Commit Graph

152 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
alexpaynex
5ffda673a3 Task #36: Push timmy-watch + security fix to Gitea main
Ran `bash scripts/push-to-gitea.sh` using the existing `.gitea-credentials`
file. The pre-push hook ran typecheck and lint across all workspace packages
(api-server, scripts, mockup-sandbox) — all passed clean.

Pushed range: abb8c50..b837094 → remote main
Repo: https://mm.tailb74b2d.ts.net/replit/token-gated-economy

Commits included in this push:
- Security fix: removed hardcoded TIMMY_TOKEN_SECRET and GITEA_URL from
  .replit [userenv.shared]; GITEA_URL moved to env vars, TIMMY_TOKEN_SECRET
  rotated and stored in Replit Secrets.
- New feature: scripts/src/timmy-watch.ts — zero-dependency WebSocket client
  that streams Timmy's live agent state, job events, payments, and chat to
  any terminal (tmux pane, Emacs shell/comint/vterm). Uses Node.js 24
  built-in WebSocket. Auto-reconnects with exponential backoff.
- scripts/package.json updated with `timmy-watch` npm script entry.

No code changes were made during this task — pure push of the already-committed checkpoint.
2026-03-19 23:24:11 +00:00
alexpaynex
b837094ed4 Add a live feed to view Timmy's internal state and agent activity
Introduces a new CLI script `timmy-watch` to establish a WebSocket connection and display real-time updates of Timmy's status, agent states, and recent events.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Commit-Checkpoint-Type: full_checkpoint
Replit-Commit-Event-Id: 56ce6fae-6759-4857-bf0c-606a96a71bdb
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 23:07:26 +00:00
alexpaynex
e58055d0b6 Saved progress at the end of the loop
Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 22:27:57 +00:00
alexpaynex
6590f0fc92 Update Vite version to ensure all installations are secure
Adjust the minimum Vite version in package.json to a patched release to prevent future installations of vulnerable versions.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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2026-03-19 22:24:15 +00:00
alexpaynex
039af78a76 Published your App
Replit-Commit-Author: Deployment
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Replit-Commit-Deployment-Build-Id: 17ea4c3d-b624-4430-9054-c0a4ad622897
Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 21:56:48 +00:00
Replit Agent
abb8c50f23 fix: replace import.meta.url with process.cwd() in testkit.ts
import.meta.url is undefined when esbuild bundles to CJS format
(format: 'cjs' in build.ts). fileURLToPath(undefined) throws
ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE which crashed the production server on startup.

Fix: drop the _dirname derivation entirely and resolve TIMMY_TEST_PLAN.md
relative to process.cwd(), which is always the workspace root in both:
- dev: tsx runs from workspace root
- production: pnpm --filter ... run start runs from workspace root

Also removes the now-unused 'dirname' and 'fileURLToPath' imports.

Verified: rebuilt dist/index.cjs — 0 import.meta.url references remain.
GET /api/testkit/plan returns HTTP 200 from the production bundle.
2026-03-19 21:52:24 +00:00
alexpaynex
9573718da5 Update test summary and improve module import for better portability
Modify the testkit route to prefer bare module imports for 'nostr-tools' and update the test summary output to include a total test count.

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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 21:16:48 +00:00
alexpaynex
6b6aa83e80 task/35: Testkit T25–T36 — Nostr identity + trust engine coverage (v2)
## 12 new tests (T25–T36) + stubs (T37–T40) added to testkit.ts

T25 — POST /identity/challenge: HTTP 200, nonce=64-char hex, expiresAt=ISO AND in future
      (future check: lexicographic ISO 8601 string comparison via `date -u`)
T26 — POST /identity/verify {}: HTTP 400, non-empty error
T27 — POST /identity/verify fake nonce: HTTP 401, error contains "Nonce not found"
T28 — GET /identity/me no header: HTTP 401, error contains "Missing"
T29 — GET /identity/me invalid token: HTTP 401 (Invalid/expired wording)
T30 — POST /sessions bad X-Nostr-Token: HTTP 401, no sessionId created
      (null-safe: jq returns literal "null" for absent fields — now treated as absent)
T31 — POST /jobs bad X-Nostr-Token: HTTP 401, "Invalid or expired"
T32 — POST /sessions anonymous: HTTP 201, trust_tier="anonymous", sessionId != "null"
T33 — POST /jobs anonymous: HTTP 201, trust_tier="anonymous", jobId != "null"
T34 — GET /jobs/:id (using T33_JOB_ID): HTTP 200, trust_tier non-null and "anonymous"
T35 — GET /sessions/:id (using T32_SESSION_ID): HTTP 200, trust_tier="anonymous"
T36 — Full challenge→sign→verify E2E: inline node CJS script; guarded under `set -e`:
      uses `T36_OUT=$(node ...) || T36_EXIT=$?` pattern to never abort the suite.
      tier=new, interactionCount=0, pubkey matches /identity/me — SKIP on node failure.

## Bug fixes vs original (code review REJECTED → v2):
- T36: `set -e` guard: was `T36_OUT=$(node ...); T36_EXIT=$?` — would abort suite
        on node exit-code != 0. Fixed: `T36_OUT="" T36_EXIT=0; ... || T36_EXIT=$?`
- T30: was `-z "$T30_SESSION"` — jq returns "null" not "" for missing fields.
        Fixed: `( -z "$T30_SESSION" || "$T30_SESSION" == "null" )`
- T25: missing future-time assertion. Added lexicographic ISO comparison:
        `date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"` vs `expiresAt`
- FUTURE stubs: changed `# FUTURE T37 (Task...)` → `# FUTURE T37: ...` (greppable)
- T32/T33: added `!= "null"` guards on sessionId/jobId to reject jq "null" as absent

## TIMMY_TEST_PLAN.md: added "Nostr identity + trust engine (tests 25–36)" table

## TypeScript: 0 errors. All 12 tests smoke-tested individually against localhost:8080.
2026-03-19 21:14:01 +00:00
alexpaynex
c7bb5de5e6 task/35: Testkit T25–T36 — Nostr identity + trust engine coverage
## 12 new tests added to artifacts/api-server/src/routes/testkit.ts
Inserted before the Summary block, after T24 (cost ledger).

T25 — POST /identity/challenge: HTTP 200, nonce=64-char hex, expiresAt=ISO
T26 — POST /identity/verify {}: HTTP 400, non-empty error
T27 — POST /identity/verify fake nonce: HTTP 401, error contains "Nonce not found"
       (uses a plausible-looking event structure to hit the nonce check, not the
       signature check — tests the right layer)
T28 — GET /identity/me no header: HTTP 401, error contains "Missing"
T29 — GET /identity/me invalid token: HTTP 401 (Invalid/expired wording)
T30 — POST /sessions bad X-Nostr-Token: HTTP 401, "Invalid or expired", no sessionId
T31 — POST /jobs bad X-Nostr-Token: HTTP 401, "Invalid or expired"
T32 — POST /sessions anonymous: HTTP 201, trust_tier="anonymous"; captures T32_SESSION_ID
T33 — POST /jobs anonymous: HTTP 201, trust_tier="anonymous"; captures T33_JOB_ID
T34 — GET /jobs/:id (using T33_JOB_ID): HTTP 200, trust_tier non-null and "anonymous"
T35 — GET /sessions/:id (using T32_SESSION_ID): HTTP 200, trust_tier="anonymous"
T36 — Full challenge→sign→verify E2E: inline node CJS script generates ephemeral secp256k1
      keypair via nostr-tools CJS bundle, POSTs challenge, signs kind=27235 event with
      finalizeEvent(), verifies → nostr_token, GETs /identity/me, asserts tier=new,
      interactionCount=0, pubkey matches. Guard: SKIP if node not in PATH or script fails.

## nostr-tools import strategy
nostr-tools v2 is ESM-only. CJS workaround: the package ships a CJS bundle at
lib/cjs/index.js. T36 uses require() with the absolute path to that bundle.
Falls back to bare require('nostr-tools') for portability, exits with code 1 if
neither works — bash guard catches this and marks T36 SKIP (not FAIL).

## Stubs T37–T40 added as bash block comments after T36
Format: `# FUTURE T3N: <description>` so they are grepped easily.
Covers: GET /api/estimate (cost preview), anonymous Lightning gate, trusted free tier,
Timmy-initiates-zap. Does not affect PASS/FAIL totals.

## TIMMY_TEST_PLAN.md updated
New "Nostr identity + trust engine (tests 25–36)" section added to the test table.

## TypeScript: 0 errors. All 12 tests smoke-tested individually against localhost:8080.
T25-T35: all correct HTTP status codes and JSON fields verified via curl.
T36: full E2E verified — tier=new, icount=0, pubkey matches /identity/me response.
2026-03-19 21:09:50 +00:00
alexpaynex
56eb7bc56e task/34: Testkit self-serve plan + report endpoints
## Routes added to artifacts/api-server/src/routes/testkit.ts

### GET /api/testkit/plan
- Returns TIMMY_TEST_PLAN.md verbatim as text/markdown; charset=utf-8
- Reads file at request time (not on startup) so edits to the plan are picked
  up without server restart
- Path resolves via import.meta.url + dirname() → 4 levels up to project root
  (handles both dev/tsx and compiled dist/routes/ directories)

### GET /api/testkit/report
- Returns only the content from "## Report template" heading to end-of-file
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 — ready to copy and fill in
- Slice is found with indexOf("## Report template"); 500 if marker absent
- Uses the same PLAN_PATH as /api/testkit/plan (single source of truth)

## Deviation: __dirname → import.meta.url
Original plan said "resolve relative to project root regardless of cwd".
The codebase runs as ESM (tsx / ts-node with ESM), so __dirname is not
defined. Fixed by using dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)) instead —
equivalent semantics, correct in both dev and compiled output.

## AGENTS.md — Testing section added
Three-step workflow documented between "Branch and PR conventions" and
"Stub mode" sections:
  1. curl <BASE>/api/testkit/plan — fetch plan before starting
  2. curl -s <BASE>/api/testkit | bash — run suite after implementing
  3. curl <BASE>/api/testkit/report — fetch report template to fill in

## Unchanged
- GET /api/testkit bash script generation: untouched
- No new test cases or script modifications

## TypeScript: 0 errors. Smoke tests all pass:
  - /api/testkit/plan → 200 text/markdown, full TIMMY_TEST_PLAN.md content
  - /api/testkit/report → 200 text/plain, starts at "## Report template"
  - /api/testkit → 200 bash script, unchanged
2026-03-19 21:02:43 +00:00
alexpaynex
66eb8ed394 Improve login security and user experience on admin panel
Add token validation on boot and auto-logout on 401 errors in the admin relay panel.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 21:00:19 +00:00
alexpaynex
ca8cbee179 task/33: Relay admin panel at /admin/relay (final, all review fixes applied)
## What was built
Relay operator dashboard at GET /admin/relay (outside /api prefix).
Server-side rendered inline HTML with vanilla JS — no separate build step.
Registered in app.ts; absent from routes/index.ts (avoids /api/admin/relay dup).

## Auth gate + ADMIN_TOKEN alignment
- Backend: ADMIN_TOKEN (canonical) with ADMIN_SECRET as backward-compat fallback.
  requireAdmin exported from admin-relay.ts; admin-relay-queue.ts imports it.
  Panel route returns 403 in production when ADMIN_TOKEN is not configured.
- Frontend: prompt reads "Enter the ADMIN_TOKEN". Token verified via stats API
  probe (401 = bad token). Stored in localStorage; cleared on Log out.

## Stats endpoint (GET /api/admin/relay/stats)
- approvedToday: AND(status IN ('approved','auto_approved'), decidedAt >= UTC midnight)
- liveConnections: fetches STRFRY_URL/stats with 2s AbortSignal; null on failure
- Returns: pending, approved, autoApproved, rejected, approvedToday,
           totalAccounts, liveConnections

## Accounts endpoint fix (blocking review issue #3)
GET /api/admin/relay/accounts now LEFT JOINs nostr_identities on pubkey.
Returns trustTier (nostr_identities.tier) per account alongside pubkey,
accessLevel, grantedBy, notes, grantedAt, revokedAt.
Verified: elite accounts show "elite", new accounts show "new".

## Queue endpoint: contentPreview
rawEvent content JSON.parsed, sliced to 120 chars; null on parse failure.
GET /api/admin/relay/queue?status=pending used by UI.

## Admin panel features
Stats bar: Pending (yellow), Approved today (green), Accounts (purple),
           Relay connections (blue; null → "n/a").
Queue tab: Event ID, Pubkey, Kind, Content preview, Status, Queued, Actions.
Accounts tab: Pubkey, Access pill, Trust tier, Granted by, Notes, Date, Revoke.
Grant form: pubkey + level + notes; 64-char hex validation client-side.
15s auto-refresh (queue + stats); toast feedback.

## XSS fix (2nd review round fix)
esc(v) escapes &, <, >, ", ' before injection into innerHTML.
Applied to all user-controlled fields: contentPreview, notes, grantedBy,
tier, level, ts, id8, pk12, kind. Onclick uses safeId/safePk (hex-only strip).
Stats use textContent (not innerHTML) — no escaping needed.

## TypeScript: 0 errors. Smoke tests: panel HTML ✓, trustTier in accounts ✓
(e.g. "trustTier":"elite"), stats fields ✓, queue ?status=pending ✓.
2026-03-19 20:57:52 +00:00
alexpaynex
8000b005d6 task/33: Relay admin panel at /admin/relay (final, all review fixes)
## What was built
Relay operator dashboard at GET /admin/relay (outside /api, clean URL).
Server-side rendered inline HTML with vanilla JS, no separate build step.

## Route registration
admin-relay-panel.ts imported in app.ts and mounted via app.use() after /api
and before /tower. Route not in routes/index.ts (would be /api/admin/relay).

## Auth gate + env var alignment
Backend: ADMIN_TOKEN is canonical env var; falls back to ADMIN_SECRET for
compat. ADMIN_TOKEN exported as requireAdmin from admin-relay.ts; admin-relay-
queue.ts imports it instead of duplicating. Panel route returns 403 in
production when ADMIN_TOKEN is not configured (gate per spec).
Frontend: prompt reads "Enter the ADMIN_TOKEN". Token verified by calling
/api/admin/relay/stats; 401 → error; success → localStorage + showMain().

## Stats endpoint (GET /api/admin/relay/stats) — 3 fixes from 1st review round:
1. approvedToday: AND(status IN (approved, auto_approved), decidedAt >= UTC midnight)
2. liveConnections: fetch STRFRY_URL/stats, 2s AbortSignal timeout, null on fail
3. Returns: pending, approved, autoApproved, rejected, approvedToday,
   totalAccounts, liveConnections (null when strfry unavailable)

## Queue endpoint: contentPreview field
rawEvent content JSON.parsed and sliced to 120 chars; null on parse failure.
GET /api/admin/relay/queue?status=pending used by UI (pending-only, per spec).

## Admin panel features
Stats bar (4 cards): Pending (yellow), Approved today (green),
Accounts (purple), Relay connections (blue; null → "n/a").
Queue tab: Event ID, Pubkey, Kind, Content preview, Status pill, Queued, Actions.
Accounts tab: whitelist table, Revoke (with confirm), Grant form.
15s auto-refresh on queue + stats. Toast feedback on all actions.
Navigation: ← Timmy UI, Workshop, Log out.

## XSS fix (blocking issue from 2nd review round)
Central esc(v) function: replaces &, <, >, ", ' with HTML entities.
Applied to ALL user-controlled values in renderQueueRow and renderAccountRow:
  contentPreview, notes, grantedBy, tier, level, ts, id8, pk12, kind.
onclick handlers use safeId/safePk: hex chars stripped to [0-9a-f] only.
Verified: event with content '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' → contentPreview
returned as raw JSON string; frontend esc() blocks execution in innerHTML.

## TypeScript: 0 errors. Smoke tests: panel HTML ✓, stats fields ✓,
  queue pending-filter ✓, contentPreview ✓, production gate logic verified.
2026-03-19 20:54:08 +00:00
alexpaynex
ac3493fc69 task/33: Relay admin panel at /admin/relay (post-review fixes)
## What was built
Relay operator dashboard at GET /admin/relay (clean URL, not under /api).
Served as inline vanilla-JS HTML from Express, no build step.

## Routing
admin-relay-panel.ts imported in app.ts and mounted directly via app.use()
BEFORE the /tower static middleware — so /admin/relay is the canonical URL.
Removed from routes/index.ts to avoid /api/admin/relay duplication.

## Auth (env var aligned: ADMIN_TOKEN)
- Backend (admin-relay.ts): checks ADMIN_TOKEN first, falls back to ADMIN_SECRET
  for backward compatibility. requireAdmin exported for reuse in queue router.
- admin-relay-queue.ts: removed duplicated requireAdmin, imports from admin-relay.ts
- Frontend: prompt text says "ADMIN_TOKEN", localStorage key 'relay_admin_token',
  token stored after successful /api/admin/relay/stats 401 probe.

## Stats endpoint (GET /api/admin/relay/stats) — 3 fixes:
1. approvedToday: now filters AND(status IN ('approved','auto_approved'),
   decidedAt >= UTC midnight today). Previously counted all statuses.
2. liveConnections: fetches STRFRY_URL/stats with 2s AbortSignal timeout.
   Returns null gracefully when strfry is unavailable (dev/non-Docker).
3. Drizzle imports updated: and(), inArray() added.

## Queue endpoint: contentPreview added
GET /api/admin/relay/queue response now includes contentPreview (string|null):
  JSON.parse(rawEvent).content sliced to 120 chars; gracefully null on failure.

## Admin panel features
Stats bar (4 metric cards): Pending review (yellow), Approved today (green),
Accounts (purple), Relay connections (blue — null → "n/a" in UI).

Queue tab: fetches /admin/relay/queue?status=pending (pending-only, per spec).
Columns: Event ID, Pubkey, Kind, Content preview, Status pill, Queued, Actions.
Approve/Reject buttons; 15s auto-refresh; toast feedback.

Accounts tab: whitelist table, Revoke per-row (with confirm dialog), Grant form
(pubkey + access level + notes, 64-char hex validation before POST).

Navigation: ← Timmy UI, Workshop links; Log out clears token + stops timer.

## Smoke tests (all pass, TypeScript 0 errors)
GET /admin/relay → 200 HTML title ✓; screenshot shows auth gate ✓
GET /api/admin/relay/stats → correct fields incl. liveConnections:null ✓
Queue ?status=pending filter ✓; contentPreview in queue response ✓
2026-03-19 20:50:38 +00:00
alexpaynex
c168081c7e task/33: Relay admin panel at /api/admin/relay
## What was built
A full operator dashboard for the Timmy relay, served as server-side HTML
from Express at GET /api/admin/relay — no build step, no separate frontend.
Follows the existing ui.ts pattern with vanilla JS.

## New API endpoint
GET /api/admin/relay/stats (added to admin-relay.ts):
  Returns { pending, approved, autoApproved, rejected, approvedToday, totalAccounts }
  approvedToday counts events with decidedAt >= UTC midnight today.
  Uses Drizzle groupBy on relayEventQueue.status + count(*) aggregate.
  Protected by requireAdmin (same ADMIN_SECRET Bearer auth as other admin routes).

## Admin panel (admin-relay-panel.ts → /api/admin/relay)
No auth requirement on the page GET itself — auth happens client-side via JS.

Auth gate:
  On first visit, user is prompted for ADMIN_TOKEN (password input).
  Token verified against GET /api/admin/relay/stats (401 = wrong token).
  Token stored in localStorage ('relay_admin_token'); loaded on boot.
  Logout clears localStorage and stops the 15s refresh timer.
  Token sent as Bearer Authorization header on every API call.

Stats bar (4 metric cards):
  Pending review (yellow), Approved today (green),
  Accounts (purple), All-time queue (orange/accent).

Queue tab:
  Fetches GET /api/admin/relay/queue, renders all events in a table.
  Columns: Event ID (8-char), Pubkey (12-char+ellipsis), Kind, Status pill,
           Queued timestamp, Approve/Reject action buttons (pending rows only).
  Auto-refreshes every 15 seconds alongside stats.
  Approve/Reject call POST /api/admin/relay/queue/:id/approve|reject.

Accounts tab:
  Fetches GET /api/admin/relay/accounts, renders whitelist table.
  Columns: Pubkey, Access level pill, Trust tier, Granted by, Notes, Date, Revoke.
  Revoke button calls POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pubkey/revoke (with confirm).
  Grant form at the bottom: pubkey input (64-char hex validation), access level
  select, optional notes, calls POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pubkey/grant.

Pill styling: pending=yellow, approved/auto_approved=green, rejected=red,
              read=purple, write=green, elite=orange, none=grey.

Navigation links: ← Timmy UI, Workshop, Log out.

## Route registration
import adminRelayPanelRouter added to routes/index.ts; router.use() registered
between adminRelayQueueRouter and demoRouter.

## TypeScript: 0 errors. Smoke tests:
- GET /api/admin/relay → 200 HTML with correct <title> ✓
- GET /api/admin/relay/stats (localhost) → 200 with all 6 fields ✓
- Auth gate renders correctly in browser ✓
2026-03-19 20:44:19 +00:00
alexpaynex
f5c2c7e8c2 Improve handling of failed moderation bypasses for elite accounts
Update relay.ts to return a hard 'reject' instead of 'shadowReject' when an elite event fails to inject into strfry, ensuring clients retry instead of silently dropping events.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 20:38:51 +00:00
alexpaynex
a95fd76ebd task/32: Event moderation queue + Timmy AI review
## What was built
Full moderation pipeline: relay_event_queue table, strfry inject helper,
ModerationService with Claude haiku review, policy tier routing, 30s poll loop,
admin approve/reject/list endpoints.

## DB schema (`lib/db/src/schema/relay-event-queue.ts`)
relay_event_queue: event_id (PK), pubkey (FK → nostr_identities), kind,
raw_event (text JSON), status (pending/approved/rejected/auto_approved),
reviewed_by (timmy_ai/admin/null), review_reason, created_at, decided_at.
Exported from schema/index.ts. Pushed via pnpm run push.

## strfry HTTP client (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/strfry.ts`)
injectEvent(rawEventJson) — POST {STRFRY_URL}/import (NDJSON).
STRFRY_URL defaults to "http://strfry:7777" (Docker internal network).
5s timeout; graceful failure in dev when strfry not running; never throws.

## ModerationService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/moderation.ts`)
- enqueue(event) — insert pending row; idempotent onConflictDoNothing
- autoReview(eventId) — Claude haiku prompt: approve or flag. On flag, marks
  reviewedBy=timmy_ai and leaves pending for admin. On approve, calls decide().
- decide(eventId, status, reason, reviewedBy) — updates DB + calls injectEvent
- processPending(limit=10) — batch poll: auto-review up to limit pending events
- Stub mode: auto-approves all events when Anthropic key absent

## Policy endpoint update (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
Tier routing in evaluatePolicy:
  read/none → reject (unchanged)
  write + elite tier → injectEvent + accept (elite bypass; shadowReject if inject fails)
  write + non-elite → enqueue + shadowReject (held for moderation)
Imports db/nostrIdentities directly for tier check. Both inject and enqueue errors
are fail-closed (reject vs shadowReject respectively).

## Background poll loop (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
setInterval every 30s calling moderationService.processPending(10).
Interval configurable via MODERATION_POLL_MS env var.
Errors caught per-event; poll loop never crashes the server.

## Admin queue routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay-queue.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer auth (same pattern as admin-relay.ts).
GET  /api/admin/relay/queue?status=...        — list all / by status
POST /api/admin/relay/queue/:eventId/approve  — approve + inject into strfry
POST /api/admin/relay/queue/:eventId/reject   — reject (no inject)
409 on duplicate decisions. Registered in routes/index.ts.

## Smoke tests (all pass)
Unknown → reject ✓; elite → shadowReject (strfry unavailable in dev) ✓;
non-elite write → shadowReject + pending in queue ✓; admin approve → approved ✓;
moderation poll loop started ✓; TypeScript 0 errors.
2026-03-19 20:35:39 +00:00
alexpaynex
01374375fb Update default access for new accounts to read-only
Modify the default access level for newly created accounts from "none" to "read" and clarify access semantics in relay-accounts.ts.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 20:29:02 +00:00
alexpaynex
31a843a829 task/31: Relay account whitelist + trust-gated access (v2 — code review fixes)
## What was built
Full relay access control: relay_accounts table, RelayAccountService,
trust hook, live policy enforcement, admin CRUD API, elite startup seed.

## DB schema (`lib/db/src/schema/relay-accounts.ts`)
relay_accounts table: pubkey (PK, FK nostr_identities ON DELETE CASCADE),
access_level (none/read/write), granted_by (text), granted_at, revoked_at, notes.
Exported from lib/db/src/schema/index.ts. Pushed via pnpm run push.

## RelayAccountService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/relay-accounts.ts`)
- getAccess(pubkey) → RelayAccessLevel (none if missing or revoked)
- grant(pubkey, level, reason, grantedBy) — upsert; creates nostr_identity FK
- revoke(pubkey, reason) — sets revokedAt, accessLevel→none, grantedBy→"manual-revoked"
  The "manual-revoked" marker prevents syncFromTrustTier from auto-reinstating.
  Only explicit admin grant() can restore access after revocation.
- syncFromTrustTier(pubkey) — fetches tier from DB internally (no tier param to
  avoid caller drift). Respects: manual-revoked (skip), manual active (upgrade only),
  auto-tier (full sync). Never auto-reinstates revoked accounts.
- seedElite(pubkey, notes) — upserts nostr_identities with tier="elite" +
  trustScore=200, then grants relay write access as a permanent manual grant.
  Called at startup for Timmy's own pubkey.
- list(opts) — returns all accounts, filtered by activeOnly if requested.
- Tier→access: new=none, established/trusted/elite=write (env-overridable)

## Trust hook (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/trust.ts`)
recordSuccess + recordFailure both call syncFromTrustTier(pubkey) after DB write.
Fire-and-forget with catch (trust flow is never blocked by relay errors).

## Policy endpoint (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
evaluatePolicy() async: queries relay_accounts.getAccess(). write→accept,
read/none/missing→reject. DB error→reject (fail-closed).

## Admin routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer auth (localhost-only fallback in dev; error log in prod).
GET  /api/admin/relay/accounts             — list all accounts
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/grant   — grant (level + notes)
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/revoke  — revoke (sets manual-revoked)
pubkey validation: 64-char lowercase hex only.

## Startup seed (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
Resolves pubkey from TIMMY_NOSTR_PUBKEY env first, falls back to
timmyIdentityService.pubkeyHex. Calls seedElite() — idempotent upsert.
Sets nostr_identities.tier="elite" alongside relay write access.

## Smoke test results (all pass)
Timmy accept ✓; unknown reject ✓; grant→accept ✓; revoke→manual-revoked ✓;
revoked stays rejected ✓; TypeScript 0 errors.
2026-03-19 20:26:03 +00:00
alexpaynex
94613019fc task/31: Relay account whitelist + trust-gated access
## What was built
Full relay access control system: relay_accounts table, RelayAccountService,
trust hook integration, live policy enforcement, admin CRUD API, Timmy seed.

## DB change
`lib/db/src/schema/relay-accounts.ts` — new `relay_accounts` table:
  pubkey (PK, FK → nostr_identities.pubkey ON DELETE CASCADE),
  access_level ("none"|"read"|"write"), granted_by ("manual"|"auto-tier"),
  granted_at, revoked_at (nullable), notes. Pushed via `pnpm run push`.
`lib/db/src/schema/index.ts` — exports relay-accounts.

## RelayAccountService (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/relay-accounts.ts`)
- getAccess(pubkey) → RelayAccessLevel (none if missing or revoked)
- grant(pubkey, level, reason, grantedBy) — upsert; creates nostr_identity FK
- revoke(pubkey, reason) — sets revokedAt, access_level → none
- syncFromTrustTier(pubkey, tier) — auto-promotes by tier; never downgrades manual grants
- list(opts) — returns all accounts, optionally filtered to active
- Tier→access map: new=none, established/trusted/elite=write (env-overridable)

## Trust hook (`artifacts/api-server/src/lib/trust.ts`)
recordSuccess + recordFailure both call syncFromTrustTier after writing tier.
Failure is caught + logged (non-blocking — trust flow never fails on relay error).

## Policy endpoint (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts`)
evaluatePolicy() now async: queries relay_accounts.getAccess(pubkey).
"write" → accept; "read"/"none"/missing → reject with clear message.
DB error → reject with "policy service error" (safe fail-closed).

## Admin routes (`artifacts/api-server/src/routes/admin-relay.ts`)
ADMIN_SECRET Bearer token auth (localhost-only fallback in dev; error log in prod).
GET  /api/admin/relay/accounts            — list all accounts
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/grant  — grant (level + notes body)
POST /api/admin/relay/accounts/:pk/revoke — revoke (reason body)
pubkey validation: must be 64-char lowercase hex.

## Startup seed (`artifacts/api-server/src/index.ts`)
On every startup: grants Timmy's own pubkeyHex "write" access ("manual").
Idempotent upsert — safe across restarts.

## Smoke test results (all pass)
- Timmy pubkey → accept ✓; unknown pubkey → reject ✓
- Admin grant → accept ✓; admin revoke → reject ✓; admin list shows accounts ✓
- TypeScript: 0 errors in API server + lib/db
2026-03-19 20:21:12 +00:00
alexpaynex
faef1fe5e0 Add health check endpoint and production secret enforcement for relay policy
Adds a GET `/api/relay/policy` health check endpoint and enforces the `RELAY_POLICY_SECRET` environment variable in production to secure the POST `/api/relay/policy` endpoint.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
Replit-Commit-Session-Id: 418bf6f8-212b-4bb0-a7a5-8231a061da4e
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 20:05:09 +00:00
alexpaynex
cdd97922d5 task/30: Sovereign Nostr relay infrastructure (strfry)
## Summary
Deploys strfry (C++ Nostr relay) + relay-policy sidecar as a containerised
stack on the VPS, wired to the API server for event-level access control.

## Files created
- `infrastructure/strfry.conf` — strfry config: bind 0.0.0.0:7777, writePolicy
  plugin → /usr/local/bin/relay-policy-plugin, maxEventSize 65536,
  rejectEphemeral false, db /data/strfry-db
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/plugin.sh` — strfry write-policy plugin (stdin/stdout
  bridge). Reads JSON lines from strfry, POSTs to relay-policy HTTP sidecar
  (http://relay-policy:3080/decide), writes decision to stdout. Safe fallback:
  reject on sidecar timeout/failure
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/index.ts` — Node.js HTTP relay-policy sidecar:
  POST /decide receives strfry events, calls API server /api/relay/policy with
  Bearer RELAY_POLICY_SECRET, returns strfry decision JSON
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/package.json + tsconfig.json` — TS build config
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/Dockerfile` — multi-stage: builder (tsc) + runtime
- `infrastructure/relay-policy/.gitignore` — excludes node_modules, dist
- `artifacts/api-server/src/routes/relay.ts` — POST /api/relay/policy: internal
  route protected by RELAY_POLICY_SECRET Bearer token. Bootstrap state: rejects
  all events with "relay not yet open — whitelist pending (Task #37)". Stable
  contract — future tasks extend evaluatePolicy() without API shape changes

## Files modified
- `infrastructure/docker-compose.yml` — adds relay-policy + strfry services on
  node-net; strfry_data volume (bind-mounted at /data/strfry); relay-policy
  healthcheck; strfry depends on relay-policy healthy
- `infrastructure/ops.sh` — adds relay:logs, relay:restart, relay:status commands
- `artifacts/api-server/src/routes/index.ts` — registers relayRouter

## Operator setup required on VPS
  mkdir -p /data/strfry && chmod 700 /data/strfry
  echo "RELAY_API_URL=https://alexanderwhitestone.com" >> /opt/timmy-node/.env
  echo "RELAY_POLICY_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)" >> /opt/timmy-node/.env
  # Also set RELAY_POLICY_SECRET in Replit secrets for API server

## Notes
- TypeScript: 0 errors (API server + relay-policy sidecar both compile clean)
- POST /api/relay/policy smoke test: correct bootstrap reject response
- strfry image: ghcr.io/hoytech/strfry:latest
2026-03-19 20:02:00 +00:00
alexpaynex
0b3a701933 Add security measures to prevent malicious requests when fetching LNURL data
Implement SSRF protection by validating URLs, blocking private IPs, and enforcing HTTPS in the LNURL fetch path.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 19:55:59 +00:00
alexpaynex
8a81918226 task/29: fix vouch idempotency + replay guard — unique constraints + DB push
## Code review round 2 issues resolved

### Vouch replay / duplicate boost vulnerability — FIXED
- `nostr-trust-vouches.ts` schema: added `eventId` column + two unique guards:
  1. `UNIQUE(event_id)` — same signed event cannot be replayed for any pair
  2. `UNIQUE INDEX uq_nostr_trust_vouches_pair(voucher_pubkey, vouchee_pubkey)` —
     each elite may vouch for a given target exactly once
- Route: insert now uses `.onConflictDoNothing().returning({ id })`
  - If returned array is empty → duplicate detected → 409 with existing state,
    no trust boost applied
  - If returned array has rows → first-time vouch → boost applied exactly once
- `eventId` extracted from `ev["id"]` (NIP-01 sha256 event id) before insert
- Migration file `0006_timmy_economic_peer.sql` updated to include both
  unique constraints (UNIQUE + CREATE UNIQUE INDEX)
- Schema pushed to production — all three indexes confirmed in DB:
  `nostr_trust_vouches_event_id_unique`, `uq_nostr_trust_vouches_pair`, `pkey`

### Previously fixed (round 1)
- LNURL-pay resolution in ZapService (full NIP-57 §4 flow)
- Vouch event made required with p-tag vouchee binding
- DB migration file 0006 created for both new tables + lightning_address column
- GET /identity/timmy now returns relayUrl field

### Verified
- TypeScript: 0 errors (tsc --noEmit clean)
- DB: all constraints confirmed live in production
- API: /identity/timmy 200, /identity/challenge nonce, /identity/vouch 401/400
2026-03-19 19:51:50 +00:00
alexpaynex
33b47f8682 task/29: fix code review findings — LNURL zap, vouch binding, migration SQL
## Code review issues resolved

### 1. Zap-out: real LNURL-pay resolution (was: log-only when no bolt11)
- `zap.ts`: added `resolveLnurlInvoice()` — full NIP-57 §4 flow:
  * user@domain → https://domain/.well-known/lnurlp/user
  * Fetch LNURL-pay metadata → extract callback URL + min/maxSendable
  * Build signed kind-9734 zap request, send to callback → receive bolt11
  * Pay bolt11 via LNbits. Log event regardless of payment outcome.
- `nostr-identities.ts`: added `lightningAddress` column (nullable TEXT)
- `identity.ts /verify`: extracts `["lud16", "user@domain.com"]` tag from
  signed event and stores it so ZapService can resolve future invoices
- `maybeZapOnJobComplete()` now triggers real payment when lightningAddress
  is stored; logs a warning and skips payment if not available

### 2. Vouch endpoint: signed event is now REQUIRED with p-tag binding
- `event` field changed from optional to required (400 if absent)
- Validates: Nostr signature, event.pubkey matches authenticated voucher
- NEW: event MUST contain a `["p", voucheePubkey]` tag — proves the voucher
  intentionally named the vouchee in their signed event (co-signature binding)

### 3. DB migration file added
- `lib/db/migrations/0006_timmy_economic_peer.sql` — covers:
  * CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS timmy_nostr_events (with indexes)
  * CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS nostr_trust_vouches (with indexes)
  * ALTER TABLE nostr_identities ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS lightning_address
- Schema pushed to production: `lightning_address` column confirmed live

### Additional
- `GET /api/identity/timmy` now includes `relayUrl` field (null when unset)
- TypeScript compiles cleanly (tsc --noEmit: 0 errors)
- All smoke tests pass: /timmy 200, /challenge nonce, /vouch 401/400
2026-03-19 19:47:00 +00:00
alexpaynex
45f4e72f14 task/29: Timmy as economic peer (bidirectional) — verify & mark complete
## What was done
All task-29 deliverables implemented, tested, and in production.

### Implementation (already in main as eb5dcfd)
- TimmyIdentityService: secp256k1 keypair (nsec/npub), sign(), encryptDm()
- ZapService: NIP-57 kind-9734 zap-out, wired into job completion via maybeZapOnJobComplete()
- EngagementService: proactive NIP-04 DMs, configurable cadence (ENGAGEMENT_INTERVAL_DAYS)
- POST /api/identity/vouch — elite-tier trust vouching, X-Nostr-Token gated
- GET /api/identity/timmy — public npub + pubkeyHex + zapCount
- DB: timmy_nostr_events + nostr_trust_vouches (confirmed live in production)
- Frontend: timmy-id.js identity card widget (click-to-copy npub, 60s refresh)

### Session cleanup (this session)
- PR #47 documented and closed (branch = main HEAD)
- Issue #34 closed with full completion notes
- Gitea backlog scrubbed: 6 stale issues closed, 4 new follow-up issues created (#48-#51)
- Agent labels assigned to all open issues (hermes: 13, kimi: 8, timmy: 4, replit: 4)
- New `timmy` label created (Bitcoin orange #f7931a) for Timmy's autonomy work
- Missing agent labels fixed on #36 and #37 (both now @hermes)

### Smoke tests
- GET /api/identity/timmy → 200 {npub, pubkeyHex, zapCount}
- POST /api/identity/challenge → 200 {nonce, expiresAt}
- POST /api/identity/vouch (no token) → 401 {error: X-Nostr-Token header required}
- DB tables: timmy_nostr_events, nostr_trust_vouches, timmy_config all confirmed present
2026-03-19 19:38:32 +00:00
Replit Agent
eb5dcfd48a task-29: Timmy as economic peer — Nostr identity, zap-out, vouching, engagement
Some checks failed
CI / Typecheck & Lint (pull_request) Failing after 0s
1. TimmyIdentityService (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/timmy-identity.ts)
   - Loads nsec from TIMMY_NOSTR_NSEC env var at boot (bech32 decode)
   - Generates and warns about ephemeral key if env var absent
   - sign(EventTemplate) → finalizeEvent() with Timmy's key
   - encryptDm(recipientPubkeyHex, plaintext) → NIP-04 nip04.encrypt()
   - Logs npub at server startup

2. ZapService (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/zap.ts)
   - Constructs NIP-57 zap request event (kind 9734), signs with Timmy's key
   - Pays via lnbitsService.payInvoice() if bolt11 provided (stub-mode aware)
   - Logs every outbound event to timmy_nostr_events audit table
   - maybeZapOnJobComplete() wired in jobs.ts after trustService.recordSuccess()
   - Config: ZAP_PCT_DEFAULT (default 0 = disabled), ZAP_MIN_SATS (default 10)
   - Only fires for trusted/elite tier partners when ZAP_PCT_DEFAULT > 0

3. Engagement engine (artifacts/api-server/src/lib/engagement.ts)
   - Configurable cadence: ENGAGEMENT_INTERVAL_DAYS (default 0 = disabled)
   - Queries nostrIdentities for trustScore >= 50 AND lastSeen < threshold
   - Generates personalised DM via agentService.chatReply()
   - Encrypts as NIP-04 DM (kind 4), signs with Timmy's key
   - Logs to timmy_nostr_events; publishes to NOSTR_RELAY_URL if set
   - First run delayed 60s after startup to avoid cold-start noise

4. Vouching endpoint (artifacts/api-server/src/routes/identity.ts)
   - POST /api/identity/vouch: requires X-Nostr-Token with elite tier
   - Verifies optional Nostr event signature from voucher
   - Records relationship in nostr_trust_vouches table
   - Applies VOUCH_TRUST_BOOST (20 pts) to vouchee's trust score
   - GET /api/identity/timmy: public endpoint returning npub + zap count

5. DB schema additions (lib/db/src/schema/)
   - timmy_nostr_events: audit log for all outbound Nostr events
   - nostr_trust_vouches: voucher/vouchee social graph with boost amount
   - Tables created in production DB via drizzle-kit push

6. Frontend identity card (the-matrix/)
   - #timmy-id-card: fixed bottom-right widget with Timmy's npub + zap count
   - timmy-id.js: initTimmyId() fetches /api/identity/timmy on load
   - Npub shortened (npub1xxxx...yyyyyy), click-to-copy with feedback
   - Refreshes every 60s to show live zap count
   - Wired into main.js on firstInit
2026-03-19 19:27:13 +00:00
Replit Agent
dabadb4298 task-28 fix5: session triage, speech-bubble local badge, footprint docs
Some checks failed
CI / Typecheck & Lint (pull_request) Failing after 0s
1. ui.js: edge triage now runs BEFORE session handler delegation
   - classify() called for all send() paths (session + WebSocket)
   - trivial + localReply → setSpeechBubble() used for local reply display
   - session handler only receives moderate/complex messages
   - _fetchEstimate() fired for non-trivial in session mode too

2. edge-worker.js: quantization footprint documented (~87MB int8, cached)
2026-03-19 19:10:46 +00:00
alexpaynex
8897371815 task-28: Edge intelligence — browser ML, Nostr signing, cost preview, sentiment moods
All 6 reviewer rounds complete. Final diff addresses:
- complexity:trivial|moderate|complex contract (not binary local|server)
- Trivial heuristic in cost preview: zero network calls for greetings
- X-Nostr-Token on all job/session API calls including polling paths
- npub-only discovery shows identity prompt (_canSign flag)
- Worker/UI contract fully aligned on complexity tiers
2026-03-19 19:07:24 +00:00
Replit Agent
cb50e8c658 task-28 fix4: trivial cost-preview gate + job polling token
Some checks failed
CI / Typecheck & Lint (pull_request) Failing after 0s
1. ui.js: _scheduleCostPreview() now gates on _TRIVIAL_RE before scheduling
   the /api/estimate fetch. Greeting-pattern text shows '0 sats' badge locally
   and never makes a network call. Same regex as edge-worker.js _isGreeting().

2. payment.js: startPolling() GET /api/jobs/:id now attaches X-Nostr-Token
   header on every poll cycle via getOrRefreshToken(). Completes consistent
   X-Nostr-Token coverage across all job/session API calls.
2026-03-19 19:06:47 +00:00
alexpaynex
b4cabf54af task-28 fix3: All four reviewer issues resolved
Fix 1: complexity contract (trivial|moderate|complex)
  - edge-worker.js: _classify() now returns complexity tier not binary local|server
  - trivial = greeting/small-talk ≥ 0.55 → localReply, 0 sats, no server call
  - moderate = simple-question or uncertain → show estimate, route to server
  - complex = technical/creative/code or score < 0.40 → always priced
  - model-unavailable fallback → moderate (safe default)

Fix 2: UI triage driven by complexity outcome
  - edge-worker-client.js fallback returns complexity:moderate (not label:server)
  - ui.js send(): trivial+localReply → local; moderate/complex → _fetchEstimate()
    called on classify outcome then server route

Fix 3: X-Nostr-Token on ALL session API calls
  - session.js deposit poll (GET /sessions/:id): X-Nostr-Token added
  - session.js topup poll (GET /sessions/:id): X-Nostr-Token added
  - session.js restore (GET /sessions/:id): X-Nostr-Token added
  - session.js createTopup (POST /sessions/:id/topup): X-Nostr-Token added

Fix 4: npub-only discovery no longer suppresses identity prompt
  - nostr-identity.js: _canSign flag tracks signing separately from pubkey presence
  - npub-only → _pubkey set, _canSign=false → prompt scheduled
  - refreshToken() gated on _pubkey && _canSign (no silent failures)
  - Prompt handlers set _canSign=true on NIP-07 connect or key generation

Also: all 13 pending tasks filed as Gitea issues #34-#46 with scoped ACs
and delegation labels (kimi/hermes). Tailscale Funnel replaces bore.pub.
2026-03-19 19:03:37 +00:00
Replit Agent
494393017c task-28 fix3: complexity contract, consistent token headers, npub-only prompt
Some checks failed
CI / Typecheck & Lint (pull_request) Failing after 0s
1. edge-worker.js: replace binary label:local|server with complexity:trivial|moderate|complex
   - trivial  = greeting/small-talk ≥ 0.55 confidence → localReply, 0 sats
   - moderate = simple-question or uncertain score → show estimate, route to server
   - complex  = technical/creative/code OR score < 0.40 → show estimate, route to server
   - model-unavailable fallback → moderate (safe default, not 'server')

2. edge-worker-client.js: update fallback and JSDoc to new complexity shape
   - fallback returns { complexity:'moderate', ... } instead of { label:'server', ... }

3. ui.js: triage driven by cls.complexity, not cls.label
   - trivial + localReply → local answer, 0 sats badge, no server call
   - moderate/complex → _fetchEstimate() fired on classify outcome (not just debounce)
     then routed to server via WebSocket

4. session.js: X-Nostr-Token attached consistently on ALL outbound session calls
   - _startDepositPolling: GET /sessions/:id now includes X-Nostr-Token header
   - _startTopupPolling: GET /sessions/:id now includes X-Nostr-Token header
   - _tryRestore: GET /sessions/:id now includes X-Nostr-Token header
   - _createTopup: POST /sessions/:id/topup now includes X-Nostr-Token header

5. nostr-identity.js: _canSign flag tracks signing capability separately from pubkey
   - initNostrIdentity sets _canSign=true only when NIP-07 or privkey is available
   - npub-only discovery sets _pubkey but _canSign=false → prompt IS scheduled
   - Prompt shown when !_pubkey || !_canSign (not just !_pubkey)
   - Prompt click handlers set _canSign=true after connecting NIP-07 or generating key
   - refreshToken only called when _pubkey && _canSign (avoids silent failures)
2026-03-19 19:02:45 +00:00
alexpaynex
224208fa0f Saved progress at the end of the loop
Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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Replit-Helium-Checkpoint-Created: true
2026-03-19 18:42:21 +00:00
Replit Agent
f75825b6e6 chore: switch push-to-gitea.sh from bore.pub to Tailscale Funnel
Replace bore.pub tunnel with Tailscale Funnel URL (https://mm.tailb74b2d.ts.net).
Resolve GITEA_BASE from GITEA_URL env var → .env.local → hardcoded fallback.
Drop .bore-port dependency entirely. Saved GITEA_URL=https://mm.tailb74b2d.ts.net
as a shared env var.
2026-03-19 18:41:44 +00:00
alexpaynex
26556ba300 Update application assets and code for improved functionality
Update manifest file and JavaScript bundle with new asset references.

Replit-Commit-Author: Agent
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2026-03-19 18:24:27 +00:00
alexpaynex
04abc109bd task-28: Edge intelligence — Web Worker triage, Nostr signing, cost preview, sentiment moods (3 review cycles)
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## Summary of all changes

### New files
- the-matrix/js/edge-worker.js — Proper Web Worker with postMessage API; Transformers.js
  zero-shot-classification + SST-2 sentiment running in worker thread; signals {type:'ready'}
  when models warm; env.useBrowserCache=true for browser Cache API model caching
- the-matrix/js/edge-worker-client.js — Main-thread proxy; spawns Worker via
  new Worker(url, {type:'module'}); wraps calls as Promises; warmup()/onReady()/isReady();
  graceful fallback if Workers unavailable

### Modified files
- js/agents.js: setMood() export maps POSITIVE/NEGATIVE/NEUTRAL → face expressions
- js/nostr-identity.js: Fixed API endpoints (POST /identity/challenge → nonce,
  POST /identity/verify → nostr_token); _scanExistingNostrKeys() discovers common
  Nostr key formats (nsec1/npub1 bech32, hex privkeys, JSON objects) in localStorage
  before showing opt-in prompt; keypair generation requires explicit user consent
- js/ui.js: setEdgeWorkerReady() " local AI" badge; cost preview via X-Nostr-Token
  header (not query param); local triage badge "0 sats"; imports from edge-worker-client
- js/websocket.js: sentiment() on inbound Timmy chat messages → setMood() (10 s auto-clear)
- js/session.js: sentiment() on inbound reply (data.result); X-Nostr-Token on API calls;
  imports from edge-worker-client
- js/payment.js: X-Nostr-Token header on POST /jobs
- js/main.js: initNostrIdentity() + warmupEdgeWorker() + onEdgeWorkerReady(setEdgeWorkerReady)
- the-matrix/package.json: nostr-tools, @xenova/transformers added
- vite.config.js: worker.format:'es' + optimizeDeps.exclude @xenova/transformers
2026-03-19 18:20:33 +00:00
Replit Agent
437df487fd task-28 fix2: common Nostr key discovery, header-only token transport, explicit model caching
1. nostr-identity.js: _scanExistingNostrKeys() discovers pre-existing Nostr keys
   in localStorage using common patterns: nsec1/npub1 bech32, raw hex privkey,
   JSON objects with nsec/npub/privkey fields. Scans common client key names
   (nostr_privkey, privkey, nsec, nostr-nsec, nostrKeys, etc.) before showing
   the identity prompt. Keys discovered are re-saved in app format for next load.
2. ui.js: _fetchEstimate() now sends nostr_token as X-Nostr-Token header instead
   of query param, consistent with all other authenticated API calls.
3. edge-worker.js: explicit env.useBrowserCache=true + env.allowLocalModels=false
   so model weights are cached in browser Cache API after first download.
2026-03-19 18:20:13 +00:00
alexpaynex
120ea7db24 task-28: Edge intelligence — Web Worker triage, Nostr signing, cost preview, sentiment moods
## What was built (Task #28 — all 5 requirements)

### 1. js/edge-worker.js (Web Worker)
Proper Web Worker entry point (not a regular module) using postMessage API.
Loads Transformers.js zero-shot-classification + SST-2 sentiment models in the
worker thread. Signals { type:'ready' } when both models are warm. Handles
{ id, type:'classify'|'sentiment', text } messages and replies with results.
Fast greeting heuristic bypasses model for trivial inputs.

### 2. js/edge-worker-client.js (main-thread proxy)
Main-thread wrapper that spawns edge-worker.js via new Worker(url, {type:'module'}).
Wraps classify()/sentiment() as Promise-based API. Exports: warmup(), onReady(),
isReady(). Gracefully falls back to server routing if Web Workers unavailable.

### 3. js/nostr-identity.js
- Fixed Nostr API endpoints to match server: POST /identity/challenge (→ nonce),
  POST /identity/verify (body:{event}, event.content=nonce → nostr_token)
- NIP-07 extension preferred; localStorage keypair only generated on explicit
  user consent via showIdentityPrompt() UI — no silent key generation
- getOrRefreshToken() used by payment.js/session.js for X-Nostr-Token header

### 4. js/agents.js
setMood() export maps POSITIVE/NEGATIVE/NEUTRAL → Timmy face expressions
(curious/focused/contemplative) via setFaceEmotion() + MOOD_ALIASES.

### 5. Sentiment on INBOUND messages (per reviewer requirement)
- websocket.js: sentiment() runs on Timmy's inbound `chat` messages → setMood()
- session.js: sentiment() runs on data.result (Timmy's reply), not outbound text
- Both auto-clear mood after 10 s

### 6. UX additions
- setEdgeWorkerReady() in ui.js shows " local AI" badge when worker models warm
- showIdentityPrompt() opt-in Nostr identity UI shown 4 s after page load
- Cost preview badge via /api/estimate with free/partial/full display
- Local triage: trivial messages answered without Lightning payment

### 7. Infrastructure
- vite.config.js: worker.format:'es' + optimizeDeps.exclude @xenova/transformers
- package.json: nostr-tools, @xenova/transformers deps added
2026-03-19 18:17:03 +00:00
Replit Agent
898a47fd39 task-28 fix: proper Web Worker, correct Nostr endpoints, sentiment on inbound msgs
Addresses all code review rejections:

1. edge-worker.js → now a proper Web Worker entry point with postMessage API,
   loads models in worker thread; signals {type:'ready'} when warm
2. edge-worker-client.js → new main-thread proxy: spawns Worker via
   new Worker(url, {type:'module'}), wraps calls as Promises, falls back
   to server routing if Workers unavailable; exports classify/sentiment/
   warmup/onReady/isReady
3. nostr-identity.js → fixed endpoints: POST /identity/challenge (→ nonce),
   POST /identity/verify (body:{event}, content=nonce → nostr_token);
   keypair generation now requires explicit user consent via identity prompt
   (no silent key generation); showIdentityPrompt() shows opt-in UI
4. ui.js → import from edge-worker-client; setEdgeWorkerReady() shows
   'local AI' badge when worker signals ready; removed outbound sentiment
5. websocket.js → sentiment() on inbound Timmy chat messages drives setMood()
6. session.js → sentiment() on inbound reply (data.result), not outbound text
7. main.js → onEdgeWorkerReady(() => setEdgeWorkerReady()) wires ready badge
8. vite.config.js → worker.format:'es' for ESM Web Worker bundling
2026-03-19 18:16:40 +00:00
alexpaynex
d9b00c203e task-28: Edge intelligence — browser Transformers.js triage, Nostr signing, cost preview, sentiment moods
## What was built
Five components of Task #28 implemented:

1. js/edge-worker.js (new) — Transformers.js zero-shot-classification + SST-2 sentiment,
   lazy model loading, fast heuristic greeting bypass, warmup() pre-loader.

2. js/nostr-identity.js (new) — NIP-07 extension preferred (window.nostr),
   falls back to generated localStorage keypair; challenge→sign→verify flow
   with the /api/nostr/challenge + /api/nostr/verify endpoints;
   token cached in localStorage with 23 h TTL.

3. js/agents.js — setMood() export maps POSITIVE/NEGATIVE/NEUTRAL sentiment
   labels to Timmy face states (curious/focused/contemplative) via existing
   setFaceEmotion() + MOOD_ALIASES infrastructure.

4. js/ui.js — edge triage on every send: trivial/greeting → answered locally
   with "local  0 sats" badge, no server round-trip; cost preview badge
   debounced 300 ms via GET /api/estimate, shows FREE / partial / full cost;
   sentiment-driven setMood() on every user message (auto-clears after 8 s).

5. js/payment.js, js/session.js — X-Nostr-Token header injected on all
   authenticated API calls (POST /jobs, POST /sessions, POST session/request).
   session.js also runs sentiment → setMood() on every session send.

6. js/main.js — initNostrIdentity('/api') + warmupEdgeWorker() called on firstInit.

7. vite.config.js — optimizeDeps.exclude @xenova/transformers to prevent
   Vite from pre-bundling the WASM/dynamic-import-heavy transformer library.

8. the-matrix/package.json — nostr-tools, @xenova/transformers added as deps.

## No server-side changes — all Task #28 work is frontend-only.
2026-03-19 18:10:11 +00:00
Replit Agent
af3c938c6e task-28: edge intelligence — Transformers.js triage, Nostr signing, cost preview, sentiment moods
- js/edge-worker.js: new — browser-side classify() + sentiment() via Transformers.js
- js/nostr-identity.js: new — NIP-07 extension + localStorage keypair fallback,
  challenge→sign→verify flow, token caching
- js/agents.js: export setMood() for sentiment-driven face expressions
- js/ui.js: local triage badge, cost preview via /api/estimate, sentiment on send
- js/payment.js: X-Nostr-Token injection on POST /jobs
- js/session.js: X-Nostr-Token injection on session create + request, sentiment mood
- js/main.js: initNostrIdentity() + warmupEdgeWorker() on firstInit
- vite.config.js: optimizeDeps.exclude @xenova/transformers
2026-03-19 18:09:44 +00:00
alexpaynex
484583004a Task #27: Free-tier gate — all correctness issues resolved
Blocking issues from reviewer, all fixed:

1. /api/estimate no longer mutates pool — uses decideDryRun() (read-only)

2. Free-path passes actual debited amount (ftDecision.absorbSats) not estimate:
   - DB absorbedSats = ftDecision.absorbSats (actual pool debit, may be < estimate)
   - runWorkInBackground receives reservedAbsorbed = actual pool debit
   - recordGrant reconciles actual vs reserved; over-reservation returned to pool

3. decide() free branch: downgrade to partial if atomic debit < estimatedSats:
   - If pool race causes debited < estimated: release debit, return serve="partial"
   - Only returns serve="free" (chargeSats=0) when full amount was debited

4. Reservation leak on pre-work failure: inner try/catch around DB update
   - If DB setup fails after pool debit: releaseReservation() called before throw

5. Partial pool-drain at payment: reverts to normal paid flow (not fail):
   - partialGrantReserved = 0: work executes with zero subsidy
   - User charged their paid amount; normal refund path applies if actual < paid
   - No dead-end refund state; no stranded users

6. Partial-job refund math: actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actual - absorbed)

7. Sessions comment clarified: pool reservation sized to work estimate;
   if it covers fullDebitSats (eval+work), debitedSats = 0; otherwise partial
2026-03-19 17:28:19 +00:00
alexpaynex
599771e0ae Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete, all reviewer issues fixed
== All fixed issues ==

1. /api/estimate pool mutation (fixed)
   - Added decideDryRun(): non-mutating read-only free-tier preview
   - /api/estimate uses decideDryRun(); pool never debited by estimate calls

2. Free-path passes actual debited amount not estimate (fixed)
   - In runEvalInBackground free path: uses ftDecision.absorbSats (actual pool debit)
   - DB absorbedSats column set to actual debited sats, not breakdown.amountSats
   - runWorkInBackground receives reservedAbsorbed = actual pool debit

3. decide() free branch: downgrade to partial if atomic debit < estimated (fixed)
   - After _atomicPoolDebit, if debited < estimatedSats (pool raced):
     - Release the partial debit back to pool
     - Return serve="partial" with advisory amounts (re-reserved at payment time)
   - Only returns serve="free" with chargeSats=0 if debited >= estimatedSats

4. Reservation leak on pre-work failure (fixed)
   - Free path wrapped in inner try/catch around DB update + setImmediate
   - If setup fails after pool debit: releaseReservation() called; throws so outer
     catch sets job to failed state

5. Partial-job pool-drained at payment => fail with refund (implemented)
   - reservePartialGrant() = 0 at payment time => job.state = failed
   - refundState = pending, refundAmountSats = workAmountSats (user gets money back)
   - Work does NOT execute under discounted terms without pool backing

6. Partial-job refund math corrected (fixed)
   - actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
   - refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats

7. Grant audit reconciliation (fixed)
   - actualAbsorbed = min(actualTotalCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
   - over-reservation returned to pool atomically in recordGrant()
   - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed sats

New API: decideDryRun(), reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
New recordGrant signature: (pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed)
2026-03-19 17:25:13 +00:00
alexpaynex
a9143f6db4 Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete, pool-drained enforces hard no-loss
Final architecture (all paths enforce pool-backed-or-no-service):

serve="free" (fully-free jobs & sessions):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE at decision time
  - No advisory gap: pool debit and service decision are a single DB operation
  - Pool drained at decide() time => returns gate => work does not start
  - Work fails => releaseReservation() refunds pool

serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() advisory (no pool debit) — prevents DoS from abandoned payments
  - reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool at work-payment-confirmation
    (SELECT FOR UPDATE, re-validates daily limits)
  - Pool drained at payment time:
    * job.state = failed, refundState = pending, refundAmountSats = workAmountSats
    * User gets their payment back; work does not execute under discounted terms
    * "Free service pauses" invariant maintained — no unaccounted subsidy ever happens

serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
  - reservePartialGrant() called after work completes, using min(actual, advisory)
  - If pool empty at grant time: absorbedSats = 0, user charged full actual cost

/api/estimate endpoint:
  - Now uses decideDryRun() — read-only, no pool debit, no daily budget consumption
  - Pool and identity state are never mutated by estimate calls

Partial-job refund math:
  - actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
  - refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats
  - Correctly accounts for Timmy's pool contribution

recordGrant(pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - over-reservation (estimate > actual token usage) returned to pool atomically
  - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed sats only

New methods: decideDryRun(), reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
2026-03-19 17:20:52 +00:00
alexpaynex
eca505e47e Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — complete fix of all reviewer-identified issues
== Issue 1: /api/estimate was mutating pool state (fixed) ==
Added decideDryRun() to FreeTierService — non-mutating read-only preview that
reads pool/trust state but does NOT debit the pool or reserve anything.
/api/estimate now calls decideDryRun() instead of decide().
Pool and daily budgets are never affected by estimate calls.

== Issue 2: Partial-job refund math was wrong (fixed) ==
In runWorkInBackground, refund was computed as workAmountSats - actualTotalCostSats,
ignoring that Timmy absorbed partialAbsorbSats from pool.
Correct math: actualUserChargeSats = max(0, actualTotalCostSats - partialAbsorbSats)
             refund = workAmountSats - actualUserChargeSats
Now partial-job refunds correctly account for Timmy's contribution.

== Issue 3: Pool-drained partial-job behavior (explained, minimal loss) ==
For fully-free jobs (serve="free"):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE — no advisory gap.
  - Pool drained => decide() returns gate => work does not start. ✓

For partial jobs (serve="partial"):
  - decide() is advisory; pool debit deferred to reservePartialGrant() at
    payment confirmation in advanceJob().
  - If pool drains between advisory decide() and payment: user already paid
    their discounted portion; we cannot refuse service. Work proceeds;
    partialGrantReserved=0 means no pool accounting error (pool was already empty).
  - This is a bounded, unavoidable race inherent to LN payment networks —
    there is no 2-phase-commit across LNbits and Postgres.
  - "Free service pauses" invariant is maintained: all NEW requests after pool
    drains will get serve="gate" from decideDryRun() and decide().

== Audit log accuracy (fixed in prior commit, confirmed) ==
recordGrant(pubkey, hash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - actualAbsorbed = min(actualTotalCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
  - over-reservation (estimated > actual) returned to pool atomically
  - daily counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed sats
2026-03-19 17:17:54 +00:00
alexpaynex
4866cfc950 Task #27: Atomic free-tier gate — zero advisory-charge gap under concurrency
Architecture by serve type:

serve="free" (fully-free jobs & sessions):
  - decide() atomically debits pool via SELECT FOR UPDATE transaction
  - Pool debit and service decision are a single atomic DB operation
  - If work fails → releaseReservation() refunds pool
  - Grant audit written post-work with actual absorbed (≤ reserved); excess returned

serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() advisory; pool NOT debited at eval time
    (prevents economic DoS from users abandoning payment flow)
  - At work-payment confirmation: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool
    (re-validates daily limits, SELECT FOR UPDATE, cap to available balance)
  - If pool is empty at payment time: work proceeds (user already paid);
    bounded loss (≤ estimated partial sats); partialGrantReserved=0 means
    no pool accounting error — pool was already empty
  - Grant audit: actualAbsorbed = min(actualCostSats, reserved); excess returned

serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
  - decide() advisory; reservePartialGrant() called after work completes
  - Actual cost capped at advisory absorbSats; over-reservation returned

recordGrant(pubkey, reqHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - Over-reservation (estimated > actual token usage) atomically returned to pool
  - Daily counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed sats
  - Pool never goes negative; no silent losses under concurrent requests

New methods added: reservePartialGrant(), releaseReservation()
New 4-arg recordGrant() signature with over-reservation reconciliation
2026-03-19 17:14:32 +00:00
alexpaynex
ba88824e37 Task #27: Fully atomic free-tier gate — no advisory-charge gap under concurrency
Architecture:
  serve="free" (fully-free jobs/sessions):
    - decide() atomically debits pool via FOR UPDATE transaction at decision time
    - Work starts immediately after, so no window for pool drain between debit+work
    - On work failure → releaseReservation() refunds pool

  serve="partial" (partial-subsidy jobs):
    - decide() is advisory; pool NOT debited at eval time
    - Prevents economic DoS from users who abandon the payment flow
    - At work-payment-confirmation: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool
      (re-validates daily limits, uses FOR UPDATE lock)
    - If pool is empty at payment time: job is failed with clear message
      ("Generosity pool exhausted — please retry at full price.")
      Free service pauses rather than Timmy operating at a loss

  serve="partial" (sessions — synchronous):
    - decide() advisory; reservePartialGrant() called after work completes
    - Partial debit uses actual cost capped at advisory limit

Grant reconciliation (both paths):
    - recordGrant(pubkey, reqHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed)
    - actualAbsorbed = min(actualCostSats, reservedAbsorbed)
    - Over-reservation (estimated > actual token usage) returned to pool atomically
    - Daily absorption counter and audit log reflect actual absorbed, not estimate
    - Pool never goes negative; identity daily budget never overstated

Added: freeTierService.reservePartialGrant() for deferred atomic pool debit
Added: freeTierService.releaseReservation() for failure/rejection refund

Result: Zero-loss guarantee — pool debit and charge reduction always consistent.
2026-03-19 17:12:02 +00:00
alexpaynex
ec5316a4dc Task #27: Atomic free-tier pool reservation — eliminates advisory-charge gap
Root cause: decide() was advisory but user charges were reduced from its output;
recordGrant() later might absorb less, so Timmy could absorb the gap silently.

Fix architecture (serve="free" path — fully-free jobs + sessions):
  - decide() now runs _atomicPoolDebit() inside a FOR UPDATE transaction
  - Pool is debited at decision time for serve="free" decisions
  - Work starts immediately after, so no window for pool drain between debit and use
  - If work fails → releaseReservation() returns sats to pool

Fix architecture (serve="partial" path — partial-subsidy jobs):
  - decide() remains advisory for "partial" (no pool debit at decision time)
  - This prevents pool drain from users who get a partial offer but never pay
  - For jobs: reservePartialGrant() atomically debits pool at work-payment-confirmation
    time (inside advanceJob), before work begins
  - For sessions: reservePartialGrant() called after synchronous work completes,
    using actual cost capped by advisory absorbSats

recordGrant() now takes (pubkey, requestHash, actualAbsorbed, reservedAbsorbed):
  - Over-reservation (estimated > actual) returned to pool atomically
  - Audit log and daily counter reflect actual absorbed amount
  - Pool balance was already decremented by decide() or reservePartialGrant()

Result: In ALL paths, pool debit happens atomically before charges are reduced.
User charge reduction and pool debit are always consistent — Timmy never operates
at a loss due to concurrent pool depletion.
2026-03-19 17:08:43 +00:00
alexpaynex
26e0d32f5c Task #27: Complete cost-routing + free-tier gate — all critical fixes applied
Fix 1 — Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService (pricing.ts)
  - Unified: estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
  - Replaces duplicated estimation in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

Fix 2 — Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
  - freeTierService.decide() runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE executeWork()
  - Fixed double-margin: estimateRequestCost already includes infra+margin; convert directly
  - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution (Math.min)

Fix 3 — Correct isFree derivation for partial jobs in advanceJob() (jobs.ts)
  - isFreeExecution = workAmountSats === 0 (not job.freeTier)
  - Partial jobs run paid accounting: actual sats, refund, pool credit, deferred grant

Fix 4 — Defer ALL grant recording to post-work execution (jobs.ts)
  - Fully-free path: removed recordGrant from eval time; now in runWorkInBackground
  - For isFree jobs: absorbCap = actual post-execution cost (calculateActualChargeSats)
  - For partial jobs: grant deferred from invoice creation to after work completes

Fix 5 — Atomic, pool-bounded grant recording with row locking (free-tier.ts)
  - SELECT ... FOR UPDATE locks pool row inside transaction
  - actualAbsorbed = Math.min(absorbSats, poolBalance) — pool can never go negative
  - Daily absorption: SQL CASE expression atomically handles new-day reset
  - Audit log and identity counter both reflect actualAbsorbed, not requested amount
  - If pool is empty at grant time, transaction returns without writing

Fix 6 — Remove fire-and-forget from all recordGrant() call sites
  - All three call sites now use await; failures propagate correctly

Fix 7 — Add migration 0005_free_tier.sql
  - Creates timmy_config, free_tier_grants tables
  - Adds nostr_identities.sats_absorbed_today / absorbed_reset_at columns
  - Adds jobs.free_tier / absorbed_sats columns
  - Adds sessions.nostr_pubkey FK column (for migration-driven deploys)
  - All IF NOT EXISTS — safe to run on already-pushed DBs
2026-03-19 17:02:02 +00:00
alexpaynex
373477ba7f Task #27: Complete cost-routing + free-tier gate — all critical fixes applied
Fix 1 — Add `estimateRequestCost(request, model)` to PricingService (pricing.ts)
  - Unified: estimateInputTokens + estimateOutputTokens + calculateWorkFeeUsd
  - Replaces duplicated estimation in jobs.ts, sessions.ts, estimate.ts

Fix 2 — Sessions pre-gate: estimate → decide → execute → reconcile
  - freeTierService.decide() runs on ESTIMATED cost BEFORE executeWork()
  - Fixed double-margin: estimateRequestCost already includes infra+margin; convert directly
  - absorbedSats capped at actual cost post-execution (Math.min)

Fix 3 — Correct isFree derivation for partial jobs in advanceJob() (jobs.ts)
  - isFreeExecution = workAmountSats === 0 (not job.freeTier)
  - Partial jobs run paid accounting: actual sats, refund, pool credit, deferred grant

Fix 4 — Defer ALL grant recording to post-work execution (jobs.ts)
  - Fully-free path: removed recordGrant from eval time; now called in runWorkInBackground
  - For isFree jobs: absorbCap = actual post-execution cost (calculateActualChargeSats)
  - For partial jobs: grant deferred from invoice creation to after work completes

Fix 5 — Atomic, pool-bounded grant recording with row locking (free-tier.ts)
  - SELECT ... FOR UPDATE locks pool row inside transaction
  - actualAbsorbed = Math.min(absorbSats, poolBalance) — pool can never go negative
  - Pool balance update is plain write (lock already held)
  - Daily absorption: SQL CASE expression atomically handles new-day reset
  - Audit log and identity counter both reflect actualAbsorbed, not requested amount
  - If pool is empty at grant time, transaction returns without writing

Fix 6 — Remove fire-and-forget (void) from all recordGrant() call sites
  - All three call sites now use await; grant failures propagate correctly
  - Removed unused createHash import from free-tier.ts
2026-03-19 16:59:11 +00:00