Files
timmy bc64055196
Quality gates / quality (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Merge main into the #16 ingress branch and close what the RC gate caught
Brings #82 up to today's `main` (1bbcc10) and resolves the two conflicts as ordered
unions: `package.json` `test`/`check:syntax` and the release builder's syntax allow-list
and evidence keys. Both sides only appended, so nothing was dropped.

Verifying the merge against main's RC attack suite (#40) found two real defects, each
fixed test-first:

- An oversized body destroyed the socket mid-upload, so the caller saw `fetch failed`
  instead of the 413 it had already earned, and `security_attack_suite.mjs` could not
  complete at all. New test in `tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js` failed with
  `fetch failed` before the fix; `src/http-body.js` now keeps draining without buffering
  and refuses on `end`, so the ceiling still holds and the refusal is readable.
- #16's per-caller budget turned the suite's own load phase into 8/8 429s, which would
  have published refusals as analysis latency. The load phase now runs against a second
  permissive target and the suite refuses to publish a load figure if any sample was
  refused. `buildReport` also publishes `evidenceVerified`, so the verdict is
  re-derivable from the report — asserted by #40's acceptance test, which only trips once
  the verdict is GO.

Evidence on the merged tree: `npm test` 277/277, `test:security-attack` 8/8, the RC attack
suite returns VERDICT: GO with both P0 ingress cases passing (main is BLOCKED on exactly
those two), 14 browser acceptance suites green, and the release demo records end to end
(8:13, 97 captions) including the on-camera refusal scene.
2026-10-31 11:17:13 +00:00

80 lines
2.5 KiB
JavaScript

// Bounded request-body reading for the API boundary (issue #16).
//
// Three limits have to fail before any provider work starts: the byte ceiling, a deadline for a body
// that never arrives, and JSON validity. All three refuse with a client-visible status and a fixed
// message; none of them logs or returns the body.
const COPY = Object.freeze({
too_large: [413, 'Request is too large.'],
invalid_json: [400, 'Invalid JSON request.'],
body_timeout: [408, 'The request took too long to arrive. Try again.'],
});
export class BodyError extends Error {
constructor(code) {
const [status, message] = COPY[code] || COPY.invalid_json;
super(message);
this.name = 'BodyError';
this.code = code;
this.status = status;
}
}
export function readJsonBody(req, { maxBytes = 6 * 1024 * 1024, timeoutMs = 15_000 } = {}) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let settled = false;
let tooLarge = false;
let size = 0;
const chunks = [];
const finish = callback => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
clearTimeout(deadline);
req.removeListener('data', onData);
req.removeListener('end', onEnd);
req.removeListener('error', onError);
callback();
};
const deadline = setTimeout(() => {
finish(() => {
// Stop reading and let the caller answer 408; the server destroys the socket once the
// refusal is written, so a half-read body cannot be held open indefinitely.
req.pause?.();
reject(new BodyError('body_timeout'));
});
}, timeoutMs);
function onData(chunk) {
if (settled) return;
// Past the ceiling the body is already refused: keep draining it without buffering so the
// caller can still read the 413. Destroying the socket here would surface as "fetch failed"
// and leave the caller with no status to act on.
if (tooLarge) return;
size += chunk.length;
if (size > maxBytes) {
tooLarge = true;
chunks.length = 0;
return;
}
chunks.push(chunk);
}
function onEnd() {
finish(() => {
if (tooLarge) return reject(new BodyError('too_large'));
try {
resolve(JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')));
} catch {
reject(new BodyError('invalid_json'));
}
});
}
function onError(error) {
finish(() => reject(error));
}
req.on('data', onData);
req.on('end', onEnd);
req.on('error', onError);
});
}