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Author SHA1 Message Date
4e3f5072f6 security: add rate limiting to API server (V-016, CVSS 7.3)
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Add token bucket rate limiter per client IP.

Changes:
- gateway/platforms/api_server.py:
  - Add _RateLimiter class with token bucket algorithm
  - Add rate_limit_middleware for request throttling
  - Configurable via API_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT (default 100 req/min)
  - Returns 429 with Retry-After header when limit exceeded
  - Skip rate limiting for /health endpoint

CVSS: 7.3 (High)
Refs: V-016 in SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
2026-03-31 00:04:56 +00:00
5936745636 Merge pull request '[SECURITY] Validate CDP URLs to Prevent SSRF (V-010, CVSS 8.4)' (#65) from security/fix-browser-cdp into main
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2026-03-30 23:57:27 +00:00
cfaf6c827e security: validate CDP URLs to prevent SSRF (V-010, CVSS 8.4)
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Add URL validation before fetching Chrome DevTools Protocol endpoints.
Only allows localhost and private network addresses.

Changes:
- tools/browser_tool.py: Add hostname validation in _resolve_cdp_override()
- Block external URLs to prevent SSRF attacks
- Log security errors for rejected URLs

CVSS: 8.4 (High)
Refs: V-010 in SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery
2026-03-30 23:57:22 +00:00
cf1afb07f2 Merge pull request '[SECURITY] Block Dangerous Docker Volume Mounts (V-012, CVSS 8.7)' (#64) from security/fix-docker-privilege into main
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2026-03-30 23:55:50 +00:00
2 changed files with 124 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -241,6 +241,43 @@ else:
security_headers_middleware = None # type: ignore[assignment]
# SECURITY FIX (V-016): Rate limiting middleware
if AIOHTTP_AVAILABLE:
@web.middleware
async def rate_limit_middleware(request, handler):
"""Apply rate limiting per client IP.
Returns 429 Too Many Requests if rate limit exceeded.
Configurable via API_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT env var (requests per minute).
"""
# Skip rate limiting for health checks
if request.path == "/health":
return await handler(request)
# Get client IP (respecting X-Forwarded-For if behind proxy)
client_ip = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", request.remote)
if client_ip and "," in client_ip:
client_ip = client_ip.split(",")[0].strip()
limiter = _get_rate_limiter()
if not limiter.acquire(client_ip):
retry_after = limiter.get_retry_after(client_ip)
logger.warning(f"Rate limit exceeded for {client_ip}")
return web.json_response(
_openai_error(
f"Rate limit exceeded. Try again in {retry_after} seconds.",
err_type="rate_limit_error",
code="rate_limit_exceeded"
),
status=429,
headers={"Retry-After": str(retry_after)}
)
return await handler(request)
else:
rate_limit_middleware = None # type: ignore[assignment]
class _IdempotencyCache:
"""In-memory idempotency cache with TTL and basic LRU semantics."""
def __init__(self, max_items: int = 1000, ttl_seconds: int = 300):
@@ -273,6 +310,59 @@ class _IdempotencyCache:
_idem_cache = _IdempotencyCache()
# SECURITY FIX (V-016): Rate limiting
class _RateLimiter:
"""Token bucket rate limiter per client IP.
Default: 100 requests per minute per IP.
Configurable via API_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT env var (requests per minute).
"""
def __init__(self, requests_per_minute: int = 100):
from collections import defaultdict
self._buckets = defaultdict(lambda: {"tokens": requests_per_minute, "last": 0})
self._rate = requests_per_minute / 60.0 # tokens per second
self._max_tokens = requests_per_minute
self._lock = threading.Lock()
def _get_bucket(self, key: str) -> dict:
import time
with self._lock:
bucket = self._buckets[key]
now = time.time()
elapsed = now - bucket["last"]
bucket["last"] = now
# Add tokens based on elapsed time
bucket["tokens"] = min(
self._max_tokens,
bucket["tokens"] + elapsed * self._rate
)
return bucket
def acquire(self, key: str) -> bool:
"""Try to acquire a token. Returns True if allowed, False if rate limited."""
bucket = self._get_bucket(key)
with self._lock:
if bucket["tokens"] >= 1:
bucket["tokens"] -= 1
return True
return False
def get_retry_after(self, key: str) -> int:
"""Get seconds until next token is available."""
return 1 # Simplified - return 1 second
_rate_limiter = None
def _get_rate_limiter() -> _RateLimiter:
global _rate_limiter
if _rate_limiter is None:
# Parse rate limit from env (default 100 req/min)
rate_limit = int(os.getenv("API_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT", "100"))
_rate_limiter = _RateLimiter(rate_limit)
return _rate_limiter
def _make_request_fingerprint(body: Dict[str, Any], keys: List[str]) -> str:
from hashlib import sha256
subset = {k: body.get(k) for k in keys}
@@ -1282,7 +1372,8 @@ class APIServerAdapter(BasePlatformAdapter):
return False
try:
mws = [mw for mw in (cors_middleware, body_limit_middleware, security_headers_middleware) if mw is not None]
# SECURITY FIX (V-016): Add rate limiting middleware
mws = [mw for mw in (cors_middleware, body_limit_middleware, security_headers_middleware, rate_limit_middleware) if mw is not None]
self._app = web.Application(middlewares=mws)
self._app["api_server_adapter"] = self
self._app.router.add_get("/health", self._handle_health)

View File

@@ -170,6 +170,9 @@ def _resolve_cdp_override(cdp_url: str) -> str:
For discovery-style endpoints we fetch /json/version and return the
webSocketDebuggerUrl so downstream tools always receive a concrete browser
websocket instead of an ambiguous host:port URL.
SECURITY FIX (V-010): Validates URLs before fetching to prevent SSRF.
Only allows localhost/private network addresses for CDP connections.
"""
raw = (cdp_url or "").strip()
if not raw:
@@ -191,6 +194,35 @@ def _resolve_cdp_override(cdp_url: str) -> str:
else:
version_url = discovery_url.rstrip("/") + "/json/version"
# SECURITY FIX (V-010): Validate URL before fetching
# Only allow localhost and private networks for CDP
from urllib.parse import urlparse
parsed = urlparse(version_url)
hostname = parsed.hostname or ""
# Allow only safe hostnames for CDP
allowed_hostnames = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1"]
if hostname not in allowed_hostnames:
# Check if it's a private IP
try:
import ipaddress
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
if not (ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback):
logger.error(
"SECURITY: Rejecting CDP URL '%s' - only localhost and private "
"networks are allowed to prevent SSRF attacks.",
raw
)
return raw # Return original without fetching
except ValueError:
# Not an IP - reject unknown hostnames
logger.error(
"SECURITY: Rejecting CDP URL '%s' - unknown hostname '%s'. "
"Only localhost and private IPs are allowed.",
raw, hostname
)
return raw
try:
response = requests.get(version_url, timeout=10)
response.raise_for_status()