Brings #82 up to today's `main` (1bbcc10) and resolves the two conflicts as ordered
unions: `package.json` `test`/`check:syntax` and the release builder's syntax allow-list
and evidence keys. Both sides only appended, so nothing was dropped.
Verifying the merge against main's RC attack suite (#40) found two real defects, each
fixed test-first:
- An oversized body destroyed the socket mid-upload, so the caller saw `fetch failed`
instead of the 413 it had already earned, and `security_attack_suite.mjs` could not
complete at all. New test in `tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js` failed with
`fetch failed` before the fix; `src/http-body.js` now keeps draining without buffering
and refuses on `end`, so the ceiling still holds and the refusal is readable.
- #16's per-caller budget turned the suite's own load phase into 8/8 429s, which would
have published refusals as analysis latency. The load phase now runs against a second
permissive target and the suite refuses to publish a load figure if any sample was
refused. `buildReport` also publishes `evidenceVerified`, so the verdict is
re-derivable from the report — asserted by #40's acceptance test, which only trips once
the verdict is GO.
Evidence on the merged tree: `npm test` 277/277, `test:security-attack` 8/8, the RC attack
suite returns VERDICT: GO with both P0 ingress cases passing (main is BLOCKED on exactly
those two), 14 browser acceptance suites green, and the release demo records end to end
(8:13, 97 captions) including the on-camera refusal scene.
Add an executable abuse suite that drives the real server with synthetic hostile bytes while a
counting stub worker records every call that reaches the model boundary, plus the verdict rule that
turns those observations into a release decision.
- src/release-security-gate.js: nearest-rank latency percentiles, per-case pass/fail derivation that
names the field that broke, and the rule that any failing P0 case blocks RC approval while a
required class with no verified evidence blocks it too. Reports are redacted and fail closed.
- scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs: oversized body, HTML polyglot as JPEG, undecodable bytes,
missing consent, non-conforming worker answer, byte-identical replay, concurrent burst, captured
log scan, and an out-of-surface deletion case counted only against a real test file. Writes the
report, prints the verdict, exits 1 when blocked.
- docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md: procedure, rule, and the current finding stated plainly.
- Demo: a real run of the suite on camera, printing the verdict it derived instead of a flattering
one; CI regenerates the same evidence on every change.
The suite currently returns VERDICT: BLOCKED: bytes are trusted from the data-URL label, so an HTML
polyglot still reaches the worker and only fails afterwards on schema. That is a finding against
#16, not a passing check, and it is why the gate treats a failing case as a block.
timmy