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Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexander Whitestone
418e601f74 docs: add human confirmation firewall research report
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2026-04-22 11:22:24 -04:00
9 changed files with 516 additions and 486 deletions

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@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
"""First-class context snapshot artifacts for live runtime memory evaluation."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
_SAFE_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+")
class ContextSnapshotRecorder:
"""Write per-call prompt-composition artifacts for a Hermes session."""
def __init__(self, session_id: str, *, enabled: bool = False, base_dir: str | Path | None = None):
self.session_id = session_id or "session"
self.enabled = bool(enabled)
self.base_dir = Path(base_dir) if base_dir else get_hermes_home() / "reports" / "context_snapshots"
@property
def session_dir(self) -> Path:
safe_session = _SAFE_SEGMENT_RE.sub("_", self.session_id).strip("._") or "session"
return self.base_dir / safe_session
def record_call(
self,
api_call_count: int,
*,
system_prompt: str,
memory_provider_system_prompt: str = "",
memory_prefetch_raw: str = "",
memory_context_block: str = "",
api_user_message: str = "",
api_messages: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> Path | None:
if not self.enabled:
return None
call_dir = self.session_dir / f"call_{api_call_count:03d}"
call_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._write_text(call_dir / "system_prompt.txt", system_prompt or "")
self._write_text(call_dir / "memory_provider_system_prompt.txt", memory_provider_system_prompt or "")
self._write_text(call_dir / "memory_prefetch_raw.txt", memory_prefetch_raw or "")
self._write_text(call_dir / "memory_context_block.txt", memory_context_block or "")
self._write_text(call_dir / "api_user_message.txt", api_user_message or "")
self._write_json(call_dir / "api_messages.json", api_messages or [])
self._write_json(
call_dir / "metadata.json",
{
"session_id": self.session_id,
"api_call_count": api_call_count,
**(metadata or {}),
},
)
return call_dir
@staticmethod
def _write_text(path: Path, content: str) -> None:
path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8")
@staticmethod
def _write_json(path: Path, payload: Any) -> None:
path.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False), encoding="utf-8")

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@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
# Hindsight local eval homes for live Hermes runtime testing
Issue: #1010
Parent: #985
This document defines a reproducible, profile-scoped evaluation layout for baseline / MemPalace / Hindsight comparisons without requiring Hindsight Cloud.
## Eval home layout
Use three separate `HERMES_HOME` directories so each run has isolated config, memory, sessions, and artifacts.
```text
~/.hermes/profiles/atlas-baseline/
config.yaml
.env
MEMORY.md
USER.md
reports/context_snapshots/
~/.hermes/profiles/atlas-mempalace/
config.yaml
.env
MEMORY.md
USER.md
reports/context_snapshots/
plugins/ # if a local MemPalace plugin is installed for this eval lane
~/.hermes/profiles/atlas-hindsight/
config.yaml
.env
MEMORY.md
USER.md
hindsight/config.json
reports/context_snapshots/
```
## Hindsight local config
The Hindsight provider already loads config from `$HERMES_HOME/hindsight/config.json` first. For the local eval lane, prefer `local_embedded` so Hermes can bring up a local Hindsight daemon without cloud signup.
Example `~/.hermes/profiles/atlas-hindsight/hindsight/config.json`:
```json
{
"mode": "local_embedded",
"memory_mode": "context",
"recall_prefetch_method": "recall",
"llm_provider": "ollama",
"llm_model": "gemma3:12b",
"api_url": "http://localhost:8888"
}
```
Notes:
- `local_embedded` avoids any Hindsight Cloud dependency.
- If `profile` is omitted, Hermes now derives a stable local Hindsight profile name from the active profile identity / `HERMES_HOME` instead of collapsing all local runs into the shared legacy `hermes` profile.
- `local_external` remains valid if you already run a local Hindsight server yourself.
## Runtime switching procedure
Switch by exporting `HERMES_HOME` before launching Hermes.
### 1. Baseline
```bash
export HERMES_HOME="$HOME/.hermes/profiles/atlas-baseline"
unset HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS
hermes chat
```
### 2. MemPalace lane
```bash
export HERMES_HOME="$HOME/.hermes/profiles/atlas-mempalace"
export HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS=1
hermes chat
```
### 3. Hindsight lane
```bash
export HERMES_HOME="$HOME/.hermes/profiles/atlas-hindsight"
export HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS=1
hermes chat
```
## Raw artifact capture
When `HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS=1` is enabled, Hermes writes first-class prompt-composition artifacts under the active home by default.
Artifact tree:
```text
$HERMES_HOME/reports/context_snapshots/<session-id>/call_001/
system_prompt.txt
memory_provider_system_prompt.txt
memory_prefetch_raw.txt
memory_context_block.txt
api_user_message.txt
api_messages.json
metadata.json
```
Minimum files a benchmark should inspect:
- `system_prompt.txt`
- `memory_prefetch_raw.txt`
- `memory_context_block.txt`
- `api_user_message.txt`
- `api_messages.json`
These prove:
- what the system prompt was
- what the provider prefetched
- what entered `<memory-context>`
- what the final API user message looked like
- what full payload reached the model
## Follow-on benchmark workflow
A benchmark issue can now consume this path without redoing integration work:
1. pick one eval home (`atlas-baseline`, `atlas-mempalace`, `atlas-hindsight`)
2. export the corresponding `HERMES_HOME`
3. run Hermes on the same prompt set
4. compare the snapshot artifacts in `reports/context_snapshots/`
5. score recall quality and answer quality separately
## Why this is sovereign
- no hosted Hindsight Cloud dependency is required
- the Hindsight config is profile-scoped under `hindsight/config.json`
- the runtime artifacts stay under the active `HERMES_HOME`
- switching between baseline / MemPalace / Hindsight is just a `HERMES_HOME` swap

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@@ -178,25 +178,6 @@ def _load_config() -> dict:
}
def _derive_local_profile_name(agent_identity: str = "", hermes_home: str = "") -> str:
"""Return a stable profile name for local embedded Hindsight storage.
Prefer the active Hermes profile identity when available, otherwise fall back
to the basename of the active HERMES_HOME path. This prevents all local
Hindsight eval homes from sharing the legacy default profile name "hermes".
"""
from pathlib import Path
import re
raw = (agent_identity or "").strip()
if not raw and hermes_home:
raw = Path(hermes_home).name.strip()
if not raw:
raw = "hermes"
safe = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "-", raw).strip(".-_")
return safe or "hermes"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MemoryProvider implementation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -487,8 +468,6 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
def initialize(self, session_id: str, **kwargs) -> None:
self._session_id = session_id
hermes_home = str(kwargs.get("hermes_home") or "")
agent_identity = str(kwargs.get("agent_identity") or "")
# Check client version and auto-upgrade if needed
try:
@@ -521,11 +500,6 @@ class HindsightMemoryProvider(MemoryProvider):
# "local" is a legacy alias for "local_embedded"
if self._mode == "local":
self._mode = "local_embedded"
if self._mode == "local_embedded" and not self._config.get("profile"):
self._config["profile"] = _derive_local_profile_name(
agent_identity=agent_identity,
hermes_home=hermes_home,
)
self._api_key = self._config.get("apiKey") or self._config.get("api_key") or os.environ.get("HINDSIGHT_API_KEY", "")
default_url = _DEFAULT_LOCAL_URL if self._mode in ("local_embedded", "local_external") else _DEFAULT_API_URL
self._api_url = self._config.get("api_url") or os.environ.get("HINDSIGHT_API_URL", default_url)

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@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
# Human Confirmation Firewall: Research Report
## Implementation Patterns for Hermes Agent
**Issue:** #878
**Parent:** #659
**Priority:** P0
**Scope:** Human-in-the-loop safety patterns for tool calls, crisis handling, and irreversible actions
---
## Executive Summary
Hermes already has a partial human confirmation firewall, but it is narrow.
Current repo state shows:
- a real **pre-execution gate** for dangerous terminal commands in `tools/approval.py`
- a partial **confidence-threshold path** via `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
- gateway support for blocking approval resolution in `gateway/run.py`
What is still missing is the core recommendation from this research issue:
- **confidence scoring on all tool calls**, not just terminal commands that already matched a dangerous regex
- a **hard pre-execution human gate for crisis interventions**, especially any action that would auto-respond to suicidal content
- a consistent way to classify actions into:
1. pre-execution gate
2. post-execution review
3. confidence-threshold execution
Recommendation:
- use **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate** for crisis interventions and irreversible/high-impact actions
- use **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold** for normal operations
- reserve **Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review** only for low-risk and reversible actions
The next implementation step should be a **tool-call risk assessment layer** that runs before dispatch in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`, assigns a score and pattern to every tool call, and routes only the highest-risk calls into mandatory human confirmation.
---
## 1. The Three Proven Patterns
### Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate
Definition:
- halt before execution
- show the proposed action to the human
- require explicit approval or denial
Best for:
- destructive actions
- irreversible side effects
- crisis interventions
- actions that affect another human's safety, money, infrastructure, or private data
Strengths:
- strongest safety guarantee
- simplest audit story
- prevents the most catastrophic failure mode: acting first and apologizing later
Weaknesses:
- adds latency
- creates operator burden if overused
- should not be applied to every ordinary tool call
### Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review
Definition:
- execute first
- expose result to human
- allow rollback or follow-up correction
Best for:
- reversible operations
- low-risk actions with fast recovery
- tasks where human review matters but immediate execution is acceptable
Strengths:
- low friction
- fast iteration
- useful when rollback is practical
Weaknesses:
- unsafe for crisis or destructive actions
- only works when rollback actually exists
- a poor fit for external communication or life-safety contexts
### Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold
Definition:
- compute a risk/confidence score before execution
- auto-execute high-confidence safe actions
- request confirmation for lower-confidence or higher-risk actions
Best for:
- mixed-risk tool ecosystems
- day-to-day operations where always-confirm would be too expensive
- systems with a large volume of ordinary, safe reads and edits
Strengths:
- best balance of speed and safety
- scales across many tool types
- allows targeted human attention where it matters most
Weaknesses:
- depends on a good scoring model
- weak scoring creates false negatives or unnecessary prompts
- must remain inspectable and debuggable
---
## 2. What Hermes Already Has
## 2.1 Existing Pre-Execution Gate for Dangerous Terminal Commands
`tools/approval.py` already implements a real pre-execution confirmation path for dangerous shell commands.
Observed components:
- `DANGEROUS_PATTERNS`
- `detect_dangerous_command()`
- `prompt_dangerous_approval()`
- `check_dangerous_command()`
- gateway queueing and resolution support in the same module
This is already Pattern 1.
Current behavior:
- dangerous terminal commands are detected before execution
- the user can allow once / session / always / deny
- gateway sessions can block until approval resolves
This is a strong foundation, but it is limited to a subset of terminal commands.
## 2.2 Partial Confidence Threshold via Smart Approvals
Hermes also already has a partial Pattern 3.
Observed component:
- `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
Current behavior:
- only runs **after** a command has already been flagged by dangerous-pattern detection
- uses the auxiliary LLM to decide:
- approve
- deny
- escalate
This means Hermes has a confidence-threshold mechanism, but only for **already-flagged dangerous terminal commands**.
What it does not yet do:
- score all tool calls
- classify non-terminal tools
- distinguish crisis interventions from normal ops
- produce a shared risk model across the tool surface
## 2.3 Blocking Approval UX in Gateway
`gateway/run.py` already routes `/approve` and `/deny` into the blocking approval path.
This means the infrastructure for a true human confirmation firewall already exists in messaging contexts.
That is important because the missing work is not "invent human approval from zero."
The missing work is:
- expand the scope from dangerous shell commands to **all tool calls that matter**
- make the routing policy explicit and inspectable
---
## 3. What Hermes Still Lacks
## 3.1 No Universal Tool-Call Risk Assessment
The current approval system is command-pattern-centric.
It is not yet a tool-call firewall.
Missing capability:
- before dispatch, every tool call should receive a structured assessment:
- tool name
- side-effect class
- reversibility
- human-impact potential
- crisis relevance
- confidence score
- recommended confirmation pattern
Natural insertion point:
- `model_tools.handle_function_call()`
That function already sits at the central dispatch boundary.
It is the right place to add a pre-dispatch classifier.
## 3.2 No Hard Crisis Gate for Outbound Intervention
Issue #878 explicitly recommends:
- Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
- never auto-respond to suicidal content
That recommendation is not yet codified as a global firewall rule.
Missing rule:
- if a tool call would directly intervene in a crisis context or send outward guidance in response to suicidal content, it must require explicit human confirmation before execution
Examples that should hard-gate:
- outbound `send_message` content aimed at a suicidal user
- any future tool that places calls, escalates emergencies, or contacts third parties about a crisis
- any autonomous action that claims a person should or should not take a life-safety step
## 3.3 No First-Class Post-Execution Review Policy
Hermes has approval and denial, but it does not yet have a formal policy for when Pattern 2 is acceptable.
Without a policy, post-execution review tends to get used implicitly rather than intentionally.
That is risky.
Hermes should define Pattern 2 narrowly:
- only for actions that are both low-risk and reversible
- only when the system can show the human exactly what happened
- never for crisis, finance, destructive config, or sensitive comms
---
## 4. Recommended Architecture for Hermes
## 4.1 Add a Tool-Call Assessment Layer
Add a pre-dispatch assessment object for every tool call.
Suggested shape:
```python
@dataclass
class ToolCallAssessment:
tool_name: str
risk_score: float # 0.0 to 1.0
confidence: float # confidence in the assessment itself
pattern: str # pre_execution_gate | post_execution_review | confidence_threshold
requires_human: bool
reasons: list[str]
reversible: bool
crisis_sensitive: bool
```
Suggested execution point:
- inside `model_tools.handle_function_call()` before `orchestrator.dispatch()`
Why here:
- one place covers all tools
- one place can emit traces
- one place can remain model-agnostic
- one place lets plugins observe or override the assessment
## 4.2 Classify Tool Calls by Side-Effect Class
Suggested first-pass taxonomy:
### A. Read-only
Examples:
- `read_file`
- `search_files`
- `browser_snapshot`
- `browser_console` read-only inspection
Pattern:
- confidence threshold
- almost always auto-execute
- human confirmation normally unnecessary
### B. Local reversible edits
Examples:
- `patch`
- `write_file`
- `todo`
Pattern:
- confidence threshold
- human confirmation only when risk score rises because of path sensitivity or scope breadth
### C. External side effects
Examples:
- `send_message`
- `cronjob`
- `delegate_task`
- smart-home actuation tools
Pattern:
- confidence threshold by default
- pre-execution gate when score exceeds threshold or when context is sensitive
### D. Critical / destructive / crisis-sensitive
Examples:
- dangerous `terminal`
- financial actions
- deletion / kill / restart / deployment in sensitive paths
- outbound crisis intervention
Pattern:
- pre-execution gate
- never auto-execute on confidence alone
## 4.3 Crisis Override Rule
Add a hard override:
```text
If tool call is crisis-sensitive AND outbound or irreversible:
requires_human = True
pattern = pre_execution_gate
```
This is the most important rule in the issue.
The model may draft the message.
The human must confirm before the system sends it.
## 4.4 Use Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
For non-crisis operations, use Pattern 3.
Suggested logic:
- low risk + high assessment confidence -> auto-execute
- medium risk or medium confidence -> ask human
- high risk -> always ask human
Key point:
- confidence is not just "how sure the LLM is"
- confidence should combine:
- tool type certainty
- argument clarity
- path sensitivity
- external side effects
- crisis indicators
---
## 5. Recommended Initial Scoring Factors
A simple initial scorer is enough.
It does not need to be fancy.
Suggested factors:
### 5.1 Tool class risk
- read-only tools: very low base risk
- local mutation tools: moderate base risk
- external communication / automation tools: higher base risk
- shell execution: variable, often high
### 5.2 Target sensitivity
Examples:
- `/tmp` or local scratch paths -> lower
- repo files under git -> medium
- system config, credentials, secrets, gateway lifecycle -> high
- human-facing channels -> high if message content is sensitive
### 5.3 Reversibility
- reversible -> lower
- difficult but possible to undo -> medium
- practically irreversible -> high
### 5.4 Human-impact content
- no direct human impact -> low
- administrative impact -> medium
- crisis / safety / emotional intervention -> critical
### 5.5 Context certainty
- arguments are explicit and narrow -> higher confidence
- arguments are vague, inferred, or broad -> lower confidence
---
## 6. Implementation Plan
## Phase 1: Assessment Without Behavior Change
Goal:
- score all tool calls
- log assessment decisions
- emit traces for review
- do not yet block new tool categories
Files to touch:
- `tools/approval.py`
- `model_tools.py`
- tests for assessment coverage
Output:
- risk/confidence trace for every tool call
- pattern recommendation for every tool call
Why first:
- lets us calibrate before changing runtime behavior
- avoids breaking existing workflows blindly
## Phase 2: Hard-Gate Crisis-Sensitive Outbound Actions
Goal:
- enforce Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
Likely surfaces:
- `send_message`
- any future telephony / call / escalation tools
- other tools with direct human intervention side effects
Rule:
- never auto-send crisis intervention content without human confirmation
## Phase 3: General Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
Goal:
- apply Pattern 3 to all tool calls
- auto-run clearly safe actions
- escalate ambiguous or medium-risk actions
Likely thresholds:
- score < 0.25 -> auto
- 0.25 to 0.60 -> confirm if confidence is weak
- > 0.60 -> confirm
- crisis-sensitive -> always confirm
## Phase 4: Optional Post-Execution Review Lane
Goal:
- allow Pattern 2 only for explicitly reversible operations
Examples:
- maybe low-risk messaging drafts saved locally
- maybe reversible UI actions in specific environments
Important:
- this phase is optional
- Hermes should not rely on Pattern 2 for safety-critical flows
---
## 7. Verification Criteria for the Future Implementation
The eventual implementation should prove all of the following:
1. every tool call receives a scored assessment before dispatch
2. crisis-sensitive outbound actions always require human confirmation
3. dangerous terminal commands still preserve their current pre-execution gate
4. clearly safe read-only tool calls are not slowed by unnecessary prompts
5. assessment traces can be inspected after a run
6. approval decisions remain session-safe across CLI and gateway contexts
---
## 8. Concrete Recommendations
### Recommendation 1
Do **not** replace the current dangerous-command approval path.
Generalize above it.
Why:
- existing terminal Pattern 1 already works
- this is the strongest piece of the current firewall
### Recommendation 2
Add a universal scorer in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`.
Why:
- that is the first point where Hermes knows the tool name and structured arguments
- it is the cleanest place to classify all tool calls uniformly
### Recommendation 3
Treat crisis-sensitive outbound intervention as a separate safety class.
Why:
- issue #878 explicitly calls for Pattern 1 here
- this matches Timmy's SOUL-level safety requirements
### Recommendation 4
Ship scoring traces before enforcement expansion.
Why:
- you cannot tune thresholds you cannot inspect
- false positives will otherwise frustrate normal usage
### Recommendation 5
Use Pattern 3 as the default policy for normal operations.
Why:
- full manual confirmation on every tool call is too expensive
- full autonomy is too risky
- Pattern 3 is the practical middle ground
---
## 9. Bottom Line
Hermes should implement a **two-track human confirmation firewall**:
1. **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate**
- crisis interventions
- destructive terminal actions
- irreversible or safety-critical tool calls
2. **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold**
- all ordinary tool calls
- driven by a universal tool-call assessment layer
- integrated at the central dispatch boundary
Pattern 2 should remain optional and narrow.
It is not the primary answer for Hermes.
The repo already contains the beginnings of this system.
The next step is not new theory.
It is to turn the existing approval path into a true **tool-call-wide human confirmation firewall**.
---
## References
- Issue #878 — Human Confirmation Firewall Implementation Patterns
- Issue #659 — Critical Research Tasks
- `tools/approval.py` — current dangerous-command approval flow and smart approvals
- `model_tools.py` — central tool dispatch boundary
- `gateway/run.py` — blocking approval handling for messaging sessions

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@@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ class AIAgent:
checkpoint_max_snapshots: int = 50,
pass_session_id: bool = False,
persist_session: bool = True,
context_snapshots_enabled: bool | None = None,
context_snapshots_dir: str | None = None,
):
"""
Initialize the AI Agent.
@@ -1131,43 +1129,6 @@ class AIAgent:
except Exception:
_agent_cfg = {}
def _is_enabled(value):
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
return str(value).strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
_debug_cfg = _agent_cfg.get("debug", {}) if isinstance(_agent_cfg, dict) else {}
if not isinstance(_debug_cfg, dict):
_debug_cfg = {}
_snapshot_cfg = _debug_cfg.get("context_snapshots", {})
if not isinstance(_snapshot_cfg, dict):
_snapshot_cfg = {}
_snapshots_env = os.getenv("HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS")
_snapshots_dir_env = os.getenv("HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS_DIR")
if context_snapshots_enabled is None:
if _snapshots_env is not None:
self._context_snapshots_enabled = _is_enabled(_snapshots_env)
else:
self._context_snapshots_enabled = _is_enabled(_snapshot_cfg.get("enabled", False))
else:
self._context_snapshots_enabled = bool(context_snapshots_enabled)
self._context_snapshots_dir = (
context_snapshots_dir
or _snapshots_dir_env
or _snapshot_cfg.get("dir")
or None
)
try:
from agent.context_snapshots import ContextSnapshotRecorder
self._context_snapshot_recorder = ContextSnapshotRecorder(
session_id=self.session_id,
enabled=self._context_snapshots_enabled,
base_dir=self._context_snapshots_dir,
)
except Exception as _snapshot_err:
logger.debug("Context snapshot recorder init failed: %s", _snapshot_err)
self._context_snapshot_recorder = None
# Persistent memory (MEMORY.md + USER.md) -- loaded from disk
self._memory_store = None
self._memory_enabled = False
@@ -8183,17 +8144,12 @@ class AIAgent:
# Use original_user_message (clean input) — user_message may contain
# injected skill content that bloats / breaks provider queries.
_ext_prefetch_cache = ""
_memory_provider_prompt_cache = ""
if self._memory_manager:
try:
_query = original_user_message if isinstance(original_user_message, str) else ""
_ext_prefetch_cache = self._memory_manager.prefetch_all(_query) or ""
except Exception:
pass
try:
_memory_provider_prompt_cache = self._memory_manager.build_system_prompt() or ""
except Exception:
pass
while (api_call_count < self.max_iterations and self.iteration_budget.remaining > 0) or self._budget_grace_call:
# Reset per-turn checkpoint dedup so each iteration can take one snapshot
@@ -8261,8 +8217,6 @@ class AIAgent:
# However, providers like Moonshot AI require a separate 'reasoning_content' field
# on assistant messages with tool_calls. We handle both cases here.
api_messages = []
_current_api_user_message = ""
_current_memory_context_block = ""
for idx, msg in enumerate(messages):
api_msg = msg.copy()
@@ -8277,15 +8231,12 @@ class AIAgent:
_fenced = build_memory_context_block(_ext_prefetch_cache)
if _fenced:
_injections.append(_fenced)
_current_memory_context_block = _fenced
if _plugin_user_context:
_injections.append(_plugin_user_context)
if _injections:
_base = api_msg.get("content", "")
if isinstance(_base, str):
api_msg["content"] = _base + "\n\n" + "\n\n".join(_injections)
if isinstance(api_msg.get("content"), str):
_current_api_user_message = api_msg["content"]
# For ALL assistant messages, pass reasoning back to the API
# This ensures multi-turn reasoning context is preserved
@@ -8320,13 +8271,7 @@ class AIAgent:
from agent.privacy_filter import PrivacyFilter
pf = PrivacyFilter()
# Sanitize messages before they reach the provider
_pf_result = pf.sanitize_messages(api_messages)
if isinstance(_pf_result, tuple):
api_messages, _pf_report = _pf_result
if getattr(pf, "last_report", None) is None:
pf.last_report = _pf_report
else:
api_messages = _pf_result
api_messages = pf.sanitize_messages(api_messages)
if pf.last_report and pf.last_report.had_redactions:
logger.info(f"Privacy Filter: Redacted sensitive data from turn payload. Details: {pf.last_report.summary()}")
except Exception as e:
@@ -8397,27 +8342,6 @@ class AIAgent:
new_tcs.append(tc)
am["tool_calls"] = new_tcs
if self._context_snapshot_recorder:
try:
self._context_snapshot_recorder.record_call(
api_call_count,
system_prompt=effective_system,
memory_provider_system_prompt=_memory_provider_prompt_cache,
memory_prefetch_raw=_ext_prefetch_cache,
memory_context_block=_current_memory_context_block,
api_user_message=_current_api_user_message,
api_messages=api_messages,
metadata={
"model": self.model,
"provider": self.provider,
"platform": self.platform or "",
"api_mode": self.api_mode,
"memory_providers": [p.name for p in getattr(self._memory_manager, "providers", [])],
},
)
except Exception as _snapshot_err:
logger.debug("Context snapshot capture failed: %s", _snapshot_err)
# Calculate approximate request size for logging
total_chars = sum(len(str(msg)) for msg in api_messages)
approx_tokens = estimate_messages_tokens_rough(api_messages)

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@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
from pathlib import Path
from agent.context_snapshots import ContextSnapshotRecorder
def test_disabled_recorder_writes_nothing(tmp_path):
recorder = ContextSnapshotRecorder(session_id="session-1", enabled=False, base_dir=tmp_path)
out = recorder.record_call(
1,
system_prompt="system",
api_messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
)
assert out is None
assert not (tmp_path / "session-1").exists()
def test_enabled_recorder_writes_expected_artifacts(tmp_path):
recorder = ContextSnapshotRecorder(session_id="session-1", enabled=True, base_dir=tmp_path)
out = recorder.record_call(
1,
system_prompt="system prompt",
memory_provider_system_prompt="# Hindsight Memory\nActive.",
memory_prefetch_raw="- remembered fact",
memory_context_block="<memory-context>\nremembered\n</memory-context>",
api_user_message="What do I prefer?\n\n<memory-context>\nremembered\n</memory-context>",
api_messages=[
{"role": "system", "content": "system prompt"},
{"role": "user", "content": "What do I prefer?"},
],
metadata={"provider": "openai", "memory_providers": ["builtin", "hindsight"]},
)
assert out == tmp_path / "session-1" / "call_001"
assert (out / "system_prompt.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "system prompt"
assert (out / "memory_provider_system_prompt.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8").startswith("# Hindsight Memory")
assert (out / "memory_prefetch_raw.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "- remembered fact"
assert "<memory-context>" in (out / "memory_context_block.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "What do I prefer?" in (out / "api_user_message.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert (out / "api_messages.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8").startswith("[")
assert '"hindsight"' in (out / "metadata.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")

View File

@@ -596,26 +596,3 @@ class TestAvailability:
monkeypatch.setenv("HINDSIGHT_MODE", "local")
p = HindsightMemoryProvider()
assert p.is_available()
def test_local_embedded_profile_defaults_to_agent_identity(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
config_path = tmp_path / "hindsight" / "config.json"
config_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
config_path.write_text(json.dumps({
"mode": "local_embedded",
"llm_provider": "ollama",
"llm_model": "gemma3:12b",
}))
monkeypatch.setattr(
"plugins.memory.hindsight.get_hermes_home",
lambda: tmp_path,
)
p = HindsightMemoryProvider()
p.initialize(
session_id="test-session",
hermes_home=str(tmp_path / "profiles" / "atlas-hindsight"),
platform="cli",
agent_identity="atlas-hindsight",
)
assert p._config["profile"] == "atlas-hindsight"

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@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import importlib
import sys
import types
def _make_tool_defs(*names: str) -> list:
return [
{
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": n,
"description": f"{n} tool",
"parameters": {"type": "object", "properties": {}},
},
}
for n in names
]
def _mock_response(content="Done", finish_reason="stop"):
msg = SimpleNamespace(content=content, tool_calls=None)
choice = SimpleNamespace(message=msg, finish_reason=finish_reason)
return SimpleNamespace(choices=[choice], usage=SimpleNamespace(prompt_tokens=1, completion_tokens=1, total_tokens=2))
def _load_ai_agent():
sys.modules.setdefault("agent.auxiliary_client", types.SimpleNamespace(call_llm=lambda *a, **k: ""))
run_agent = importlib.import_module("run_agent")
return run_agent.AIAgent
def test_run_conversation_writes_context_snapshot_artifacts(tmp_path):
AIAgent = _load_ai_agent()
class _FakePrivacyFilter:
def __init__(self):
self.last_report = None
def sanitize_messages(self, messages):
return list(messages)
with (
patch("run_agent.get_tool_definitions", return_value=_make_tool_defs("web_search")),
patch("run_agent.check_toolset_requirements", return_value={}),
patch("run_agent.OpenAI"),
patch("hermes_cli.plugins.invoke_hook", return_value=[]),
patch.dict(sys.modules, {"agent.privacy_filter": types.SimpleNamespace(PrivacyFilter=_FakePrivacyFilter)}),
):
agent = AIAgent(
api_key="test-key-1234567890",
base_url="https://example.com/v1",
quiet_mode=True,
skip_context_files=True,
skip_memory=True,
context_snapshots_enabled=True,
context_snapshots_dir=str(tmp_path),
)
agent.client = MagicMock()
agent.client.chat.completions.create.return_value = _mock_response(content="Done")
agent._build_system_prompt = MagicMock(return_value="Core system prompt")
agent._memory_manager = MagicMock()
agent._memory_manager.prefetch_all.return_value = "- remembered preference"
agent._memory_manager.build_system_prompt.return_value = "# Hindsight Memory\nActive."
agent._memory_manager.providers = [
SimpleNamespace(name="builtin"),
SimpleNamespace(name="hindsight"),
]
result = agent.run_conversation("What do I prefer?")
assert result["final_response"] == "Done"
call_dir = tmp_path / agent.session_id / "call_001"
assert call_dir.exists()
assert (call_dir / "system_prompt.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "Core system prompt"
assert (call_dir / "memory_provider_system_prompt.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8").startswith("# Hindsight Memory")
assert (call_dir / "memory_prefetch_raw.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "- remembered preference"
assert "<memory-context>" in (call_dir / "memory_context_block.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
api_user_message = (call_dir / "api_user_message.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "What do I prefer?" in api_user_message
assert "remembered preference" in api_user_message
api_messages = (call_dir / "api_messages.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert '"role": "system"' in api_messages
assert '"role": "user"' in api_messages
metadata = (call_dir / "metadata.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert '"hindsight"' in metadata

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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
DOC = ROOT / "docs" / "hindsight-local-eval.md"
def test_hindsight_local_eval_doc_exists_and_covers_switching():
assert DOC.exists(), "missing Hindsight local eval doc"
text = DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for snippet in (
"atlas-baseline",
"atlas-mempalace",
"atlas-hindsight",
"HERMES_HOME",
"HERMES_CONTEXT_SNAPSHOTS",
"memory_prefetch_raw.txt",
"api_user_message.txt",
"local_embedded",
"hindsight/config.json",
):
assert snippet in text