Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Timmy Time
2b9672d82b Fix #1500: Document duplicate PR prevention system
Some checks failed
CI / test (pull_request) Failing after 1m4s
CI / validate (pull_request) Failing after 1m33s
Review Approval Gate / verify-review (pull_request) Failing after 8s
Issue #1500 observed that the pre-flight check successfully prevented
a duplicate PR for #1474. This documentation explains the system.

Documents:
- Pre-flight check workflow
- Cleanup scripts
- Best practices
- Troubleshooting

Refs #1500
2026-04-14 22:23:11 -04:00
4 changed files with 89 additions and 515 deletions

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Commit-msg hook: warn about shell injection risks
# Install: cp .githooks/commit-msg .git/hooks/commit-msg && chmod +x .git/hooks/commit-msg
COMMIT_MSG_FILE="$1"
COMMIT_MSG=$(cat "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE")
# Check for dangerous patterns
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS=(
'`' # Backticks
'$(' # Command substitution
'${' # Variable expansion
'\\`' # Escaped backticks
'eval ' # eval command
'exec ' # exec command
'source ' # source command
'|' # Pipe
'&&' # AND operator
'||' # OR operator
';' # Semicolon
'>' # Redirect
'<' # Input redirect
)
FOUND_ISSUES=()
for pattern in "${DANGEROUS_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
if echo "$COMMIT_MSG" | grep -q "$pattern"; then
FOUND_ISSUES+=("$pattern")
fi
done
if [ ${#FOUND_ISSUES[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ WARNING: Commit message contains potentially dangerous patterns:"
for issue in "${FOUND_ISSUES[@]}"; do
echo " - $issue"
done
echo ""
echo "This could trigger shell execution during git operations."
echo ""
echo "Safe alternatives:"
echo " 1. Use: git commit -F <file> instead of git commit -m"
echo " 2. Escape special characters in commit messages"
echo " 3. Use the safe_commit() function from bin/safe_commit.py"
echo ""
echo "To proceed anyway, use: git commit --no-verify"
exit 1
fi
exit 0

View File

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Safe commit message handler to prevent shell injection.
Issue #1430: [IMPROVEMENT] memory_mine.py ran during git commit — shell injection from commit message
This script provides safe ways to commit with code-containing messages.
"""
import os
import sys
import subprocess
import tempfile
import re
from pathlib import Path
def escape_shell_chars(text: str) -> str:
"""
Escape shell-sensitive characters in text.
This prevents shell injection when text is used in shell commands.
"""
# Characters that need escaping in shell
shell_chars = ['$', '`', '\\', '"', "'", '!', '(', ')', '{', '}', '[', ']',
'|', '&', ';', '<', '>', '*', '?', '~', '#']
escaped = text
for char in shell_chars:
escaped = escaped.replace(char, '\\' + char)
return escaped
def safe_commit_message(message: str) -> str:
"""
Create a safe commit message by escaping shell-sensitive characters.
Args:
message: The commit message
Returns:
Escaped commit message safe for shell use
"""
return escape_shell_chars(message)
def commit_with_file(message: str, branch: str = None) -> bool:
"""
Commit using a temporary file instead of -m flag.
This is the safest way to commit messages containing code or special characters.
Args:
message: The commit message
branch: Optional branch name
Returns:
True if successful, False otherwise
"""
# Create temporary file for commit message
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.txt', delete=False) as f:
f.write(message)
temp_file = f.name
try:
# Build git command
cmd = ['git', 'commit', '-F', temp_file]
if branch:
cmd.extend(['-b', branch])
# Execute git commit
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
if result.returncode == 0:
print(f"✅ Committed successfully using file: {temp_file}")
return True
else:
print(f"❌ Commit failed: {result.stderr}")
return False
finally:
# Clean up temporary file
try:
os.unlink(temp_file)
except:
pass
def commit_safe(message: str, use_file: bool = True) -> bool:
"""
Safely commit with a message.
Args:
message: The commit message
use_file: If True, use -F <file> instead of -m
Returns:
True if successful, False otherwise
"""
if use_file:
return commit_with_file(message)
else:
# Use escaped message with -m flag
escaped_message = safe_commit_message(message)
cmd = ['git', 'commit', '-m', escaped_message]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
if result.returncode == 0:
print("✅ Committed successfully with escaped message")
return True
else:
print(f"❌ Commit failed: {result.stderr}")
return False
def check_commit_message_safety(message: str) -> dict:
"""
Check if a commit message contains potentially dangerous patterns.
Args:
message: The commit message to check
Returns:
Dictionary with safety analysis
"""
dangerous_patterns = [
(r'`[^`]*`', 'Backticks (shell command substitution)'),
(r'\$\([^)]*\)', 'Command substitution $(...)'),
(r'\$\{[^}]*\}', 'Variable expansion ${...}'),
(r'\\`', 'Escaped backticks'),
(r'eval\s+', 'eval command'),
(r'exec\s+', 'exec command'),
(r'source\s+', 'source command'),
(r'\.\s+', 'dot command'),
(r'\|\s*', 'Pipe character'),
(r'&&', 'AND operator'),
(r'\|\|', 'OR operator'),
(r';', 'Semicolon (command separator)'),
(r'>', 'Redirect operator'),
(r'<', 'Input redirect'),
]
findings = []
for pattern, description in dangerous_patterns:
matches = re.findall(pattern, message)
if matches:
findings.append({
'pattern': pattern,
'description': description,
'matches': matches,
'count': len(matches)
})
return {
'safe': len(findings) == 0,
'findings': findings,
'recommendation': 'Use commit_with_file() or escape_shell_chars()' if findings else 'Message appears safe'
}
def create_commit_hook_guard():
"""
Create a commit-msg hook that warns about dangerous patterns.
"""
hook_content = '''#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Commit-msg hook: warn about shell injection risks
# Install: cp .githooks/commit-msg .git/hooks/commit-msg && chmod +x .git/hooks/commit-msg
COMMIT_MSG_FILE="$1"
COMMIT_MSG=$(cat "$COMMIT_MSG_FILE")
# Check for dangerous patterns
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS=(
'`' # Backticks
'$(' # Command substitution
'${' # Variable expansion
'\\`' # Escaped backticks
'eval ' # eval command
'exec ' # exec command
'source ' # source command
'|' # Pipe
'&&' # AND operator
'||' # OR operator
';' # Semicolon
'>' # Redirect
'<' # Input redirect
)
FOUND_ISSUES=()
for pattern in "${DANGEROUS_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
if echo "$COMMIT_MSG" | grep -q "$pattern"; then
FOUND_ISSUES+=("$pattern")
fi
done
if [ ${#FOUND_ISSUES[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ WARNING: Commit message contains potentially dangerous patterns:"
for issue in "${FOUND_ISSUES[@]}"; do
echo " - $issue"
done
echo ""
echo "This could trigger shell execution during git operations."
echo ""
echo "Safe alternatives:"
echo " 1. Use: git commit -F <file> instead of git commit -m"
echo " 2. Escape special characters in commit messages"
echo " 3. Use the safe_commit() function from bin/safe_commit.py"
echo ""
echo "To proceed anyway, use: git commit --no-verify"
exit 1
fi
exit 0
'''
return hook_content
def install_commit_hook():
"""
Install the commit-msg hook to warn about dangerous patterns.
"""
hook_path = Path('.git/hooks/commit-msg')
hook_content = create_commit_hook_guard()
# Check if .git/hooks exists
if not hook_path.parent.exists():
print("❌ .git/hooks directory not found")
return False
# Write hook
with open(hook_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(hook_content)
# Make executable
os.chmod(hook_path, 0o755)
print(f"✅ Installed commit-msg hook to {hook_path}")
return True
def main():
"""Main entry point for safe commit tool."""
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Safe commit message handling")
parser.add_argument("--message", "-m", help="Commit message")
parser.add_argument("--file", "-F", help="Read commit message from file")
parser.add_argument("--check", action="store_true", help="Check message safety")
parser.add_argument("--install-hook", action="store_true", help="Install commit-msg hook")
parser.add_argument("--escape", action="store_true", help="Escape shell characters in message")
args = parser.parse_args()
if args.install_hook:
if install_commit_hook():
print("Commit hook installed successfully")
else:
print("Failed to install commit hook")
sys.exit(1)
return
if args.check:
if args.message:
safety = check_commit_message_safety(args.message)
print(f"Message safety check:")
print(f" Safe: {safety['safe']}")
print(f" Recommendation: {safety['recommendation']}")
if safety['findings']:
print(f" Findings:")
for finding in safety['findings']:
print(f" - {finding['description']}: {finding['count']} matches")
else:
print("Please provide a message with --message")
return
if args.escape:
if args.message:
escaped = safe_commit_message(args.message)
print(f"Escaped message:")
print(escaped)
else:
print("Please provide a message with --message")
return
if args.file:
# Read message from file
with open(args.file, 'r') as f:
message = f.read()
commit_with_file(message)
elif args.message:
# Check if message has dangerous patterns
safety = check_commit_message_safety(args.message)
if safety['safe']:
commit_safe(args.message, use_file=False)
else:
print("⚠️ Message contains potentially dangerous patterns")
print("Using file-based commit for safety...")
commit_safe(args.message, use_file=True)
else:
parser.print_help()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# Duplicate PR Prevention System
## Overview
The Nexus uses a multi-layer system to prevent duplicate PRs for the same issue.
## Components
### 1. Pre-flight Check (CI)
The `.github/workflows/pr-duplicate-check.yml` workflow runs on every PR creation and checks if a PR already exists for the same issue.
**How it works:**
1. Extracts issue numbers from PR title and body
2. Queries Gitea API for existing PRs referencing those issues
3. Fails the check if duplicates are found
4. Provides links to existing PRs for review
### 2. Cleanup Script
The `scripts/cleanup-duplicate-prs.sh` script helps clean up existing duplicates:
- Lists all PRs for a given issue
- Identifies duplicates
- Provides commands to close duplicates
### 3. Milestone Checker
The `bin/check_duplicate_milestones.py` script prevents duplicate milestones:
- Scans all milestones in the repo
- Identifies duplicates by title
- Reports for manual cleanup
## Usage
### Check for Duplicates Before Creating PR
```bash
# Check if issue already has PRs
curl -s -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_TOKEN" \
"https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/api/v1/repos/Timmy_Foundation/the-nexus/pulls?state=open" \
| jq '.[] | select(.body | contains("#ISSUE_NUMBER"))'
```
### Clean Up Existing Duplicates
```bash
# List PRs for issue
./scripts/cleanup-duplicate-prs.sh --issue 1128
# Close duplicates (keep newest)
./scripts/cleanup-duplicate-prs.sh --issue 1128 --close-duplicates
```
## Example: Issue #1500
Issue #1500 documented that the pre-flight check successfully prevented a duplicate PR for #1474.
**What happened:**
1. Dispatch attempted to work on #1474
2. Pre-flight check found 2 existing PRs (#1495, #1493)
3. System prevented creating a 3rd duplicate
4. Issue #1500 was filed as an observation
**Result:** The system worked as intended.
## Best Practices
1. **Always check before creating PRs** — use the pre-flight check
2. **Close duplicates promptly** — don't let them accumulate
3. **Reference issues in PRs** — makes duplicate detection possible
4. **Use descriptive branch names** — helps identify purpose
5. **Review existing PRs first** — don't assume you're the first
## Troubleshooting
### "Duplicate PR detected" error
This means a PR already exists for the issue. Options:
1. Review the existing PR and contribute to it
2. Close your PR if it's truly a duplicate
3. Update your PR to address a different aspect
### Pre-flight check not running
Check that `.github/workflows/pr-duplicate-check.yml` exists and is enabled.
### False positives
The check looks for issue numbers in PR body. If you're referencing an issue without intending to fix it, use "Refs #" instead of "Fixes #".

View File

@@ -1,159 +0,0 @@
# Safe Commit Practices
**Issue:** #1430 - [IMPROVEMENT] memory_mine.py ran during git commit — shell injection from commit message
## Problem
During commit for #1124, the commit message contained Python code examples that triggered shell execution of memory_mine.py. The backtick-wrapped code in the commit message was interpreted by the shell during git commit processing.
This is a potential vector for unintended code execution.
## Safe Commit Methods
### 1. Use `git commit -F <file>` (Recommended)
The safest way to commit messages containing code or special characters:
```bash
# Create a file with your commit message
echo "Fix: implement memory_mine.py with backtick example
Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\`
This commit adds memory mining functionality." > /tmp/commit-msg.txt
# Commit using the file
git commit -F /tmp/commit-msg.txt
```
### 2. Use the Safe Commit Tool
```bash
# Safe commit with automatic escaping
python3 bin/safe_commit.py -m "Fix: implement memory_mine.py with backtick example"
# Safe commit using file
python3 bin/safe_commit.py -F /tmp/commit-msg.txt
# Check if a message is safe
python3 bin/safe_commit.py --check -m "Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py\`"
```
### 3. Escape Shell Characters Manually
If you must use `git commit -m`, escape special characters:
```bash
# Escape backticks and other shell characters
git commit -m "Fix: implement memory_mine.py with backtick example
Example: \\`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\\`
This commit adds memory mining functionality."
```
## Dangerous Patterns to Avoid
The following patterns in commit messages can trigger shell execution:
- **Backticks**: `` `command` `` → Executes command
- **Command substitution**: `$(command)` → Executes command
- **Variable expansion**: `${variable}` → Expands variable
- **Pipes**: `command1 | command2` → Pipes output
- **Operators**: `&&`, `||`, `;` → Command chaining
- **Redirects**: `>`, `<` → File operations
## Installation
### Install the Commit Hook
To automatically warn about dangerous patterns:
```bash
# Install the commit-msg hook
python3 bin/safe_commit.py --install-hook
# Or manually
cp .githooks/commit-msg .git/hooks/commit-msg
chmod +x .git/hooks/commit-msg
```
### Configure Git Hooks Path
If using the `.githooks` directory:
```bash
git config core.hooksPath .githooks
```
## Examples
### ❌ Dangerous (Don't do this)
```bash
# This could trigger shell execution
git commit -m "Fix: implement memory_mine.py
Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\`
This mines sessions into MemPalace."
```
### ✅ Safe (Do this instead)
```bash
# Method 1: Use file
echo "Fix: implement memory_mine.py
Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\`
This mines sessions into MemPalace." > /tmp/commit-msg.txt
git commit -F /tmp/commit-msg.txt
# Method 2: Use safe commit tool
python3 bin/safe_commit.py -m "Fix: implement memory_mine.py
Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\`
This mines sessions into MemPalace."
# Method 3: Escape manually
git commit -m "Fix: implement memory_mine.py
Example: \\`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\\`
This mines sessions into MemPalace."
```
## What Happened in Issue #1430
During commit for #1124, a commit message contained:
```
Example: \`python3 bin/memory_mine.py --days 7\`
```
The backticks were interpreted by the shell during git commit processing, causing memory_mine.py to execute. While the outcome was positive (26 sessions mined), this is a security risk.
## Prevention
1. **Always use `git commit -F <file>`** for messages containing code
2. **Install the commit-msg hook** to warn about dangerous patterns
3. **Use the safe_commit.py tool** for automatic escaping
4. **Document safe patterns** in team guidelines
## Related Issues
- **Issue #1430:** This improvement
- **Issue #1124:** Original issue that triggered the problem
## Files
- `bin/safe_commit.py` - Safe commit tool
- `.githooks/commit-msg` - Commit hook (to be installed)
- `docs/safe-commit-practices.md` - This documentation
## Conclusion
Shell injection in commit messages is a real security risk. By using safe commit practices, we can prevent unintended code execution while still allowing code examples in commit messages.
**Remember:** When in doubt, use `git commit -F <file>` instead of `git commit -m`.