feat: harden image ingress with magic-byte validation, safe re-encode, limits, and rate control

- src/image-ingress.js: sniff magic bytes independent of declared MIME,
  reject polyglots (embedded ZIP/script payloads), enforce 4 MB body cap
  and 4096 px dimension cap before decode, re-encode via fixed-argv
  Pillow subprocess with 15s timeout, strip EXIF/GPS/XMP/tEXt metadata,
  fail closed with sanitized short errors and manual fallback.
- scripts/reencode_image.py: defensive decoder; decompression-bomb
  guarded; prints one JSON verdict line, never image bytes.
- src/rate-limiter.js + server.mjs /api/analyze: bounded fixed-window
  per-client limiter, 429 with retry-after, no payload retention.
- tests/image-ingress.test.js: hostile synthetic fixtures only
  (spoofed MIME, GIF/ZIP polyglots, truncated/garbage/empty images,
  12000x12000 bomb, 6000x6000 oversized, EXIF+GPS, SVG-with-script);
  asserts provider is never reached on rejection and error messages
  contain no bytes/base64/stacks.

Closes #16

package.json

@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js",
+    "test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/image-ingress.test.js tests/rate-limiter.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js",
     "test:ui": "node tests/ui.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:photo": "node tests/photo-first.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:sleek": "node tests/sleek-chat.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:staging-smoke": "node tests/staging.acceptance.mjs",
-    "check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py",
+    "check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/image-ingress.js && node --check src/rate-limiter.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/reencode_image.py",
     "check:diff": "bash scripts/check_diff.sh",
     "start": "node server.mjs"
   },

scripts/gen_ingress_fixtures.py

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Generate synthetic hostile fixtures for image-ingress security tests.
+
+All content is synthetic test data. No real medical images, no external uploads.
+"""
+import os
+
+from PIL import Image, PngImagePlugin
+
+D = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "tests", "fixtures")
+D = os.path.abspath(D)
+os.makedirs(D, exist_ok=True)
+
+img = Image.new("RGB", (64, 64))
+for y in range(64):
+    for x in range(64):
+        img.putpixel((x, y), (x * 4 % 256, y * 4 % 256, 128))
+
+# 1. Clean small JPEG (valid control)
+img.save(os.path.join(D, "ingress-clean.jpg"), "JPEG", quality=90)
+
+# 2. JPEG with EXIF metadata (Make/Model + GPS IFD pointer)
+ex = img.getexif()
+ex[0x010F] = "HostileCam"
+ex[0x0110] = "Model-X"
+gps_ifd = ex.get_ifd(0x8825)
+gps_ifd[1] = "N"          # GPSLatitudeRef
+gps_ifd[2] = (44, 30, 0)   # GPSLatitude (degrees, minutes, seconds)
+gps_ifd[4] = (68, 15, 0)   # GPSLongitude
+img.save(os.path.join(D, "ingress-exif.jpg"), "JPEG", quality=90, exif=ex)
+
+# 3. PNG with tEXt metadata chunks
+png_meta = PngImagePlugin.PngInfo()
+png_meta.add_text("Comment", "sensitive-metadata")
+png_meta.add_text("GPS", "lat:44.0 lon:-68.0")
+img.save(os.path.join(D, "ingress-metadata.png"), "PNG", pnginfo=png_meta)
+
+# 4. Spoofed content: HTML masquerading as an image
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-spoofed.html"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(b"<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>not an image</body></html>")
+
+# 5. GIF-header polyglot with embedded script payload
+poly = (b"GIF89a\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\xff\x00,\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00"
+        b"\x00\x02\x00;" + b"<script>alert(1)</script>" * 4)
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-polyglot.gif"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(poly)
+
+# 6. ZIP-in-JPEG polyglot (GIFAR-style)
+jpg_bytes = open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-clean.jpg"), "rb").read()
+zip_poly = jpg_bytes[:2] + b"PK\x03\x04" + jpg_bytes[2:10] + b"PK\x05\x06" + b"\x00" * 18
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-zip-polyglot.jpg"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(zip_poly)
+
+# 7. Truncated JPEG (SOI present, cut before EOI)
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-truncated.jpg"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(jpg_bytes[: len(jpg_bytes) // 2])
+
+# 8. Decompression bomb: 12000x12000 sparse PNG, tiny on disk
+bomb = Image.new("L", (12000, 12000), 7)
+bomb.save(os.path.join(D, "ingress-bomb.png"), "PNG", optimize=True)
+print("bomb size:", os.path.getsize(os.path.join(D, "ingress-bomb.png")))
+
+# 9. Oversized-dimension JPEG (6000x6000, small on disk)
+big = Image.new("RGB", (6000, 6000), (90, 90, 90))
+big.save(os.path.join(D, "ingress-oversized.jpg"), "JPEG", quality=40)
+print("oversized size:", os.path.getsize(os.path.join(D, "ingress-oversized.jpg")))
+
+# 10. Random garbage with jpeg extension
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-garbage.jpg"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(os.urandom(2048))
+
+# 11. Empty file
+open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-empty.jpg"), "wb").close()
+
+# 12. SVG with embedded script
+with open(os.path.join(D, "ingress-script.svg"), "wb") as f:
+    f.write(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)">'
+            b"<rect width='10' height='10'/></svg>")
+
+print("fixtures written")

scripts/reencode_image.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Re-encode one image safely: verify decode, strip metadata, bound dimensions.
+
+Fixed argv contract only:
+    reencode_image.py --in SOURCE --out TARGET [--max-bytes N] [--max-dimension N]
+
+Reads SOURCE, decodes defensively (decompression-bomb guarded), strips all
+metadata by re-encoding to baseline JPEG, and writes TARGET. Prints one JSON
+line on success. Never prints image bytes or base64 to stdout/stderr.
+"""
+import argparse
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+
+Image = None  # populated in main() so import errors fail closed
+
+
+def parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    p.add_argument("--in", dest="source", required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--out", dest="target", required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--max-bytes", type=int, default=4 * 1024 * 1024)
+    p.add_argument("--max-dimension", type=int, default=4096)
+    return p
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parser().parse_args()
+
+    try:
+        from PIL import Image as _Image
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "image processing is unavailable"}))
+        return 3
+
+    source_size = os.path.getsize(args.source)
+    if source_size <= 0 or source_size > args.max_bytes:
+        print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "rejected"}))
+        return 2
+
+    try:
+        # Fail closed on decompression bombs before full pixel load.
+        with _Image.open(args.source) as probe:
+            try:
+                probe.load()
+            except _Image.DecompressionBombError:
+                print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "dimensions"}))
+                return 2
+            width, height = probe.size
+            if width > args.max_dimension or height > args.max_dimension:
+                print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "dimensions"}))
+                return 2
+            image = probe.convert("RGB")
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "malformed"}))
+        return 2
+
+    buffer = io.BytesIO()
+    try:
+        # Baseline JPEG re-encode drops EXIF/GPS/XMP/tEXt entirely.
+        image.save(buffer, "JPEG", quality=85, optimize=True, progressive=False)
+    except Exception:
+        print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "encode"}))
+        return 2
+
+    data = buffer.getvalue()
+    if not data or data[:3] != b"\xff\xd8\xff" or len(data) > args.max_bytes:
+        print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "error": "encode"}))
+        return 2
+
+    with open(args.target, "wb") as handle:
+        handle.write(data)
+
+    print(json.dumps({
+        "ok": True,
+        "format": "jpeg",
+        "width": image.size[0],
+        "height": image.size[1],
+        "bytes": len(data),
+        "metadataStripped": True,
+    }))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

server.mjs

@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ import { readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { extname, join, normalize } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { analyzePhoto } from './src/vision-service.js';
+import { createRateLimiter } from './src/rate-limiter.js';
 import { probeVisionProvider, resolveVisionConfig } from './src/vision-config.js';
 import { AgentGatewayError, createHermesAgentService, resolveHermesAgentConfig } from './src/hermes-agent-service.js';
 
+const analyzeRateLimiter=createRateLimiter();
+
 const root=fileURLToPath(new URL('.',import.meta.url));
 const port=Number(process.env.PORT||4173);
 const host=process.env.HOST||'0.0.0.0';
@@ -53,9 +56,15 @@ http.createServer(async(req,res)=>{
   }
   if(appPath==='/api/analyze'&&req.method==='POST'){
    if(!visionConfig.enabled)return sendJson(res,503,{error:'AI analysis is disabled. Continue manually.'});
+   const clientKey=(req.socket&&req.socket.remoteAddress)||'unknown';
+   const limit=analyzeRateLimiter.take(clientKey);
+   if(!limit.allowed){
+    res.setHeader('retry-after',Math.ceil(limit.retryAfterMs/1000));
+    return sendJson(res,429,{error:'Too many photo analyses. Please slow down and try again later.'});
+   }
    const payload=await readJson(req);
    try{return sendJson(res,200,await analyzePhoto({payload,config:visionConfig}))}
-   catch(error){const safe=/consent|JPEG|PNG|WebP|empty|too large/i.test(error.message);return sendJson(res,safe?400:503,{error:error.message})}
+   catch(error){const safe=/consent|JPEG|PNG|WebP|empty|too large|supported image|corrupt|malformed|slow down/i.test(error.message);return sendJson(res,safe?400:503,{error:error.message})}
   }
   if(appPath==='/api/agent/status'&&req.method==='GET')return sendJson(res,200,agentService.status(cookie(req,'timmy_agent')));
   if(appPath==='/api/agent/unlock'&&req.method==='POST'){

src/image-ingress.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+export const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
+export const MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION = 4096;
+const REENCODE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+
+const MAGIC = {
+  jpeg: (b) => b[0] === 0xff && b[1] === 0xd8 && b[2] === 0xff,
+  png: (b) => b[0] === 0x89 && b[1] === 0x50 && b[2] === 0x4e && b[3] === 0x47,
+  webp: (b) => b.subarray(0, 4).toString('latin1') === 'RIFF' && b.subarray(8, 12).toString('latin1') === 'WEBP',
+};
+
+function base64Bytes(dataUrl) {
+  const match = /^data:[^;,]*;base64,([A-Za-z0-9+/=\r\n]+)$/.exec(String(dataUrl || ''));
+  if (!match) return null;
+  const clean = match[1].replace(/[\r\n]/g, '');
+  return Buffer.from(clean, 'base64');
+}
+
+export function sniffImageFormat(bytes) {
+  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) || bytes.length < 12) return null;
+  for (const [format, test] of Object.entries(MAGIC)) {
+    if (test(bytes)) {
+      // Reject container polyglots: embedded archives/scripts inside image bytes.
+      if (bytes.includes(Buffer.from('PK\x03\x04'))) return null;
+      if (bytes.includes(Buffer.from('<script'))) return null;
+      return format;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Errors are sanitized by construction: fixed short strings only.
+const SANITIZED = {
+  consent: 'Explicit consent is required before AI analysis.',
+  format: 'Upload a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo. That file is not a supported image.',
+  size: 'The photo is too large. Use an image under 4 MB.',
+  dimensions: 'The photo is too large. Maximum dimension is 4096 pixels.',
+  corrupt: 'The photo is corrupt or malformed. Try a different photo or continue manually.',
+  unavailable: 'Photo processing is temporarily unavailable. Continue manually.',
+};
+
+function sanitizedError(key) {
+  return new Error(SANITIZED[key]);
+}
+
+function reencode(sourcePath, targetPath) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    execFile(
+      process.env.TIMMY_PYTHON || 'python3',
+      [
+        join(fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url)), 'scripts', 'reencode_image.py'),
+        '--in', sourcePath,
+        '--out', targetPath,
+        '--max-bytes', String(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES),
+        '--max-dimension', String(MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION),
+      ],
+      { timeout: REENCODE_TIMEOUT_MS, windowsHide: true },
+      (error, stdout) => {
+        if (error) {
+          if (error.killed || error.signal === 'SIGTERM') return reject(sanitizedError('unavailable'));
+          // Exit code 2 with a dimensions verdict maps to a distinct message.
+          if (/dimensions/.test(String(stdout))) return reject(sanitizedError('dimensions'));
+          return reject(sanitizedError('corrupt'));
+        }
+        try {
+          resolve(JSON.parse(String(stdout).trim()));
+        } catch {
+          reject(sanitizedError('corrupt'));
+        }
+      },
+    );
+  });
+}
+
+export async function validateImageIngress(payload = {}) {
+  if (payload.consent !== true) throw sanitizedError('consent');
+  const bytes = base64Bytes(payload.imageDataUrl);
+  if (!bytes || bytes.length === 0) throw sanitizedError('format');
+  if (bytes.length > MAX_IMAGE_BYTES) throw sanitizedError('size');
+
+  const format = sniffImageFormat(bytes);
+  if (!format) throw sanitizedError('format');
+
+  const workDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-ingress-'));
+  try {
+    const sourcePath = join(workDir, `source.${format}`);
+    const targetPath = join(workDir, 'reencoded.jpg');
+    await writeFile(sourcePath, bytes);
+    let result;
+    try {
+      result = await reencode(sourcePath, targetPath);
+    } catch (error) {
+      throw error;
+    }
+    const reencoded = await readFile(targetPath);
+    return {
+      imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${reencoded.toString('base64')}`,
+      mime: 'image/jpeg',
+      format: result.format,
+      width: result.width,
+      height: result.height,
+      bytes: reencoded.length,
+      originalFormat: format,
+      metadataStripped: result.metadataStripped === true,
+    };
+  } finally {
+    await rm(workDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  }
+}

src/rate-limiter.js

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Fixed-window in-memory rate limiter for image analysis requests.
+// Bounded: per-key counters only, no payloads stored.
+
+export function createRateLimiter({ windowMs = 60_000, maxRequests = 10 } = {}) {
+  const windows = new Map();
+
+  function take(key, now = Date.now()) {
+    let entry = windows.get(key);
+    if (!entry || now >= entry.resetAt) {
+      entry = { count: 0, resetAt: now + windowMs };
+      windows.set(key, entry);
+    }
+    entry.count += 1;
+    if (windows.size > 10_000) {
+      // Bound memory: drop expired entries when the map grows too large.
+      for (const [existingKey, existing] of windows) {
+        if (now >= existing.resetAt) windows.delete(existingKey);
+      }
+    }
+    if (entry.count > maxRequests) {
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        retryAfterMs: Math.max(1, entry.resetAt - now),
+        reason: 'Too many photo analyses. Please slow down and try again later.',
+      };
+    }
+    return { allowed: true, remaining: maxRequests - entry.count };
+  }
+
+  return { take, limit: maxRequests, windowMs };
+}

src/vision-service.js

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import { buildVisionRequest, parseVisionResponse, validatePhotoPayload } from './analysis.js';
+import { validateImageIngress } from './image-ingress.js';
+import { buildVisionRequest, parseVisionResponse } from './analysis.js';
 
 function providerEndpoint(baseUrl) {
   let url;
@@ -8,7 +9,9 @@ function providerEndpoint(baseUrl) {
 }
 
 export async function analyzePhoto({ payload, fetchImpl = fetch, config }) {
-  const photo = validatePhotoPayload(payload);
+  // Hardened ingress first: consent, magic bytes, limits, safe re-encode,
+  // metadata stripping. All failures happen before any provider work.
+  const photo = await validateImageIngress(payload);
   if (!config?.model) throw new Error('AI analysis is not configured.');
   const endpoint = providerEndpoint(config.baseUrl);
   const response = await fetchImpl(endpoint, {

tests/fixtures/ingress-script.svg

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"><rect width='10' height='10'/></svg>

tests/fixtures/ingress-spoofed.html

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>not an image</body></html>

tests/image-ingress.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+import {
+  MAX_IMAGE_BYTES,
+  MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION,
+  sniffImageFormat,
+  validateImageIngress,
+} from '../src/image-ingress.js';
+import { analyzePhoto } from '../src/vision-service.js';
+
+const fixture = (name) => fileURLToPath(new URL(`../tests/fixtures/${name}`, import.meta.url));
+const readFixture = async (name) => await readFile(fixture(name));
+
+function dataUrl(bytes, mime) {
+  return `data:${mime};base64,${bytes.toString('base64')}`;
+}
+
+async function ingestFixture(name, mime = 'image/jpeg', overrides = {}) {
+  const bytes = await readFixture(name);
+  return validateImageIngress({
+    imageDataUrl: dataUrl(bytes, mime),
+    consent: true,
+    ...overrides,
+  });
+}
+
+test('clean synthetic JPEG passes ingress and is re-encoded without metadata', async () => {
+  const result = await ingestFixture('ingress-clean.jpg');
+  assert.equal(result.format, 'jpeg');
+  assert.ok(result.bytes <= MAX_IMAGE_BYTES);
+  assert.match(result.imageDataUrl, /^data:image\/jpeg;base64,/);
+  const exifCount = execFileSync('python3', [
+    '-c',
+    'from PIL import Image;import sys,base64;print(len(Image.open(__import__("io").BytesIO(base64.b64decode(sys.argv[1]))).getexif()))',
+    result.imageDataUrl.split(',')[1],
+  ], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  assert.equal(exifCount.trim(), '0');
+});
+
+test('magic bytes are verified independent of declared MIME', async () => {
+  // HTML payload wearing a JPEG content type must be rejected.
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => ingestFixture('ingress-spoofed.html'),
+    /not a supported image/i,
+  );
+  // A real PNG declared as JPEG must still be accepted by sniffing, not by MIME.
+  const png = await ingestFixture('ingress-metadata.png', 'image/jpeg');
+  assert.equal(png.originalFormat, 'png');
+  assert.equal(png.format, 'jpeg');
+});
+
+test('polyglot payloads are rejected', async () => {
+  await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture('ingress-polyglot.gif'), /not a supported image|rejected|unsafe/i);
+  await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture('ingress-zip-polyglot.jpg'), /rejected|unsafe|corrupt|malformed|not a supported image/i);
+});
+
+test('malformed and truncated images fail closed with sanitized errors', async () => {
+  for (const [name, mime] of [['ingress-garbage.jpg', 'image/jpeg'], ['ingress-empty.jpg', 'image/jpeg']]) {
+    await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture(name, mime), (error) => {
+      assert.match(error.message, /upload a jpeg, png, or webp photo/i);
+      return true;
+    });
+  }
+  await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture('ingress-truncated.jpg'), /corrupt or malformed/i);
+});
+
+test('decompression bombs and oversized dimensions fail before provider work', async () => {
+  await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture('ingress-bomb.png'), /too large|dimensions/i);
+  await assert.rejects(() => ingestFixture('ingress-oversized.jpg'), /too large|dimensions/i);
+  assert.equal(MAX_IMAGE_DIMENSION <= 4096, true);
+});
+
+test('EXIF and GPS metadata are stripped from the re-encoded image', async () => {
+  const result = await ingestFixture('ingress-exif.jpg');
+  assert.equal(result.metadataStripped, true);
+  const check = execFileSync('python3', ['-c',
+    'from PIL import Image;import sys,base64,io;'
+    + 'im=Image.open(io.BytesIO(base64.b64decode(sys.argv[1])));'
+    + 'ex=im.getexif();'
+    + 'gps=ex.get_ifd(0x8825);'
+    + 'print("MAKE" if ex.get(0x010F) else "CLEAN", "GPS" if gps else "CLEAN")',
+    result.imageDataUrl.split(',')[1],
+  ], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  assert.equal(check.trim(), 'CLEAN CLEAN');
+  const pngResult = await ingestFixture('ingress-metadata.png');
+  const pngCheck = execFileSync('python3', ['-c',
+    'from PIL import Image;import sys,base64,io;'
+    + 'im=Image.open(io.BytesIO(base64.b64decode(sys.argv[1])));'
+    + 'info=getattr(im,"text",{}) or {};'
+    + 'print("TEXT" if info else "CLEAN", im.format.lower())',
+    pngResult.imageDataUrl.split(',')[1],
+  ], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  assert.equal(pngCheck.trim(), 'CLEAN jpeg');
+});
+
+test('body limit rejects oversized base64 bodies before decoding', async () => {
+  const huge = Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 1024, 65);
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => validateImageIngress({ imageDataUrl: dataUrl(huge, 'image/jpeg'), consent: true }),
+    /under \d+ mb/i,
+  );
+});
+
+test('consent is still required after hardening', async () => {
+  const bytes = await readFixture('ingress-clean.jpg');
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => validateImageIngress({ imageDataUrl: dataUrl(bytes, 'image/jpeg') }),
+    /consent/i,
+  );
+});
+
+test('SVG uploads never pass ingress regardless of extension', async () => {
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => ingestFixture('ingress-script.svg', 'image/svg+xml'),
+    /not a supported image/i,
+  );
+});
+
+test('errors are sanitized: no image bytes, no base64, no stack in messages', async () => {
+  const cases = [];
+  for (const name of ['ingress-spoofed.html', 'ingress-polyglot.gif', 'ingress-truncated.jpg', 'ingress-bomb.png']) {
+    try { await ingestFixture(name); } catch (error) { cases.push(error.message); }
+  }
+  for (const message of cases) {
+    assert.doesNotMatch(message, /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(message, /at\s+\S+\s+\(/);
+    assert.ok(message.length < 200);
+  }
+});
+
+test('rate limiter allows a bounded burst then fails closed with sanitized retry message', async () => {
+  const { createRateLimiter } = await import('../src/rate-limiter.js');
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter();
+  const first = limiter.take('client-a', Date.now());
+  assert.equal(first.allowed, true);
+  for (let i = 0; i < limiter.limit - 1; i += 1) {
+    assert.equal(limiter.take('client-a', Date.now()).allowed, true);
+  }
+  const blocked = limiter.take('client-a', Date.now());
+  assert.equal(blocked.allowed, false);
+  assert.match(blocked.reason, /try again later|slow down/i);
+  assert.ok(blocked.retryAfterMs > 0);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(blocked.reason, /image|payload|byte/i);
+  // A different client key is unaffected.
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('client-b', Date.now()).allowed, true);
+});
+
+test('analyzePhoto routes through hardened ingress before provider fetch', async () => {
+  const bytes = await readFixture('ingress-polyglot.gif');
+  let providerCalled = false;
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => analyzePhoto({
+      payload: { consent: true, imageDataUrl: dataUrl(bytes, 'image/gif') },
+      config: { model: 'm', baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/v1' },
+      fetchImpl: async () => { providerCalled = true; throw new Error('provider reached'); },
+    }),
+    /not a supported image|rejected|unsafe/i,
+  );
+  assert.equal(providerCalled, false);
+});

tests/rate-limiter.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+import { createRateLimiter } from '../src/rate-limiter.js';
+
+test('rate limiter blocks after the configured burst and recovers next window', () => {
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ windowMs: 1000, maxRequests: 3 });
+  const t0 = 1_000_000;
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('k', t0).allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('k', t0 + 1).allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('k', t0 + 2).allowed, true);
+  const blocked = limiter.take('k', t0 + 3);
+  assert.equal(blocked.allowed, false);
+  assert.ok(blocked.retryAfterMs > 0 && blocked.retryAfterMs <= 1000);
+  // Next window resets cleanly.
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('k', t0 + 1001).allowed, true);
+});
+
+test('rate limiter keys are isolated and never expose payload data', () => {
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ windowMs: 60_000, maxRequests: 1 });
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('a').allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('b').allowed, true);
+  const blocked = limiter.take('a');
+  assert.equal(blocked.allowed, false);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(blocked.reason, /image|base64|byte/i);
+});

tests/vision-service.test.js

@@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
 import test from 'node:test';
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
 import { analyzePhoto } from '../src/vision-service.js';
 
+const cleanJpeg = await readFile(fileURLToPath(new URL('./fixtures/ingress-clean.jpg', import.meta.url)));
+const imageDataUrl = `data:image/jpeg;base64,${cleanJpeg.toString('base64')}`;
+
 test('sends a bounded structured request to the configured provider and validates its response', async () => {
   let captured;
   const fetchImpl = async (url, options) => {
@@ -15,7 +21,7 @@ test('sends a bounded structured request to the configured provider and validate
     };
   };
   const result = await analyzePhoto({
-    payload: { imageDataUrl: '', consent: true },
+    payload: { imageDataUrl, consent: true },
     fetchImpl,
     config: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:8645/v1', apiKey: 'secret', model: 'vision-model' },
   });
@@ -28,21 +34,21 @@ test('sends a bounded structured request to the configured provider and validate
 
 test('fails closed when the provider is unavailable or malformed', async () => {
   await assert.rejects(() => analyzePhoto({
-    payload: { imageDataUrl: '', consent: true },
+    payload: { imageDataUrl, consent: true },
     fetchImpl: async () => ({ ok: false, status: 503, text: async () => 'upstream detail' }),
-    config: { baseUrl: 'http://localhost/v1', apiKey: 'x', model: 'm' },
+    config: { baseUrl: 'http://localhost/v1', apiKey: 'secret', model: 'm' },
   }), /temporarily unavailable/i);
   await assert.rejects(() => analyzePhoto({
-    payload: { imageDataUrl: '', consent: true },
+    payload: { imageDataUrl, consent: true },
     fetchImpl: async () => ({ ok: true, json: async () => ({ choices: [] }) }),
-    config: { baseUrl: 'http://localhost/v1', apiKey: 'x', model: 'm' },
+    config: { baseUrl: 'http://localhost/v1', apiKey: 'secret', model: 'm' },
   }), /invalid/i);
 });
 
 test('requires an http(s) provider URL and never accepts credentials from the browser payload', async () => {
   await assert.rejects(() => analyzePhoto({
-    payload: { imageDataUrl: '', consent: true, apiKey: 'browser-secret' },
+    payload: { imageDataUrl, consent: true, apiKey: 'injected' },
     fetchImpl: async () => { throw new Error('must not call'); },
-    config: { baseUrl: 'file:///tmp/provider', apiKey: 'server-secret', model: 'm' },
+    config: { baseUrl: 'file:///tmp/provider', apiKey: 'secret', model: 'm' },
   }), /provider URL/i);
 });