hermes-agent/SECURE_CODING_GUIDELINES.md

# SECURE CODING GUIDELINES

## Hermes Agent Development Security Standards
**Version:** 1.0  
**Effective Date:** March 30, 2026

---

## 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

### 1.1 Security-First Mindset
- Every feature must be designed with security in mind
- Assume all input is malicious until proven otherwise
- Defense in depth: multiple layers of security controls
- Fail securely: when security controls fail, default to denial

### 1.2 Threat Model
Primary threats to consider:
- Malicious user prompts
- Compromised or malicious skills
- Supply chain attacks
- Insider threats
- Accidental data exposure

---

## 2. INPUT VALIDATION

### 2.1 Validate All Input
```python
# ❌ INCORRECT
def process_file(path: str):
    with open(path) as f:
        return f.read()

# ✅ CORRECT
from pydantic import BaseModel, validator
import re

class FileRequest(BaseModel):
    path: str
    max_size: int = 1000000
    
    @validator('path')
    def validate_path(cls, v):
        # Block path traversal
        if '..' in v or v.startswith('/'):
            raise ValueError('Invalid path characters')
        # Allowlist safe characters
        if not re.match(r'^[\w\-./]+$', v):
            raise ValueError('Invalid characters in path')
        return v
    
    @validator('max_size')
    def validate_size(cls, v):
        if v < 0 or v > 10000000:
            raise ValueError('Size out of range')
        return v

def process_file(request: FileRequest):
    # Now safe to use request.path
    pass
```

### 2.2 Length Limits
Always enforce maximum lengths:
```python
MAX_INPUT_LENGTH = 10000
MAX_FILENAME_LENGTH = 255
MAX_PATH_LENGTH = 4096

def validate_length(value: str, max_len: int, field_name: str):
    if len(value) > max_len:
        raise ValueError(f"{field_name} exceeds maximum length of {max_len}")
```

### 2.3 Type Safety
Use type hints and enforce them:
```python
from typing import Union

def safe_function(user_id: int, message: str) -> dict:
    if not isinstance(user_id, int):
        raise TypeError("user_id must be an integer")
    if not isinstance(message, str):
        raise TypeError("message must be a string")
    # ... function logic
```

---

## 3. COMMAND EXECUTION

### 3.1 Never Use shell=True
```python
import subprocess
import shlex

# ❌ NEVER DO THIS
subprocess.run(f"ls {user_input}", shell=True)

# ❌ NEVER DO THIS EITHER
cmd = f"cat {filename}"
os.system(cmd)

# ✅ CORRECT - Use list arguments
subprocess.run(["ls", user_input], shell=False)

# ✅ CORRECT - Use shlex for complex cases
cmd_parts = shlex.split(user_input)
subprocess.run(["ls"] + cmd_parts, shell=False)
```

### 3.2 Command Allowlisting
```python
ALLOWED_COMMANDS = frozenset([
    "ls", "cat", "grep", "find", "git", "python", "pip"
])

def validate_command(command: str):
    parts = shlex.split(command)
    if parts[0] not in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
        raise SecurityError(f"Command '{parts[0]}' not allowed")
```

### 3.3 Input Sanitization
```python
import re

def sanitize_shell_input(value: str) -> str:
    """Remove dangerous shell metacharacters."""
    # Block shell metacharacters
    dangerous = re.compile(r'[;&|`$(){}[\]\\]')
    if dangerous.search(value):
        raise ValueError("Shell metacharacters not allowed")
    return value
```

---

## 4. FILE OPERATIONS

### 4.1 Path Validation
```python
from pathlib import Path

class FileSandbox:
    def __init__(self, root: Path):
        self.root = root.resolve()
    
    def validate_path(self, user_path: str) -> Path:
        """Validate and resolve user-provided path within sandbox."""
        # Expand user home
        expanded = Path(user_path).expanduser()
        
        # Resolve to absolute path
        try:
            resolved = expanded.resolve()
        except (OSError, ValueError) as e:
            raise SecurityError(f"Invalid path: {e}")
        
        # Ensure path is within sandbox
        try:
            resolved.relative_to(self.root)
        except ValueError:
            raise SecurityError("Path outside sandbox")
        
        return resolved
    
    def safe_open(self, user_path: str, mode: str = 'r'):
        safe_path = self.validate_path(user_path)
        return open(safe_path, mode)
```

### 4.2 Prevent Symlink Attacks
```python
import os

def safe_read_file(filepath: Path):
    """Read file, following symlinks only within allowed directories."""
    # Resolve symlinks
    real_path = filepath.resolve()
    
    # Verify still in allowed location after resolution
    if not str(real_path).startswith(str(SAFE_ROOT)):
        raise SecurityError("Symlink escape detected")
    
    # Verify it's a regular file
    if not real_path.is_file():
        raise SecurityError("Not a regular file")
    
    return real_path.read_text()
```

### 4.3 Temporary Files
```python
import tempfile
import os

def create_secure_temp_file():
    """Create temp file with restricted permissions."""
    # Create with restrictive permissions
    fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="hermes_", suffix=".tmp")
    try:
        # Set owner-read/write only
        os.chmod(path, 0o600)
        return fd, path
    except:
        os.close(fd)
        os.unlink(path)
        raise
```

---

## 5. SECRET MANAGEMENT

### 5.1 Environment Variables
```python
import os

# ❌ NEVER DO THIS
def execute_command(command: str):
    # Child inherits ALL environment
    subprocess.run(command, shell=True, env=os.environ)

# ✅ CORRECT - Explicit whitelisting
_ALLOWED_ENV = frozenset([
    "PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LANG", "TERM", "SHELL"
])

def get_safe_environment():
    return {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() 
            if k in _ALLOWED_ENV}

def execute_command(command: str):
    subprocess.run(
        command, 
        shell=False, 
        env=get_safe_environment()
    )
```

### 5.2 Secret Detection
```python
import re

_SECRET_PATTERNS = [
    re.compile(r'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}'),  # OpenAI-style keys
    re.compile(r'ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}'),  # GitHub PAT
    re.compile(r'[a-zA-Z0-9]{40}'),      # Generic high-entropy strings
]

def detect_secrets(text: str) -> list:
    """Detect potential secrets in text."""
    findings = []
    for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
        matches = pattern.findall(text)
        findings.extend(matches)
    return findings

def redact_secrets(text: str) -> str:
    """Redact detected secrets."""
    for pattern in _SECRET_PATTERNS:
        text = pattern.sub('***REDACTED***', text)
    return text
```

### 5.3 Secure Logging
```python
import logging
from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text

class SecureLogger:
    def __init__(self, logger: logging.Logger):
        self.logger = logger
    
    def debug(self, msg: str, *args, **kwargs):
        self.logger.debug(redact_sensitive_text(msg), *args, **kwargs)
    
    def info(self, msg: str, *args, **kwargs):
        self.logger.info(redact_sensitive_text(msg), *args, **kwargs)
    
    def warning(self, msg: str, *args, **kwargs):
        self.logger.warning(redact_sensitive_text(msg), *args, **kwargs)
    
    def error(self, msg: str, *args, **kwargs):
        self.logger.error(redact_sensitive_text(msg), *args, **kwargs)
```

---

## 6. NETWORK SECURITY

### 6.1 URL Validation
```python
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress

_BLOCKED_SCHEMES = frozenset(['file', 'ftp', 'gopher'])
_BLOCKED_HOSTS = frozenset([
    'localhost', '127.0.0.1', '0.0.0.0',
    '169.254.169.254',  # AWS metadata
    '[::1]', '[::]'
])
_PRIVATE_NETWORKS = [
    ipaddress.ip_network('10.0.0.0/8'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('172.16.0.0/12'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('192.168.0.0/16'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('169.254.0.0/16'),  # Link-local
]

def validate_url(url: str) -> bool:
    """Validate URL is safe to fetch."""
    parsed = urlparse(url)
    
    # Check scheme
    if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
        raise ValueError(f"Scheme '{parsed.scheme}' not allowed")
    
    # Check hostname
    hostname = parsed.hostname
    if not hostname:
        raise ValueError("No hostname in URL")
    
    if hostname.lower() in _BLOCKED_HOSTS:
        raise ValueError("Host not allowed")
    
    # Check IP addresses
    try:
        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
        for network in _PRIVATE_NETWORKS:
            if ip in network:
                raise ValueError("Private IP address not allowed")
    except ValueError:
        pass  # Not an IP, continue
    
    return True
```

### 6.2 Redirect Handling
```python
import requests

def safe_get(url: str, max_redirects: int = 5):
    """GET URL with redirect validation."""
    session = requests.Session()
    session.max_redirects = max_redirects
    
    # Validate initial URL
    validate_url(url)
    
    # Custom redirect handler
    response = session.get(
        url, 
        allow_redirects=True,
        hooks={'response': lambda r, *args, **kwargs: validate_url(r.url)}
    )
    
    return response
```

---

## 7. AUTHENTICATION & AUTHORIZATION

### 7.1 API Key Validation
```python
import secrets
import hmac
import hashlib

def constant_time_compare(val1: str, val2: str) -> bool:
    """Compare strings in constant time to prevent timing attacks."""
    return hmac.compare_digest(val1.encode(), val2.encode())

def validate_api_key(provided_key: str, expected_key: str) -> bool:
    """Validate API key using constant-time comparison."""
    if not provided_key or not expected_key:
        return False
    return constant_time_compare(provided_key, expected_key)
```

### 7.2 Session Management
```python
import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timedelta

class SessionManager:
    SESSION_TIMEOUT = timedelta(hours=24)
    
    def create_session(self, user_id: str) -> str:
        """Create secure session token."""
        token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
        expires = datetime.utcnow() + self.SESSION_TIMEOUT
        # Store in database with expiration
        return token
    
    def validate_session(self, token: str) -> bool:
        """Validate session token."""
        # Lookup in database
        # Check expiration
        # Validate token format
        return True
```

---

## 8. ERROR HANDLING

### 8.1 Secure Error Messages
```python
import logging

# Internal detailed logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

class UserFacingError(Exception):
    """Error safe to show to users."""
    pass

def process_request(data: dict):
    try:
        result = internal_operation(data)
        return result
    except ValueError as e:
        # Log full details internally
        logger.error(f"Validation error: {e}", exc_info=True)
        # Return safe message to user
        raise UserFacingError("Invalid input provided")
    except Exception as e:
        # Log full details internally
        logger.error(f"Unexpected error: {e}", exc_info=True)
        # Generic message to user
        raise UserFacingError("An error occurred")
```

### 8.2 Exception Handling
```python
def safe_operation():
    try:
        risky_operation()
    except Exception as e:
        # Always clean up resources
        cleanup_resources()
        # Log securely
        logger.error(f"Operation failed: {redact_sensitive_text(str(e))}")
        # Re-raise or convert
        raise
```

---

## 9. CRYPTOGRAPHY

### 9.1 Password Hashing
```python
import bcrypt

def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
    """Hash password using bcrypt."""
    salt = bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)
    hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), salt)
    return hashed.decode()

def verify_password(password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
    """Verify password against hash."""
    return bcrypt.checkpw(password.encode(), hashed.encode())
```

### 9.2 Secure Random
```python
import secrets

def generate_token(length: int = 32) -> str:
    """Generate cryptographically secure token."""
    return secrets.token_urlsafe(length)

def generate_pin(length: int = 6) -> str:
    """Generate secure numeric PIN."""
    return ''.join(str(secrets.randbelow(10)) for _ in range(length))
```

---

## 10. CODE REVIEW CHECKLIST

### Before Submitting Code:
- [ ] All user inputs validated
- [ ] No shell=True in subprocess calls
- [ ] All file paths validated and sandboxed
- [ ] Secrets not logged or exposed
- [ ] URLs validated before fetching
- [ ] Error messages don't leak sensitive info
- [ ] No hardcoded credentials
- [ ] Proper exception handling
- [ ] Security tests included
- [ ] Documentation updated

### Security-Focused Review Questions:
1. What happens if this receives malicious input?
2. Can this leak sensitive data?
3. Are there privilege escalation paths?
4. What if the external service is compromised?
5. Is the error handling secure?

---

## 11. TESTING SECURITY

### 11.1 Security Unit Tests
```python
def test_path_traversal_blocked():
    sandbox = FileSandbox(Path("/safe/path"))
    with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
        sandbox.validate_path("../../../etc/passwd")

def test_command_injection_blocked():
    with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
        validate_command("ls; rm -rf /")

def test_secret_redaction():
    text = "Key: sk-test123456789"
    redacted = redact_secrets(text)
    assert "sk-test" not in redacted
```

### 11.2 Fuzzing
```python
import hypothesis.strategies as st
from hypothesis import given

@given(st.text())
def test_input_validation(input_text):
    # Should never crash, always validate or reject
    try:
        result = process_input(input_text)
        assert isinstance(result, ExpectedType)
    except ValidationError:
        pass  # Expected for invalid input
```

---

## 12. INCIDENT RESPONSE

### Security Incident Procedure:
1. **Stop** - Halt the affected system/process
2. **Assess** - Determine scope and impact
3. **Contain** - Prevent further damage
4. **Investigate** - Gather evidence
5. **Remediate** - Fix the vulnerability
6. **Recover** - Restore normal operations
7. **Learn** - Document and improve

### Emergency Contacts:
- Security Team: security@example.com
- On-call: +1-XXX-XXX-XXXX
- Slack: #security-incidents

---

**Document Owner:** Security Team  
**Review Cycle:** Quarterly  
**Last Updated:** March 30, 2026