Compare commits
1 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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418e601f74 |
@@ -1,326 +0,0 @@
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Any, Optional
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import httpx
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from agent.anthropic_adapter import _is_oauth_token, resolve_anthropic_token
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from hermes_cli.auth import _read_codex_tokens, resolve_codex_runtime_credentials
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from hermes_cli.runtime_provider import resolve_runtime_provider
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def _utc_now() -> datetime:
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return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class AccountUsageWindow:
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label: str
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used_percent: Optional[float] = None
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reset_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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detail: Optional[str] = None
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class AccountUsageSnapshot:
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provider: str
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source: str
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fetched_at: datetime
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title: str = "Account limits"
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plan: Optional[str] = None
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windows: tuple[AccountUsageWindow, ...] = ()
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details: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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unavailable_reason: Optional[str] = None
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@property
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def available(self) -> bool:
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return bool(self.windows or self.details) and not self.unavailable_reason
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def _title_case_slug(value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
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cleaned = str(value or "").strip()
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if not cleaned:
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return None
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return cleaned.replace("_", " ").replace("-", " ").title()
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def _parse_dt(value: Any) -> Optional[datetime]:
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if value in (None, ""):
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return None
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if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
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return datetime.fromtimestamp(float(value), tz=timezone.utc)
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if isinstance(value, str):
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text = value.strip()
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if not text:
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return None
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if text.endswith("Z"):
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text = text[:-1] + "+00:00"
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try:
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dt = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
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return dt if dt.tzinfo else dt.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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except ValueError:
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return None
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return None
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def _format_reset(dt: Optional[datetime]) -> str:
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if not dt:
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return "unknown"
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local_dt = dt.astimezone()
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delta = dt - _utc_now()
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total_seconds = int(delta.total_seconds())
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if total_seconds <= 0:
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return f"now ({local_dt.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M %Z')})"
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hours, rem = divmod(total_seconds, 3600)
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minutes = rem // 60
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if hours >= 24:
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days, hours = divmod(hours, 24)
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rel = f"in {days}d {hours}h"
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elif hours > 0:
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rel = f"in {hours}h {minutes}m"
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else:
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rel = f"in {minutes}m"
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return f"{rel} ({local_dt.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M %Z')})"
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def render_account_usage_lines(snapshot: Optional[AccountUsageSnapshot], *, markdown: bool = False) -> list[str]:
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if not snapshot:
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return []
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header = f"📈 {'**' if markdown else ''}{snapshot.title}{'**' if markdown else ''}"
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lines = [header]
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if snapshot.plan:
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lines.append(f"Provider: {snapshot.provider} ({snapshot.plan})")
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else:
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lines.append(f"Provider: {snapshot.provider}")
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for window in snapshot.windows:
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if window.used_percent is None:
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base = f"{window.label}: unavailable"
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else:
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remaining = max(0, round(100 - float(window.used_percent)))
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used = max(0, round(float(window.used_percent)))
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base = f"{window.label}: {remaining}% remaining ({used}% used)"
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if window.reset_at:
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base += f" • resets {_format_reset(window.reset_at)}"
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elif window.detail:
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base += f" • {window.detail}"
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lines.append(base)
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for detail in snapshot.details:
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lines.append(detail)
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if snapshot.unavailable_reason:
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lines.append(f"Unavailable: {snapshot.unavailable_reason}")
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return lines
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def _resolve_codex_usage_url(base_url: str) -> str:
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normalized = (base_url or "").strip().rstrip("/")
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if not normalized:
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normalized = "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex"
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if normalized.endswith("/codex"):
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normalized = normalized[: -len("/codex")]
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if "/backend-api" in normalized:
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return normalized + "/wham/usage"
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return normalized + "/api/codex/usage"
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def _fetch_codex_account_usage() -> Optional[AccountUsageSnapshot]:
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creds = resolve_codex_runtime_credentials(refresh_if_expiring=True)
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token_data = _read_codex_tokens()
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tokens = token_data.get("tokens") or {}
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account_id = str(tokens.get("account_id", "") or "").strip() or None
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headers = {
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {creds['api_key']}",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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"User-Agent": "codex-cli",
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}
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if account_id:
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headers["ChatGPT-Account-Id"] = account_id
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with httpx.Client(timeout=15.0) as client:
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response = client.get(_resolve_codex_usage_url(creds.get("base_url", "")), headers=headers)
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response.raise_for_status()
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payload = response.json() or {}
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rate_limit = payload.get("rate_limit") or {}
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windows: list[AccountUsageWindow] = []
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for key, label in (("primary_window", "Session"), ("secondary_window", "Weekly")):
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window = rate_limit.get(key) or {}
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used = window.get("used_percent")
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if used is None:
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continue
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windows.append(
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AccountUsageWindow(
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label=label,
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used_percent=float(used),
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reset_at=_parse_dt(window.get("reset_at")),
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)
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)
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details: list[str] = []
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credits = payload.get("credits") or {}
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if credits.get("has_credits"):
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balance = credits.get("balance")
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if isinstance(balance, (int, float)):
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details.append(f"Credits balance: ${float(balance):.2f}")
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elif credits.get("unlimited"):
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details.append("Credits balance: unlimited")
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return AccountUsageSnapshot(
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provider="openai-codex",
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source="usage_api",
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fetched_at=_utc_now(),
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plan=_title_case_slug(payload.get("plan_type")),
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windows=tuple(windows),
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details=tuple(details),
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)
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def _fetch_anthropic_account_usage() -> Optional[AccountUsageSnapshot]:
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token = (resolve_anthropic_token() or "").strip()
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if not token:
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return None
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if not _is_oauth_token(token):
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return AccountUsageSnapshot(
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provider="anthropic",
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source="oauth_usage_api",
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fetched_at=_utc_now(),
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unavailable_reason="Anthropic account limits are only available for OAuth-backed Claude accounts.",
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)
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headers = {
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"anthropic-beta": "oauth-2025-04-20",
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"User-Agent": "claude-code/2.1.0",
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}
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with httpx.Client(timeout=15.0) as client:
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response = client.get("https://api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage", headers=headers)
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response.raise_for_status()
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payload = response.json() or {}
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windows: list[AccountUsageWindow] = []
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mapping = (
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("five_hour", "Current session"),
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("seven_day", "Current week"),
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("seven_day_opus", "Opus week"),
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("seven_day_sonnet", "Sonnet week"),
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)
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for key, label in mapping:
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window = payload.get(key) or {}
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util = window.get("utilization")
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if util is None:
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continue
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used = float(util) * 100 if float(util) <= 1 else float(util)
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windows.append(
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AccountUsageWindow(
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label=label,
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used_percent=used,
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reset_at=_parse_dt(window.get("resets_at")),
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)
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)
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details: list[str] = []
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extra = payload.get("extra_usage") or {}
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if extra.get("is_enabled"):
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used_credits = extra.get("used_credits")
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monthly_limit = extra.get("monthly_limit")
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currency = extra.get("currency") or "USD"
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if isinstance(used_credits, (int, float)) and isinstance(monthly_limit, (int, float)):
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details.append(
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f"Extra usage: {used_credits:.2f} / {monthly_limit:.2f} {currency}"
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)
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return AccountUsageSnapshot(
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provider="anthropic",
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source="oauth_usage_api",
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fetched_at=_utc_now(),
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windows=tuple(windows),
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details=tuple(details),
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)
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def _fetch_openrouter_account_usage(base_url: Optional[str], api_key: Optional[str]) -> Optional[AccountUsageSnapshot]:
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runtime = resolve_runtime_provider(
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requested="openrouter",
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explicit_base_url=base_url,
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explicit_api_key=api_key,
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)
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token = str(runtime.get("api_key", "") or "").strip()
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if not token:
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return None
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normalized = str(runtime.get("base_url", "") or "").rstrip("/")
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credits_url = f"{normalized}/credits"
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key_url = f"{normalized}/key"
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headers = {
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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}
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with httpx.Client(timeout=10.0) as client:
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credits_resp = client.get(credits_url, headers=headers)
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credits_resp.raise_for_status()
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credits = (credits_resp.json() or {}).get("data") or {}
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try:
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key_resp = client.get(key_url, headers=headers)
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key_resp.raise_for_status()
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key_data = (key_resp.json() or {}).get("data") or {}
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except Exception:
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key_data = {}
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total_credits = float(credits.get("total_credits") or 0.0)
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total_usage = float(credits.get("total_usage") or 0.0)
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details = [f"Credits balance: ${max(0.0, total_credits - total_usage):.2f}"]
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windows: list[AccountUsageWindow] = []
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limit = key_data.get("limit")
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limit_remaining = key_data.get("limit_remaining")
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limit_reset = str(key_data.get("limit_reset") or "").strip()
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usage = key_data.get("usage")
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if (
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isinstance(limit, (int, float))
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and float(limit) > 0
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and isinstance(limit_remaining, (int, float))
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and 0 <= float(limit_remaining) <= float(limit)
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):
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limit_value = float(limit)
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remaining_value = float(limit_remaining)
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used_percent = ((limit_value - remaining_value) / limit_value) * 100
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detail_parts = [f"${remaining_value:.2f} of ${limit_value:.2f} remaining"]
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if limit_reset:
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detail_parts.append(f"resets {limit_reset}")
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windows.append(
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AccountUsageWindow(
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label="API key quota",
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used_percent=used_percent,
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detail=" • ".join(detail_parts),
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)
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)
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if isinstance(usage, (int, float)):
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usage_parts = [f"API key usage: ${float(usage):.2f} total"]
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for value, label in (
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(key_data.get("usage_daily"), "today"),
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(key_data.get("usage_weekly"), "this week"),
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(key_data.get("usage_monthly"), "this month"),
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):
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if isinstance(value, (int, float)) and float(value) > 0:
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usage_parts.append(f"${float(value):.2f} {label}")
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details.append(" • ".join(usage_parts))
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return AccountUsageSnapshot(
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provider="openrouter",
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source="credits_api",
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fetched_at=_utc_now(),
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windows=tuple(windows),
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details=tuple(details),
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)
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def fetch_account_usage(
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provider: Optional[str],
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*,
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base_url: Optional[str] = None,
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api_key: Optional[str] = None,
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) -> Optional[AccountUsageSnapshot]:
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normalized = str(provider or "").strip().lower()
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if normalized in {"", "auto", "custom"}:
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return None
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try:
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if normalized == "openai-codex":
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return _fetch_codex_account_usage()
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if normalized == "anthropic":
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return _fetch_anthropic_account_usage()
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if normalized == "openrouter":
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return _fetch_openrouter_account_usage(base_url, api_key)
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except Exception:
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return None
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return None
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25
cli.py
25
cli.py
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ Usage:
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python cli.py --list-tools # List available tools and exit
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"""
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import concurrent.futures
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import logging
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import os
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import shutil
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@@ -64,7 +63,6 @@ from agent.usage_pricing import (
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format_duration_compact,
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format_token_count_compact,
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)
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from agent.account_usage import fetch_account_usage, render_account_usage_lines
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from hermes_cli.banner import _format_context_length, format_banner_version_label
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_COMMAND_SPINNER_FRAMES = ("⠋", "⠙", "⠹", "⠸", "⠼", "⠴", "⠦", "⠧", "⠇", "⠏")
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@@ -6473,29 +6471,6 @@ class HermesCLI:
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if cost_result.status == "unknown":
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print(f" Note: Pricing unknown for {agent.model}")
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# Account limits -- fetched off-thread with a hard timeout so slow
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# provider APIs don't hang the prompt.
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provider = getattr(agent, "provider", None) or getattr(self, "provider", None)
|
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base_url = getattr(agent, "base_url", None) or getattr(self, "base_url", None)
|
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api_key = getattr(agent, "api_key", None) or getattr(self, "api_key", None)
|
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account_snapshot = None
|
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if provider:
|
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with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as _pool:
|
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try:
|
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account_snapshot = _pool.submit(
|
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fetch_account_usage,
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provider,
|
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base_url=base_url,
|
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api_key=api_key,
|
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).result(timeout=10.0)
|
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except (concurrent.futures.TimeoutError, Exception):
|
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account_snapshot = None
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account_lines = [f" {line}" for line in render_account_usage_lines(account_snapshot)]
|
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if account_lines:
|
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print()
|
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for line in account_lines:
|
||||
print(line)
|
||||
|
||||
if self.verbose:
|
||||
logging.getLogger().setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
|
||||
for noisy in ('openai', 'openai._base_client', 'httpx', 'httpcore', 'asyncio', 'hpack', 'grpc', 'modal'):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
from typing import Dict, Optional, Any, List
|
||||
|
||||
from agent.account_usage import fetch_account_usage, render_account_usage_lines
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# SSL certificate auto-detection for NixOS and other non-standard systems.
|
||||
# Must run BEFORE any HTTP library (discord, aiohttp, etc.) is imported.
|
||||
@@ -6483,38 +6481,6 @@ class GatewayRunner:
|
||||
if cached:
|
||||
agent = cached[0]
|
||||
|
||||
# Resolve provider/base_url/api_key for the account-usage fetch.
|
||||
# Prefer the live agent; fall back to persisted billing data on the
|
||||
# SessionDB row so `/usage` still returns account info between turns
|
||||
# when no agent is resident.
|
||||
provider = getattr(agent, "provider", None) if agent and agent is not _AGENT_PENDING_SENTINEL else None
|
||||
base_url = getattr(agent, "base_url", None) if agent and agent is not _AGENT_PENDING_SENTINEL else None
|
||||
api_key = getattr(agent, "api_key", None) if agent and agent is not _AGENT_PENDING_SENTINEL else None
|
||||
if not provider and getattr(self, "_session_db", None) is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
_entry_for_billing = self.session_store.get_or_create_session(source)
|
||||
persisted = self._session_db.get_session(_entry_for_billing.session_id) or {}
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
persisted = {}
|
||||
provider = provider or persisted.get("billing_provider")
|
||||
base_url = base_url or persisted.get("billing_base_url")
|
||||
|
||||
# Fetch account usage off the event loop so slow provider APIs don't
|
||||
# block the gateway. Failures are non-fatal -- account_lines stays [].
|
||||
account_lines: list[str] = []
|
||||
if provider:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
account_snapshot = await asyncio.to_thread(
|
||||
fetch_account_usage,
|
||||
provider,
|
||||
base_url=base_url,
|
||||
api_key=api_key,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
account_snapshot = None
|
||||
if account_snapshot:
|
||||
account_lines = render_account_usage_lines(account_snapshot, markdown=True)
|
||||
|
||||
if agent and hasattr(agent, "session_total_tokens") and agent.session_api_calls > 0:
|
||||
lines = []
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6572,10 +6538,6 @@ class GatewayRunner:
|
||||
if ctx.compression_count:
|
||||
lines.append(f"Compressions: {ctx.compression_count}")
|
||||
|
||||
if account_lines:
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.extend(account_lines)
|
||||
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
# No agent at all -- check session history for a rough count
|
||||
@@ -6585,18 +6547,12 @@ class GatewayRunner:
|
||||
from agent.model_metadata import estimate_messages_tokens_rough
|
||||
msgs = [m for m in history if m.get("role") in ("user", "assistant") and m.get("content")]
|
||||
approx = estimate_messages_tokens_rough(msgs)
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"📊 **Session Info**",
|
||||
f"Messages: {len(msgs)}",
|
||||
f"Estimated context: ~{approx:,} tokens",
|
||||
"_(Detailed usage available after the first agent response)_",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if account_lines:
|
||||
lines.append("")
|
||||
lines.extend(account_lines)
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
if account_lines:
|
||||
return "\n".join(account_lines)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"📊 **Session Info**\n"
|
||||
f"Messages: {len(msgs)}\n"
|
||||
f"Estimated context: ~{approx:,} tokens\n"
|
||||
f"_(Detailed usage available after the first agent response)_"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return "No usage data available for this session."
|
||||
|
||||
async def _handle_insights_command(self, event: MessageEvent) -> str:
|
||||
|
||||
515
research_human_confirmation_firewall.md
Normal file
515
research_human_confirmation_firewall.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,515 @@
|
||||
# Human Confirmation Firewall: Research Report
|
||||
## Implementation Patterns for Hermes Agent
|
||||
|
||||
**Issue:** #878
|
||||
**Parent:** #659
|
||||
**Priority:** P0
|
||||
**Scope:** Human-in-the-loop safety patterns for tool calls, crisis handling, and irreversible actions
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Executive Summary
|
||||
|
||||
Hermes already has a partial human confirmation firewall, but it is narrow.
|
||||
|
||||
Current repo state shows:
|
||||
- a real **pre-execution gate** for dangerous terminal commands in `tools/approval.py`
|
||||
- a partial **confidence-threshold path** via `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
|
||||
- gateway support for blocking approval resolution in `gateway/run.py`
|
||||
|
||||
What is still missing is the core recommendation from this research issue:
|
||||
- **confidence scoring on all tool calls**, not just terminal commands that already matched a dangerous regex
|
||||
- a **hard pre-execution human gate for crisis interventions**, especially any action that would auto-respond to suicidal content
|
||||
- a consistent way to classify actions into:
|
||||
1. pre-execution gate
|
||||
2. post-execution review
|
||||
3. confidence-threshold execution
|
||||
|
||||
Recommendation:
|
||||
- use **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate** for crisis interventions and irreversible/high-impact actions
|
||||
- use **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold** for normal operations
|
||||
- reserve **Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review** only for low-risk and reversible actions
|
||||
|
||||
The next implementation step should be a **tool-call risk assessment layer** that runs before dispatch in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`, assigns a score and pattern to every tool call, and routes only the highest-risk calls into mandatory human confirmation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. The Three Proven Patterns
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate
|
||||
|
||||
Definition:
|
||||
- halt before execution
|
||||
- show the proposed action to the human
|
||||
- require explicit approval or denial
|
||||
|
||||
Best for:
|
||||
- destructive actions
|
||||
- irreversible side effects
|
||||
- crisis interventions
|
||||
- actions that affect another human's safety, money, infrastructure, or private data
|
||||
|
||||
Strengths:
|
||||
- strongest safety guarantee
|
||||
- simplest audit story
|
||||
- prevents the most catastrophic failure mode: acting first and apologizing later
|
||||
|
||||
Weaknesses:
|
||||
- adds latency
|
||||
- creates operator burden if overused
|
||||
- should not be applied to every ordinary tool call
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 2: Post-Execution Review
|
||||
|
||||
Definition:
|
||||
- execute first
|
||||
- expose result to human
|
||||
- allow rollback or follow-up correction
|
||||
|
||||
Best for:
|
||||
- reversible operations
|
||||
- low-risk actions with fast recovery
|
||||
- tasks where human review matters but immediate execution is acceptable
|
||||
|
||||
Strengths:
|
||||
- low friction
|
||||
- fast iteration
|
||||
- useful when rollback is practical
|
||||
|
||||
Weaknesses:
|
||||
- unsafe for crisis or destructive actions
|
||||
- only works when rollback actually exists
|
||||
- a poor fit for external communication or life-safety contexts
|
||||
|
||||
### Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold
|
||||
|
||||
Definition:
|
||||
- compute a risk/confidence score before execution
|
||||
- auto-execute high-confidence safe actions
|
||||
- request confirmation for lower-confidence or higher-risk actions
|
||||
|
||||
Best for:
|
||||
- mixed-risk tool ecosystems
|
||||
- day-to-day operations where always-confirm would be too expensive
|
||||
- systems with a large volume of ordinary, safe reads and edits
|
||||
|
||||
Strengths:
|
||||
- best balance of speed and safety
|
||||
- scales across many tool types
|
||||
- allows targeted human attention where it matters most
|
||||
|
||||
Weaknesses:
|
||||
- depends on a good scoring model
|
||||
- weak scoring creates false negatives or unnecessary prompts
|
||||
- must remain inspectable and debuggable
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. What Hermes Already Has
|
||||
|
||||
## 2.1 Existing Pre-Execution Gate for Dangerous Terminal Commands
|
||||
|
||||
`tools/approval.py` already implements a real pre-execution confirmation path for dangerous shell commands.
|
||||
|
||||
Observed components:
|
||||
- `DANGEROUS_PATTERNS`
|
||||
- `detect_dangerous_command()`
|
||||
- `prompt_dangerous_approval()`
|
||||
- `check_dangerous_command()`
|
||||
- gateway queueing and resolution support in the same module
|
||||
|
||||
This is already Pattern 1.
|
||||
|
||||
Current behavior:
|
||||
- dangerous terminal commands are detected before execution
|
||||
- the user can allow once / session / always / deny
|
||||
- gateway sessions can block until approval resolves
|
||||
|
||||
This is a strong foundation, but it is limited to a subset of terminal commands.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2.2 Partial Confidence Threshold via Smart Approvals
|
||||
|
||||
Hermes also already has a partial Pattern 3.
|
||||
|
||||
Observed component:
|
||||
- `_smart_approve()` in `tools/approval.py`
|
||||
|
||||
Current behavior:
|
||||
- only runs **after** a command has already been flagged by dangerous-pattern detection
|
||||
- uses the auxiliary LLM to decide:
|
||||
- approve
|
||||
- deny
|
||||
- escalate
|
||||
|
||||
This means Hermes has a confidence-threshold mechanism, but only for **already-flagged dangerous terminal commands**.
|
||||
|
||||
What it does not yet do:
|
||||
- score all tool calls
|
||||
- classify non-terminal tools
|
||||
- distinguish crisis interventions from normal ops
|
||||
- produce a shared risk model across the tool surface
|
||||
|
||||
## 2.3 Blocking Approval UX in Gateway
|
||||
|
||||
`gateway/run.py` already routes `/approve` and `/deny` into the blocking approval path.
|
||||
|
||||
This means the infrastructure for a true human confirmation firewall already exists in messaging contexts.
|
||||
|
||||
That is important because the missing work is not "invent human approval from zero."
|
||||
The missing work is:
|
||||
- expand the scope from dangerous shell commands to **all tool calls that matter**
|
||||
- make the routing policy explicit and inspectable
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. What Hermes Still Lacks
|
||||
|
||||
## 3.1 No Universal Tool-Call Risk Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
The current approval system is command-pattern-centric.
|
||||
It is not yet a tool-call firewall.
|
||||
|
||||
Missing capability:
|
||||
- before dispatch, every tool call should receive a structured assessment:
|
||||
- tool name
|
||||
- side-effect class
|
||||
- reversibility
|
||||
- human-impact potential
|
||||
- crisis relevance
|
||||
- confidence score
|
||||
- recommended confirmation pattern
|
||||
|
||||
Natural insertion point:
|
||||
- `model_tools.handle_function_call()`
|
||||
|
||||
That function already sits at the central dispatch boundary.
|
||||
It is the right place to add a pre-dispatch classifier.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3.2 No Hard Crisis Gate for Outbound Intervention
|
||||
|
||||
Issue #878 explicitly recommends:
|
||||
- Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
|
||||
- never auto-respond to suicidal content
|
||||
|
||||
That recommendation is not yet codified as a global firewall rule.
|
||||
|
||||
Missing rule:
|
||||
- if a tool call would directly intervene in a crisis context or send outward guidance in response to suicidal content, it must require explicit human confirmation before execution
|
||||
|
||||
Examples that should hard-gate:
|
||||
- outbound `send_message` content aimed at a suicidal user
|
||||
- any future tool that places calls, escalates emergencies, or contacts third parties about a crisis
|
||||
- any autonomous action that claims a person should or should not take a life-safety step
|
||||
|
||||
## 3.3 No First-Class Post-Execution Review Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Hermes has approval and denial, but it does not yet have a formal policy for when Pattern 2 is acceptable.
|
||||
|
||||
Without a policy, post-execution review tends to get used implicitly rather than intentionally.
|
||||
|
||||
That is risky.
|
||||
|
||||
Hermes should define Pattern 2 narrowly:
|
||||
- only for actions that are both low-risk and reversible
|
||||
- only when the system can show the human exactly what happened
|
||||
- never for crisis, finance, destructive config, or sensitive comms
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Recommended Architecture for Hermes
|
||||
|
||||
## 4.1 Add a Tool-Call Assessment Layer
|
||||
|
||||
Add a pre-dispatch assessment object for every tool call.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested shape:
|
||||
|
||||
```python
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class ToolCallAssessment:
|
||||
tool_name: str
|
||||
risk_score: float # 0.0 to 1.0
|
||||
confidence: float # confidence in the assessment itself
|
||||
pattern: str # pre_execution_gate | post_execution_review | confidence_threshold
|
||||
requires_human: bool
|
||||
reasons: list[str]
|
||||
reversible: bool
|
||||
crisis_sensitive: bool
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested execution point:
|
||||
- inside `model_tools.handle_function_call()` before `orchestrator.dispatch()`
|
||||
|
||||
Why here:
|
||||
- one place covers all tools
|
||||
- one place can emit traces
|
||||
- one place can remain model-agnostic
|
||||
- one place lets plugins observe or override the assessment
|
||||
|
||||
## 4.2 Classify Tool Calls by Side-Effect Class
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested first-pass taxonomy:
|
||||
|
||||
### A. Read-only
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- `read_file`
|
||||
- `search_files`
|
||||
- `browser_snapshot`
|
||||
- `browser_console` read-only inspection
|
||||
|
||||
Pattern:
|
||||
- confidence threshold
|
||||
- almost always auto-execute
|
||||
- human confirmation normally unnecessary
|
||||
|
||||
### B. Local reversible edits
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- `patch`
|
||||
- `write_file`
|
||||
- `todo`
|
||||
|
||||
Pattern:
|
||||
- confidence threshold
|
||||
- human confirmation only when risk score rises because of path sensitivity or scope breadth
|
||||
|
||||
### C. External side effects
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- `send_message`
|
||||
- `cronjob`
|
||||
- `delegate_task`
|
||||
- smart-home actuation tools
|
||||
|
||||
Pattern:
|
||||
- confidence threshold by default
|
||||
- pre-execution gate when score exceeds threshold or when context is sensitive
|
||||
|
||||
### D. Critical / destructive / crisis-sensitive
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- dangerous `terminal`
|
||||
- financial actions
|
||||
- deletion / kill / restart / deployment in sensitive paths
|
||||
- outbound crisis intervention
|
||||
|
||||
Pattern:
|
||||
- pre-execution gate
|
||||
- never auto-execute on confidence alone
|
||||
|
||||
## 4.3 Crisis Override Rule
|
||||
|
||||
Add a hard override:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
If tool call is crisis-sensitive AND outbound or irreversible:
|
||||
requires_human = True
|
||||
pattern = pre_execution_gate
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
This is the most important rule in the issue.
|
||||
|
||||
The model may draft the message.
|
||||
The human must confirm before the system sends it.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4.4 Use Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
|
||||
|
||||
For non-crisis operations, use Pattern 3.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested logic:
|
||||
- low risk + high assessment confidence -> auto-execute
|
||||
- medium risk or medium confidence -> ask human
|
||||
- high risk -> always ask human
|
||||
|
||||
Key point:
|
||||
- confidence is not just "how sure the LLM is"
|
||||
- confidence should combine:
|
||||
- tool type certainty
|
||||
- argument clarity
|
||||
- path sensitivity
|
||||
- external side effects
|
||||
- crisis indicators
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Recommended Initial Scoring Factors
|
||||
|
||||
A simple initial scorer is enough.
|
||||
It does not need to be fancy.
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested factors:
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Tool class risk
|
||||
- read-only tools: very low base risk
|
||||
- local mutation tools: moderate base risk
|
||||
- external communication / automation tools: higher base risk
|
||||
- shell execution: variable, often high
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Target sensitivity
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- `/tmp` or local scratch paths -> lower
|
||||
- repo files under git -> medium
|
||||
- system config, credentials, secrets, gateway lifecycle -> high
|
||||
- human-facing channels -> high if message content is sensitive
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Reversibility
|
||||
- reversible -> lower
|
||||
- difficult but possible to undo -> medium
|
||||
- practically irreversible -> high
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Human-impact content
|
||||
- no direct human impact -> low
|
||||
- administrative impact -> medium
|
||||
- crisis / safety / emotional intervention -> critical
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 Context certainty
|
||||
- arguments are explicit and narrow -> higher confidence
|
||||
- arguments are vague, inferred, or broad -> lower confidence
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Implementation Plan
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 1: Assessment Without Behavior Change
|
||||
|
||||
Goal:
|
||||
- score all tool calls
|
||||
- log assessment decisions
|
||||
- emit traces for review
|
||||
- do not yet block new tool categories
|
||||
|
||||
Files to touch:
|
||||
- `tools/approval.py`
|
||||
- `model_tools.py`
|
||||
- tests for assessment coverage
|
||||
|
||||
Output:
|
||||
- risk/confidence trace for every tool call
|
||||
- pattern recommendation for every tool call
|
||||
|
||||
Why first:
|
||||
- lets us calibrate before changing runtime behavior
|
||||
- avoids breaking existing workflows blindly
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 2: Hard-Gate Crisis-Sensitive Outbound Actions
|
||||
|
||||
Goal:
|
||||
- enforce Pattern 1 for crisis interventions
|
||||
|
||||
Likely surfaces:
|
||||
- `send_message`
|
||||
- any future telephony / call / escalation tools
|
||||
- other tools with direct human intervention side effects
|
||||
|
||||
Rule:
|
||||
- never auto-send crisis intervention content without human confirmation
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 3: General Confidence Threshold for Normal Ops
|
||||
|
||||
Goal:
|
||||
- apply Pattern 3 to all tool calls
|
||||
- auto-run clearly safe actions
|
||||
- escalate ambiguous or medium-risk actions
|
||||
|
||||
Likely thresholds:
|
||||
- score < 0.25 -> auto
|
||||
- 0.25 to 0.60 -> confirm if confidence is weak
|
||||
- > 0.60 -> confirm
|
||||
- crisis-sensitive -> always confirm
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase 4: Optional Post-Execution Review Lane
|
||||
|
||||
Goal:
|
||||
- allow Pattern 2 only for explicitly reversible operations
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
- maybe low-risk messaging drafts saved locally
|
||||
- maybe reversible UI actions in specific environments
|
||||
|
||||
Important:
|
||||
- this phase is optional
|
||||
- Hermes should not rely on Pattern 2 for safety-critical flows
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Verification Criteria for the Future Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
The eventual implementation should prove all of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1. every tool call receives a scored assessment before dispatch
|
||||
2. crisis-sensitive outbound actions always require human confirmation
|
||||
3. dangerous terminal commands still preserve their current pre-execution gate
|
||||
4. clearly safe read-only tool calls are not slowed by unnecessary prompts
|
||||
5. assessment traces can be inspected after a run
|
||||
6. approval decisions remain session-safe across CLI and gateway contexts
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Concrete Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation 1
|
||||
Do **not** replace the current dangerous-command approval path.
|
||||
Generalize above it.
|
||||
|
||||
Why:
|
||||
- existing terminal Pattern 1 already works
|
||||
- this is the strongest piece of the current firewall
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation 2
|
||||
Add a universal scorer in `model_tools.handle_function_call()`.
|
||||
|
||||
Why:
|
||||
- that is the first point where Hermes knows the tool name and structured arguments
|
||||
- it is the cleanest place to classify all tool calls uniformly
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation 3
|
||||
Treat crisis-sensitive outbound intervention as a separate safety class.
|
||||
|
||||
Why:
|
||||
- issue #878 explicitly calls for Pattern 1 here
|
||||
- this matches Timmy's SOUL-level safety requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation 4
|
||||
Ship scoring traces before enforcement expansion.
|
||||
|
||||
Why:
|
||||
- you cannot tune thresholds you cannot inspect
|
||||
- false positives will otherwise frustrate normal usage
|
||||
|
||||
### Recommendation 5
|
||||
Use Pattern 3 as the default policy for normal operations.
|
||||
|
||||
Why:
|
||||
- full manual confirmation on every tool call is too expensive
|
||||
- full autonomy is too risky
|
||||
- Pattern 3 is the practical middle ground
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Bottom Line
|
||||
|
||||
Hermes should implement a **two-track human confirmation firewall**:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Pattern 1: Pre-Execution Gate**
|
||||
- crisis interventions
|
||||
- destructive terminal actions
|
||||
- irreversible or safety-critical tool calls
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Pattern 3: Confidence Threshold**
|
||||
- all ordinary tool calls
|
||||
- driven by a universal tool-call assessment layer
|
||||
- integrated at the central dispatch boundary
|
||||
|
||||
Pattern 2 should remain optional and narrow.
|
||||
It is not the primary answer for Hermes.
|
||||
|
||||
The repo already contains the beginnings of this system.
|
||||
The next step is not new theory.
|
||||
It is to turn the existing approval path into a true **tool-call-wide human confirmation firewall**.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue #878 — Human Confirmation Firewall Implementation Patterns
|
||||
- Issue #659 — Critical Research Tasks
|
||||
- `tools/approval.py` — current dangerous-command approval flow and smart approvals
|
||||
- `model_tools.py` — central tool dispatch boundary
|
||||
- `gateway/run.py` — blocking approval handling for messaging sessions
|
||||
@@ -175,79 +175,3 @@ class TestUsageCachedAgent:
|
||||
result = await runner._handle_usage_command(event)
|
||||
|
||||
assert "Cost: included" in result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestUsageAccountSection:
|
||||
"""Account-limits section appended to /usage output."""
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_usage_command_includes_account_section(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
agent = _make_mock_agent(provider="openai-codex")
|
||||
agent.base_url = "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex"
|
||||
agent.api_key = "unused"
|
||||
runner = _make_runner(SK, cached_agent=agent)
|
||||
event = MagicMock()
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"gateway.run.fetch_account_usage",
|
||||
lambda provider, base_url=None, api_key=None: object(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"gateway.run.render_account_usage_lines",
|
||||
lambda snapshot, markdown=False: [
|
||||
"📈 **Account limits**",
|
||||
"Provider: openai-codex (Pro)",
|
||||
"Session: 85% remaining (15% used)",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch("agent.rate_limit_tracker.format_rate_limit_compact", return_value="RPM: 50/60"), \
|
||||
patch("agent.usage_pricing.estimate_usage_cost") as mock_cost:
|
||||
mock_cost.return_value = MagicMock(amount_usd=None, status="included")
|
||||
result = await runner._handle_usage_command(event)
|
||||
|
||||
assert "📊 **Session Token Usage**" in result
|
||||
assert "📈 **Account limits**" in result
|
||||
assert "Provider: openai-codex (Pro)" in result
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.asyncio
|
||||
async def test_usage_command_uses_persisted_provider_when_agent_not_running(self, monkeypatch):
|
||||
runner = _make_runner(SK)
|
||||
runner._session_db = MagicMock()
|
||||
runner._session_db.get_session.return_value = {
|
||||
"billing_provider": "openai-codex",
|
||||
"billing_base_url": "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex",
|
||||
}
|
||||
session_entry = MagicMock()
|
||||
session_entry.session_id = "sess-1"
|
||||
runner.session_store.get_or_create_session.return_value = session_entry
|
||||
runner.session_store.load_transcript.return_value = [
|
||||
{"role": "user", "content": "earlier"},
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
calls = {}
|
||||
|
||||
async def _fake_to_thread(fn, *args, **kwargs):
|
||||
calls["args"] = args
|
||||
calls["kwargs"] = kwargs
|
||||
return fn(*args, **kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr("gateway.run.asyncio.to_thread", _fake_to_thread)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"gateway.run.fetch_account_usage",
|
||||
lambda provider, base_url=None, api_key=None: object(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"gateway.run.render_account_usage_lines",
|
||||
lambda snapshot, markdown=False: [
|
||||
"📈 **Account limits**",
|
||||
"Provider: openai-codex (Pro)",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
event = MagicMock()
|
||||
result = await runner._handle_usage_command(event)
|
||||
|
||||
assert calls["args"] == ("openai-codex",)
|
||||
assert calls["kwargs"]["base_url"] == "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex"
|
||||
assert "📊 **Session Info**" in result
|
||||
assert "📈 **Account limits**" in result
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
from agent.account_usage import (
|
||||
AccountUsageSnapshot,
|
||||
AccountUsageWindow,
|
||||
fetch_account_usage,
|
||||
render_account_usage_lines,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _Response:
|
||||
def __init__(self, payload, status_code=200):
|
||||
self._payload = payload
|
||||
self.status_code = status_code
|
||||
|
||||
def raise_for_status(self):
|
||||
if self.status_code >= 400:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {self.status_code}")
|
||||
|
||||
def json(self):
|
||||
return self._payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _Client:
|
||||
def __init__(self, payload):
|
||||
self._payload = payload
|
||||
|
||||
def __enter__(self):
|
||||
return self
|
||||
|
||||
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get(self, url, headers=None):
|
||||
return _Response(self._payload)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _RoutingClient:
|
||||
def __init__(self, payloads):
|
||||
self._payloads = payloads
|
||||
|
||||
def __enter__(self):
|
||||
return self
|
||||
|
||||
def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def get(self, url, headers=None):
|
||||
return _Response(self._payloads[url])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fetch_account_usage_codex(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.resolve_codex_runtime_credentials",
|
||||
lambda refresh_if_expiring=True: {
|
||||
"provider": "openai-codex",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex",
|
||||
"api_key": "***",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage._read_codex_tokens",
|
||||
lambda: {"tokens": {"account_id": "acct_123"}},
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.httpx.Client",
|
||||
lambda timeout=15.0: _Client(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"plan_type": "pro",
|
||||
"rate_limit": {
|
||||
"primary_window": {
|
||||
"used_percent": 15,
|
||||
"reset_at": 1_900_000_000,
|
||||
"limit_window_seconds": 18000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"secondary_window": {
|
||||
"used_percent": 40,
|
||||
"reset_at": 1_900_500_000,
|
||||
"limit_window_seconds": 604800,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"credits": {"has_credits": True, "balance": 12.5},
|
||||
}
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
snapshot = fetch_account_usage("openai-codex")
|
||||
|
||||
assert snapshot is not None
|
||||
assert snapshot.plan == "Pro"
|
||||
assert len(snapshot.windows) == 2
|
||||
assert snapshot.windows[0].label == "Session"
|
||||
assert snapshot.windows[0].used_percent == 15.0
|
||||
assert snapshot.windows[0].reset_at == datetime.fromtimestamp(1_900_000_000, tz=timezone.utc)
|
||||
assert "Credits balance: $12.50" in snapshot.details
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_render_account_usage_lines_includes_reset_and_provider():
|
||||
snapshot = AccountUsageSnapshot(
|
||||
provider="openai-codex",
|
||||
source="usage_api",
|
||||
fetched_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
|
||||
plan="Pro",
|
||||
windows=(
|
||||
AccountUsageWindow(
|
||||
label="Session",
|
||||
used_percent=25,
|
||||
reset_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
details=("Credits balance: $9.99",),
|
||||
)
|
||||
lines = render_account_usage_lines(snapshot)
|
||||
|
||||
assert lines[0] == "📈 Account limits"
|
||||
assert "openai-codex (Pro)" in lines[1]
|
||||
assert "Session: 75% remaining (25% used)" in lines[2]
|
||||
assert "Credits balance: $9.99" in lines[3]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fetch_account_usage_openrouter_uses_limit_remaining_and_ignores_deprecated_rate_limit(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.resolve_runtime_provider",
|
||||
lambda requested, explicit_base_url=None, explicit_api_key=None: {
|
||||
"provider": "openrouter",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "***",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.httpx.Client",
|
||||
lambda timeout=10.0: _RoutingClient(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/credits": {
|
||||
"data": {"total_credits": 300.0, "total_usage": 10.92}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/key": {
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"limit": 100.0,
|
||||
"limit_remaining": 70.0,
|
||||
"limit_reset": "monthly",
|
||||
"usage": 12.5,
|
||||
"usage_daily": 0.5,
|
||||
"usage_weekly": 2.0,
|
||||
"usage_monthly": 8.0,
|
||||
"rate_limit": {"requests": -1, "interval": "10s"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
snapshot = fetch_account_usage("openrouter")
|
||||
|
||||
assert snapshot is not None
|
||||
assert snapshot.windows == (
|
||||
AccountUsageWindow(
|
||||
label="API key quota",
|
||||
used_percent=30.0,
|
||||
detail="$70.00 of $100.00 remaining • resets monthly",
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert "Credits balance: $289.08" in snapshot.details
|
||||
assert "API key usage: $12.50 total • $0.50 today • $2.00 this week • $8.00 this month" in snapshot.details
|
||||
assert all("-1 requests / 10s" not in line for line in render_account_usage_lines(snapshot))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fetch_account_usage_openrouter_omits_quota_window_when_key_has_no_limit(monkeypatch):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.resolve_runtime_provider",
|
||||
lambda requested, explicit_base_url=None, explicit_api_key=None: {
|
||||
"provider": "openrouter",
|
||||
"base_url": "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1",
|
||||
"api_key": "***",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
||||
"agent.account_usage.httpx.Client",
|
||||
lambda timeout=10.0: _RoutingClient(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/credits": {
|
||||
"data": {"total_credits": 100.0, "total_usage": 25.5}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/key": {
|
||||
"data": {
|
||||
"limit": None,
|
||||
"limit_remaining": None,
|
||||
"usage": 25.5,
|
||||
"usage_daily": 1.25,
|
||||
"usage_weekly": 4.5,
|
||||
"usage_monthly": 18.0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
snapshot = fetch_account_usage("openrouter")
|
||||
|
||||
assert snapshot is not None
|
||||
assert snapshot.windows == ()
|
||||
assert "Credits balance: $74.50" in snapshot.details
|
||||
assert "API key usage: $25.50 total • $1.25 today • $4.50 this week • $18.00 this month" in snapshot.details
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user