96dac22194
* fix: prevent infinite 400 failure loop on context overflow (#1630) When a gateway session exceeds the model's context window, Anthropic may return a generic 400 invalid_request_error with just 'Error' as the message. This bypassed the phrase-based context-length detection, causing the agent to treat it as a non-retryable client error. Worse, the failed user message was still persisted to the transcript, making the session even larger on each attempt — creating an infinite loop. Three-layer fix: 1. run_agent.py — Fallback heuristic: when a 400 error has a very short generic message AND the session is large (>40% of context or >80 messages), treat it as a probable context overflow and trigger compression instead of aborting. 2. run_agent.py + gateway/run.py — Don't persist failed messages: when the agent returns failed=True before generating any response, skip writing the user's message to the transcript/DB. This prevents the session from growing on each failure. 3. gateway/run.py — Smarter error messages: detect context-overflow failures and suggest /compact or /reset specifically, instead of a generic 'try again' that will fail identically. * fix(skills): detect prompt injection patterns and block cache file reads Adds two security layers to prevent prompt injection via skills hub cache files (#1558): 1. read_file: blocks direct reads of ~/.hermes/skills/.hub/ directory (index-cache, catalog files). The 3.5MB clawhub_catalog_v1.json was the original injection vector — untrusted skill descriptions in the catalog contained adversarial text that the model executed. 2. skill_view: warns when skills are loaded from outside the trusted ~/.hermes/skills/ directory, and detects common injection patterns in skill content ("ignore previous instructions", "<system>", etc.). Cherry-picked from PR #1562 by ygd58. --------- Co-authored-by: buray <ygd58@users.noreply.github.com>
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