feat(security): attack the RC before users do and gate approval on P0 findings (#40)
Quality gates / quality (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Quality gates / quality (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Add an executable abuse suite that drives the real server with synthetic hostile bytes while a counting stub worker records every call that reaches the model boundary, plus the verdict rule that turns those observations into a release decision. - src/release-security-gate.js: nearest-rank latency percentiles, per-case pass/fail derivation that names the field that broke, and the rule that any failing P0 case blocks RC approval while a required class with no verified evidence blocks it too. Reports are redacted and fail closed. - scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs: oversized body, HTML polyglot as JPEG, undecodable bytes, missing consent, non-conforming worker answer, byte-identical replay, concurrent burst, captured log scan, and an out-of-surface deletion case counted only against a real test file. Writes the report, prints the verdict, exits 1 when blocked. - docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md: procedure, rule, and the current finding stated plainly. - Demo: a real run of the suite on camera, printing the verdict it derived instead of a flattering one; CI regenerates the same evidence on every change. The suite currently returns VERDICT: BLOCKED: bytes are trusted from the data-URL label, so an HTML polyglot still reaches the worker and only fails afterwards on schema. That is a finding against #16, not a passing check, and it is why the gate treats a failing case as a block.
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@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ jobs:
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- name: Unit and security tests
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run: |
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npm test
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npm run test:security-attack
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python3 tests/staging-deploy.test.py -v
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python3 tests/corpus-manifest.test.py -v
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python3 tests/corpus-review.test.py -v
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@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ __pycache__/
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*.pyc
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.env
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.env.*
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artifacts/security/
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@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ npm run test:grounded-chat # chat answers cite the ledger, or refuse to answe
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npm run test:photo-lifecycle # photo presence, explicit reveal, remove-photo-keeps-log, delete-all
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npm run test:calibration # the release-gate harness: gates, threshold protocol, refused corpora
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npm run test:review # blind review queue, held-back model answer, an append-only ledger, withdrawals
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npm run test:security-attack # hostile synthetic uploads at the real boundary, with a counting worker (#40)
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npm audit --audit-level=high
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```
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@@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ The reviewer tool ([scripts/review_corpus.py](scripts/review_corpus.py), [contra
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What the corpus is, and what a label may assert, is published rather than implied: [docs/DATASET_CARD.md](docs/DATASET_CARD.md) is generated from the manifest by [scripts/dataset_card.py](scripts/dataset_card.py), so every count on it is read back from real records and every fact the pipeline does not collect (devices, contexts, licenses) is printed as `pending` instead of estimated — a card for a corpus where one contributor straddles two splits is refused, not published. [docs/LABELING_GUIDE.md](docs/LABELING_GUIDE.md) is the reviewer's rulebook: visible form, broad visible color, and photo quality only, visible color is not blood, nothing is diagnosed, and a model suggestion is provisional input to a human decision rather than the label.
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The release candidate is attacked before anyone is asked to trust it. [scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs](scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs) drives the real server with synthetic hostile bytes — an oversized body, an HTML polyglot dressed as a JPEG, undecodable bytes, a request without consent, a worker answer that breaks the schema, a byte-identical replay, and a concurrent burst — while a counting stub worker records every call that reaches the model boundary. [docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md](docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md) owns the rule: any failing P0 case blocks RC approval, and a required class with no executable evidence blocks it too. **It currently returns `VERDICT: BLOCKED`** — bytes are still trusted from the data-URL label, so a hostile file reaches the worker before it fails on schema. That is a published finding against [#16](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/16), not a passing check.
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## Architecture
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```text
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
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# RC Security & Abuse Evidence (#40)
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The release candidate is attacked before users get to it. This page is the procedure and the rule,
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not a stored result: a pasted-in "all clear" is exactly the kind of evidence that stops being true
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after the next commit.
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## Run it
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```bash
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node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs --json artifacts/security/rc-attack-report.json
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```
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Exit codes are part of the contract:
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| Exit | Meaning |
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|---:|---|
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| `0` | `VERDICT: GO` — every case matched its expectation. |
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| `1` | `VERDICT: BLOCKED` — at least one P0 case failed, or a required category has no executable evidence. |
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| `2` | The suite could not complete (target never became ready, vision disabled, no log captured). |
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The suite is a child process of nothing: it starts its own copy of `server.mjs` on a free loopback
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port, points it at a **counting stub worker**, and drives it with synthetic hostile bytes. It never
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contacts a real model provider, never uses a real medical image, and never touches a live user's data.
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## What it does and does not prove
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- It proves what this HTTP boundary did with the bytes it was handed, and whether the worker behind
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it was called. The worker is a stub, so "the provider saw it" is a counted fact, not an inference.
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- It does **not** measure model quality, clinical accuracy, or the safety of the medical/non-diagnostic
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boundary. Those live in the vision, escalation, and clinical-review issues.
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- Latency numbers describe the loopback boundary against a stub. They are not a model benchmark.
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## Cases
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| Case | Class | Severity | Expectation |
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|---|---|---:|---|
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| `ingress-oversized-body` | oversized | P0 | `413`, worker never called |
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| `ingress-polyglot-html` | polyglot | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
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| `ingress-garbage-bytes` | truncated | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
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| `consent-required` | consent | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
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| `model-output-malformed` | malformed | P0 | `503` neutral copy, provider text never echoed |
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| `replay-duplicate-request` | replay | P2 | identical answer, nothing stored server-side |
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| `flood-concurrency` | flood | P1 | burst meets a bound (`429`/overload), not an open pipe |
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| `log-leak-scan` | log | P0 | captured server log carries no image bytes |
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| `deletion-withdrawal` | deletion | P0 | out of surface — counted only when `tests/training-contribution.test.js` exists |
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## The rule
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`src/release-security-gate.js` owns the verdict, so it is testable rather than asserted:
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- A case passes only when **every** expected field matches the observation. A partial match fails and
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names the field that broke (`status 400 expected, observed 200`).
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- **Any** failing P0 case blocks RC approval. P1/P2 failures are recorded as holds.
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- A required class with no executable evidence is `unproven` and blocks the release. Coverage may be
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borrowed from another suite (`out-of-surface` + an evidence path) only after the runner verified
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that file exists — otherwise it blocks.
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- The report is redacted before it is written, and assembly fails closed if any image bytes survive
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redaction. Evidence that carries a photo is worse than no evidence.
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## Current state (read the run, not this line)
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The suite is expected to come back **BLOCKED** until the ingress hardening in
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[#16](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/16) lands: bytes
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are still trusted from the data-URL label, so an HTML file dressed as a JPEG reaches the worker and
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only fails afterwards on schema. That is the finding, and it is why the release gate treats a failing
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case as a block instead of a warning. Queue bounding is
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[#17](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/17) and is held
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here as P1.
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Deletion is governed by the contribution ledger, not by this HTTP boundary; the case stays
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`covered-elsewhere` against `tests/training-contribution.test.js` and blocks if that file disappears.
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## Evidence hygiene
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- The report is written to `artifacts/security/` and must never be committed with a real photo in it.
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- The captured server log is scanned by the same detector (`containsImageBytes`) before it is quoted.
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- Error bodies are recorded as a 120-character snippet; the suite refuses to write a report that
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still contains a data URI or a long base64 run.
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+4
-3
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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"private": true,
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"type": "module",
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"scripts": {
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"test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/draft.test.js tests/suggestion.test.js tests/followup.test.js tests/vision-readiness.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js tests/threat-model.test.js tests/vision-corpus.test.js tests/vision-boundary.test.js tests/worker-benchmark.test.js tests/worker-ready.test.js tests/worker-container.test.js tests/summary.test.js tests/escalation-regression.test.js tests/grounded-chat.test.js tests/photo-lifecycle.test.js tests/training-contribution.test.js tests/portability.test.js tests/abstention-policy.test.js",
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"test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/draft.test.js tests/suggestion.test.js tests/followup.test.js tests/vision-readiness.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js tests/threat-model.test.js tests/vision-corpus.test.js tests/vision-boundary.test.js tests/worker-benchmark.test.js tests/worker-ready.test.js tests/worker-container.test.js tests/summary.test.js tests/escalation-regression.test.js tests/grounded-chat.test.js tests/photo-lifecycle.test.js tests/training-contribution.test.js tests/portability.test.js tests/abstention-policy.test.js tests/release-security-gate.test.js",
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"test:ui": "node tests/ui.acceptance.mjs",
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"test:photo": "node tests/photo-first.acceptance.mjs",
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"test:mobile-capture": "node tests/mobile-capture.acceptance.mjs",
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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"test:grounded-chat": "node tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs",
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"test:photo-lifecycle": "node tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs",
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"test:training-contribution": "node tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs",
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"check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/draft.js && node --check src/suggestion.js && node --check src/followup.js && node --check src/vision-readiness.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check src/vision-corpus.js && node --check src/summary.js && node --check src/photo-lifecycle.js && node --check src/grounded-chat.js && node --check src/training-contribution.js && node --check src/abstention-policy.js && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/manual-fallback.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/provisional-suggestion.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/followup.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/corpus_manifest.py scripts/review_corpus.py scripts/dataset_card.py scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/build_vision_corpus.py scripts/calibration_report.py scripts/operator_backup.py && node --check scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs && node --check scripts/abstention_policy_receipt.mjs && node --check tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/portability.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/worker_ready.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/entrypoint.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/build_image.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/run_worker_container.sh",
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"check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/draft.js && node --check src/suggestion.js && node --check src/followup.js && node --check src/vision-readiness.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check src/vision-corpus.js && node --check src/summary.js && node --check src/photo-lifecycle.js && node --check src/grounded-chat.js && node --check src/training-contribution.js && node --check src/abstention-policy.js && node --check src/release-security-gate.js && node --check scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs && node --check tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/manual-fallback.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/provisional-suggestion.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/followup.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/corpus_manifest.py scripts/review_corpus.py scripts/dataset_card.py scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/build_vision_corpus.py scripts/calibration_report.py scripts/operator_backup.py && node --check scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs && node --check scripts/abstention_policy_receipt.mjs && node --check tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/portability.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/worker_ready.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/entrypoint.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/build_image.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/run_worker_container.sh",
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"check:diff": "bash scripts/check_diff.sh",
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"start": "node server.mjs",
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"test:worker-readiness": "node tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs",
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@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
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"test:review": "python3 tests/corpus-review.test.py",
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"test:dataset-card": "python3 tests/dataset-card.test.py",
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"test:backup": "python3 tests/backup-restore.test.py",
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"test:runbook": "python3 tests/production-runbook.test.py"
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"test:runbook": "python3 tests/production-runbook.test.py",
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"test:security-attack": "node tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs"
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},
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"devDependencies": {
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"playwright": "^1.62.1"
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@@ -1165,6 +1165,76 @@ await caption('Each candidate is scored on test at a threshold chosen on validat
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await caption('One contributor spread across two splits is refused before anything is scored, and a passing verdict is proven only by a fixture engineered to clear it', 3800);
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await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#calibration-report')?.remove());
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// Issue #40 — the RC attack suite is a command line too, and unlike the other cards this one is
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// expected to come back with a verdict that is not flattering. Hostile synthetic bytes go at the
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// real server with a counting stub worker behind it, so "the worker was called" is measured, not
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// inferred. The card prints whatever verdict the suite derived from what it observed; the captions
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// name where a failing fix lives instead of implying the boundary is already safe.
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async function securityAttackSuite() {
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const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'timmy-security-demo-'));
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const reportPath = path.join(directory, 'rc-attack-report.json');
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try {
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const run = await execFileAsync(
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process.execPath,
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['scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs', '--json', reportPath],
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{ cwd: process.cwd() },
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).then(result => ({ code: 0, stdout: result.stdout, stderr: result.stderr }))
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.catch(error => ({ code: typeof error.code === 'number' ? error.code : 1, stdout: error.stdout || '', stderr: error.stderr || '' }));
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if (![0, 1].includes(run.code)) throw new Error(`the attack suite could not complete: ${run.stderr.trim()}`);
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const report = JSON.parse(await readFile(reportPath, 'utf8'));
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if (run.code !== (report.verdict === 'BLOCKED' ? 1 : 0)) {
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throw new Error('the attack suite exit code must match the verdict it published');
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}
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return { report, run };
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} finally {
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await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}
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const securityRun = await securityAttackSuite();
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const securityReport = securityRun.report;
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if (securityReport.cases.length < 8) throw new Error('the RC attack suite must run every named abuse class');
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await tap('[data-view="home"]', 450);
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const caseDetail = (item) => {
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const observed = item.observed || {};
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if ('providerCalls' in observed) return `http ${observed.status} · worker ${observed.providerCalls}`;
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if ('refused' in observed) return `refused ${observed.refused}`;
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if ('imageBytesInLog' in observed) return `image bytes ${observed.imageBytesInLog}`;
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return item.status;
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};
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const securityRows = [
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['command', 'node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs'],
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['target', 'real server · counting stub worker · synthetic bytes'],
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['—', ''],
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];
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for (const item of securityReport.cases) securityRows.push([item.category, `${item.severity} ${item.status} · ${caseDetail(item)}`]);
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securityRows.push(['—', '']);
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securityRows.push(['load', `${securityReport.load.requests} req · p50 ${securityReport.load.p50}ms · p95 ${securityReport.load.p95}ms · abstain ${securityReport.load.abstentions}`]);
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securityRows.push(['verdict', `${securityReport.verdict} · ${securityReport.blocking.length} blocking · ${securityReport.holds.length} held`]);
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for (const item of securityReport.blocking) securityRows.push(['blocks', item.id]);
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const securityCard = await evidenceCard({
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id: 'security-attack',
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title: 'SECURITY ATTACK SUITE',
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subtitle: 'command line, not app UI — real server, counted worker calls',
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rows: securityRows,
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font: '600 9.5px/1.45 ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, monospace',
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keyWidth: 62,
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gap: '1px',
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rowGap: '5px',
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});
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await sleep(420);
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const securityCardProof = await evidenceCardProof('security-attack');
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if (!securityCardProof.ok) throw new Error(`Security card is not fully readable on screen: ${JSON.stringify(securityCardProof)}`);
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for (const item of securityReport.blocking) {
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if (!securityCard.text.includes(item.id)) throw new Error(`the card must name the blocking case ${item.id}`);
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}
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if (!securityCard.text.includes(securityReport.verdict)) throw new Error('the card must show the verdict the suite derived');
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if (!securityCard.text.includes(`${securityReport.load.p95}ms`)) throw new Error('the card must show the p95 the load phase measured');
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await caption('Every hostile upload on screen went at the real server, and the worker behind it counted every call it received', 3800);
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await caption('Refusing bytes by their content is the fix in review, not a claim this video makes: an HTML file dressed as a JPEG still reaches the worker today', 4200);
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await caption('A failing case is a finding the release job has to see, so the card prints the verdict the suite derived instead of a reassuring one', 3800);
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await caption('The gate blocks RC approval on any P0 case that reached the worker — the gate decides, not the caption', 3400);
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await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#security-attack')?.remove());
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// Issue #39 — the operator backup is a command line, not a screen in the app. The app itself keeps
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// no server-side journal, so what an operator can actually lose is the corpus: the append-only
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// manifest with its withdrawal tombstones. This scene builds a synthetic data root with the real
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@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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// RC attack suite (#40): attack the release candidate before users do.
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//
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// Every case drives the shipping `server.mjs` with synthetic hostile bytes while a stub worker counts
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// the calls that reach it. The suite records what it observed and derives a verdict from the
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// observation; it never asserts a result it did not see. No real medical image, no live user data,
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// no third-party provider is involved, and the provider is a counting stub, so "reached the worker"
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// is provable rather than inferred.
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//
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// Usage: node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs [--json <path>] [--base-url <url>]
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// Exit: 0 = GO, 1 = BLOCKED (a P0 finding, or a required category with no executable evidence).
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import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
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import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
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import { access, mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
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import http from 'node:http';
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import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
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import { buildReport, containsImageBytes, latencyPercentiles } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
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const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
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const argument = (name, fallback) => {
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const index = process.argv.indexOf(name);
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return index === -1 ? fallback : process.argv[index + 1];
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};
|
||||
const reportPath = argument('--json', join(repoRoot, 'artifacts/security/rc-attack-report.json'));
|
||||
const explicitBaseUrl = argument('--base-url', '');
|
||||
|
||||
function freePort() {
|
||||
return new Promise(resolve => {
|
||||
const probe = http.createServer();
|
||||
probe.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
|
||||
const { port } = probe.address();
|
||||
probe.close(() => resolve(port));
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A counting OpenAI-compatible worker. `state.content` is the answer the next request receives, and
|
||||
// `state.requests` is the evidence that a request crossed the provider boundary at all.
|
||||
function startStubWorker() {
|
||||
const state = { content: '', requests: 0 };
|
||||
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
|
||||
if (req.url.endsWith('/models')) {
|
||||
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
|
||||
return res.end(JSON.stringify({ data: [{ id: 'stub-vision-worker' }] }));
|
||||
}
|
||||
req.resume();
|
||||
req.on('end', () => {
|
||||
state.requests += 1;
|
||||
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
|
||||
res.end(JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ message: { content: state.content } }] }));
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
return new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve({
|
||||
state,
|
||||
port: server.address().port,
|
||||
close: () => new Promise(done => server.close(done)),
|
||||
})));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The real server, with its own stdout/stderr captured from the first byte: the log scan is only
|
||||
// worth something if it read a log that actually exists.
|
||||
async function startTarget({ providerPort, port }) {
|
||||
const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
|
||||
cwd: repoRoot,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
HOST: '127.0.0.1',
|
||||
PORT: String(port),
|
||||
TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED: 'true',
|
||||
TIMMY_VISION_PROFILE: 'selfhost',
|
||||
TIMMY_VISION_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${providerPort}/v1`,
|
||||
TIMMY_VISION_MODEL: 'stub-vision-worker',
|
||||
TIMMY_VISION_TIMEOUT_MS: '5000',
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
|
||||
});
|
||||
const log = [];
|
||||
child.stdout.on('data', chunk => log.push(chunk.toString('utf8')));
|
||||
child.stderr.on('data', chunk => log.push(chunk.toString('utf8')));
|
||||
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 100; attempt += 1) {
|
||||
if (log.join('').includes('Timmy is listening')) return { child, log };
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/healthz`);
|
||||
if (response.ok) return { child, log };
|
||||
} catch {}
|
||||
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
|
||||
}
|
||||
child.kill();
|
||||
throw new Error('attack suite target did not become ready');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const stop = child => new Promise(resolve => {
|
||||
if (!child || child.exitCode !== null) return resolve();
|
||||
child.kill();
|
||||
child.once('exit', resolve);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
async function main() {
|
||||
const worker = await startStubWorker();
|
||||
const port = explicitBaseUrl ? null : await freePort();
|
||||
const baseUrl = explicitBaseUrl || `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
|
||||
const target = explicitBaseUrl ? null : await startTarget({ providerPort: worker.port, port });
|
||||
const photo = await readFile(join(repoRoot, 'tests/fixtures/synthetic-type4.jpg'));
|
||||
const imageDataUrl = `data:image/jpeg;base64,${photo.toString('base64')}`;
|
||||
|
||||
const post = async (body) => {
|
||||
const before = worker.state.requests;
|
||||
const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/analyze`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const text = await response.text();
|
||||
return { status: response.status, text, providerCalls: worker.state.requests - before };
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const cases = [];
|
||||
const record = (entry) => { cases.push(entry); return entry; };
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const health = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/healthz`).then(response => response.json());
|
||||
if (!health.visionEnabled) throw new Error('the attack suite needs vision analysis enabled on the target');
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. An oversized body must die at the request cap, before the photo is parsed or forwarded.
|
||||
const oversized = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${'A'.repeat(6.6 * 1024 * 1024)}` });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'ingress-oversized-body',
|
||||
category: 'oversized',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'A body over the request cap is refused before any provider work.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 413, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
observed: { status: oversized.status, providerCalls: oversized.providerCalls },
|
||||
snippet: oversized.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Bytes decide the format, not the data-URL label: HTML dressed as a JPEG is a polyglot.
|
||||
const html = Buffer.from('<html><body><script>alert(document.cookie)</script></body></html>');
|
||||
const polyglot = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${html.toString('base64')}` });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'ingress-polyglot-html',
|
||||
category: 'polyglot',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'A payload whose bytes are HTML under an image/jpeg label is refused before the provider sees it.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
observed: { status: polyglot.status, providerCalls: polyglot.providerCalls },
|
||||
snippet: polyglot.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Random bytes under a JPEG label are not an image either.
|
||||
const garbage = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${randomBytes(64).toString('base64')}` });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'ingress-garbage-bytes',
|
||||
category: 'truncated',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'Undecodable bytes are refused rather than forwarded and interpreted.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
observed: { status: garbage.status, providerCalls: garbage.providerCalls },
|
||||
snippet: garbage.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Consent is a precondition, and it is cheap to prove: no consent, no provider call.
|
||||
const noConsent = await post({ consent: false, imageDataUrl });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'consent-required',
|
||||
category: 'consent',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'Analysis without explicit consent is refused and never leaves the boundary.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
observed: { status: noConsent.status, providerCalls: noConsent.providerCalls },
|
||||
snippet: noConsent.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 5. A worker answer outside the schema must fail closed, and the provider's words must not
|
||||
// reach the user or the evidence file.
|
||||
worker.state.content = 'garbage-completion-token: isStool yes maybe, bristolType ten';
|
||||
const malformed = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'model-output-malformed',
|
||||
category: 'malformed',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'A non-conforming provider answer is replaced by neutral copy and never echoed.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 503, providerTextLeaked: false },
|
||||
observed: { status: malformed.status, providerTextLeaked: /garbage-completion-token/.test(malformed.text) },
|
||||
snippet: malformed.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 6. Replay: this boundary holds no session state, so a replay is a second request. What must
|
||||
// hold is that it is answered identically and that nothing accumulates server-side.
|
||||
worker.state.content = JSON.stringify({ isStool: true, bristolType: 4, color: 'brown', confidence: 0.82, imageQuality: 'good', observations: 'Smooth, formed appearance.' });
|
||||
const first = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
|
||||
const second = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'replay-duplicate-request',
|
||||
category: 'replay',
|
||||
severity: 'P2',
|
||||
requirement: 'A byte-identical replay is answered identically and stores nothing on the server.',
|
||||
expected: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1, repeatedAnswerIdentical: true },
|
||||
observed: { status: second.status, providerCalls: second.providerCalls, repeatedAnswerIdentical: first.text === second.text },
|
||||
snippet: second.text.slice(0, 120),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 7. Flood: concurrent requests must meet a bound instead of all reaching the worker at once.
|
||||
const beforeFlood = worker.state.requests;
|
||||
const flood = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 12 }, () => post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl })));
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'flood-concurrency',
|
||||
category: 'flood',
|
||||
severity: 'P1',
|
||||
requirement: 'A burst of concurrent analyses meets a bounded queue or a rate refusal.',
|
||||
expected: { refused: true },
|
||||
observed: { refused: flood.some(item => item.status === 429 || item.status === 503), providerCalls: worker.state.requests - beforeFlood },
|
||||
snippet: `statuses ${[...new Set(flood.map(item => item.status))].sort().join(',')}`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 8. Log inspection: the operator log is committed evidence, so it must not contain the photo.
|
||||
const capturedLog = (target?.log || []).join('');
|
||||
if (!capturedLog.trim()) throw new Error('no server log was captured, so the log scan would prove nothing');
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'log-leak-scan',
|
||||
category: 'log',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
requirement: 'Server logs contain no image bytes, base64, or note text.',
|
||||
expected: { imageBytesInLog: false },
|
||||
observed: { imageBytesInLog: containsImageBytes(capturedLog) },
|
||||
snippet: `${capturedLog.trim().split('\n').length} log line(s) inspected`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// 9. Deletion is governed by the contribution ledger, not by this HTTP boundary. Covering it
|
||||
// here means naming the executable test that does it, and only counting it once verified.
|
||||
let evidenceVerified = false;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await access(join(repoRoot, 'tests/training-contribution.test.js'));
|
||||
evidenceVerified = true;
|
||||
} catch {}
|
||||
record({
|
||||
id: 'deletion-withdrawal',
|
||||
category: 'deletion',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
surface: 'out-of-surface',
|
||||
requirement: 'Withdrawal deletes the contribution and the server holds no copy of the photo.',
|
||||
evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js',
|
||||
evidenceVerified,
|
||||
snippet: evidenceVerified ? 'covered by the contribution ledger suite' : 'named evidence file is missing',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Load: sequential valid analyses, abstaining answers, latency measured with the same boundary.
|
||||
worker.state.content = JSON.stringify({ isStool: false, confidence: 0.9 });
|
||||
const samples = [];
|
||||
let errors = 0;
|
||||
let abstentions = 0;
|
||||
for (let index = 0; index < 8; index += 1) {
|
||||
const started = performance.now();
|
||||
const result = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
|
||||
samples.push(Math.round(performance.now() - started));
|
||||
if (result.status !== 200) errors += 1;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (JSON.parse(result.text).status === 'needs_user_input') abstentions += 1;
|
||||
} catch {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
const percentiles = latencyPercentiles(samples);
|
||||
const load = {
|
||||
requests: samples.length,
|
||||
errors,
|
||||
abstentions,
|
||||
p50: percentiles.p50,
|
||||
p95: percentiles.p95,
|
||||
max: percentiles.max,
|
||||
note: 'Latency measured against a counting stub on loopback; it measures this boundary, not a model.',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const report = buildReport({
|
||||
generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
||||
target: {
|
||||
baseUrl,
|
||||
provider: 'stub counting worker (synthetic answers, no model loaded)',
|
||||
visionProfile: 'selfhost',
|
||||
release: health.release,
|
||||
commit: health.commit,
|
||||
},
|
||||
cases,
|
||||
load,
|
||||
});
|
||||
await mkdir(dirname(reportPath), { recursive: true });
|
||||
await writeFile(reportPath, `${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
const width = Math.max(...cases.map(item => item.id.length));
|
||||
for (const item of report.cases) {
|
||||
const detail = item.status === 'fail' ? ` — ${item.mismatch}` : '';
|
||||
console.log(`${item.id.padEnd(width)} ${item.severity} ${item.status}${detail}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
console.log(`load: ${load.requests} requests · p50 ${load.p50}ms · p95 ${load.p95}ms · errors ${load.errors} · abstentions ${load.abstentions}`);
|
||||
console.log(`report: ${reportPath}`);
|
||||
console.log(`VERDICT: ${report.verdict}`);
|
||||
if (report.verdict === 'BLOCKED') {
|
||||
for (const item of [...report.blocking, ...report.unproven]) console.log(` blocks RC: ${item.id} (${item.severity}) ${item.reason}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return report.verdict === 'GO' ? 0 : 1;
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
await stop(target?.child);
|
||||
await worker.close();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main().then(code => { process.exitCode = code; }).catch(error => {
|
||||
console.error(`attack suite could not complete: ${error.message}`);
|
||||
process.exitCode = 2;
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
|
||||
// Release security gate: the arithmetic and the verdict rule for the RC attack suite (#40).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The suite observes the real server; this module only turns observations into a verdict. Keeping
|
||||
// the rule here (not in the runner) is what makes "a P0 finding blocks RC approval" testable.
|
||||
|
||||
/** Nearest-rank percentile: the returned value is always a sample that was actually measured. */
|
||||
export function latencyPercentiles(samples) {
|
||||
const sorted = [...samples].sort((a, b) => a - b);
|
||||
if (!sorted.length) return { count: 0, p50: null, p95: null, max: null };
|
||||
const rank = (p) => sorted[Math.min(sorted.length - 1, Math.ceil((p / 100) * sorted.length) - 1)];
|
||||
return { count: sorted.length, p50: rank(50), p95: rank(95), max: sorted[sorted.length - 1] };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** One case against one expectation. A partial match is a failure, and it says which field broke. */
|
||||
export function evaluateCase(record) {
|
||||
const mismatches = Object.keys(record.expected)
|
||||
.filter(field => record.observed?.[field] !== record.expected[field])
|
||||
.map(field => `${field} ${record.expected[field]} expected, observed ${record.observed?.[field]}`);
|
||||
return { ...record, status: mismatches.length ? 'fail' : 'pass', mismatch: mismatches.join('; ') };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const SEVERITY_BLOCKS = (severity) => severity === 'P0';
|
||||
|
||||
/** The RC rule: every P0 failure blocks approval, unproven categories block it too, P1/P2 only hold. */
|
||||
export function releaseVerdict({ cases, load = null }) {
|
||||
const evaluated = cases.map(record => (record.surface === 'out-of-surface'
|
||||
? { ...record, status: record.evidenceVerified ? 'covered-elsewhere' : 'unproven' }
|
||||
: evaluateCase(record)));
|
||||
const blocking = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'fail' && SEVERITY_BLOCKS(item.severity))
|
||||
.map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: item.mismatch }));
|
||||
const holds = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'fail' && !SEVERITY_BLOCKS(item.severity))
|
||||
.map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: item.mismatch }));
|
||||
const unproven = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'unproven')
|
||||
.map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: 'no executable evidence' }));
|
||||
return {
|
||||
verdict: blocking.length || unproven.length ? 'BLOCKED' : 'GO',
|
||||
blocking,
|
||||
holds,
|
||||
unproven,
|
||||
coveredElsewhere: evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'covered-elsewhere').map(item => item.id),
|
||||
proven: evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'pass').length,
|
||||
cases: evaluated,
|
||||
load,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Evidence hygiene: the report and the captured server log are committed and quoted. A photo that
|
||||
// survived into either one is a leak of the exact data this suite exists to protect.
|
||||
const IMAGE_DATA_URI = /data:image\/[a-z0-9.+-]+;base64,[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/gi;
|
||||
const LONG_BASE64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{200,}={0,2}/;
|
||||
|
||||
export function containsImageBytes(text) {
|
||||
const value = String(text ?? '');
|
||||
return new RegExp(IMAGE_DATA_URI.source, 'i').test(value) || LONG_BASE64.test(value);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function redactImageBytes(text) {
|
||||
return String(text ?? '')
|
||||
.replace(IMAGE_DATA_URI, '[redacted image bytes]')
|
||||
.replace(new RegExp(LONG_BASE64.source, 'g'), '[redacted image bytes]');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Fails closed rather than emitting evidence that carries a photo. */
|
||||
export function assertNoImageBytes(label, text) {
|
||||
if (containsImageBytes(text)) throw new Error(`${label} contains image bytes; refusing to write release evidence.`);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The receipt the release job quotes. It is redacted after assembly, so a case that captured a
|
||||
* response body still cannot carry a photo in it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function buildReport({ generatedAt, target, cases, load, suite = 'scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs' }) {
|
||||
const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases, load });
|
||||
const report = {
|
||||
schema: 'timmy-rc-security-attack/1',
|
||||
issue: 40,
|
||||
generatedAt,
|
||||
suite,
|
||||
target,
|
||||
verdict: verdict.verdict,
|
||||
blocking: verdict.blocking,
|
||||
holds: verdict.holds,
|
||||
unproven: verdict.unproven,
|
||||
coveredElsewhere: verdict.coveredElsewhere,
|
||||
proven: verdict.proven,
|
||||
cases: verdict.cases.map(({ id, category, severity, requirement, expected, observed, status, mismatch, snippet, surface, evidence }) =>
|
||||
({ id, category, severity, requirement, expected, observed, status, mismatch, surface, evidence, snippet: snippet ? redactImageBytes(snippet) : undefined })),
|
||||
load,
|
||||
disclaimer: 'Synthetic hostile bytes only. Every case drives the real server against a stub worker; no real medical image and no live user data is involved.',
|
||||
};
|
||||
const clean = JSON.parse(redactImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)));
|
||||
assertNoImageBytes('security report', JSON.stringify(clean));
|
||||
return clean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -202,3 +202,14 @@ test('the calibration harness is wired into the unit and syntax gates', async ()
|
||||
assert.match(builder, /tests\/calibration-harness\.test\.py/);
|
||||
assert.match(builder, /"calibration_harness_gates": "passed"/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('CI runs the RC attack suite so its evidence is reproducible on every change', async () => {
|
||||
const workflow = await readFile(workflowPath, 'utf8');
|
||||
const packageJson = JSON.parse(await readFile(packagePath, 'utf8'));
|
||||
|
||||
// Issue #40: the attack report is evidence, not a claim. CI has to be able to regenerate it.
|
||||
assert.match(workflow, /npm run test:security-attack/);
|
||||
assert.equal(packageJson.scripts['test:security-attack'], 'node tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs');
|
||||
assert.match(packageJson.scripts.test, /tests\/release-security-gate\.test\.js/);
|
||||
assert.match(packageJson.scripts['check:syntax'], /node --check src\/release-security-gate\.js/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -520,3 +520,19 @@ test('release demo runs the operator backup and restore on synthetic records ins
|
||||
assert.match(builder, /The operator backup is a command line, not a screen in the app/);
|
||||
assert.match(builder, /A restore returns the same records, including the withdrawal tombstone a trainer must never lose/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('release demo runs the RC attack suite on camera and prints the verdict it derived', async () => {
|
||||
const demo = await readFile(demoPath, 'utf8');
|
||||
|
||||
// Issue #40 turns hostile uploads into a release gate. The scene must run the real suite, not
|
||||
// describe it, and the card must show the verdict the suite derived rather than a flattering one.
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /scripts\/security_attack_suite\.mjs', '--json'/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /SECURITY ATTACK SUITE/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /Every hostile upload on screen went at the real server, and the worker behind it counted every call it received/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /A failing case is a finding the release job has to see, so the card prints the verdict the suite derived/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /The gate blocks RC approval on any P0 case that reached the worker/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /securityReport\.verdict/);
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /securityCardProof/);
|
||||
// The finding must name where the fix lives instead of implying the boundary is already safe.
|
||||
assert.match(demo, /Refusing bytes by their content is the fix in review, not a claim this video makes/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
||||
import test from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
|
||||
import { buildReport, containsImageBytes, evaluateCase, latencyPercentiles, redactImageBytes, releaseVerdict } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
|
||||
|
||||
test('latency percentiles use nearest-rank so p95 is an observed sample, not an interpolation', () => {
|
||||
const samples = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100];
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(latencyPercentiles(samples), { count: 10, p50: 50, p95: 100, max: 100 });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// A case is a promise the suite makes before it runs: this input must land here, and the provider
|
||||
// must (or must not) see exactly this many calls. The verdict is derived, never typed.
|
||||
const polyglot = {
|
||||
id: 'ingress-polyglot-html',
|
||||
severity: 'P0',
|
||||
expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
observed: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
test('a case whose observation matches its expectation passes', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(evaluateCase(polyglot).status, 'pass');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a case that reached the provider is a failure that names the field that broke', () => {
|
||||
const result = evaluateCase({ ...polyglot, observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1 } });
|
||||
assert.equal(result.status, 'fail');
|
||||
assert.match(result.mismatch, /status 400 expected, observed 200/);
|
||||
assert.match(result.mismatch, /providerCalls 0 expected, observed 1/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a P0 failure blocks the release, and a P1 failure only holds it', () => {
|
||||
const leaked = { ...polyglot, observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1 } };
|
||||
const blocked = releaseVerdict({ cases: [leaked, { ...polyglot, id: 'flood', severity: 'P1', observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 12 } }] });
|
||||
assert.equal(blocked.verdict, 'BLOCKED');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocked.blocking.map(item => item.id), ['ingress-polyglot-html']);
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(blocked.holds.map(item => item.id), ['flood']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a suite with no failures is a GO, and counts say how many cases were proven', () => {
|
||||
const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot] });
|
||||
assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'GO');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(verdict.blocking, []);
|
||||
assert.equal(verdict.proven, 1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a required category that no case exercised blocks the release instead of passing by omission', () => {
|
||||
const deletion = { id: 'deletion-withdrawal', severity: 'P0', surface: 'out-of-surface', evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js', evidenceVerified: false };
|
||||
const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot, deletion] });
|
||||
assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'BLOCKED');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(verdict.unproven.map(item => item.id), ['deletion-withdrawal']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('coverage borrowed from another test file only counts once the runner verified that file exists', () => {
|
||||
const verified = { id: 'deletion-withdrawal', severity: 'P0', surface: 'out-of-surface', evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js', evidenceVerified: true };
|
||||
const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot, verified] });
|
||||
assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'GO');
|
||||
assert.deepEqual(verdict.coveredElsewhere, ['deletion-withdrawal']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// The report and the server log are shipped as release evidence. Neither may carry a photo.
|
||||
const JPEG_DATA_URI = '';
|
||||
|
||||
test('a data URI or a long base64 run is recognised as image bytes', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(`posted ${JPEG_DATA_URI} to the worker`), true);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes('chunk ' + 'A'.repeat(64) + 'yQ'.repeat(200)), true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('ordinary log lines, hex digests, and short tokens are not image bytes', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes('Timmy is listening on http://127.0.0.1:4173 · vision configured · Hermes locked and ready'), false);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes('sha256 ' + 'a1b2c3d4'.repeat(8)), false);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes('case ingress-polyglot-html observed status 200'), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('redaction removes the bytes and keeps the sentence around them honest', () => {
|
||||
const redacted = redactImageBytes(`provider received ${JPEG_DATA_URI} at 12:01`);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(redacted), false);
|
||||
assert.match(redacted, /\[redacted image bytes\]/);
|
||||
assert.match(redacted, /^provider received .* at 12:01$/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the report carries the verdict, the target it ran against, and the measured load numbers', () => {
|
||||
const report = buildReport({
|
||||
generatedAt: '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z',
|
||||
target: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', provider: 'stub counting worker' },
|
||||
cases: [polyglot],
|
||||
load: { requests: 8, errors: 0, abstentions: 8, p50: 12, p95: 40, max: 40 },
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(report.schema, 'timmy-rc-security-attack/1');
|
||||
assert.equal(report.verdict, 'GO');
|
||||
assert.equal(report.generatedAt, '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z');
|
||||
assert.equal(report.target.provider, 'stub counting worker');
|
||||
assert.equal(report.load.p95, 40);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a case that quotes a response body cannot smuggle the photo into the report', () => {
|
||||
const report = buildReport({
|
||||
generatedAt: '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z',
|
||||
target: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', provider: 'stub' },
|
||||
cases: [{ ...polyglot, observed: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 }, snippet: `refused ${JPEG_DATA_URI}` }],
|
||||
load: null,
|
||||
});
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)), false);
|
||||
assert.match(JSON.stringify(report), /redacted image bytes/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
|
||||
// Acceptance: the RC attack suite must drive the real server and then tell the truth about what it
|
||||
// saw. Nothing here trusts the runner's own summary line: every case status is re-derived from the
|
||||
// recorded observation with the same rule the release gate uses, and the report is scanned for photo
|
||||
// bytes. If the suite ever marks a case pass while observing a mismatch, this test fails.
|
||||
import test from 'node:test';
|
||||
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
|
||||
import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
|
||||
import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
||||
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
|
||||
import { join } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { containsImageBytes, evaluateCase, releaseVerdict } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const repoRoot = new URL('..', import.meta.url).pathname;
|
||||
|
||||
async function runSuite() {
|
||||
const directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-rc-attack-'));
|
||||
const reportPath = join(directory, 'report.json');
|
||||
const run = await new Promise(resolve => {
|
||||
execFile(process.execPath, ['scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs', '--json', reportPath], {
|
||||
cwd: repoRoot,
|
||||
timeout: 180_000,
|
||||
}, (error, stdout, stderr) => resolve({
|
||||
code: error?.code ?? 0,
|
||||
stdout,
|
||||
stderr,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
});
|
||||
const report = JSON.parse(await readFile(reportPath, 'utf8'));
|
||||
await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
return { run, report };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const suite = await runSuite();
|
||||
const byId = new Map(suite.report.cases.map(item => [item.id, item]));
|
||||
|
||||
test('the suite exits non-zero exactly when its own verdict blocks the release', () => {
|
||||
assert.ok([0, 1].includes(suite.run.code), `unexpected exit ${suite.run.code}: ${suite.run.stderr}`);
|
||||
assert.match(suite.run.stdout, new RegExp(`VERDICT: ${suite.report.verdict}`));
|
||||
assert.equal(suite.run.code, suite.report.verdict === 'BLOCKED' ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('every reported case status is re-derivable from the observation it recorded', () => {
|
||||
for (const item of suite.report.cases.filter(entry => entry.surface !== 'out-of-surface')) {
|
||||
const derived = evaluateCase(item);
|
||||
assert.equal(item.status, derived.status, `${item.id} claims ${item.status} but observed ${JSON.stringify(item.observed)} against ${JSON.stringify(item.expected)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert.equal(suite.report.verdict, releaseVerdict({ cases: suite.report.cases }).verdict);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the suite covers the abuse classes the ticket names, not a convenient subset', () => {
|
||||
const required = ['oversized', 'polyglot', 'malformed', 'flood', 'log', 'deletion', 'replay'];
|
||||
const categories = new Set(suite.report.cases.map(item => item.category));
|
||||
for (const category of required) assert.ok(categories.has(category), `no case covers ${category}`);
|
||||
assert.ok(suite.report.cases.length >= 8, `only ${suite.report.cases.length} cases ran`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a request without consent is refused and the worker is never called', () => {
|
||||
const consent = byId.get('consent-required');
|
||||
assert.equal(consent.observed.status, 400);
|
||||
assert.equal(consent.observed.providerCalls, 0);
|
||||
assert.equal(consent.status, 'pass');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('an oversized body is refused before any provider work', () => {
|
||||
const oversized = byId.get('ingress-oversized-body');
|
||||
assert.equal(oversized.observed.status, 413);
|
||||
assert.equal(oversized.observed.providerCalls, 0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('a provider answer that breaks the schema fails closed without quoting the provider', () => {
|
||||
const malformed = byId.get('model-output-malformed');
|
||||
assert.equal(malformed.observed.status, 503);
|
||||
assert.equal(malformed.observed.providerTextLeaked, false);
|
||||
assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(malformed).includes('garbage-completion-token'), 'the report must not quote the provider');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the captured server log and the report itself carry no photo bytes', () => {
|
||||
assert.equal(byId.get('log-leak-scan').observed.imageBytesInLog, false);
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(suite.report)), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('the load phase recorded percentiles, errors, and abstentions without any image body', () => {
|
||||
const load = suite.report.load;
|
||||
assert.ok(load.requests >= 8, `only ${load.requests} load requests ran`);
|
||||
assert.equal(typeof load.p50, 'number');
|
||||
assert.equal(typeof load.p95, 'number');
|
||||
assert.equal(typeof load.abstentions, 'number');
|
||||
assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(load)), false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user