",
)
self.v1_msg, self.v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(self.resp)
self.v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(self.resp)
def test_all_fields_present(self):
assert self.v2.content is not None
assert self.v2.tool_calls is not None
assert self.v2.reasoning is not None
assert self.v2.finish_reason == "tool_calls"
def test_content_matches(self):
assert self.v2.content == self.v1_msg.content
def test_reasoning_matches(self):
assert self.v2.reasoning == self.v1_msg.reasoning
def test_tool_call_matches(self):
assert self.v2.tool_calls[0].id == self.v1_msg.tool_calls[0].id
assert self.v2.tool_calls[0].name == self.v1_msg.tool_calls[0].function.name
class TestStopReasons:
@pytest.mark.parametrize("stop_reason,expected", [
("end_turn", "stop"),
("tool_use", "tool_calls"),
("max_tokens", "length"),
("stop_sequence", "stop"),
("refusal", "content_filter"),
("model_context_window_exceeded", "length"),
("unknown_future_reason", "stop"),
])
def test_stop_reason_mapping(self, stop_reason, expected):
resp = _response([_text_block("x")], stop_reason=stop_reason)
_v1_msg, v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(resp)
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp)
assert v2.finish_reason == v1_finish == expected
class TestStripToolPrefix:
def test_prefix_stripped(self):
resp = _response(
[_tool_use_block("toolu_1", "mcp_terminal", {"cmd": "ls"})],
stop_reason="tool_use",
)
v1_msg, _ = normalize_anthropic_response(resp, strip_tool_prefix=True)
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp, strip_tool_prefix=True)
assert v1_msg.tool_calls[0].function.name == "terminal"
assert v2.tool_calls[0].name == "terminal"
def test_prefix_kept(self):
resp = _response(
[_tool_use_block("toolu_1", "mcp_terminal", {"cmd": "ls"})],
stop_reason="tool_use",
)
v1_msg, _ = normalize_anthropic_response(resp, strip_tool_prefix=False)
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp, strip_tool_prefix=False)
assert v1_msg.tool_calls[0].function.name == "mcp_terminal"
assert v2.tool_calls[0].name == "mcp_terminal"
class TestEdgeCases:
def test_empty_content_blocks(self):
resp = _response([])
v1_msg, _v1_finish = normalize_anthropic_response(resp)
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp)
assert v2.content == v1_msg.content
assert v2.content is None
def test_no_reasoning_details_means_none_provider_data(self):
resp = _response([_text_block("hi")])
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp)
assert v2.provider_data is None
def test_v2_returns_dataclass_not_namespace(self):
resp = _response([_text_block("hi")])
v2 = normalize_anthropic_response_v2(resp)
assert isinstance(v2, NormalizedResponse)
assert not isinstance(v2, SimpleNamespace)

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"""Tests for the transport ABC, registry, and AnthropicTransport."""
from types import SimpleNamespace
import pytest
from agent.transports import _REGISTRY, get_transport, register_transport
from agent.transports.base import ProviderTransport
from agent.transports.types import NormalizedResponse
class TestProviderTransportABC:
def test_cannot_instantiate_abc(self):
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
ProviderTransport()
def test_concrete_must_implement_all_abstract(self):
class Incomplete(ProviderTransport):
@property
def api_mode(self):
return "test"
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
Incomplete()
def test_minimal_concrete(self):
class Minimal(ProviderTransport):
@property
def api_mode(self):
return "test_minimal"
def convert_messages(self, messages, **kw):
return messages
def convert_tools(self, tools):
return tools
def build_kwargs(self, model, messages, tools=None, **params):
return {"model": model, "messages": messages}
def normalize_response(self, response, **kw):
return NormalizedResponse(content="ok", tool_calls=None, finish_reason="stop")
t = Minimal()
assert t.api_mode == "test_minimal"
assert t.validate_response(None) is True
assert t.extract_cache_stats(None) is None
assert t.map_finish_reason("end_turn") == "end_turn"
class TestTransportRegistry:
def test_get_unregistered_returns_none(self):
assert get_transport("nonexistent_mode") is None
def test_anthropic_registered_on_import(self):
import agent.transports.anthropic # noqa: F401
t = get_transport("anthropic_messages")
assert t is not None
assert t.api_mode == "anthropic_messages"
def test_register_and_get(self):
class DummyTransport(ProviderTransport):
@property
def api_mode(self):
return "dummy_test"
def convert_messages(self, messages, **kw):
return messages
def convert_tools(self, tools):
return tools
def build_kwargs(self, model, messages, tools=None, **params):
return {}
def normalize_response(self, response, **kw):
return NormalizedResponse(content=None, tool_calls=None, finish_reason="stop")
register_transport("dummy_test", DummyTransport)
t = get_transport("dummy_test")
assert t.api_mode == "dummy_test"
_REGISTRY.pop("dummy_test", None)
class TestAnthropicTransport:
@pytest.fixture
def transport(self):
import agent.transports.anthropic # noqa: F401
return get_transport("anthropic_messages")
def test_api_mode(self, transport):
assert transport.api_mode == "anthropic_messages"
def test_convert_tools_simple(self, transport):
tools = [{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "test_tool",
"description": "A test",
"parameters": {"type": "object", "properties": {}},
},
}]
result = transport.convert_tools(tools)
assert len(result) == 1
assert result[0]["name"] == "test_tool"
assert "input_schema" in result[0]
def test_validate_response_none(self, transport):
assert transport.validate_response(None) is False
def test_validate_response_empty_content(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(content=[])
assert transport.validate_response(r) is False
def test_validate_response_valid(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(content=[SimpleNamespace(type="text", text="hello")])
assert transport.validate_response(r) is True
def test_map_finish_reason(self, transport):
assert transport.map_finish_reason("end_turn") == "stop"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("tool_use") == "tool_calls"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("max_tokens") == "length"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("stop_sequence") == "stop"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("refusal") == "content_filter"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("model_context_window_exceeded") == "length"
assert transport.map_finish_reason("unknown") == "stop"
def test_extract_cache_stats_none_usage(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(usage=None)
assert transport.extract_cache_stats(r) is None
def test_extract_cache_stats_with_cache(self, transport):
usage = SimpleNamespace(cache_read_input_tokens=100, cache_creation_input_tokens=50)
r = SimpleNamespace(usage=usage)
result = transport.extract_cache_stats(r)
assert result == {"cached_tokens": 100, "creation_tokens": 50}
def test_extract_cache_stats_zero(self, transport):
usage = SimpleNamespace(cache_read_input_tokens=0, cache_creation_input_tokens=0)
r = SimpleNamespace(usage=usage)
assert transport.extract_cache_stats(r) is None
def test_normalize_response_text(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(
content=[SimpleNamespace(type="text", text="Hello world")],
stop_reason="end_turn",
usage=SimpleNamespace(input_tokens=10, output_tokens=5),
model="claude-sonnet-4-6",
)
nr = transport.normalize_response(r)
assert isinstance(nr, NormalizedResponse)
assert nr.content == "Hello world"
assert nr.tool_calls is None or nr.tool_calls == []
assert nr.finish_reason == "stop"
def test_normalize_response_tool_calls(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(
content=[
SimpleNamespace(type="tool_use", id="toolu_123", name="terminal", input={"command": "ls"}),
],
stop_reason="tool_use",
usage=SimpleNamespace(input_tokens=10, output_tokens=20),
model="claude-sonnet-4-6",
)
nr = transport.normalize_response(r)
assert nr.finish_reason == "tool_calls"
assert len(nr.tool_calls) == 1
tc = nr.tool_calls[0]
assert tc.name == "terminal"
assert tc.id == "toolu_123"
assert '"command"' in tc.arguments
def test_normalize_response_thinking(self, transport):
r = SimpleNamespace(
content=[
SimpleNamespace(type="thinking", thinking="Let me think..."),
SimpleNamespace(type="text", text="The answer is 42"),
],
stop_reason="end_turn",
usage=SimpleNamespace(input_tokens=10, output_tokens=15),
model="claude-sonnet-4-6",
)
nr = transport.normalize_response(r)
assert nr.content == "The answer is 42"
assert nr.reasoning == "Let me think..."
def test_build_kwargs_returns_dict(self, transport):
messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}]
kw = transport.build_kwargs(
model="claude-sonnet-4-6",
messages=messages,
max_tokens=1024,
)
assert isinstance(kw, dict)
assert "model" in kw
assert "max_tokens" in kw
assert "messages" in kw
def test_convert_messages_extracts_system(self, transport):
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "You are helpful."},
{"role": "user", "content": "Hi"},
]
system, msgs = transport.convert_messages(messages)
assert system is not None
assert len(msgs) >= 1

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"""Tests for agent/transports/types.py — dataclass construction + helpers."""
import json
from agent.transports.types import (
NormalizedResponse,
ToolCall,
Usage,
build_tool_call,
map_finish_reason,
)
class TestToolCall:
def test_basic_construction(self):
tc = ToolCall(id="call_abc", name="terminal", arguments='{"cmd": "ls"}')
assert tc.id == "call_abc"
assert tc.name == "terminal"
assert tc.arguments == '{"cmd": "ls"}'
assert tc.provider_data is None
def test_none_id(self):
tc = ToolCall(id=None, name="read_file", arguments="{}")
assert tc.id is None
def test_provider_data(self):
tc = ToolCall(
id="call_x",
name="t",
arguments="{}",
provider_data={"call_id": "call_x", "response_item_id": "fc_x"},
)
assert tc.provider_data["call_id"] == "call_x"
assert tc.provider_data["response_item_id"] == "fc_x"
class TestUsage:
def test_defaults(self):
u = Usage()
assert u.prompt_tokens == 0
assert u.completion_tokens == 0
assert u.total_tokens == 0
assert u.cached_tokens == 0
def test_explicit(self):
u = Usage(prompt_tokens=100, completion_tokens=50, total_tokens=150, cached_tokens=80)
assert u.total_tokens == 150
class TestNormalizedResponse:
def test_text_only(self):
r = NormalizedResponse(content="hello", tool_calls=None, finish_reason="stop")
assert r.content == "hello"
assert r.tool_calls is None
assert r.finish_reason == "stop"
assert r.reasoning is None
assert r.usage is None
assert r.provider_data is None
def test_with_tool_calls(self):
tcs = [ToolCall(id="call_1", name="terminal", arguments='{"cmd":"pwd"}')]
r = NormalizedResponse(content=None, tool_calls=tcs, finish_reason="tool_calls")
assert r.finish_reason == "tool_calls"
assert len(r.tool_calls) == 1
assert r.tool_calls[0].name == "terminal"
def test_with_reasoning(self):
r = NormalizedResponse(
content="answer",
tool_calls=None,
finish_reason="stop",
reasoning="I thought about it",
)
assert r.reasoning == "I thought about it"
def test_with_provider_data(self):
r = NormalizedResponse(
content=None,
tool_calls=None,
finish_reason="stop",
provider_data={"reasoning_details": [{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "hmm"}]},
)
assert r.provider_data["reasoning_details"][0]["type"] == "thinking"
class TestBuildToolCall:
def test_dict_arguments_serialized(self):
tc = build_tool_call(id="call_1", name="terminal", arguments={"cmd": "ls"})
assert tc.arguments == json.dumps({"cmd": "ls"})
assert tc.provider_data is None
def test_string_arguments_passthrough(self):
tc = build_tool_call(id="call_2", name="read_file", arguments='{"path": "/tmp"}')
assert tc.arguments == '{"path": "/tmp"}'
def test_provider_fields(self):
tc = build_tool_call(
id="call_3",
name="terminal",
arguments="{}",
call_id="call_3",
response_item_id="fc_3",
)
assert tc.provider_data == {"call_id": "call_3", "response_item_id": "fc_3"}
def test_none_id(self):
tc = build_tool_call(id=None, name="t", arguments="{}")
assert tc.id is None
class TestMapFinishReason:
ANTHROPIC_MAP = {
"end_turn": "stop",
"tool_use": "tool_calls",
"max_tokens": "length",
"stop_sequence": "stop",
"refusal": "content_filter",
}
def test_known_reason(self):
assert map_finish_reason("end_turn", self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "stop"
assert map_finish_reason("tool_use", self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "tool_calls"
assert map_finish_reason("max_tokens", self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "length"
assert map_finish_reason("refusal", self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "content_filter"
def test_unknown_reason_defaults_to_stop(self):
assert map_finish_reason("something_new", self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "stop"
def test_none_reason(self):
assert map_finish_reason(None, self.ANTHROPIC_MAP) == "stop"