timmy-talking-turd/tests/release-dashboard-cli.test.js
Timmy 9c9286b59f
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Quality gates / quality (pull_request) Successful in 1m53s
fix(ops): harden release observability against hostile review findings
Strict RED-GREEN TDD over PR review blockers; every fix landed test-first
with the failing run observed before implementation.

- failureClass: closed privacy-safe vocabulary (worker.unavailable,
  vision.timeout, model.error) under strict dotted slug grammar. Newlines,
  carriage returns, ANSI/control characters, secrets, medical text, SQL,
  oversized values, and off-vocabulary classes fail the entire evidence
  file closed; nothing hostile can reach rendering.
- depth: added to the counter vocabulary so queue.backlog can fire at all;
  bounded counters (0..1,000,000, integer) fail closed above the ceiling.
  9/10/11 edge tests pin silent/at-threshold/above-threshold; backlog is
  suppressed while worker.outage pages (depth is residual from the same
  incident) and returns the moment the page clears.
- drill integrity: the pre-drill baseline is now read from the fixture
  itself and must be genuinely healthy; already-outaged fixtures are
  refused with exit 2 without touching their switch, and a flip that
  produces no real healthy-to-outage transition reports DRILL FAIL
  instead of passing vacuously.
- manual fallback: deterministic contract replaces the tautology.
  available+none-required when healthy, available+local-journal under any
  degradation, unavailable+app-down only when the app boundary itself is
  down.
- fail-closed telemetry: evidence missing any of the four boundaries is
  rejected; unknown statuses surface as a warn telemetry.gap alert with
  owner/threshold/runbook instead of passing as healthy (documented in
  the runbook inventory).
- drill origin: validateLoopbackOrigin gates every network path before
  any fetch. Only a bare http://127.0.0.1:<port> URL passes; credentials,
  DNS names, hex/decimal/percent-encoded IP encodings, IPv6 forms, paths,
  queries, fragments, and non-http schemes are refused pre-contact
  (raw-string grammar gate plus parse round-trip, because the URL parser
  canonicalizes hostile encodings).
- terminal safety: controlSafe() strips C0/C1 control characters from all
  dynamically produced CLI output so hostile evidence paths cannot inject
  ANSI escapes into a terminal.

Gates: npm test 98/98, check:syntax, npm audit (0 vulns), check:diff,
deploy_staging status read-only; 30 adversarial probes against sanitizer,
alert edges, and live loopback CLI all pass. No merge, no deploy.
2026-08-22 21:43:18 +00:00

235 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript

import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import http from 'node:http';
const root = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
let nextPort = 43600;
const healthyEvidence = {
schemaVersion: 1,
releaseTag: 'daily-2026-08-22.1',
commit: 'ca31e6d38bec649407f63880504554c59f2878ae',
generatedAtUtc: '2026-08-22T12:00:00Z',
checks: [
{ id: 'app.healthz', boundary: 'app', status: 'pass', latencyMs: 12 },
{ id: 'api.analyze', boundary: 'api', status: 'pass', counters: { ok: 40, fail: 0 } },
{ id: 'queue.depth', boundary: 'queue', status: 'pass', counters: { depth: 2, ok: 30, fail: 0 } },
{ id: 'model.inference', boundary: 'model', status: 'pass', latencyMs: 900, counters: { ok: 25, fail: 0, abstain: 3 } },
],
};
function runCli(args) {
return new Promise(resolve => {
const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['scripts/release_dashboard.mjs', ...args], {
cwd: root,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
env: process.env,
});
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
child.stdout.on('data', chunk => { stdout += chunk; });
child.stderr.on('data', chunk => { stderr += chunk; });
const timer = setTimeout(() => child.kill('SIGKILL'), 15_000);
child.on('close', code => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve({ code, stdout, stderr });
});
});
}
test('cli renders boundary dashboard with zero alerts from sanitized evidence file', async () => {
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-obs-'));
try {
const evidencePath = join(dir, 'evidence.json');
await writeFile(evidencePath, JSON.stringify(healthyEvidence));
const result = await runCli(['--evidence', evidencePath]);
assert.equal(result.code, 0, result.stderr);
assert.match(result.stdout, /RELEASE OBSERVABILITY DASHBOARD/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /release daily-2026-08-22\.1 · commit ca31e6d38bec/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /app\s+1\/1 pass/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /queue\s+1\/1 pass/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /model\s+1\/1 pass/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /manual fallback: available/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /alerts \(0\)/);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stdout, /token|cookie|session|password/i);
} finally {
await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('cli exits nonzero on unsanitizable evidence and never echoes its contents', async () => {
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-obs-'));
try {
const hostile = {
...healthyEvidence,
sessionToken: 'sess_live_supersecret99',
checks: [{ id: 'x', boundary: 'nope-boundary', status: 'weird' }],
};
const evidencePath = join(dir, 'hostile.json');
await writeFile(evidencePath, JSON.stringify(hostile));
const result = await runCli(['--evidence', evidencePath]);
assert.equal(result.code, 2);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stderr + result.stdout, /supersecret/);
} finally {
await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('cli output stays control-safe when rejected evidence paths carry ANSI escapes', async () => {
const evilPath = join(tmpdir(), `timmy-\x1b[31mred\rbell\x07.json`);
const result = await runCli(['--evidence', evilPath]);
assert.equal(result.code, 2);
const emitted = result.stdout + result.stderr;
assert.doesNotMatch(emitted, /\x1b/, 'ANSI escape reached the terminal');
assert.doesNotMatch(emitted, /\x07/, 'bell control character reached the terminal');
assert.doesNotMatch(emitted, /\r/, 'carriage return reached the terminal');
});
test('successful dashboard rendering emits no control characters besides newlines', async () => {
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-obs-'));
try {
const evidencePath = join(dir, 'evidence.json');
await writeFile(evidencePath, JSON.stringify(healthyEvidence));
const result = await runCli(['--evidence', evidencePath]);
assert.equal(result.code, 0, result.stderr);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stdout, /[\u0000-\u0009\u000B-\u001F\u007F-\u009F]/, 'control character reached the terminal');
} finally {
await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
async function startDrillServer({ startDown = false, flipHasNoEffect = false } = {}) {
const port = nextPort++;
const origin = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
let workerUp = !startDown;
let outageSwitchCount = 0;
const app = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url, origin);
if (url.pathname === '/drill/outage' && req.method === 'POST') {
outageSwitchCount += 1;
if (!flipHasNoEffect) workerUp = false;
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
return;
}
if (url.pathname === '/api/healthz') {
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, release: 'daily-2026-08-22.1', commit: 'ca31e6d38bec649407f63880504554c59f2878ae', visionEnabled: false, agentEnabled: false }));
return;
}
if (url.pathname === '/api/drill/checks') {
const appCheck = { id: 'app.healthz', boundary: 'app', status: 'pass', latencyMs: 12 };
const checks = workerUp
? [
appCheck,
{ id: 'api.analyze', boundary: 'api', status: 'pass', counters: { ok: 5, fail: 0 } },
{ id: 'queue.depth', boundary: 'queue', status: 'pass', counters: { depth: 1, ok: 5, fail: 0 } },
{ id: 'model.inference', boundary: 'model', status: 'pass', latencyMs: 800, counters: { ok: 4, fail: 0 } },
]
: [
appCheck,
{ id: 'api.analyze', boundary: 'api', status: 'fail', failureClass: 'worker.unavailable' },
{ id: 'queue.depth', boundary: 'queue', status: 'fail', failureClass: 'worker.unavailable', counters: { depth: 17 } },
{ id: 'model.inference', boundary: 'model', status: 'fail', failureClass: 'worker.unavailable', counters: { timeout: 4 } },
];
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ checks }));
return;
}
res.writeHead(404, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
res.end('Not found');
});
await new Promise(resolve => app.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
return {
origin,
close: () => new Promise(resolve => app.close(() => resolve())),
get outageSwitchCount() { return outageSwitchCount; },
};
}
test('outage drill reads the genuine fixture baseline, flips once, and reports exactly one page alert plus manual fallback', async t => {
const server = await startDrillServer();
t.after(() => server.close());
const result = await runCli(['--drill-origin', server.origin]);
assert.equal(result.code, 0, result.stderr);
assert.match(result.stdout, /WORKER OUTAGE DRILL/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /pre-drill: healthy \(0 page alerts\)/i);
assert.equal(server.outageSwitchCount, 1, 'drill must flip the simulated switch exactly once');
assert.match(result.stdout, /post-outage: exactly 1 alert/i);
assert.match(result.stdout, /PAGE worker\.unavailable on daily-2026-08-22\.1/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /manual fallback: AVAILABLE — local journal remains usable/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /DRILL PASS/);
});
test('drill refuses to flip an already-outaged fixture and never touches its switch', async t => {
const server = await startDrillServer({ startDown: true });
t.after(() => server.close());
const result = await runCli(['--drill-origin', server.origin]);
assert.equal(result.code, 2, `expected refusal exit 2, got ${result.code}`);
assert.match(result.stderr, /not healthy/i);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stdout, /DRILL PASS/);
assert.equal(server.outageSwitchCount, 0, 'already-down fixture must not be flipped again');
});
test('drill fails when the flip produces no genuine healthy-to-outage transition', async t => {
const server = await startDrillServer({ flipHasNoEffect: true });
t.after(() => server.close());
const result = await runCli(['--drill-origin', server.origin]);
assert.equal(result.code, 1);
assert.match(result.stdout, /no outage observed after flip/i);
assert.match(result.stdout, /DRILL FAIL/);
assert.equal(server.outageSwitchCount, 1);
});
test('drill refuses a credentialed origin even when its loopback target is alive', async t => {
const server = await startDrillServer();
t.after(() => server.close());
const credentialed = `http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:${new URL(server.origin).port}`;
const result = await runCli(['--drill-origin', credentialed]);
assert.equal(result.code, 2, `expected refusal exit 2, got ${result.code}`);
assert.match(result.stderr, /drill origin rejected/i);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stdout, /DRILL PASS|WORKER OUTAGE DRILL/, 'hostile origin must never reach the drill');
assert.equal(server.outageSwitchCount, 0, 'credentialed origin must never touch the fixture');
});
test('drill-origin accepts only validated loopback HTTP and rejects every hostile form without contacting it', async () => {
const hostileOrigins = [
'https://127.0.0.1:43600',
'http://localhost:43600',
'ftp://127.0.0.1:43600',
'file:///etc/passwd',
'http://0x7f.0.0.1:43600',
'http://2130706433:43600',
'http://[::1]:43600',
'http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:43600',
'http://[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]:43600',
'http://127.0.0.2:43600',
'http://10.0.0.5:43600',
'http://example.com:43600',
'http://127%2E0%2E0%2E1:43600',
'http://127.0.0.1:43600/drill',
'http://127.0.0.1:43600/?next=1',
'//127.0.0.1:43600',
'127.0.0.1:43600',
'not a url at all',
'null',
];
for (const origin of hostileOrigins) {
const result = await runCli(['--drill-origin', origin]);
assert.equal(result.code, 2, `expected refusal exit 2 for origin ${JSON.stringify(origin)}`);
assert.match(result.stderr, /drill origin rejected/i, `origin must be rejected as an origin, not merely unreachable: ${JSON.stringify(origin)}`);
assert.doesNotMatch(result.stdout, /DRILL PASS|WORKER OUTAGE DRILL/, `hostile origin must never reach the drill: ${JSON.stringify(origin)}`);
}
});