Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending). The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular. When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron management were accessible to any machine on the network. Changes: - Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema, model/info) - Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead - Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest() to prevent timing side-channel attacks - Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to override (with warning log) - Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab
38 KiB
38 KiB