fix(demo): keep each operator-report label on one line

The first recorded card split 'ANALYZE REQUESTS' and every 'FAILURE' label
across two lines, detaching each label from its count. Long CLI labels are
now folded into values (one wrapped failures line), the key column holds
only short keys, and the card was geometry-probed at the recording's phone
viewport before rebuilding: 706px of content in a 706px panel, no clipped
key.

.gitea/workflows/quality.yml

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Unit and security tests
         run: |
           npm test
+          npm run test:security-attack
           python3 tests/staging-deploy.test.py -v
           python3 tests/corpus-manifest.test.py -v
           python3 tests/corpus-review.test.py -v
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ jobs:
           npm run test:ui
           npm run test:photo
           npm run test:mobile-capture
+          npm run test:ingress-capture
           npm run test:sleek
           npm run test:manual-fallback
           npm run test:provisional

.gitignore

@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ __pycache__/
 *.pyc
 .env
 .env.*
+artifacts/security/

README.md

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ A working mobile-first bowel diary with an optional **photo-first AI assist**:
 - [Product boundary and release authority decision](docs/PRODUCT-DECISIONS.md)
 - [Self-hosted stool-vision decision](research/SELF-HOSTED-STOOL-VISION.md)
 - [Production topology, secrets, backup, and rollback runbook](docs/PRODUCTION-RUNBOOK.md)
+- [Privacy-safe model health counters (operator view)](docs/MODEL-METRICS.md)
 
 ## Build a gated review release
 
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ npm run test:grounded-chat    # chat answers cite the ledger, or refuse to answe
 npm run test:photo-lifecycle  # photo presence, explicit reveal, remove-photo-keeps-log, delete-all
 npm run test:calibration      # the release-gate harness: gates, threshold protocol, refused corpora
 npm run test:review           # blind review queue, held-back model answer, an append-only ledger, withdrawals
+npm run test:security-attack  # hostile synthetic uploads at the real boundary, with a counting worker (#40)
 npm audit --audit-level=high
 ```
 
@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ The reviewer tool ([scripts/review_corpus.py](scripts/review_corpus.py), [contra
 
 What the corpus is, and what a label may assert, is published rather than implied: [docs/DATASET_CARD.md](docs/DATASET_CARD.md) is generated from the manifest by [scripts/dataset_card.py](scripts/dataset_card.py), so every count on it is read back from real records and every fact the pipeline does not collect (devices, contexts, licenses) is printed as `pending` instead of estimated — a card for a corpus where one contributor straddles two splits is refused, not published. [docs/LABELING_GUIDE.md](docs/LABELING_GUIDE.md) is the reviewer's rulebook: visible form, broad visible color, and photo quality only, visible color is not blood, nothing is diagnosed, and a model suggestion is provisional input to a human decision rather than the label.
 
+The release candidate is attacked before anyone is asked to trust it. [scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs](scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs) drives the real server with synthetic hostile bytes — an oversized body, an HTML polyglot dressed as a JPEG, undecodable bytes, a request without consent, a worker answer that breaks the schema, a byte-identical replay, and a concurrent burst — while a counting stub worker records every call that reaches the model boundary. [docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md](docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md) owns the rule: any failing P0 case blocks RC approval, and a required class with no executable evidence blocks it too. **It currently returns `VERDICT: BLOCKED`** — bytes are still trusted from the data-URL label, so a hostile file reaches the worker before it fails on schema. That is a published finding against [#16](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/16), not a passing check.
+
 ## Architecture
 
 ```text

app.js

@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ function withdrawTrainingContribution(contributionId){
 }
 
 function privacy(){
-  shell(`<main><div class="page-title"><span class="eyebrow">Private by design</span><h1>Your poop. Your phone.</h1><p>This prototype has no account, analytics, ad tracker, or server database.</p></div><section class="card privacy-list"><div class="privacy-item"><b>⌂</b><div><h3>Stored locally</h3><p>Saved entries and optional photos live in this browser’s local storage. You can remove one photo without deleting its confirmed log.</p></div></div><div class="privacy-item"><b>⇩</b><div><h3>Portable</h3><p>Export a readable JSON file. Import it in another copy of Timmy.</p></div></div><div class="privacy-item"><b>◎</b><div><h3>AI only when you ask</h3><p>Manual logging never uploads. Analyze a photo sends one compressed copy after consent. Hermes chat may receive up to 20 confirmed text-only entries after you connect; photos and backend credentials never enter chat.</p></div></div></section><section class="section card"><h2>Data controls</h2><div class="row"><button class="btn btn-primary" id="export">Export JSON</button><label class="btn btn-secondary" for="import">Import JSON</label><input class="hidden" type="file" id="import" accept="application/json"></div><p class="fine section">Exports can contain sensitive health notes and photos. Store them somewhere you trust.</p></section>${portabilityNoticeBlock()}${trainingConsentSection()}<section class="section card source-list"><h2>Health sources</h2><p class="fine">The Bristol groupings and urgent-symptom copy are grounded in public clinical guidance.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.continence.org.au/about-incontinence/bowel-incontinence/bristol-stool-chart/">Continence Health Australia</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/bleeding-from-the-bottom-rectal-bleeding/">NHS rectal bleeding guidance</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/digestive-diseases/constipation/symptoms-causes">NIDDK constipation guidance</a></p></section><section class="section card danger-zone"><h2>Delete everything</h2><p class="fine">Permanently removes Timmy’s local ledger and every saved photo from this browser.</p><button class="btn btn-danger" id="delete-all">Delete all local data</button></section></main>`);
+  shell(`<main><div class="page-title"><span class="eyebrow">Private by design</span><h1>Your poop. Your phone.</h1><p>This prototype has no account, analytics, ad tracker, or server database.</p></div><section class="card privacy-list"><div class="privacy-item"><b>⌂</b><div><h3>Stored locally</h3><p>Saved entries and optional photos live in this browser’s local storage. You can remove one photo without deleting its confirmed log.</p></div></div><div class="privacy-item"><b>⇩</b><div><h3>Portable</h3><p>Export a readable JSON file. Import it in another copy of Timmy.</p></div></div><div class="privacy-item"><b>◎</b><div><h3>AI only when you ask</h3><p>Manual logging never uploads. Analyze a photo sends one compressed copy after consent. Hermes chat may receive up to 20 confirmed text-only entries after you connect; photos and backend credentials never enter chat.</p></div></div><div class="privacy-item" data-health-disclosure><b>♥</b><div><h3>Health counters</h3><p>Timmy’s server keeps in-memory counters of how analysis requests went — allowed, refused, failed, and how long they took — so an outage can be seen without opening anyone’s journal. They never include your notes, photos, image fingerprints, or identity, and they reset when the server restarts.</p></div></div></section><section class="section card"><h2>Data controls</h2><div class="row"><button class="btn btn-primary" id="export">Export JSON</button><label class="btn btn-secondary" for="import">Import JSON</label><input class="hidden" type="file" id="import" accept="application/json"></div><p class="fine section">Exports can contain sensitive health notes and photos. Store them somewhere you trust.</p></section>${portabilityNoticeBlock()}${trainingConsentSection()}<section class="section card source-list"><h2>Health sources</h2><p class="fine">The Bristol groupings and urgent-symptom copy are grounded in public clinical guidance.</p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.continence.org.au/about-incontinence/bowel-incontinence/bristol-stool-chart/">Continence Health Australia</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/bleeding-from-the-bottom-rectal-bleeding/">NHS rectal bleeding guidance</a></p><p><a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" href="https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/digestive-diseases/constipation/symptoms-causes">NIDDK constipation guidance</a></p></section><section class="section card danger-zone"><h2>Delete everything</h2><p class="fine">Permanently removes Timmy’s local ledger and every saved photo from this browser.</p><button class="btn btn-danger" id="delete-all">Delete all local data</button></section></main>`);
   document.querySelector('#export').onclick=exportData;document.querySelector('#import').onchange=importData;document.querySelector('#delete-all').onclick=deleteData;
 }
 function exportData(){const blob=new Blob([exportLedgerBackup({entries,contributions})],{type:'application/json'}),a=document.createElement('a');a.href=URL.createObjectURL(blob);a.download=`timmy-backup-v${LEDGER_EXPORT_VERSION}.json`;a.click();URL.revokeObjectURL(a.href);portabilityNotice={kind:'ok',version:LEDGER_EXPORT_VERSION,text:`Backup written as version ${LEDGER_EXPORT_VERSION}: ${entries.length} log${entries.length===1?'':'s'} and ${contributions.length} training receipt${contributions.length===1?'':'s'}.`};render();toast('Backup exported');}
@@ -340,20 +340,23 @@ function photoFirstBody(mode,error=''){
  if(mode==='pick')return `${visionStatusHtml()}<div class="scan-hero"><img src="${appPath('assets/timmy.svg')}" alt="Timmy"><h3>One photo. Two useful suggestions.</h3><p>Timmy can suggest the visible Bristol form and color. A camera cannot know urgency, pain, symptoms, or a diagnosis.</p></div>${error?`<p class="capture-status" role="status">${esc(error)}</p>`:''}<div class="capture-choice-grid"><label class="photo-capture" for="camera-photo"><b>📷</b><strong>Take photo</strong><span>Use the rear camera</span><input id="camera-photo" type="file" accept="image/*" capture="environment"></label><label class="photo-capture" for="gallery-photo"><b>▧</b><strong>Choose from gallery</strong><span>JPEG, PNG, or WebP</span><input id="gallery-photo" type="file" accept="image/*"></label></div><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="manual-from-scan">Continue without AI</button>`;
  if(mode==='ready'){const readiness=visionReadiness(visionStatus);if(!readiness.ready)return `${visionStatusHtml()}<img class="photo-preview scan-preview" src="${form.photoDataUrl}" alt="Photo kept on this device"><p class="quality-note">${esc(photoHint)}</p><p class="fine">${esc(readiness.message)} Nothing is uploaded, and this photo stays on this device until you save the entry.</p><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="manual-from-scan">${esc(readiness.manualLabel)}</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="retake-photo">Use another photo</button>`;const processingCopy=visionStatus?.profile==='selfhost'?'Timmy’s server does not save it. The compressed copy stays on Timmy’s self-hosted model server.':'Timmy’s server does not save it. Your configured AI provider processes it under that provider’s terms.';return `${visionStatusHtml()}<img class="photo-preview scan-preview" src="${form.photoDataUrl}" alt="Photo awaiting AI analysis"><p class="quality-note">${esc(photoHint)}</p><div class="consent-card"><label class="check"><input id="ai-consent" type="checkbox"><span><strong>Send this compressed copy for one-time AI analysis.</strong><br>${processingCopy}</span></label></div><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="analyze-photo" disabled>Analyze visible form + color</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="retake-photo">Use another photo</button>`;}
  if(mode==='analyzing')return `<div class="analyzing"><img src="${appPath('assets/timmy.svg')}" alt="Timmy"><div class="spinner" aria-hidden="true"></div><h3>Timmy is looking at form and color…</h3><p>Not symptoms. Not disease. Not whether Taco Bell was a strategic error.</p></div>`;
+ // An unreadable file is its own state, not a failed analysis: nothing was sent, nothing was
+ // attempted, and saying "couldn't analyze that safely" here implied an upload that never happened.
+ if(mode==='unreadable')return `<div class="scan-result needs-input" data-capture-error="unreadable"><b>⚠</b><h3>That file isn’t a photo Timmy can read.</h3><p>Nothing was uploaded. Choose a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo, take a new one, or fill it out manually.</p></div><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="manual-from-scan">Fill it out manually</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="retake-photo">Choose another photo</button>`;
  if(mode==='error')return `<div class="scan-result needs-input"><b>↻</b><h3>Timmy couldn’t analyze that safely.</h3><p>${esc(error||'Continue manually or try a clearer photo.')}</p></div><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="manual-from-scan">Fill it out manually</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="retake-photo">Try another photo</button>`;
  if(suggestionState.status==='pending'){const copy=provenanceCopy(suggestionState,form);return `<div class="scan-result provisional" data-provenance="${copy.status}" aria-label="${esc(copy.aria)}"><span class="ai-badge">${esc(copy.label)} · ${Math.round(suggestionState.suggestion.confidence*100)}% CONFIDENCE</span><div class="suggestion-pair"><div><small>BRISTOL FORM</small><strong>Type ${suggestionState.suggestion.bristolType}</strong></div><div><small>VISIBLE COLOR</small><strong>${esc(suggestionState.suggestion.color)}</strong></div></div><p>${esc(aiSuggestion.observations||'Visual match found.')}</p><p class="provenance-note" role="status">${esc(copy.detail)}</p><p class="fine">${esc(aiSuggestion.warning)}</p></div><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="use-suggestion">Use these suggestions</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="manual-from-scan">Review everything manually</button>`;}
  return `<div class="scan-result needs-input"><b>?</b><h3>No confident match.</h3><p>${esc(aiSuggestion?.reason||'The image was too uncertain to prefill safely.')}</p></div><button class="btn btn-primary btn-wide" id="manual-from-scan">Choose the form yourself</button><button class="btn btn-ghost btn-wide section" id="retake-photo">Try another photo</button>`;
 }
 function showPhotoFirst(mode='pick',error=''){
  photoFirstMode=mode;
- document.querySelector('.sheet-backdrop')?.remove();const wrap=document.createElement('div');wrap.className='sheet-backdrop';wrap.innerHTML=`<section class="sheet scan-sheet" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-labelledby="scan-title"><div class="sheet-handle"></div><div class="sheet-header"><div><span class="eyebrow">Photo-first log</span><h2 id="scan-title">${mode==='result'?'Review Timmy’s suggestion':mode==='analyzing'?'Analyzing privately':'Start with the camera'}</h2></div><button class="icon-btn" id="close-sheet" aria-label="Close">×</button></div>${photoFirstBody(mode,error)}</section>`;document.body.append(wrap);document.querySelector('#close-sheet').onclick=()=>wrap.remove();wrap.onclick=e=>{if(e.target===wrap)wrap.remove()};
+ document.querySelector('.sheet-backdrop')?.remove();const wrap=document.createElement('div');wrap.className='sheet-backdrop';wrap.innerHTML=`<section class="sheet scan-sheet" role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-labelledby="scan-title"><div class="sheet-handle"></div><div class="sheet-header"><div><span class="eyebrow">Photo-first log</span><h2 id="scan-title">${mode==='result'?'Review Timmy’s suggestion':mode==='analyzing'?'Analyzing privately':mode==='unreadable'?'That photo could not be read':'Start with the camera'}</h2></div><button class="icon-btn" id="close-sheet" aria-label="Close">×</button></div>${photoFirstBody(mode,error)}</section>`;document.body.append(wrap);document.querySelector('#close-sheet').onclick=()=>wrap.remove();wrap.onclick=e=>{if(e.target===wrap)wrap.remove()};
  document.querySelectorAll('#camera-photo,#gallery-photo').forEach(file=>{file.onchange=handleAiPhoto;file.addEventListener('cancel',()=>showPhotoFirst('pick','Camera or photo picker closed. If permission was denied, allow camera access in browser settings, choose from the gallery, or continue without AI.'))});
  const consent=document.querySelector('#ai-consent'),analyze=document.querySelector('#analyze-photo');if(consent&&analyze)consent.onchange=()=>analyze.disabled=!consent.checked||!visionReadiness(visionStatus).ready;if(analyze)analyze.onclick=runAiAnalysis;
  document.querySelector('#retake-photo')?.addEventListener('click',()=>{form.photoDataUrl='';photoHint='';resetSuggestion();showPhotoFirst('pick')});
  document.querySelector('#manual-from-scan')?.addEventListener('click',()=>{resetSuggestion();showLogStep(1)});
  document.querySelector('#use-suggestion')?.addEventListener('click',()=>{suggestionState=confirmSuggestion(suggestionState);form=mergeVisualSuggestion(form,aiSuggestion);form.typeChosen=true;showLogStep(1)});
 }
-async function handleAiPhoto(e){const file=e.target.files[0];if(!file)return;try{const result=await compressPhoto(file);form.photoDataUrl=result.dataUrl;photoHint=photoQualityMessage(result);showPhotoFirst('ready')}catch{showPhotoFirst('error','That image could not be read. Try another photo.')}}
+async function handleAiPhoto(e){const file=e.target.files[0];if(!file)return;try{const result=await compressPhoto(file);form.photoDataUrl=result.dataUrl;photoHint=photoQualityMessage(result);showPhotoFirst('ready')}catch{form.photoDataUrl='';photoHint='';showPhotoFirst('unreadable')}}
 async function runAiAnalysis(){showPhotoFirst('analyzing');try{const response=await fetch(appPath('api/analyze'),{method:'POST',headers:{'content-type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({imageDataUrl:form.photoDataUrl,consent:true})});const data=await response.json();if(!response.ok)throw new Error(data.error||'AI analysis is unavailable.');aiSuggestion=data;suggestionState=createSuggestionState(data);showPhotoFirst('result')}catch(error){showPhotoFirst('error',error.message||'AI analysis is unavailable. Continue manually.')}}
 
 function openLogger(){beginDraft();photoHint='';resetSuggestion();showLogStep(1)}

docs/MODEL-METRICS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+# Privacy-safe model health counters
+
+Issue [#19](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/19).
+This is the operator surface for "is the worker healthy?", and it is deliberately the smallest one
+that answers the question. The journal stays the only place a person's bowel data lives.
+
+## Endpoint
+
+```
+GET /api/metrics
+Authorization: Bearer $TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN
+```
+
+- `TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN` unset → **404**. A default deployment has no metrics route at all; nothing is
+  exposed by forgetting to configure something.
+- Token set, header missing or wrong → **403**, with a body that contains no counters.
+- Token set and matched → **200** with the snapshot below.
+
+The snapshot is read from process memory. It survives no restart, is written to no log, and is sent
+to no third party.
+
+## What is in the snapshot
+
+```json
+{
+  "schema": 1,
+  "generatedAt": "2026-11-01T10:00:00.000Z",
+  "app":   { "uptimeMs": 0, "analyzeRequests": 0, "refusedBeforeModel": 0 },
+  "queue": { "inFlight": 0, "limit": 4, "atCapacity": false, "accepted": 0 },
+  "model": {
+    "outcomes": { "suggestion": 0, "abstained": 0, "failure": 0 },
+    "failureClasses": { "ingress_refused": 0, "rate_limited": 0, "disabled": 0,
+                        "provider_unreachable": 0, "provider_rejected": 0,
+                        "schema_invalid": 0, "timeout": 0, "unexpected": 0 },
+    "abstentionRate": null,
+    "readiness": { "phase": "checking", "ready": false, "coldLoadMs": null },
+    "latency": { "count": 0, "meanMs": null, "maxMs": 0,
+                 "bucketsMs": { "1000": 0, "2000": 0, "5000": 0, "15000": 0, "60000": 0 } }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The three blocks are the three boundaries, and each counts only what it owns:
+
+| Block | Owns | Does not own |
+|---|---|---|
+| `app` | Every `POST /api/analyze` the process saw, and the ones refused before any model work (bad bytes, per-device budget, analysis disabled). | Queue occupancy or model answers. |
+| `queue` | Slots handed out and released, and the configured concurrency ceiling. | Whether the request succeeded. |
+| `model` | Answers (`suggestion` / `abstained`), classified failures, readiness phase, and model-work latency. | Anything decided before a slot was taken. |
+
+`abstentionRate` is `abstained / (suggestion + abstained)`; it is `null` until the model has answered
+at least once. A failed request is **not** an abstention — an outage must not look like a cautious
+model.
+
+`latency.bucketsMs` is cumulative: `"5000"` counts every sample at or below 5 s. `coldLoadMs` is the
+interval from process start to the first observation in which the pinned model was resident; a worker
+that flaps back to `offline` keeps the original figure.
+
+`readiness.phase` uses the same vocabulary the browser uses for the AI affordance (`checking`,
+`disabled`, `offline`, `loading`, `ready`), and the value is produced by the same
+`visionReadiness()` function the app renders, so a metric and a screen cannot disagree.
+
+## What can never appear in it
+
+The only strings this module stores are members of three frozen lists — outcomes, failure classes,
+and readiness phases — plus a fixed latency-bucket edge set. Anything else is bucketed, not copied:
+
+- an unrecognised outcome becomes `failure`;
+- an unrecognised failure class becomes `unexpected`;
+- an unrecognised readiness phase becomes `checking`.
+
+Therefore no note text, no image bytes, no image hash or fingerprint, no subject key, no caller
+address, and no session or cookie value can reach a label. `tests/model-metrics.test.js` asserts this
+by feeding hostile strings into every label position, and
+`tests/metrics-endpoint.acceptance.test.js` asserts it through the shipping server.
+
+## Reading it
+
+```bash
+curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:4173/api/metrics | jq .
+```
+
+For a quick look that does not need `jq`, the report renders the same snapshot as three labelled blocks:
+
+```bash
+TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN=... node scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs --url http://127.0.0.1:4173
+```
+
+Exit codes are the point of the command as much as the numbers: `0` means a snapshot was rendered,
+`1` means the server answered non-200 (404 says the route is disabled because no token is configured,
+403 says the supplied token was rejected), `2` means the command itself was called wrongly or the
+server could not be reached. The token is read from the environment or `--token` and is never echoed
+in the report or in an error line.
+
+What the numbers mean to an operator:
+
+| Signal | Reading |
+|---|---|
+| `readiness.phase: offline` | The worker is not answering. Manual logging is unaffected; do not restart the app for this. |
+| `readiness.phase: loading` | The worker answered but the pinned model is not resident. AI is withheld rather than offered and failed. |
+| `queue.atCapacity: true` | Every model slot is in use. Watch `latency.maxMs`; a growing figure with no completions is a stuck inference, not load. |
+| `failureClasses.provider_unreachable` climbing | Network or worker outage, not caller error. |
+| `failureClasses.schema_invalid` climbing | The worker is answering off-contract. Treat as a regression in the pinned model or prompt, not a user problem. |
+| `app.refusedBeforeModel` climbing with no model traffic | Abuse or a broken client; the model never saw it. |
+
+## Known gap
+
+`queue.inFlight` is the app's own admission depth for `POST /api/analyze`. The full bounded queue
+(concurrency limit enforcement, cancellation, overload fallback) is issue
+[#17](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/17); this
+snapshot reports the slot accounting that exists today and does not claim the rest.

docs/PHOTO-DATAFLOW-THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -144,6 +144,26 @@ Each entry names the abuse case, the mitigation that is already committed or que
 - **Testable follow-up:** #39
 - **Evidence:** The production topology, secrets, backup, and rollback runbook, exercised against the deletion path so that purge reaches memory, temporary files, logs, and backups, with observability from #41 confirming no bytes reach the metrics surface.
 
+## Ingress controls implemented for #16
+
+`/api/analyze` is the only route that accepts image bytes, and every limit below is decided inside
+`server.mjs` before `analyzePhoto` runs, so a refusal never costs a provider call.
+
+| Control | Where | Behaviour |
+|---|---|---|
+| Per-caller request budget | `src/rate-limit.js` | Sliding window, 12 requests per 60s by default (`TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_LIMIT`, `TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_WINDOW_MS`); refusal is `429` with `Retry-After`. The key is a salted SHA-256 of the socket address held in process memory only — no address, no identity, no bytes are stored. |
+| Body ceiling and deadline | `src/http-body.js` | 6 MB ceiling and a 15s deadline (`TIMMY_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS`); `413` and `408` respectively, and the half-read socket is dropped after the refusal is written. |
+| Container sniffing | `src/image-ingress.js` | The declared data-URL MIME is treated as a claim, never evidence: JPEG/PNG/WebP is decided from magic bytes, and a mismatch is refused. |
+| Polyglot / trailing payloads | `src/image-ingress.js` | The container is walked to its own end marker (PNG `IEND`, JPEG `EOI`, RIFF length); anything appended after the image is refused instead of forwarded. |
+| Embedded metadata | `src/image-ingress.js` | JPEG APP1/APP13/COM segments and PNG `eXIf`/`tEXt`/`zTXt`/`iTXt`/`tIME` chunks are refused. The app's own upload is a canvas re-encode (JPEG q0.7, longest edge 1200px) and carries none, so the accepted path is already metadata-free. |
+| Pixel limits | `src/image-ingress.js` | Dimensions are read from the header (PNG `IHDR`, JPEG SOF, WebP `VP8X`/`VP8`/`VP8L`) and refused above a 4096px edge or 16 megapixels, so a decode bomb never reaches the worker. |
+| Log hygiene | `server.mjs` | Refusal copy is fixed prose; no request body, image bytes, hash, or address is written to a log or returned in an error. |
+
+Residual, and not claimed as solved here: the server refuses metadata-bearing or mismatched
+containers rather than transcoding them itself, so a client that cannot produce a clean re-encode
+must use the app's capture path. PNG chunk CRCs are not validated (structure is), and the request
+budget is per process, not per cluster.
+
 ## Accepted residual risks
 
 - **Host compromise.** Data in a running process can be read by a sufficiently privileged attacker. This is accepted for the private beta and bounded by least privilege plus the purge procedure in #39; it is not claimed as eliminated.
@@ -154,4 +174,5 @@ Each entry names the abuse case, the mitigation that is already committed or que
 
 - This document is enforced by `tests/threat-model.test.js`, which asserts that the diagram covers every byte-bearing component, that each required abuse case is a numbered threat with an owner and a tracked follow-up ticket, and that the model keeps the non-diagnostic boundary and ships no real medical images.
 - The test runs in `npm test` and therefore inside the CI quality gate and the release build, so the threat model cannot silently drift from the code it describes.
+- The ingress controls above are enforced by `tests/image-ingress.test.js`, `tests/rate-limit.test.js`, `tests/http-body.test.js`, and `tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js`, which runs the shipping server against synthetic bytes and a counting provider stub; `tests/ingress-capture.acceptance.mjs` proves the same refusal in the running app. All of them run in `npm test` or the browser gate, so a regression fails the release instead of a promise.
 - Boundary and boundary-adjacent claims are reviewed by the clinical and privacy gate (#22, #23) before beta; this model does not move that gate, it feeds it.

docs/PRODUCTION-RUNBOOK.md

@@ -57,13 +57,14 @@ enforces that distinction and the app withholds the AI control until it passes.
 
 ## Secrets
 
-Four secrets exist, and every one of them is injected at runtime:
+Five secrets exist, and every one of them is injected at runtime:
 
 | Secret | Source | Scope |
 |---|---|---|
 | `TIMMY_DATASET_SALT` | mode-600 environment file on the host | Corpus subject keys and split assignment. Rotating it re-splits future ingests, so it is not rotated casually. |
 | Vision provider key or worker token | mode-600 environment file on the host | Only the app process reads it; the browser never receives it. |
 | Agent access code | mode-600 environment file on the host | Unlocks `/api/agent/unlock`; the cookie it mints is `HttpOnly` and same-origin. |
+| `TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN` | mode-600 environment file on the host | Optional. Bearer token for the operator-only `/api/metrics` snapshot. When it is unset the route returns 404, so an unconfigured deployment exposes no counters at all. |
 | Gitea access token | local operator shell or secret store | Issue and PR automation only. It is never written into a release tree, an archive, or a log. |
 
 Rules:

docs/RC-SECURITY-EVIDENCE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# RC Security & Abuse Evidence (#40)
+
+The release candidate is attacked before users get to it. This page is the procedure and the rule,
+not a stored result: a pasted-in "all clear" is exactly the kind of evidence that stops being true
+after the next commit.
+
+## Run it
+
+```bash
+node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs --json artifacts/security/rc-attack-report.json
+```
+
+Exit codes are part of the contract:
+
+| Exit | Meaning |
+|---:|---|
+| `0` | `VERDICT: GO` — every case matched its expectation. |
+| `1` | `VERDICT: BLOCKED` — at least one P0 case failed, or a required category has no executable evidence. |
+| `2` | The suite could not complete (target never became ready, vision disabled, no log captured). |
+
+The suite is a child process of nothing: it starts its own copy of `server.mjs` on a free loopback
+port, points it at a **counting stub worker**, and drives it with synthetic hostile bytes. It never
+contacts a real model provider, never uses a real medical image, and never touches a live user's data.
+
+## What it does and does not prove
+
+- It proves what this HTTP boundary did with the bytes it was handed, and whether the worker behind
+  it was called. The worker is a stub, so "the provider saw it" is a counted fact, not an inference.
+- It does **not** measure model quality, clinical accuracy, or the safety of the medical/non-diagnostic
+  boundary. Those live in the vision, escalation, and clinical-review issues.
+- Latency numbers describe the loopback boundary against a stub. They are not a model benchmark.
+
+## Cases
+
+| Case | Class | Severity | Expectation |
+|---|---|---:|---|
+| `ingress-oversized-body` | oversized | P0 | `413`, worker never called |
+| `ingress-polyglot-html` | polyglot | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
+| `ingress-garbage-bytes` | truncated | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
+| `consent-required` | consent | P0 | `400`, worker never called |
+| `model-output-malformed` | malformed | P0 | `503` neutral copy, provider text never echoed |
+| `replay-duplicate-request` | replay | P2 | identical answer, nothing stored server-side |
+| `flood-concurrency` | flood | P1 | burst meets a bound (`429`/overload), not an open pipe |
+| `log-leak-scan` | log | P0 | captured server log carries no image bytes |
+| `deletion-withdrawal` | deletion | P0 | out of surface — counted only when `tests/training-contribution.test.js` exists |
+
+## The rule
+
+`src/release-security-gate.js` owns the verdict, so it is testable rather than asserted:
+
+- A case passes only when **every** expected field matches the observation. A partial match fails and
+  names the field that broke (`status 400 expected, observed 200`).
+- **Any** failing P0 case blocks RC approval. P1/P2 failures are recorded as holds.
+- A required class with no executable evidence is `unproven` and blocks the release. Coverage may be
+  borrowed from another suite (`out-of-surface` + an evidence path) only after the runner verified
+  that file exists — otherwise it blocks.
+- The report is redacted before it is written, and assembly fails closed if any image bytes survive
+  redaction. Evidence that carries a photo is worse than no evidence.
+
+## Current state (read the run, not this line)
+
+This section used to predict **BLOCKED** until the ingress hardening in
+[#16](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/16) landed. With
+that ingress in place the same command returns **GO** on this tree, because the format is decided from
+the bytes rather than the data-URL label: `ingress-polyglot-html` and `ingress-garbage-bytes` are now
+refused with `400` before the worker is called, and an oversized body is refused with a `413` the
+caller can read instead of a dropped connection. Latency for the load phase is measured against a
+second target with the request budget opened up, so those samples are analyses rather than `429`
+refusals. Queue bounding is still [#17](https://forge.alexanderwhitestone.com/git/stackchain/timmy-talking-turd/issues/17)
+and is held here as P1.
+
+Deletion is governed by the contribution ledger, not by this HTTP boundary; the case stays
+`covered-elsewhere` against `tests/training-contribution.test.js` and blocks if that file disappears.
+
+## Evidence hygiene
+
+- The report is written to `artifacts/security/` and must never be committed with a real photo in it.
+- The captured server log is scanned by the same detector (`containsImageBytes`) before it is quoted.
+- Error bodies are recorded as a 120-character snippet; the suite refuses to write a report that
+  still contains a data URI or a long base64 run.

package.json

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
-    "test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/draft.test.js tests/suggestion.test.js tests/followup.test.js tests/vision-readiness.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js tests/threat-model.test.js tests/vision-corpus.test.js tests/vision-boundary.test.js tests/worker-benchmark.test.js tests/worker-ready.test.js tests/worker-container.test.js tests/summary.test.js tests/escalation-regression.test.js tests/grounded-chat.test.js tests/photo-lifecycle.test.js tests/training-contribution.test.js tests/portability.test.js tests/abstention-policy.test.js",
+    "test": "node --test tests/domain.test.js tests/analysis.test.js tests/vision-service.test.js tests/vision-config.test.js tests/draft.test.js tests/suggestion.test.js tests/followup.test.js tests/vision-readiness.test.js tests/hermes-agent-service.test.js tests/agent-gateway.acceptance.test.js tests/staging-health.test.js tests/service-worker-runtime.test.js tests/training-ingest.test.js tests/ci-workflow.test.js tests/product-decisions.test.js tests/release-demo.test.js tests/selfhost-bootstrap.test.js tests/staging-config.test.js tests/threat-model.test.js tests/vision-corpus.test.js tests/vision-boundary.test.js tests/worker-benchmark.test.js tests/worker-ready.test.js tests/worker-container.test.js tests/summary.test.js tests/escalation-regression.test.js tests/grounded-chat.test.js tests/photo-lifecycle.test.js tests/training-contribution.test.js tests/portability.test.js tests/abstention-policy.test.js tests/release-security-gate.test.js tests/model-metrics.test.js tests/metrics-endpoint.acceptance.test.js tests/image-ingress.test.js tests/rate-limit.test.js tests/http-body.test.js tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js tests/model-metrics-report-format.test.js tests/model-metrics-report.acceptance.test.js",
     "test:ui": "node tests/ui.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:photo": "node tests/photo-first.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:mobile-capture": "node tests/mobile-capture.acceptance.mjs",
+    "test:ingress-capture": "node tests/ingress-capture.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:sleek": "node tests/sleek-chat.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:manual-fallback": "node tests/manual-fallback.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:provisional": "node tests/provisional-suggestion.acceptance.mjs",
@@ -18,7 +19,7 @@
     "test:grounded-chat": "node tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:photo-lifecycle": "node tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs",
     "test:training-contribution": "node tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs",
-    "check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/draft.js && node --check src/suggestion.js && node --check src/followup.js && node --check src/vision-readiness.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check src/vision-corpus.js && node --check src/summary.js && node --check src/photo-lifecycle.js && node --check src/grounded-chat.js && node --check src/training-contribution.js && node --check src/abstention-policy.js && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/manual-fallback.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/provisional-suggestion.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/followup.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/corpus_manifest.py scripts/review_corpus.py scripts/dataset_card.py scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/build_vision_corpus.py scripts/calibration_report.py scripts/operator_backup.py && node --check scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs && node --check scripts/abstention_policy_receipt.mjs && node --check tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/portability.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/worker_ready.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/entrypoint.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/build_image.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/run_worker_container.sh",
+    "check:syntax": "node --check app.js && node --check server.mjs && node --check service-worker.js && node --check src/analysis.js && node --check src/domain.js && node --check src/draft.js && node --check src/suggestion.js && node --check src/followup.js && node --check src/vision-readiness.js && node --check src/hermes-agent-service.js && node --check src/vision-config.js && node --check src/vision-service.js && node --check src/vision-corpus.js && node --check src/summary.js && node --check src/photo-lifecycle.js && node --check src/grounded-chat.js && node --check src/training-contribution.js && node --check src/abstention-policy.js && node --check src/release-security-gate.js && node --check scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs && node --check tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs && node --check scripts/record_release_demo.mjs && node --check tests/staging.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/manual-fallback.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/provisional-suggestion.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/followup.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && bash -n scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh && python3 -m py_compile scripts/corpus_manifest.py scripts/review_corpus.py scripts/dataset_card.py scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/build_vision_corpus.py scripts/calibration_report.py scripts/operator_backup.py && node --check scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs && node --check scripts/abstention_policy_receipt.mjs && node --check tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/portability.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/grounded-chat.acceptance.mjs && bash -n scripts/worker_ready.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/entrypoint.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/build_image.sh && bash -n deploy/worker/run_worker_container.sh && node --check src/model-metrics.js && node --check src/model-metrics-report.js && node --check scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs && node --check src/image-ingress.js && node --check src/rate-limit.js && node --check src/http-body.js && python3 -m py_compile scripts/ingest_training_photo.py scripts/build_release.py scripts/deploy_staging.py scripts/build_vision_corpus.py && node --check tests/ingress-capture.acceptance.mjs && node --check tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js",
     "check:diff": "bash scripts/check_diff.sh",
     "start": "node server.mjs",
     "test:worker-readiness": "node tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs",
@@ -29,7 +30,9 @@
     "test:review": "python3 tests/corpus-review.test.py",
     "test:dataset-card": "python3 tests/dataset-card.test.py",
     "test:backup": "python3 tests/backup-restore.test.py",
-    "test:runbook": "python3 tests/production-runbook.test.py"
+    "test:runbook": "python3 tests/production-runbook.test.py",
+    "test:security-attack": "node tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs",
+    "test:metrics-report": "node --test tests/model-metrics-report-format.test.js tests/model-metrics-report.acceptance.test.js"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "playwright": "^1.62.1"

scripts/build_release.py

@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ DEMO_REQUIRED_CAPTIONS = (
     "Reachable is not loaded: no AI control, no consent, and no upload until the pinned model is resident",
     "Every pattern line names the confirmed logs behind it, and following one shows exactly those records",
     "Two logs is not a pattern: the summary refuses to describe a trend it cannot support",
+    "A file that only claims to be a photo is refused on the device — nothing is uploaded",
+    "The device guard is not the only one: the same bytes, sent straight to the running server",
+    "Refused at the server too: 400 not_an_image, before any model work",
     "The answer states the count and cites the four confirmed logs it counted",
     "Following a citation opens exactly the confirmed log behind that answer",
     "Ask something the journal cannot answer and Timmy refuses instead of reassuring",
@@ -68,6 +71,10 @@ DEMO_REQUIRED_CAPTIONS = (
     "An older backup is upgraded on import, and the notice says which version the file came from",
     "A file from a newer Timmy is refused with an instruction, and the ledger it would have replaced is untouched",
     "A restored log still says it began as an AI suggestion you corrected — provenance is part of the record",
+    "Health counters are disclosed where you read privacy facts — they never include notes, photos, image fingerprints, or identity",
+    "The operator health report is a command line, not a screen in the app — this runs it against this recording’s own server",
+    "Every counter on this card came from the requests this recording just made, and a wrong token is refused instead of answered",
+    "The snapshot holds counts, a readiness phase, latency, and enumerated failure classes — no note, photo, image fingerprint, or identity",
     "The review tool is a command line, not a screen in the app — this runs it against the committed synthetic sample",
     "The queue shows the proposal and hides the model answer; revealing it is refused until a reviewer commits",
     "The model said Type 6 and the reviewer said Type 5: the disagreement is recorded, not smoothed over",
@@ -192,7 +199,10 @@ def main() -> int:
         run(["python3", "tests/backup-restore.test.py", "-v"], tree)
         run(["python3", "tests/production-runbook.test.py", "-v"], tree)
         server_env = dict(os.environ)
-        server_env.update({"HOST": "127.0.0.1", "PORT": "4173", "TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED": "false"})
+        # TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN gates the operator snapshot for this recording only. It is a demo value
+        # against a loopback-only server, not a credential, and it never appears in an artifact.
+        server_env.update({"HOST": "127.0.0.1", "PORT": "4173", "TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED": "false",
+                           "TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN": "demo-metrics-token-not-a-credential"})
         # A leftover server from another checkout answers on this port and the readiness probe cannot
         # tell it apart from ours, so every gate and the recorded demo would silently describe a
         # different tree. Refuse to build over a live listener, and verify the served bytes afterwards.
@@ -217,6 +227,7 @@ def main() -> int:
             run(["npm", "run", "test:ui"], tree)
             run(["npm", "run", "test:photo"], tree)
             run(["npm", "run", "test:mobile-capture"], tree)
+            run(["npm", "run", "test:ingress-capture"], tree)
             run(["npm", "run", "test:sleek"], tree)
             run(["npm", "run", "test:manual-fallback"], tree)
             run(["npm", "run", "test:provisional"], tree)
@@ -275,7 +286,7 @@ def main() -> int:
         if not contact_sheet.exists() or contact_sheet.stat().st_size == 0:
             raise SystemExit("Release demo contact sheet was not produced")
         run(["npm", "audit", "--audit-level=high"], tree)
-        for file in ("app.js", "server.mjs", "service-worker.js", "src/analysis.js", "src/domain.js", "src/draft.js", "src/suggestion.js", "src/followup.js", "src/vision-readiness.js", "src/hermes-agent-service.js", "src/vision-config.js", "src/vision-service.js", "src/vision-corpus.js", "src/summary.js", "src/photo-lifecycle.js", "src/training-contribution.js", "scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs", "tests/staging.acceptance.mjs", "tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs", "tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs", "tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs", "tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs", "tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs"):
+        for file in ("app.js", "server.mjs", "service-worker.js", "src/analysis.js", "src/domain.js", "src/draft.js", "src/suggestion.js", "src/followup.js", "src/vision-readiness.js", "src/hermes-agent-service.js", "src/vision-config.js", "src/vision-service.js", "src/vision-corpus.js", "src/summary.js", "src/photo-lifecycle.js", "src/training-contribution.js", "scripts/record_worker_benchmark.mjs", "tests/staging.acceptance.mjs", "tests/vision-refusal.acceptance.mjs", "tests/worker-readiness.acceptance.mjs", "tests/pattern-summary.acceptance.mjs", "tests/photo-lifecycle.acceptance.mjs", "tests/training-contribution.acceptance.mjs", "src/image-ingress.js", "src/rate-limit.js", "src/http-body.js", "tests/ingress-capture.acceptance.mjs"):
             run(["node", "--check", file], tree)
         run(["bash", "-n", "scripts/bootstrap_selfhost_smolvlm.sh"], tree)
         run(["bash", "-n", "scripts/run_selfhost_smolvlm.sh"], tree)
@@ -392,6 +403,8 @@ def main() -> int:
             "production_backup_restore": "passed",
             "production_runbook_commands": "passed",
             "portable_backup_restore": "passed",
+            "image_ingress_refusal": "passed",
+            "privacy_safe_health_metrics": "passed",
             "dependency_audit_high": "passed",
             "syntax": "passed",
             "secret_scan": "passed",

scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Operator report for the privacy-safe model counters (issue #19).
+//
+// It reads one snapshot from a running Timmy server and prints it. The token is a credential for the
+// operator surface, so it is read from the environment or argv and never echoed — not in errors, not
+// in the report, not in a stack trace.
+import { formatOperatorReport } from '../src/model-metrics-report.js';
+
+const USAGE = `Usage: node scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs [options]
+
+  --url <origin>        base URL of the Timmy server (default http://127.0.0.1:4173)
+  --token <token>       operator token (default: $TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN)
+  --json                print the raw snapshot instead of the text report
+  --timeout-ms <ms>     request deadline (default 5000)
+  --help                show this text
+`;
+
+function parseArgs(argv) {
+  const options = {
+    url: process.env.TIMMY_METRICS_URL || 'http://127.0.0.1:4173',
+    token: process.env.TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN || '',
+    json: false,
+    timeoutMs: 5_000,
+    help: false,
+  };
+  for (let index = 0; index < argv.length; index += 1) {
+    const arg = argv[index];
+    if (arg === '--help' || arg === '-h') {
+      options.help = true;
+    } else if (arg === '--json') {
+      options.json = true;
+    } else if (arg === '--url') {
+      options.url = argv[++index] ?? '';
+    } else if (arg === '--token') {
+      options.token = argv[++index] ?? '';
+    } else if (arg === '--timeout-ms') {
+      options.timeoutMs = Number(argv[++index]);
+    } else {
+      throw new Error(`unknown option: ${arg}`);
+    }
+  }
+  return options;
+}
+
+async function main(argv) {
+  const options = parseArgs(argv);
+  if (options.help) {
+    process.stdout.write(USAGE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (!options.token) {
+    throw new Error('operator token required: pass --token or set TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN');
+  }
+  const endpoint = new URL('api/metrics', options.url.endsWith('/') ? options.url : `${options.url}/`);
+  let response;
+  try {
+    response = await fetch(endpoint, {
+      headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${options.token}`, accept: 'application/json' },
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(Number.isFinite(options.timeoutMs) ? options.timeoutMs : 5_000),
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    process.stderr.write(`Could not read ${endpoint.origin}/api/metrics: ${error?.message || 'request failed'}\n`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    if (response.status === 404) {
+      // The route is absent rather than guarded: that is a deployment fact, not a credential problem.
+      process.stderr.write('Metrics are disabled on this server: the route only exists when TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN is set.\n');
+      return 1;
+    }
+    if (response.status === 403) {
+      process.stderr.write('The server rejected the operator token.\n');
+      return 1;
+    }
+    process.stderr.write(`The server answered ${response.status} for /api/metrics.\n`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  const snapshot = await response.json();
+  process.stdout.write(options.json ? `${JSON.stringify(snapshot, null, 2)}\n` : formatOperatorReport(snapshot));
+  return 0;
+}
+
+main(process.argv.slice(2)).then(code => {
+  process.exitCode = code;
+}).catch(error => {
+  process.stderr.write(`${error?.message || 'report failed'}\n`);
+  process.exitCode = 2;
+});

scripts/record_release_demo.mjs

@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@ const suggestionBody = {
   warning: 'Visual suggestion only. Confirm it yourself; this is not a diagnosis.',
 };
 let analyzeOverride = null;
+let analyzeCalls = 0;
 await page.route('**/api/analyze', route => {
+  analyzeCalls += 1;
   const response = analyzeOverride || { status: 200, body: suggestionBody };
   return route.fulfill({ status: response.status, contentType: 'application/json', body: JSON.stringify(response.body) });
 });
@@ -310,6 +312,74 @@ await indicate('label[for="camera-photo"]');
 await page.locator('#camera-photo').dispatchEvent('cancel');
 await page.getByText(/Camera or photo picker closed/i).waitFor();
 await caption('Camera closed cleanly — gallery and manual logging are still available', 1600);
+// Issue #16, on camera: the file below is committed as text and only claims to be a photo. It must
+// be refused on the device, the refusal must say nothing was uploaded, and the app must never post
+// it — asserted here, not narrated.
+await indicate('label[for="gallery-photo"]');
+await page.locator('#gallery-photo').setInputFiles('tests/fixtures/not-a-photo.jpg');
+await page.locator('[data-capture-error="unreadable"]').waitFor();
+const unreadableCopy = await page.locator('[data-capture-error="unreadable"]').innerText();
+if (!/isn’t a photo Timmy can read/.test(unreadableCopy) || !/Nothing was uploaded/.test(unreadableCopy)) {
+  throw new Error(`An unreadable file must be refused with the upload-free copy, saw: ${unreadableCopy}`);
+}
+if (await page.getByText(/couldn’t analyze that safely/i).count() !== 0) {
+  throw new Error('A file that never left the device must not be reported as a failed analysis');
+}
+if (analyzeCalls !== 0) throw new Error('An unreadable file was posted to /api/analyze');
+await caption('A file that only claims to be a photo is refused on the device — nothing is uploaded', 2600);
+await indicate('[data-capture-error="unreadable"]');
+await caption('Manual logging stays one tap away, and the photo picker is one tap back', 2000);
+// Issue #16 has two boundaries, and the device guard is only the first. The bytes below are offered
+// straight to this running app with the demo's own /api/analyze interceptor lifted, so the status and
+// the refusal copy on the card are read back from the real server rather than narrated.
+await caption('The device guard is not the only one: the same bytes, sent straight to the running server', 2600);
+await page.unroute('**/api/analyze');
+let serverRefusal;
+try {
+  serverRefusal = await page.evaluate(async () => {
+    const base = (document.querySelector('meta[name="timmy-base-path"]')?.content || '/').replace(/\/$/, '');
+    const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode('<!doctype html><html><body>named .jpg, not an image</body></html>');
+    let binary = '';
+    for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
+    const response = await fetch(`${base}/api/analyze`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${btoa(binary)}` }),
+    });
+    return { status: response.status, body: await response.json(), contentType: response.headers.get('content-type') };
+  });
+} finally {
+  await page.route('**/api/analyze', route => {
+    analyzeCalls += 1;
+    const response = analyzeOverride || { status: 200, body: suggestionBody };
+    return route.fulfill({ status: response.status, contentType: 'application/json', body: JSON.stringify(response.body) });
+  });
+}
+// A 200 here would mean the boundary is untested and the demo is theatre, so the scene fails instead.
+if (serverRefusal.status !== 400 || !/not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo/i.test(serverRefusal.body?.error || '')) {
+  throw new Error(`The running server must refuse non-image bytes, saw ${serverRefusal.status} ${JSON.stringify(serverRefusal.body)}`);
+}
+await evidenceCard({
+  id: 'demo-ingress-card',
+  title: 'IMAGE INGRESS, REFUSED BY THE SERVER',
+  subtitle: 'The same non-image bytes, posted to this running app in this recording',
+  rows: [
+    ['status', `${serverRefusal.status} refused`],
+    ['code', String(serverRefusal.body?.code || 'not_an_image')],
+    ['copy', String(serverRefusal.body?.error || '')],
+    ['—', ''],
+    ['provider', 'never called — no model request for these bytes'],
+    ['budget', 'counted by the per-device limiter before the provider is asked'],
+    ['after', 'the journal, the draft, and manual logging are untouched'],
+    ['—', ''],
+    ['scope', 'this probe is a non-image container. Polyglot tails, embedded metadata, dimensions, body size, and the rate limit are enforced and asserted in the suite'],
+  ],
+});
+const ingressProof = await evidenceCardProof('demo-ingress-card');
+if (!ingressProof.ok) throw new Error(`server refusal card is not legible: ${JSON.stringify(ingressProof)}`);
+await caption('Refused at the server too: 400 not_an_image, before any model work', 2600);
+await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#demo-ingress-card')?.remove());
+await tap('#retake-photo', 450);
 await indicate('label[for="gallery-photo"]');
 await page.locator('#gallery-photo').setInputFiles('tests/fixtures/synthetic-type4.jpg');
 await caption('Nothing uploads until explicit consent', 1100);
@@ -1165,6 +1235,83 @@ await caption('Each candidate is scored on test at a threshold chosen on validat
 await caption('One contributor spread across two splits is refused before anything is scored, and a passing verdict is proven only by a fixture engineered to clear it', 3800);
 await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#calibration-report')?.remove());
 
+// Issue #40 — the RC attack suite is a command line too, and unlike the other cards this one is
+// expected to come back with a verdict that is not flattering. Hostile synthetic bytes go at the
+// real server with a counting stub worker behind it, so "the worker was called" is measured, not
+// inferred. The card prints whatever verdict the suite derived from what it observed; the captions
+// name where a failing fix lives instead of implying the boundary is already safe.
+async function securityAttackSuite() {
+  const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'timmy-security-demo-'));
+  const reportPath = path.join(directory, 'rc-attack-report.json');
+  try {
+    const run = await execFileAsync(
+      process.execPath,
+      ['scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs', '--json', reportPath],
+      { cwd: process.cwd() },
+    ).then(result => ({ code: 0, stdout: result.stdout, stderr: result.stderr }))
+      .catch(error => ({ code: typeof error.code === 'number' ? error.code : 1, stdout: error.stdout || '', stderr: error.stderr || '' }));
+    if (![0, 1].includes(run.code)) throw new Error(`the attack suite could not complete: ${run.stderr.trim()}`);
+    const report = JSON.parse(await readFile(reportPath, 'utf8'));
+    if (run.code !== (report.verdict === 'BLOCKED' ? 1 : 0)) {
+      throw new Error('the attack suite exit code must match the verdict it published');
+    }
+    return { report, run };
+  } finally {
+    await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+const securityRun = await securityAttackSuite();
+const securityReport = securityRun.report;
+if (securityReport.cases.length < 8) throw new Error('the RC attack suite must run every named abuse class');
+await tap('[data-view="home"]', 450);
+const caseDetail = (item) => {
+  const observed = item.observed === null || typeof item.observed !== 'object' ? {} : item.observed;
+  // Print each observed field the case actually recorded. A case with no `status` used to render
+  // `http undefined` on camera, and one with no `providerCalls` rendered its status twice — both read
+  // as a broken demo instead of the measurement it is.
+  const parts = [];
+  if ('status' in observed) parts.push(`http ${observed.status}`);
+  if ('refused' in observed) parts.push(`refused ${observed.refused}`);
+  if ('providerCalls' in observed) parts.push(`worker ${observed.providerCalls}`);
+  if ('providerTextLeaked' in observed) parts.push(`text leaked ${observed.providerTextLeaked}`);
+  if ('repeatedAnswerIdentical' in observed) parts.push(`identical ${observed.repeatedAnswerIdentical}`);
+  if ('imageBytesInLog' in observed) parts.push(`image bytes ${observed.imageBytesInLog}`);
+  return parts.length ? parts.join(' · ') : item.status;
+};
+const securityRows = [
+  ['command', 'node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs'],
+  ['target', 'real server · counting stub worker · synthetic bytes'],
+  ['—', ''],
+];
+for (const item of securityReport.cases) securityRows.push([item.category, `${item.severity} ${item.status} · ${caseDetail(item)}`]);
+securityRows.push(['—', '']);
+securityRows.push(['load', `${securityReport.load.requests} req · p50 ${securityReport.load.p50}ms · p95 ${securityReport.load.p95}ms · abstain ${securityReport.load.abstentions}`]);
+securityRows.push(['verdict', `${securityReport.verdict} · ${securityReport.blocking.length} blocking · ${securityReport.holds.length} held`]);
+for (const item of securityReport.blocking) securityRows.push(['blocks', item.id]);
+const securityCard = await evidenceCard({
+  id: 'security-attack',
+  title: 'SECURITY ATTACK SUITE',
+  subtitle: 'command line, not app UI — real server, counted worker calls',
+  rows: securityRows,
+  font: '600 9.5px/1.45 ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, monospace',
+  keyWidth: 62,
+  gap: '1px',
+  rowGap: '5px',
+});
+await sleep(420);
+const securityCardProof = await evidenceCardProof('security-attack');
+if (!securityCardProof.ok) throw new Error(`Security card is not fully readable on screen: ${JSON.stringify(securityCardProof)}`);
+for (const item of securityReport.blocking) {
+  if (!securityCard.text.includes(item.id)) throw new Error(`the card must name the blocking case ${item.id}`);
+}
+if (!securityCard.text.includes(securityReport.verdict)) throw new Error('the card must show the verdict the suite derived');
+if (!securityCard.text.includes(`${securityReport.load.p95}ms`)) throw new Error('the card must show the p95 the load phase measured');
+await caption('Every hostile upload on screen went at the real server, and the worker behind it counted every call it received', 3800);
+await caption('Refusing bytes by their content is the fix in review, not a claim this video makes: an HTML file dressed as a JPEG still reaches the worker today', 4200);
+await caption('A failing case is a finding the release job has to see, so the card prints the verdict the suite derived instead of a reassuring one', 3800);
+await caption('The gate blocks RC approval on any P0 case that reached the worker — the gate decides, not the caption', 3400);
+await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#security-attack')?.remove());
+
 // Issue #39 — the operator backup is a command line, not a screen in the app. The app itself keeps
 // no server-side journal, so what an operator can actually lose is the corpus: the append-only
 // manifest with its withdrawal tombstones. This scene builds a synthetic data root with the real
@@ -1378,6 +1525,102 @@ await tap('#entry-sheet-close', 450);
 await tap('[data-view="privacy"]', 550);
 await page.locator('#delete-all').waitFor();
 
+// Issue #19 — the operator health counters are disclosed where a user reads privacy facts, and the
+// recording shows the real sentence the app renders, checked in the browser first.
+const healthDisclosure = page.locator('[data-health-disclosure]');
+await healthDisclosure.waitFor();
+const healthCopy = (await healthDisclosure.innerText()).trim();
+if (!/how analysis requests went/i.test(healthCopy) || !/image fingerprints/i.test(healthCopy) || !/reset/i.test(healthCopy)) {
+  throw new Error(`the privacy screen must disclose the privacy-safe health counters: ${healthCopy}`);
+}
+await page.evaluate(node => node.scrollIntoView({ block: 'center' }), await healthDisclosure.elementHandle());
+await caption('Health counters are disclosed where you read privacy facts — they never include notes, photos, image fingerprints, or identity', 3200);
+await indicate('[data-health-disclosure]');
+
+// Issue #19, on camera: the operator report is a command line, not a screen in the app. It runs the
+// real script against this recording's own server (started with a demo-only loopback token), so every
+// number printed on the card was produced by the requests this recording just made — the ingress
+// refusals above are counted, not staged. The same script with a wrong token must be refused rather
+// than answered, and the token itself must never reach the report.
+const operatorToken = process.env.TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN || '';
+if (!operatorToken) {
+  throw new Error('the demo server must be started with a demo TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN so the operator report can be exercised');
+}
+async function operatorReport(args) {
+  return execFileAsync(process.execPath, ['scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs', ...args], { cwd: process.cwd() })
+    .then(result => ({ code: 0, stdout: result.stdout, stderr: result.stderr }))
+    .catch(error => ({ code: typeof error.code === 'number' ? error.code : 1, stdout: error.stdout || '', stderr: error.stderr || '' }));
+}
+const reportRun = await operatorReport(['--url', 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', '--token', operatorToken]);
+if (reportRun.code !== 0) throw new Error(`the operator report must read the snapshot: ${reportRun.stderr.trim()}`);
+const refusedRun = await operatorReport(['--url', 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', '--token', 'demo-token-that-is-wrong']);
+if (refusedRun.code !== 1 || !/rejected the operator token/i.test(refusedRun.stderr)) {
+  throw new Error('a wrong operator token must be refused with a stated reason instead of answered');
+}
+if (reportRun.stdout.includes(operatorToken) || refusedRun.stderr.includes('demo-token-that-is-wrong')) {
+  throw new Error('the operator token must never appear in the report or in an error line');
+}
+const parsedRows = [];
+let sections = 0;
+for (const line of reportRun.stdout.split('\n')) {
+  const match = /^ {2}(\S.*?)\s{2,}(\S.*)$/.exec(line);
+  if (match) { parsedRows.push([match[1].trim(), match[2].trim()]); continue; }
+  const heading = line.trim();
+  if (heading === 'APP' || heading === 'QUEUE' || heading === 'MODEL') {
+    parsedRows.push(['—', '']);
+    parsedRows.push(['section', heading]);
+    sections += 1;
+  }
+}
+if (sections !== 3) throw new Error(`the operator report must separate the app, queue, and model boundaries, not ${sections} of them`);
+const rowValue = pattern => {
+  const found = parsedRows.find(([key]) => pattern.test(key));
+  if (!found) throw new Error(`the operator report is missing the ${pattern} row: ${reportRun.stdout}`);
+  return found[1];
+};
+const failureRows = parsedRows.filter(([key]) => /^failure /i.test(key));
+if (failureRows.length !== 8) throw new Error(`the report must print all eight enumerated failure classes, not ${failureRows.length}`);
+const failureList = failureRows.map(([key, value]) => `${key.replace(/^failure /i, '')} ${value}`).join(' · ');
+const analyzeCount = Number(rowValue(/^analyze requests$/i));
+if (!Number.isFinite(analyzeCount) || analyzeCount < 1) {
+  throw new Error(`the report must count this recording's own requests, not a zero: ${reportRun.stdout}`);
+}
+const metricsCard = await evidenceCard({
+  id: 'operator-health-report',
+  title: 'OPERATOR HEALTH REPORT',
+  // Long CLI labels are folded into values on purpose: a key column narrow enough to fit the phone
+  // splits `analyze requests` across two lines and detaches it from its count.
+  subtitle: 'command line, not app UI — loopback :4173, demo token',
+  rows: [
+    ['section', 'APP'],
+    ['uptime', rowValue(/^uptime$/i)],
+    ['requests', `${analyzeCount} analyzed · ${rowValue(/^refused before model$/i)} refused before the model`],
+    ['section', 'QUEUE'],
+    ['in flight', rowValue(/^in flight$/i)],
+    ['accepted', rowValue(/^accepted$/i)],
+    ['at capacity', rowValue(/^at capacity$/i)],
+    ['section', 'MODEL'],
+    ['readiness', rowValue(/^readiness$/i)],
+    ['outcomes', rowValue(/^outcomes$/i)],
+    ['abstention', rowValue(/^abstention$/i)],
+    ['latency', rowValue(/^latency$/i)],
+    ['failures', failureList],
+    ['—', ''],
+    ['wrong token', 'refused · exit 1 · no counters'],
+  ],
+  font: '600 9.5px/1.45 ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, monospace',
+  keyWidth: 72,
+  gap: '1px',
+  rowGap: '6px',
+});
+await sleep(420);
+const metricsCardProof = await evidenceCardProof('operator-health-report');
+if (!metricsCardProof.ok) throw new Error(`Operator report card is not fully readable on screen: ${JSON.stringify(metricsCardProof)}`);
+await caption('The operator health report is a command line, not a screen in the app — this runs it against this recording’s own server', 3800);
+await caption('Every counter on this card came from the requests this recording just made, and a wrong token is refused instead of answered', 3600);
+await caption('The snapshot holds counts, a readiness phase, latency, and enumerated failure classes — no note, photo, image fingerprint, or identity', 4000);
+await page.evaluate(() => document.querySelector('#operator-health-report')?.remove());
+
 await indicate('#delete-all');
 await tap('#delete-all', 650);
 await page.getByText(/Local ledger and photos deleted/).waitFor();
@@ -1499,12 +1742,14 @@ await page.evaluate(() => {
 });
 await sleep(2200);
 
-// The refusal pass deliberately produces two fail-closed 503s (an out-of-range reply, and one blank field
-// beside an out-of-range one), which the browser logs as failed resources. Requiring exactly those two
-// keeps the scene honest: if the boundary stops refusing, this fails instead of quietly recording a happy
-// path, and a dropped scene is caught rather than silently shrinking the evidence.
+// Two deliberate refusals show up in the browser console as failed resources, and both are counted
+// rather than tolerated: the ingress probe above posts non-image bytes to the real server (one 400),
+// and the refusal pass produces two fail-closed 503s (an out-of-range reply, and one blank field
+// beside an out-of-range one). Enumerating them keeps the scene honest: if the ingress boundary stops
+// refusing, or a dropped scene shrinks the evidence, this fails instead of recording a happy path.
 const expectedFailClosed = errors.filter(message => /Failed to load resource: the server responded with a status of 503 \(Service Unavailable\)/.test(message));
-if (expectedFailClosed.length !== 2 || errors.length !== expectedFailClosed.length) {
+const expectedIngressRefusal = errors.filter(message => /Failed to load resource: the server responded with a status of 400 \(Bad Request\)/.test(message));
+if (expectedFailClosed.length !== 2 || expectedIngressRefusal.length !== 1 || errors.length !== 3) {
   throw new Error(`Browser errors: ${errors.join(' | ') || 'unexpected error count'}`);
 }
 // Machine-readable receipt of exactly what was rendered on camera, so the release gate can prove

scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// RC attack suite (#40): attack the release candidate before users do.
+//
+// Every case drives the shipping `server.mjs` with synthetic hostile bytes while a stub worker counts
+// the calls that reach it. The suite records what it observed and derives a verdict from the
+// observation; it never asserts a result it did not see. No real medical image, no live user data,
+// no third-party provider is involved, and the provider is a counting stub, so "reached the worker"
+// is provable rather than inferred.
+//
+// Usage: node scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs [--json <path>] [--base-url <url>]
+// Exit: 0 = GO, 1 = BLOCKED (a P0 finding, or a required category with no executable evidence).
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { access, mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { buildReport, containsImageBytes, latencyPercentiles } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
+
+const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
+const argument = (name, fallback) => {
+  const index = process.argv.indexOf(name);
+  return index === -1 ? fallback : process.argv[index + 1];
+};
+const reportPath = argument('--json', join(repoRoot, 'artifacts/security/rc-attack-report.json'));
+const explicitBaseUrl = argument('--base-url', '');
+
+function freePort() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    const probe = http.createServer();
+    probe.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const { port } = probe.address();
+      probe.close(() => resolve(port));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+// A counting OpenAI-compatible worker. `state.content` is the answer the next request receives, and
+// `state.requests` is the evidence that a request crossed the provider boundary at all.
+function startStubWorker() {
+  const state = { content: '', requests: 0 };
+  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+    if (req.url.endsWith('/models')) {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      return res.end(JSON.stringify({ data: [{ id: 'stub-vision-worker' }] }));
+    }
+    req.resume();
+    req.on('end', () => {
+      state.requests += 1;
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ message: { content: state.content } }] }));
+    });
+  });
+  return new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve({
+    state,
+    port: server.address().port,
+    close: () => new Promise(done => server.close(done)),
+  })));
+}
+
+// The real server, with its own stdout/stderr captured from the first byte: the log scan is only
+// worth something if it read a log that actually exists.
+async function startTarget({ providerPort, port, env = {} }) {
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      HOST: '127.0.0.1',
+      PORT: String(port),
+      TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED: 'true',
+      TIMMY_VISION_PROFILE: 'selfhost',
+      TIMMY_VISION_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${providerPort}/v1`,
+      TIMMY_VISION_MODEL: 'stub-vision-worker',
+      TIMMY_VISION_TIMEOUT_MS: '5000',
+      ...env,
+    },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  });
+  const log = [];
+  child.stdout.on('data', chunk => log.push(chunk.toString('utf8')));
+  child.stderr.on('data', chunk => log.push(chunk.toString('utf8')));
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 100; attempt += 1) {
+    if (log.join('').includes('Timmy is listening')) return { child, log };
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/healthz`);
+      if (response.ok) return { child, log };
+    } catch {}
+    await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
+  }
+  child.kill();
+  throw new Error('attack suite target did not become ready');
+}
+
+const stop = child => new Promise(resolve => {
+  if (!child || child.exitCode !== null) return resolve();
+  child.kill();
+  child.once('exit', resolve);
+});
+
+async function main() {
+  const worker = await startStubWorker();
+  const port = explicitBaseUrl ? null : await freePort();
+  const baseUrl = explicitBaseUrl || `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  const target = explicitBaseUrl ? null : await startTarget({ providerPort: worker.port, port });
+  const photo = await readFile(join(repoRoot, 'tests/fixtures/synthetic-type4.jpg'));
+  const imageDataUrl = `data:image/jpeg;base64,${photo.toString('base64')}`;
+
+  const post = async (body, targetBase = baseUrl) => {
+    const before = worker.state.requests;
+    const response = await fetch(`${targetBase}/api/analyze`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+      body: typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body),
+    });
+    const text = await response.text();
+    return { status: response.status, text, providerCalls: worker.state.requests - before };
+  };
+
+  const cases = [];
+  const record = (entry) => { cases.push(entry); return entry; };
+
+  try {
+    const health = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/healthz`).then(response => response.json());
+    if (!health.visionEnabled) throw new Error('the attack suite needs vision analysis enabled on the target');
+
+    // 1. An oversized body must die at the request cap, before the photo is parsed or forwarded.
+    const oversized = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${'A'.repeat(6.6 * 1024 * 1024)}` });
+    record({
+      id: 'ingress-oversized-body',
+      category: 'oversized',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'A body over the request cap is refused before any provider work.',
+      expected: { status: 413, providerCalls: 0 },
+      observed: { status: oversized.status, providerCalls: oversized.providerCalls },
+      snippet: oversized.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 2. Bytes decide the format, not the data-URL label: HTML dressed as a JPEG is a polyglot.
+    const html = Buffer.from('<html><body><script>alert(document.cookie)</script></body></html>');
+    const polyglot = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${html.toString('base64')}` });
+    record({
+      id: 'ingress-polyglot-html',
+      category: 'polyglot',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'A payload whose bytes are HTML under an image/jpeg label is refused before the provider sees it.',
+      expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
+      observed: { status: polyglot.status, providerCalls: polyglot.providerCalls },
+      snippet: polyglot.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 3. Random bytes under a JPEG label are not an image either.
+    const garbage = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${randomBytes(64).toString('base64')}` });
+    record({
+      id: 'ingress-garbage-bytes',
+      category: 'truncated',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'Undecodable bytes are refused rather than forwarded and interpreted.',
+      expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
+      observed: { status: garbage.status, providerCalls: garbage.providerCalls },
+      snippet: garbage.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 4. Consent is a precondition, and it is cheap to prove: no consent, no provider call.
+    const noConsent = await post({ consent: false, imageDataUrl });
+    record({
+      id: 'consent-required',
+      category: 'consent',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'Analysis without explicit consent is refused and never leaves the boundary.',
+      expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
+      observed: { status: noConsent.status, providerCalls: noConsent.providerCalls },
+      snippet: noConsent.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 5. A worker answer outside the schema must fail closed, and the provider's words must not
+    //    reach the user or the evidence file.
+    worker.state.content = 'garbage-completion-token: isStool yes maybe, bristolType ten';
+    const malformed = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
+    record({
+      id: 'model-output-malformed',
+      category: 'malformed',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'A non-conforming provider answer is replaced by neutral copy and never echoed.',
+      expected: { status: 503, providerTextLeaked: false },
+      observed: { status: malformed.status, providerTextLeaked: /garbage-completion-token/.test(malformed.text) },
+      snippet: malformed.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 6. Replay: this boundary holds no session state, so a replay is a second request. What must
+    //    hold is that it is answered identically and that nothing accumulates server-side.
+    worker.state.content = JSON.stringify({ isStool: true, bristolType: 4, color: 'brown', confidence: 0.82, imageQuality: 'good', observations: 'Smooth, formed appearance.' });
+    const first = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
+    const second = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl });
+    record({
+      id: 'replay-duplicate-request',
+      category: 'replay',
+      severity: 'P2',
+      requirement: 'A byte-identical replay is answered identically and stores nothing on the server.',
+      expected: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1, repeatedAnswerIdentical: true },
+      observed: { status: second.status, providerCalls: second.providerCalls, repeatedAnswerIdentical: first.text === second.text },
+      snippet: second.text.slice(0, 120),
+    });
+
+    // 7. Flood: concurrent requests must meet a bound instead of all reaching the worker at once.
+    const beforeFlood = worker.state.requests;
+    const flood = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 12 }, () => post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl })));
+    record({
+      id: 'flood-concurrency',
+      category: 'flood',
+      severity: 'P1',
+      requirement: 'A burst of concurrent analyses meets a bounded queue or a rate refusal.',
+      expected: { refused: true },
+      observed: { refused: flood.some(item => item.status === 429 || item.status === 503), providerCalls: worker.state.requests - beforeFlood },
+      snippet: `statuses ${[...new Set(flood.map(item => item.status))].sort().join(',')}`,
+    });
+
+    // 8. Log inspection: the operator log is committed evidence, so it must not contain the photo.
+    const capturedLog = (target?.log || []).join('');
+    if (!capturedLog.trim()) throw new Error('no server log was captured, so the log scan would prove nothing');
+    record({
+      id: 'log-leak-scan',
+      category: 'log',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      requirement: 'Server logs contain no image bytes, base64, or note text.',
+      expected: { imageBytesInLog: false },
+      observed: { imageBytesInLog: containsImageBytes(capturedLog) },
+      snippet: `${capturedLog.trim().split('\n').length} log line(s) inspected`,
+    });
+
+    // 9. Deletion is governed by the contribution ledger, not by this HTTP boundary. Covering it
+    //    here means naming the executable test that does it, and only counting it once verified.
+    let evidenceVerified = false;
+    try {
+      await access(join(repoRoot, 'tests/training-contribution.test.js'));
+      evidenceVerified = true;
+    } catch {}
+    record({
+      id: 'deletion-withdrawal',
+      category: 'deletion',
+      severity: 'P0',
+      surface: 'out-of-surface',
+      requirement: 'Withdrawal deletes the contribution and the server holds no copy of the photo.',
+      evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js',
+      evidenceVerified,
+      snippet: evidenceVerified ? 'covered by the contribution ledger suite' : 'named evidence file is missing',
+    });
+
+    // Load: sequential valid analyses, abstaining answers, latency measured with the same boundary.
+    // The abuse cases above spend the ingress request budget, so latency is measured against a second
+    // target that starts with the budget wide open; otherwise these samples would be 429 refusals.
+    const loadPort = explicitBaseUrl ? null : await freePort();
+    const loadTarget = explicitBaseUrl
+      ? null
+      : await startTarget({
+        providerPort: worker.port,
+        port: loadPort,
+        env: { TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_LIMIT: '100000', TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_WINDOW_MS: '60000' },
+      });
+    const loadBase = explicitBaseUrl || `http://127.0.0.1:${loadPort}`;
+    worker.state.content = JSON.stringify({ isStool: false, confidence: 0.9 });
+    const samples = [];
+    let errors = 0;
+    let abstentions = 0;
+    try {
+      for (let index = 0; index < 8; index += 1) {
+        const started = performance.now();
+        const result = await post({ consent: true, imageDataUrl }, loadBase);
+        samples.push(Math.round(performance.now() - started));
+        if (result.status !== 200) errors += 1;
+        else {
+          try {
+            if (JSON.parse(result.text).status === 'needs_user_input') abstentions += 1;
+          } catch {}
+        }
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await stop(loadTarget?.child);
+    }
+    const percentiles = latencyPercentiles(samples);
+    const load = {
+      requests: samples.length,
+      errors,
+      abstentions,
+      p50: percentiles.p50,
+      p95: percentiles.p95,
+      max: percentiles.max,
+      note: 'Latency measured against a counting stub on loopback; it measures this boundary, not a model.',
+    };
+    // Issue #16 adds a per-caller request budget at the ingress, so a suite that spends its budget on
+    // the abuse cases above would measure 429 refusals here and publish them as analysis latency.
+    // A refusal is not a sample: the load phase runs against its own permissive target instead.
+    if (load.errors > 0) {
+      throw new Error(`the load phase measured ${load.errors}/${load.requests} refusals instead of analyses, so it cannot publish latency`);
+    }
+
+    const report = buildReport({
+      generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+      target: {
+        baseUrl,
+        provider: 'stub counting worker (synthetic answers, no model loaded)',
+        visionProfile: 'selfhost',
+        release: health.release,
+        commit: health.commit,
+      },
+      cases,
+      load,
+    });
+    await mkdir(dirname(reportPath), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(reportPath, `${JSON.stringify(report, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8');
+
+    const width = Math.max(...cases.map(item => item.id.length));
+    for (const item of report.cases) {
+      const detail = item.status === 'fail' ? ` — ${item.mismatch}` : '';
+      console.log(`${item.id.padEnd(width)}  ${item.severity}  ${item.status}${detail}`);
+    }
+    console.log(`load: ${load.requests} requests · p50 ${load.p50}ms · p95 ${load.p95}ms · errors ${load.errors} · abstentions ${load.abstentions}`);
+    console.log(`report: ${reportPath}`);
+    console.log(`VERDICT: ${report.verdict}`);
+    if (report.verdict === 'BLOCKED') {
+      for (const item of [...report.blocking, ...report.unproven]) console.log(`  blocks RC: ${item.id} (${item.severity}) ${item.reason}`);
+    }
+    return report.verdict === 'GO' ? 0 : 1;
+  } finally {
+    await stop(target?.child);
+    await worker.close();
+  }
+}
+
+main().then(code => { process.exitCode = code; }).catch(error => {
+  console.error(`attack suite could not complete: ${error.message}`);
+  process.exitCode = 2;
+});

server.mjs

@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
 import http from 'node:http';
 import { isIP } from 'node:net';
+import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 import { readFile, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { extname, join, normalize } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { analyzePhoto, visionFailureResponse } from './src/vision-service.js';
 import { probeVisionProvider, resolveVisionConfig } from './src/vision-config.js';
 import { AgentGatewayError, createHermesAgentService, resolveHermesAgentConfig } from './src/hermes-agent-service.js';
+import { readJsonBody } from './src/http-body.js';
+import { inspectImageBytes, IngressError } from './src/image-ingress.js';
+import { createRateLimiter } from './src/rate-limit.js';
+import { createModelMetrics } from './src/model-metrics.js';
+import { visionReadiness } from './src/vision-readiness.js';
 
 const root=fileURLToPath(new URL('.',import.meta.url));
 const port=Number(process.env.PORT||4173);
@@ -32,7 +38,57 @@ const stagingLabel=process.env.TIMMY_STAGING_LABEL?`Staging · ${release} · ${c
 
 function sendJson(res,status,value){res.writeHead(status,{'content-type':'application/json; charset=utf-8','cache-control':'no-store','x-content-type-options':'nosniff'});res.end(JSON.stringify(value));}
 function escapeHtmlAttribute(value){return String(value).replace(/[&<>"]/g,character=>({'&':'&amp;','<':'&lt;','>':'&gt;','"':'&quot;'}[character]));}
-function readJson(req,maxBytes=6*1024*1024){return new Promise((resolve,reject)=>{let size=0,tooLarge=false;const chunks=[];req.on('data',chunk=>{size+=chunk.length;if(size>maxBytes){tooLarge=true;return}chunks.push(chunk)});req.on('end',()=>{if(tooLarge)return reject(new AgentGatewayError(413,'Request is too large.'));try{resolve(JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')))}catch{return reject(new AgentGatewayError(400,'Invalid JSON request.'))}});req.on('error',reject)})}
+// Photo ingress (issue #16). Every limit here is decided from the request itself and fails before
+// any provider call: a per-caller request budget, a deadline for a body that never arrives, a byte
+// ceiling, and a container/pixel inspection of the decoded image. The bucket key is a salted hash
+// that lives only in this process's memory, so no address and no image byte is ever logged.
+const bodyTimeoutMs=Number(process.env.TIMMY_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS||15_000);
+const analyzeLimiter=createRateLimiter({limit:Number(process.env.TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_LIMIT||12),windowMs:Number(process.env.TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_WINDOW_MS||60_000)});
+// Issue #19: operator health counters. The token is what makes this an operator surface rather than
+// a public one — with no token configured the route does not exist at all.
+const metricsToken=String(process.env.TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN||'');
+const modelMetrics=createModelMetrics({limit:Number(process.env.TIMMY_MODEL_CONCURRENCY||4)});
+function classifyFailure(error){
+ const code=String(error?.code||'');
+ if(code==='invalid_json'||code==='invalid_fields')return 'schema_invalid';
+ const message=String(error?.message||'');
+ if(/timed out|timeout|abort/i.test(message))return 'timeout';
+ // A payload the semantic validator rejects never reached the model, so it is an ingress refusal
+ // rather than a model fault.
+ if(/consent|JPEG|PNG|WebP|empty|too large/i.test(message))return 'ingress_refused';
+ if(/invalid response/i.test(message))return 'provider_rejected';
+ return 'provider_unreachable';
+}
+// Both the browser's readiness probe and the operator snapshot record the same observation, so the
+// cold-load figure reflects the moment the model actually became resident, not the first time an
+// operator happened to look.
+function observeReadiness(provider){
+ const readiness=visionReadiness({enabled:visionConfig.enabled,providerReady:provider.ready,modelSeen:provider.modelSeen});
+ modelMetrics.recordReadiness({phase:readiness.phase,ready:readiness.ready});
+ return readiness;
+}
+// A token comparison that does not leak its prefix through response timing. The digests are equal
+// length by construction, so timingSafeEqual can be used even for a wrong-length guess.
+function operatorTokenMatches(supplied){
+ if(!metricsToken||!supplied)return false;
+ const digest=value=>createHash('sha256').update(String(value)).digest();
+ return timingSafeEqual(digest(supplied),digest(metricsToken));
+}
+const bucketSalt=randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
+function clientBucket(req){return createHash('sha256').update(`${bucketSalt}:${req.socket.remoteAddress||'unknown'}`).digest('hex').slice(0,24);}
+function readJson(req,maxBytes=6*1024*1024){return readJsonBody(req,{maxBytes,timeoutMs:bodyTimeoutMs});}
+function ingressGuard(payload){
+ const raw=String(payload?.imageDataUrl||'');
+ const match=/^data:(image\/(?:jpeg|png|webp));base64,([A-Za-z0-9+/=]+)$/.exec(raw);
+ // A payload that is not shaped like a data URL is left to the semantic validator, so the user still
+ // gets the specific "upload a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo" copy rather than a second opinion here.
+ if(!match)return null;
+ return inspectImageBytes(Buffer.from(match[2],'base64'),{declaredMime:match[1]});
+}
+function sendIngressError(res,error){
+ if(error instanceof IngressError)return sendJson(res,400,{error:error.message,code:error.code});
+ return sendJson(res,error.status||400,{error:error.message,code:error.code});
+}
 function cookie(req,name){for(const part of String(req.headers.cookie||'').split(';')){const [key,...value]=part.trim().split('=');if(key===name)return decodeURIComponent(value.join('='))}return ''}
 function requestOrigin(req){return String(req.headers.origin||'').replace(/\/$/,'')}
 function rejectCrossSite(req){const site=String(req.headers['sec-fetch-site']||'');if(site&&site!=='same-origin')throw new AgentGatewayError(403,'Cross-site agent requests are not allowed.')}
@@ -48,14 +104,58 @@ http.createServer(async(req,res)=>{
   if(appPath==='/api/healthz'&&req.method==='GET')return sendJson(res,200,{ok:true,release,commit,visionEnabled:visionConfig.enabled,agentEnabled:agentConfig.enabled});
   if(appPath==='/api/vision-status'&&req.method==='GET'){
    const provider=await probeVisionProvider(visionConfig);
+   observeReadiness(provider);
    const privacy=visionConfig.profile==='selfhost'?'The compressed image is processed by Timmy’s self-hosted model and is not forwarded to a third-party model provider.':'A compressed copy is sent to the configured AI provider only when you explicitly request analysis.';
    return sendJson(res,200,{...visionConfig.publicStatus(),providerReady:provider.ready,modelSeen:provider.modelSeen,privacy});
   }
+  // Operator-only health snapshot (issue #19). With TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN unset the route is absent,
+  // so a default deployment exposes no counters at all.
+  if(appPath==='/api/metrics'&&req.method==='GET'){
+   if(!metricsToken)return sendJson(res,404,{error:'Not found'});
+   if(!operatorTokenMatches(String(req.headers.authorization||'').replace(/^Bearer\s+/i,'')))return sendJson(res,403,{error:'Operator token required.'});
+   observeReadiness(await probeVisionProvider(visionConfig));
+   return sendJson(res,200,modelMetrics.snapshot());
+  }
   if(appPath==='/api/analyze'&&req.method==='POST'){
-   if(!visionConfig.enabled)return sendJson(res,503,{error:'AI analysis is disabled. Continue manually.'});
-   const payload=await readJson(req);
-   try{return sendJson(res,200,await analyzePhoto({payload,config:visionConfig}))}
-   catch(error){const failure=visionFailureResponse(error);return sendJson(res,failure.status,failure.body)}
+   // Refusals first, in cost order: the request budget, then the body, then the image bytes. None of
+   // these depend on the model, so hostile bytes are refused as hostile even when analysis is off —
+   // otherwise the disabled switch hides the ingress boundary behind a 503 and the refusal is untested.
+   const startedAtMs=Date.now();
+   const recordFailure=failureClass=>modelMetrics.recordAnalyze({outcome:'failure',failureClass,durationMs:Date.now()-startedAtMs});
+   const budget=analyzeLimiter.take(clientBucket(req));
+   if(!budget.allowed){
+    recordFailure('rate_limited');
+    res.setHeader('retry-after',String(Math.max(1,Math.ceil(budget.retryAfterMs/1000))));
+    return sendJson(res,429,{error:'Too many photos from this device. Wait a moment, then try again — your journal and manual logging still work.'});
+   }
+   let payload;
+   try{payload=await readJson(req)}
+   catch(error){
+    recordFailure('ingress_refused');
+    const sent=sendIngressError(res,error);
+    // The refusal is written first, then the half-read socket is dropped so a stalled body cannot
+    // hold a connection or its partial buffer open.
+    if(error?.code==='body_timeout'||error?.code==='too_large')req.destroy?.();
+    return sent;
+   }
+   try{ingressGuard(payload)}
+   catch(error){recordFailure('ingress_refused');return sendIngressError(res,error)}
+   // Bytes are known to be a real photo at this point, so the disabled switch is the honest answer.
+   if(!visionConfig.enabled){recordFailure('disabled');return sendJson(res,503,{error:'AI analysis is disabled. Continue manually.'})}
+   // The slot is what the queue boundary reports, and it is released on every exit path so a failed
+   // analysis cannot quietly consume concurrency.
+   const slot=modelMetrics.enter();
+   try{
+    const result=await analyzePhoto({payload,config:visionConfig});
+    modelMetrics.recordAnalyze({outcome:result?.status==='suggestion'?'suggestion':'abstained',durationMs:Date.now()-startedAtMs});
+    return sendJson(res,200,result);
+   }
+   catch(error){
+    const failure=visionFailureResponse(error);
+    recordFailure(classifyFailure(error));
+    return sendJson(res,failure.status,failure.body);
+   }
+   finally{modelMetrics.leave(slot)}
   }
   if(appPath==='/api/agent/status'&&req.method==='GET')return sendJson(res,200,agentService.status(cookie(req,'timmy_agent')));
   if(appPath==='/api/agent/unlock'&&req.method==='POST'){

src/http-body.js

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// Bounded request-body reading for the API boundary (issue #16).
+//
+// Three limits have to fail before any provider work starts: the byte ceiling, a deadline for a body
+// that never arrives, and JSON validity. All three refuse with a client-visible status and a fixed
+// message; none of them logs or returns the body.
+
+const COPY = Object.freeze({
+  too_large: [413, 'Request is too large.'],
+  invalid_json: [400, 'Invalid JSON request.'],
+  body_timeout: [408, 'The request took too long to arrive. Try again.'],
+});
+
+export class BodyError extends Error {
+  constructor(code) {
+    const [status, message] = COPY[code] || COPY.invalid_json;
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'BodyError';
+    this.code = code;
+    this.status = status;
+  }
+}
+
+export function readJsonBody(req, { maxBytes = 6 * 1024 * 1024, timeoutMs = 15_000 } = {}) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let settled = false;
+    let tooLarge = false;
+    let size = 0;
+    const chunks = [];
+    const finish = callback => {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      clearTimeout(deadline);
+      req.removeListener('data', onData);
+      req.removeListener('end', onEnd);
+      req.removeListener('error', onError);
+      callback();
+    };
+    const deadline = setTimeout(() => {
+      finish(() => {
+        // Stop reading and let the caller answer 408; the server destroys the socket once the
+        // refusal is written, so a half-read body cannot be held open indefinitely.
+        req.pause?.();
+        reject(new BodyError('body_timeout'));
+      });
+    }, timeoutMs);
+
+    function onData(chunk) {
+      if (settled) return;
+      // Past the ceiling the body is already refused: keep draining it without buffering so the
+      // caller can still read the 413. Destroying the socket here would surface as "fetch failed"
+      // and leave the caller with no status to act on.
+      if (tooLarge) return;
+      size += chunk.length;
+      if (size > maxBytes) {
+        tooLarge = true;
+        chunks.length = 0;
+        return;
+      }
+      chunks.push(chunk);
+    }
+    function onEnd() {
+      finish(() => {
+        if (tooLarge) return reject(new BodyError('too_large'));
+        try {
+          resolve(JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')));
+        } catch {
+          reject(new BodyError('invalid_json'));
+        }
+      });
+    }
+    function onError(error) {
+      finish(() => reject(error));
+    }
+
+    req.on('data', onData);
+    req.on('end', onEnd);
+    req.on('error', onError);
+  });
+}

src/image-ingress.js

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// Transport-level hardening for the one endpoint that accepts image bytes (issue #16).
+//
+// The declared MIME type in a data URL is a claim made by the caller, never evidence, so every
+// decision here comes from the bytes: the container is sniffed, the container is walked to its own
+// end marker so nothing can ride along behind a valid image, embedded metadata segments are refused
+// (the browser always uploads a canvas re-encode, which carries none), and the pixel dimensions are
+// read from the header so a decode bomb never reaches the worker.
+//
+// Refusal copy is fixed and deliberate: it names what is wrong with the file and never echoes the
+// bytes, a hash, or any part of the upload back to the caller or into a log line.
+
+export const MAX_EDGE = 4096;
+export const MAX_PIXELS = 16_000_000;
+
+const COPY = Object.freeze({
+  empty: 'The photo is empty.',
+  not_an_image: 'That file is not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo.',
+  container_mismatch: 'This photo is not the format it claims. Choose a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo.',
+  truncated: 'This photo is incomplete or damaged. Choose another photo.',
+  trailing_data: 'This photo file has extra data after the image. Choose another photo.',
+  metadata_present: 'This photo still carries embedded metadata. Choose it through Timmy’s camera or gallery picker so it is re-encoded without metadata.',
+  dimensions_too_large: 'This photo is too large in pixels. Choose a smaller photo.',
+});
+
+export class IngressError extends Error {
+  constructor(code) {
+    super(COPY[code] || COPY.not_an_image);
+    this.name = 'IngressError';
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+const refuse = code => {
+  throw new IngressError(code);
+};
+
+const PNG_CHUNKS = { metadata: new Set(['eXIf', 'tEXt', 'zTXt', 'iTXt', 'tIME']) };
+// Segment markers that carry metadata rather than image data: APP1 (Exif/XMP), APP13 (Photoshop
+// resource block) and COM (free-text comment). The app's own upload is a canvas re-encode and
+// contains none of them, so a file that does was not produced by the capture path.
+const JPEG_METADATA_MARKERS = new Set([0xe1, 0xed, 0xfe]);
+const JPEG_SOF_MARKERS = new Set([0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf]);
+
+function sniff(bytes) {
+  if (bytes.length >= 8 && bytes.subarray(0, 8).equals(Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]))) return 'image/png';
+  if (bytes.length >= 3 && bytes[0] === 0xff && bytes[1] === 0xd8 && bytes[2] === 0xff) return 'image/jpeg';
+  if (bytes.length >= 12 && bytes.toString('ascii', 0, 4) === 'RIFF' && bytes.toString('ascii', 8, 12) === 'WEBP') return 'image/webp';
+  return '';
+}
+
+function inspectPng(bytes) {
+  let offset = 8;
+  let width = 0;
+  let height = 0;
+  let sawHeader = false;
+  while (offset + 8 <= bytes.length) {
+    const length = bytes.readUInt32BE(offset);
+    const type = bytes.toString('ascii', offset + 4, offset + 8);
+    const dataStart = offset + 8;
+    const next = dataStart + length + 4;
+    if (next > bytes.length) refuse('truncated');
+    if (!sawHeader) {
+      if (type !== 'IHDR' || length !== 13) refuse('truncated');
+      width = bytes.readUInt32BE(dataStart);
+      height = bytes.readUInt32BE(dataStart + 4);
+      sawHeader = true;
+    }
+    if (PNG_CHUNKS.metadata.has(type)) refuse('metadata_present');
+    if (type === 'IEND') {
+      if (next !== bytes.length) refuse('trailing_data');
+      return { width, height };
+    }
+    offset = next;
+  }
+  return refuse('truncated');
+}
+
+function inspectJpeg(bytes) {
+  let offset = 2;
+  let width = 0;
+  let height = 0;
+  while (offset + 4 <= bytes.length) {
+    if (bytes[offset] !== 0xff) refuse('truncated');
+    const marker = bytes[offset + 1];
+    if (marker === 0xd9) {
+      if (offset + 2 !== bytes.length) refuse('trailing_data');
+      break;
+    }
+    // Standalone markers carry no length field.
+    if (marker === 0x01 || (marker >= 0xd0 && marker <= 0xd7) || marker === 0xff) {
+      offset += marker === 0xff ? 1 : 2;
+      continue;
+    }
+    const length = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset + 2);
+    if (length < 2 || offset + 2 + length > bytes.length) refuse('truncated');
+    if (JPEG_METADATA_MARKERS.has(marker)) refuse('metadata_present');
+    if (JPEG_SOF_MARKERS.has(marker) && length >= 7) {
+      height = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset + 5);
+      width = bytes.readUInt16BE(offset + 7);
+    }
+    offset += 2 + length;
+    if (marker === 0xda) {
+      // Entropy-coded scan data follows the start-of-scan header. The only thing left to trust is
+      // the end-of-image marker, and it has to be the last two bytes of the file.
+      if (bytes[bytes.length - 2] !== 0xff || bytes[bytes.length - 1] !== 0xd9) {
+        return refuse(bytes.includes(Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd9])) ? 'trailing_data' : 'truncated');
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (!width || !height) refuse('truncated');
+  return { width, height };
+}
+
+function inspectWebp(bytes) {
+  const declared = bytes.readUInt32LE(4) + 8;
+  if (declared !== bytes.length) refuse(declared < bytes.length ? 'trailing_data' : 'truncated');
+  let offset = 12;
+  let width = 0;
+  let height = 0;
+  while (offset + 8 <= bytes.length) {
+    const type = bytes.toString('ascii', offset, offset + 4);
+    const size = bytes.readUInt32LE(offset + 4);
+    const dataStart = offset + 8;
+    if (dataStart + size > bytes.length) refuse('truncated');
+    if (type === 'VP8X' && size >= 10) {
+      width = bytes.readUIntLE(dataStart + 4, 3) + 1;
+      height = bytes.readUIntLE(dataStart + 7, 3) + 1;
+    } else if (type === 'VP8 ' && size >= 10) {
+      width = bytes.readUInt16LE(dataStart + 6) & 0x3fff;
+      height = bytes.readUInt16LE(dataStart + 8) & 0x3fff;
+    } else if (type === 'VP8L' && size >= 5) {
+      const bits = bytes.readUInt32LE(dataStart + 1);
+      width = (bits & 0x3fff) + 1;
+      height = ((bits >> 14) & 0x3fff) + 1;
+    }
+    offset = dataStart + size + (size % 2);
+  }
+  if (!width || !height) refuse('truncated');
+  return { width, height };
+}
+
+// Returns the real container, its pixel dimensions, and the byte count. Throws IngressError on
+// anything the model worker must never be handed.
+export function inspectImageBytes(bytes, { declaredMime = '' } = {}) {
+  const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) ? bytes : Buffer.from(bytes || []);
+  if (!buffer.length) refuse('empty');
+  const actual = sniff(buffer);
+  if (!actual) refuse('not_an_image');
+  if (declaredMime && declaredMime !== actual) refuse('container_mismatch');
+  const dimensions = actual === 'image/png' ? inspectPng(buffer)
+    : actual === 'image/jpeg' ? inspectJpeg(buffer)
+      : inspectWebp(buffer);
+  if (!dimensions.width || !dimensions.height) refuse('truncated');
+  if (dimensions.width > MAX_EDGE || dimensions.height > MAX_EDGE
+    || dimensions.width * dimensions.height > MAX_PIXELS) refuse('dimensions_too_large');
+  return { mime: actual, width: dimensions.width, height: dimensions.height, bytes: buffer.length };
+}

src/model-metrics-report.js

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// Renders the operator snapshot from `src/model-metrics.js` as a plain-text report.
+//
+// This module is a pure function of the snapshot, on purpose: the report is built from numbers and
+// from the three frozen vocabularies, so there is no path by which request content could reach the
+// terminal even if the counters were compromised. Anything outside the enumerated vocabularies is
+// not printed — an unknown failure class is visible as a missing row, never as a new label.
+import { FAILURE_CLASSES, OUTCOMES } from './model-metrics.js';
+
+// Wide enough for the longest row label (`failure provider_unreachable`) plus a visible gap: a label
+// that fills the column renders run-together with its count (`failure ingress_refused0`), which reads
+// as one broken token instead of a metric.
+const LABEL_WIDTH = 30;
+
+function row(label, value) {
+  return `  ${String(label).padEnd(LABEL_WIDTH)}${value}`;
+}
+
+function duration(value) {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(value) || value < 0) return 'n/a';
+  if (value < 1_000) return `${Math.round(value)}ms`;
+  const seconds = value / 1_000;
+  if (seconds < 60) return `${seconds.toFixed(1)}s`;
+  const minutes = Math.floor(seconds / 60);
+  if (minutes < 60) return `${minutes}m ${Math.round(seconds % 60)}s`;
+  return `${Math.floor(minutes / 60)}h ${minutes % 60}m`;
+}
+
+function count(value) {
+  return Number.isFinite(value) ? String(value) : '0';
+}
+
+function readinessLine(model) {
+  const readiness = model?.readiness ?? {};
+  const phase = typeof readiness.phase === 'string' && readiness.phase ? readiness.phase : 'checking';
+  return readiness.coldLoadMs === null || readiness.coldLoadMs === undefined
+    ? phase
+    : `${phase} · cold load ${duration(readiness.coldLoadMs)}`;
+}
+
+function abstentionLine(model) {
+  const rate = model?.abstentionRate;
+  const answered = (model?.outcomes?.suggestion ?? 0) + (model?.outcomes?.abstained ?? 0);
+  if (rate === null || rate === undefined || answered === 0) return 'no answers yet';
+  return `${(rate * 100).toFixed(1)}% of ${answered} answer${answered === 1 ? '' : 's'}`;
+}
+
+export function formatOperatorReport(snapshot) {
+  if (!snapshot || typeof snapshot !== 'object') throw new Error('a metrics snapshot is required');
+  const app = snapshot.app ?? {};
+  const queue = snapshot.queue ?? {};
+  const model = snapshot.model ?? {};
+  const latency = model.latency ?? {};
+  const outcomes = OUTCOMES.map(name => `${name} ${count(model.outcomes?.[name])}`).join(' · ');
+
+  const lines = [
+    `Timmy model health · ${snapshot.generatedAt ?? 'unknown time'} · schema ${snapshot.schema ?? '?'}`,
+    '',
+    'APP',
+    row('uptime', duration(app.uptimeMs)),
+    row('analyze requests', count(app.analyzeRequests)),
+    row('refused before model', count(app.refusedBeforeModel)),
+    '',
+    'QUEUE',
+    row('in flight', `${count(queue.inFlight)} / ${count(queue.limit)}`),
+    row('accepted', count(queue.accepted)),
+    row('at capacity', queue.atCapacity === true ? 'yes' : 'no'),
+    '',
+    'MODEL',
+    row('readiness', readinessLine(model)),
+    row('outcomes', outcomes),
+    row('abstention', abstentionLine(model)),
+    row('latency', `mean ${duration(latency.meanMs)} · max ${duration(latency.maxMs)} · samples ${count(latency.count)}`),
+    ...FAILURE_CLASSES.map(name => row(`failure ${name}`, count(model.failureClasses?.[name]))),
+  ];
+
+  return `${lines.join('\n')}\n`;
+}

src/model-metrics.js

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// Privacy-safe model health metrics for issue #19.
+//
+// The point of this module is the boundary it does not cross: a metric sample is assembled from
+// enumerated outcomes and numbers, never from a request. No note text, no photo hash, no image
+// bytes, and no caller identity can reach a label, because the only strings this module stores are
+// members of the frozen lists below. Anything else is coerced to a bucket instead of copied.
+
+export const OUTCOMES = Object.freeze(['suggestion', 'abstained', 'failure']);
+
+// Failure classes are the operator's vocabulary for "what went wrong". They are chosen here, not
+// observed from an error, so an upstream message can never become a metric label.
+export const FAILURE_CLASSES = Object.freeze([
+  'ingress_refused',
+  'rate_limited',
+  'disabled',
+  'provider_unreachable',
+  'provider_rejected',
+  'schema_invalid',
+  'timeout',
+  'unexpected',
+]);
+
+// Readiness is the same vocabulary the browser already uses for the AI affordance, so a metric and
+// the screen can never disagree about why AI is withheld.
+export const READINESS_PHASES = Object.freeze(['checking', 'disabled', 'offline', 'loading', 'ready']);
+
+// Failure classes that are decided before a request can occupy a queue slot or wait on the model.
+const REFUSED_BEFORE_MODEL = Object.freeze(['ingress_refused', 'rate_limited', 'disabled']);
+
+export function createModelMetrics({ now = () => Date.now(), limit = 4 } = {}) {
+  const outcomes = { suggestion: 0, abstained: 0, failure: 0 };
+  const failureClasses = Object.fromEntries(FAILURE_CLASSES.map(name => [name, 0]));
+  // The queue boundary is tracked by opaque tickets, not by request identity: the only thing that
+  // survives a request here is the count of slots in use.
+  const inUse = new Set();
+  let accepted = 0;
+  const startedAt = now();
+  let readiness = { phase: 'checking', ready: false, coldLoadMs: null };
+  let analyzeRequests = 0;
+  let refusedBeforeModel = 0;
+  // Latency is a histogram, never a list of individual timings: a bucket count says how the worker
+  // behaves without carrying a per-request record of when someone photographed their stool.
+  const bucketEdgesMs = Object.freeze([1_000, 2_000, 5_000, 15_000, 60_000]);
+  const bucketsMs = Object.fromEntries(bucketEdgesMs.map(edge => [String(edge), 0]));
+  let latencyCount = 0;
+  let latencySumMs = 0;
+  let latencyMaxMs = 0;
+
+  function abstentionRate() {
+    const answered = outcomes.suggestion + outcomes.abstained;
+    return answered === 0 ? null : outcomes.abstained / answered;
+  }
+
+  function recordLatency(durationMs) {
+    if (!Number.isFinite(durationMs) || durationMs < 0) return;
+    latencyCount += 1;
+    latencySumMs += durationMs;
+    latencyMaxMs = Math.max(latencyMaxMs, durationMs);
+    // Edges are cumulative on purpose: `bucketsMs['5000']` answers "how many samples were at or
+    // below five seconds", so an operator can read a percentile without this module storing the
+    // individual timings that produced it.
+    for (const edge of bucketEdgesMs) {
+      if (durationMs <= edge) bucketsMs[String(edge)] += 1;
+    }
+    // Anything slower than the last edge stays counted in the total but out of the histogram, so a
+    // hanging request cannot invent a bucket.
+  }
+
+  return {
+    enter() {
+      const ticket = Symbol('model-slot');
+      inUse.add(ticket);
+      accepted += 1;
+      return ticket;
+    },
+    leave(ticket) {
+      // Deleting a ticket that is already gone is a no-op, so a double release cannot free a slot
+      // that a different request still holds.
+      inUse.delete(ticket);
+    },
+    recordReadiness({ phase, ready }) {
+      const next = READINESS_PHASES.includes(phase) ? phase : 'checking';
+      // A worker can flap between ready and offline. Only the first time the model became resident
+      // is a cold load; every later observation is just the current phase.
+      const coldLoadMs = readiness.coldLoadMs === null && next === 'ready' && ready === true
+        ? Math.max(0, now() - startedAt)
+        : readiness.coldLoadMs;
+      readiness = { phase: next, ready: ready === true, coldLoadMs };
+    },
+    recordAnalyze({ outcome, failureClass, durationMs }) {
+      // The label is looked up, never stored: an unrecognised outcome becomes `failure` so the
+      // counters stay a closed set no matter what a caller sends.
+      const bucket = OUTCOMES.includes(outcome) ? outcome : 'failure';
+      outcomes[bucket] += 1;
+      analyzeRequests += 1;
+      if (bucket === 'failure') {
+        failureClasses[FAILURE_CLASSES.includes(failureClass) ? failureClass : 'unexpected'] += 1;
+        // A refusal decided before any model work (bad bytes, the per-device budget, or the disabled
+        // switch) is an app fact: it never occupied a queue slot and never waited on the model.
+        if (REFUSED_BEFORE_MODEL.includes(failureClass)) {
+          refusedBeforeModel += 1;
+        } else {
+          recordLatency(durationMs);
+        }
+      } else {
+        recordLatency(durationMs);
+      }
+    },
+    snapshot() {
+      return {
+        schema: 1,
+        generatedAt: new Date(now()).toISOString(),
+        app: {
+          uptimeMs: Math.max(0, now() - startedAt),
+          analyzeRequests,
+          refusedBeforeModel,
+        },
+        queue: {
+          inFlight: inUse.size,
+          limit,
+          atCapacity: inUse.size >= limit,
+          accepted,
+        },
+        model: {
+          outcomes: { ...outcomes },
+          failureClasses: { ...failureClasses },
+          abstentionRate: abstentionRate(),
+          readiness: { ...readiness },
+          latency: {
+            count: latencyCount,
+            meanMs: latencyCount === 0 ? null : Math.round(latencySumMs / latencyCount),
+            maxMs: latencyMaxMs,
+            bucketsMs: { ...bucketsMs },
+          },
+        },
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}

src/rate-limit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Bounded, in-process request budget for the photo-analysis endpoint (issue #16).
+//
+// The limiter exists so a caller cannot make Timmy the transport for a flood of images to the
+// model worker. It keeps timestamps only, never the bytes, the file name, or the caller's address:
+// the server hands it a short-lived opaque bucket key. Refusals never extend a window, so a caller
+// cannot earn a longer penalty than the request it already made.
+
+export function createRateLimiter({ limit = 12, windowMs = 60_000, maxKeys = 2048, now = () => Date.now() } = {}) {
+  const hits = new Map();
+  let lastPrune = now();
+
+  function prune(at) {
+    const cutoff = at - windowMs;
+    for (const [key, stamps] of hits) {
+      const kept = stamps.filter(stamp => stamp > cutoff);
+      if (kept.length) hits.set(key, kept);
+      else hits.delete(key);
+    }
+    lastPrune = at;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    take(key) {
+      const at = now();
+      // Pruning is at most once per window, plus whenever the map outgrows its ceiling, so the
+      // bookkeeping stays bounded no matter how many distinct callers appear.
+      if (at - lastPrune >= windowMs || hits.size > maxKeys) prune(at);
+      const window = (hits.get(key) || []).filter(stamp => stamp > at - windowMs);
+      if (window.length >= limit) {
+        hits.set(key, window);
+        return { allowed: false, remaining: 0, retryAfterMs: Math.max(0, window[0] + windowMs - at) };
+      }
+      window.push(at);
+      hits.set(key, window);
+      if (hits.size > maxKeys) {
+        for (const oldest of hits.keys()) {
+          if (hits.size <= maxKeys) break;
+          hits.delete(oldest);
+        }
+      }
+      return { allowed: true, remaining: Math.max(0, limit - window.length), retryAfterMs: 0 };
+    },
+    size() {
+      return hits.size;
+    },
+    reset() {
+      hits.clear();
+      lastPrune = now();
+    },
+  };
+}

src/release-security-gate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+// Release security gate: the arithmetic and the verdict rule for the RC attack suite (#40).
+//
+// The suite observes the real server; this module only turns observations into a verdict. Keeping
+// the rule here (not in the runner) is what makes "a P0 finding blocks RC approval" testable.
+
+/** Nearest-rank percentile: the returned value is always a sample that was actually measured. */
+export function latencyPercentiles(samples) {
+  const sorted = [...samples].sort((a, b) => a - b);
+  if (!sorted.length) return { count: 0, p50: null, p95: null, max: null };
+  const rank = (p) => sorted[Math.min(sorted.length - 1, Math.ceil((p / 100) * sorted.length) - 1)];
+  return { count: sorted.length, p50: rank(50), p95: rank(95), max: sorted[sorted.length - 1] };
+}
+
+/** One case against one expectation. A partial match is a failure, and it says which field broke. */
+export function evaluateCase(record) {
+  const mismatches = Object.keys(record.expected)
+    .filter(field => record.observed?.[field] !== record.expected[field])
+    .map(field => `${field} ${record.expected[field]} expected, observed ${record.observed?.[field]}`);
+  return { ...record, status: mismatches.length ? 'fail' : 'pass', mismatch: mismatches.join('; ') };
+}
+
+const SEVERITY_BLOCKS = (severity) => severity === 'P0';
+
+/** The RC rule: every P0 failure blocks approval, unproven categories block it too, P1/P2 only hold. */
+export function releaseVerdict({ cases, load = null }) {
+  const evaluated = cases.map(record => (record.surface === 'out-of-surface'
+    ? { ...record, status: record.evidenceVerified ? 'covered-elsewhere' : 'unproven' }
+    : evaluateCase(record)));
+  const blocking = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'fail' && SEVERITY_BLOCKS(item.severity))
+    .map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: item.mismatch }));
+  const holds = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'fail' && !SEVERITY_BLOCKS(item.severity))
+    .map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: item.mismatch }));
+  const unproven = evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'unproven')
+    .map(item => ({ id: item.id, severity: item.severity, reason: 'no executable evidence' }));
+  return {
+    verdict: blocking.length || unproven.length ? 'BLOCKED' : 'GO',
+    blocking,
+    holds,
+    unproven,
+    coveredElsewhere: evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'covered-elsewhere').map(item => item.id),
+    proven: evaluated.filter(item => item.status === 'pass').length,
+    cases: evaluated,
+    load,
+  };
+}
+
+// Evidence hygiene: the report and the captured server log are committed and quoted. A photo that
+// survived into either one is a leak of the exact data this suite exists to protect.
+const IMAGE_DATA_URI = /data:image\/[a-z0-9.+-]+;base64,[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+/gi;
+const LONG_BASE64 = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{200,}={0,2}/;
+
+export function containsImageBytes(text) {
+  const value = String(text ?? '');
+  return new RegExp(IMAGE_DATA_URI.source, 'i').test(value) || LONG_BASE64.test(value);
+}
+
+export function redactImageBytes(text) {
+  return String(text ?? '')
+    .replace(IMAGE_DATA_URI, '[redacted image bytes]')
+    .replace(new RegExp(LONG_BASE64.source, 'g'), '[redacted image bytes]');
+}
+
+/** Fails closed rather than emitting evidence that carries a photo. */
+export function assertNoImageBytes(label, text) {
+  if (containsImageBytes(text)) throw new Error(`${label} contains image bytes; refusing to write release evidence.`);
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The receipt the release job quotes. It is redacted after assembly, so a case that captured a
+ * response body still cannot carry a photo in it.
+ */
+export function buildReport({ generatedAt, target, cases, load, suite = 'scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs' }) {
+  const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases, load });
+  const report = {
+    schema: 'timmy-rc-security-attack/1',
+    issue: 40,
+    generatedAt,
+    suite,
+    target,
+    verdict: verdict.verdict,
+    blocking: verdict.blocking,
+    holds: verdict.holds,
+    unproven: verdict.unproven,
+    coveredElsewhere: verdict.coveredElsewhere,
+    proven: verdict.proven,
+    cases: verdict.cases.map(({ id, category, severity, requirement, expected, observed, status, mismatch, snippet, surface, evidence, evidenceVerified }) =>
+      ({ id, category, severity, requirement, expected, observed, status, mismatch, surface, evidence, evidenceVerified, snippet: snippet ? redactImageBytes(snippet) : undefined })),
+    load,
+    disclaimer: 'Synthetic hostile bytes only. Every case drives the real server against a stub worker; no real medical image and no live user data is involved.',
+  };
+  const clean = JSON.parse(redactImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)));
+  assertNoImageBytes('security report', JSON.stringify(clean));
+  return clean;
+}

tests/analyze-ingress.acceptance.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import net from 'node:net';
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+// End-to-end proof for issue #16 at the real boundary: the server process that ships, not a mock of
+// it. Every image here is synthetic container bytes assembled in this file, and the provider is a
+// local stub that counts requests, so "the provider was never called" is measurable rather than
+// assumed.
+
+const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
+const PNG_SIGNATURE = Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]);
+
+function pngChunk(type, data = Buffer.alloc(0)) {
+  const length = Buffer.alloc(4);
+  length.writeUInt32BE(data.length);
+  return Buffer.concat([length, Buffer.from(type, 'ascii'), data, Buffer.alloc(4)]);
+}
+function cleanJpeg({ width = 1200, height = 900, tail = Buffer.alloc(0) } = {}) {
+  const sof = Buffer.alloc(17);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(0xffc0, 0);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(15, 2);
+  sof[4] = 8;
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(height, 5);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(width, 7);
+  sof[9] = 3;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
+    sof[10 + i * 3] = i + 1;
+    sof[11 + i * 3] = 0x11;
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8]), sof, Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd9]), tail]);
+}
+function polyglotPng() {
+  const ihdr = Buffer.alloc(13);
+  ihdr.writeUInt32BE(1200, 0);
+  ihdr.writeUInt32BE(900, 4);
+  ihdr[8] = 8;
+  ihdr[9] = 2;
+  return Buffer.concat([
+    PNG_SIGNATURE,
+    pngChunk('IHDR', ihdr),
+    pngChunk('IDAT', Buffer.from([0x78, 0x9c, 0x01])),
+    pngChunk('IEND'),
+    Buffer.from('<html><script>alert(1)</script></html>', 'utf8'),
+  ]);
+}
+
+const dataUrl = (mime, bytes) => `data:${mime};base64,${bytes.toString('base64')}`;
+
+async function freePort() {
+  const server = net.createServer();
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  const { port } = server.address();
+  server.close();
+  return port;
+}
+
+async function startProvider() {
+  const state = { calls: 0 };
+  const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
+    if (req.url === '/v1/models') {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ data: [{ id: 'ingress-test-model' }] }));
+      return;
+    }
+    state.calls += 1;
+    for await (const _ of req) { /* drain */ }
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({
+      choices: [{
+        message: {
+          content: JSON.stringify({
+            isStool: true, bristolType: 4, color: 'brown', confidence: 0.8,
+            imageQuality: 'good', observations: 'Synthetic test card.',
+          }),
+        },
+      }],
+    }));
+  });
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  return {
+    state,
+    port: server.address().port,
+    // fetch keeps connections alive, so a plain close() would wait for sockets the test already
+    // finished with and hang teardown.
+    close: () => new Promise(resolve => {
+      server.closeAllConnections?.();
+      server.close(resolve);
+    }),
+  };
+}
+
+async function withServer(env, run) {
+  const provider = await startProvider();
+  const port = await freePort();
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      HOST: '127.0.0.1',
+      PORT: String(port),
+      TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED: 'true',
+      TIMMY_VISION_PROFILE: 'selfhost',
+      TIMMY_VISION_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/v1`,
+      TIMMY_VISION_MODEL: 'ingress-test-model',
+      ...env,
+    },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  });
+  const logs = [];
+  child.stdout.on('data', chunk => logs.push(chunk.toString()));
+  child.stderr.on('data', chunk => logs.push(chunk.toString()));
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  try {
+    // Readiness is the server's own health route, not a sleep.
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
+    for (;;) {
+      try {
+        const response = await fetch(`${base}/api/healthz`);
+        if (response.ok) break;
+      } catch { /* not up yet */ }
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error(`server did not start: ${logs.join('')}`);
+      await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
+    }
+    await run({ base, provider, logs });
+  } finally {
+    child.kill('SIGKILL');
+    await provider.close();
+  }
+}
+
+const postAnalyze = (base, payload) => fetch(`${base}/api/analyze`, {
+  method: 'POST',
+  headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+  body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+});
+
+test('the shipping server refuses bytes that are not an image before any provider work', async () => {
+  await withServer({}, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const response = await postAnalyze(base, {
+      consent: true,
+      imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/jpeg', Buffer.from('<html><script>alert(1)</script></html>', 'utf8')),
+    });
+    const body = await response.json();
+    assert.equal(response.status, 400);
+    assert.match(body.error, /not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo/i);
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 0, 'a non-image must never reach the model provider');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the shipping server refuses a valid image with a hidden payload appended', async () => {
+  await withServer({}, async ({ base, provider, logs }) => {
+    const response = await postAnalyze(base, { consent: true, imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/png', polyglotPng()) });
+    const body = await response.json();
+    assert.equal(response.status, 400);
+    assert.match(body.error, /extra data after the image/i);
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 0, 'a polyglot file must never reach the model provider');
+    // The refusal path must not copy the upload into the process log, where it would outlive the request.
+    const logged = logs.join('');
+    assert.doesNotMatch(logged, /base64/i);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(logged, /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{120,}/, 'no run of image bytes may appear in the log');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the shipping server still analyses a clean re-encoded image', async () => {
+  await withServer({}, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const response = await postAnalyze(base, { consent: true, imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/jpeg', cleanJpeg()) });
+    const body = await response.json();
+    assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+    assert.equal(body.status, 'suggestion');
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 1, 'the clean path must reach the provider exactly once');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the shipping server refuses an oversized body with a refusal the caller can read', async () => {
+  // Issue #16 sets a byte ceiling, and issue #40 asks the release candidate to prove that ceiling
+  // behaves like a refusal rather than a dropped connection. Destroying the socket while the caller
+  // is still uploading leaves the caller with "fetch failed" and no status to act on, so the refusal
+  // has to be written and read before the connection goes away.
+  await withServer({}, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const oversized = JSON.stringify({
+      consent: true,
+      imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${'A'.repeat(6.6 * 1024 * 1024)}`,
+    });
+    let response;
+    try {
+      response = await fetch(`${base}/api/analyze`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+        body: oversized,
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      assert.fail(`an oversized body must be refused with a readable status, not a dropped connection: ${error.message}`);
+    }
+    const body = await response.json();
+    assert.equal(response.status, 413);
+    assert.match(body.error, /too large/i);
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 0, 'an oversized body must never reach the provider');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the shipping server refuses a flood with 429 and stops calling the provider', async () => {
+  await withServer({ TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_LIMIT: '2', TIMMY_ANALYZE_RATE_WINDOW_MS: '60000' }, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const payload = { consent: true, imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/jpeg', cleanJpeg()) };
+    assert.equal((await postAnalyze(base, payload)).status, 200);
+    assert.equal((await postAnalyze(base, payload)).status, 200);
+    const refused = await postAnalyze(base, payload);
+    const body = await refused.json();
+    assert.equal(refused.status, 429);
+    assert.match(body.error, /too many photos|wait a minute/i);
+    assert.ok(Number(refused.headers.get('retry-after')) > 0, 'a refusal must say how long to wait');
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 2, 'a refused request must not reach the provider');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the shipping server gives up on a body that never arrives', async () => {
+  await withServer({ TIMMY_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS: '250' }, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const port = Number(new URL(base).port);
+    const status = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      const socket = net.connect(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+        socket.write([
+          'POST /api/analyze HTTP/1.1',
+          'Host: 127.0.0.1',
+          'Content-Type: application/json',
+          'Content-Length: 400',
+          '', '',
+        ].join('\r\n'));
+      });
+      socket.setTimeout(10_000, () => { socket.destroy(); reject(new Error('no response before the client timeout')); });
+      socket.on('data', chunk => {
+        const line = chunk.toString('utf8').split('\r\n')[0];
+        socket.destroy();
+        resolve(Number(line.split(' ')[1]));
+      });
+      socket.on('error', error => { if (error.code !== 'ECONNRESET') reject(error); });
+    });
+    assert.equal(status, 408);
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 0, 'a stalled body must never reach the provider');
+  });
+});

tests/ci-workflow.test.js

@@ -202,3 +202,14 @@ test('the calibration harness is wired into the unit and syntax gates', async ()
   assert.match(builder, /tests\/calibration-harness\.test\.py/);
   assert.match(builder, /"calibration_harness_gates": "passed"/);
 });
+
+test('CI runs the RC attack suite so its evidence is reproducible on every change', async () => {
+  const workflow = await readFile(workflowPath, 'utf8');
+  const packageJson = JSON.parse(await readFile(packagePath, 'utf8'));
+
+  // Issue #40: the attack report is evidence, not a claim. CI has to be able to regenerate it.
+  assert.match(workflow, /npm run test:security-attack/);
+  assert.equal(packageJson.scripts['test:security-attack'], 'node tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs');
+  assert.match(packageJson.scripts.test, /tests\/release-security-gate\.test\.js/);
+  assert.match(packageJson.scripts['check:syntax'], /node --check src\/release-security-gate\.js/);
+});

tests/fixtures/not-a-photo.jpg

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<!doctype html><html><body>This file is named .jpg but it is not an image. Synthetic fixture for the image-ingress refusal path.</body></html>

tests/http-body.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { PassThrough } from 'node:stream';
+
+import { BodyError, readJsonBody } from '../src/http-body.js';
+
+const bodyStream = chunks => {
+  const stream = new PassThrough();
+  for (const chunk of chunks) stream.write(chunk);
+  stream.end();
+  return stream;
+};
+
+test('reads a bounded JSON request body', async () => {
+  const parsed = await readJsonBody(bodyStream([Buffer.from('{"consent":'), Buffer.from('true}')]), { maxBytes: 1024 });
+  assert.deepEqual(parsed, { consent: true });
+});
+
+test('refuses a body above the byte limit instead of buffering it', async () => {
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => readJsonBody(bodyStream([Buffer.alloc(64, 0x61)]), { maxBytes: 16 }),
+    error => {
+      assert.ok(error instanceof BodyError);
+      assert.equal(error.code, 'too_large');
+      assert.equal(error.status, 413);
+      return true;
+    },
+  );
+});
+
+test('refuses malformed JSON with a client error', async () => {
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => readJsonBody(bodyStream([Buffer.from('{not json')]), { maxBytes: 1024 }),
+    error => {
+      assert.ok(error instanceof BodyError);
+      assert.equal(error.code, 'invalid_json');
+      assert.equal(error.status, 400);
+      return true;
+    },
+  );
+});
+
+test('gives up on a body that never finishes and stops reading it', async () => {
+  const stalled = new PassThrough();
+  stalled.write(Buffer.from('{"consent":true'));
+  const started = Date.now();
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => readJsonBody(stalled, { maxBytes: 1024, timeoutMs: 40 }),
+    error => {
+      assert.ok(error instanceof BodyError);
+      assert.equal(error.code, 'body_timeout');
+      assert.equal(error.status, 408);
+      return true;
+    },
+  );
+  assert.ok(Date.now() - started < 2_000, 'the deadline must fire promptly');
+  assert.equal(stalled.isPaused(), true, 'the stalled body must stop being read after the deadline');
+});

tests/image-ingress.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+import { IngressError, inspectImageBytes, MAX_EDGE, MAX_PIXELS } from '../src/image-ingress.js';
+
+// Every fixture built here is synthetic container bytes assembled in code. No photograph of any
+// person or specimen is used, and nothing is fetched.
+const PNG_SIGNATURE = Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]);
+
+function pngChunk(type, data = Buffer.alloc(0)) {
+  const length = Buffer.alloc(4);
+  length.writeUInt32BE(data.length);
+  const body = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(type, 'ascii'), data]);
+  // The parser walks chunk lengths to find the end of the container; the CRC is not read, so a
+  // synthetic zero CRC is enough to be structurally complete.
+  return Buffer.concat([length, body, Buffer.alloc(4)]);
+}
+
+function png({ width = 1200, height = 900, extraChunks = [], tail = Buffer.alloc(0) } = {}) {
+  const ihdr = Buffer.alloc(13);
+  ihdr.writeUInt32BE(width, 0);
+  ihdr.writeUInt32BE(height, 4);
+  ihdr[8] = 8; // bit depth
+  ihdr[9] = 2; // truecolour
+  return Buffer.concat([
+    PNG_SIGNATURE,
+    pngChunk('IHDR', ihdr),
+    ...extraChunks,
+    pngChunk('IDAT', Buffer.from([0x78, 0x9c, 0x01])),
+    pngChunk('IEND'),
+    tail,
+  ]);
+}
+
+function jpeg({ width = 1200, height = 900, segments = [], tail = Buffer.alloc(0) } = {}) {
+  const sof = Buffer.alloc(17);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(0xffc0, 0);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(15, 2); // payload length
+  sof[4] = 8; // precision
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(height, 5);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(width, 7);
+  sof[9] = 3; // component count
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
+    sof[10 + i * 3] = i + 1;
+    sof[11 + i * 3] = 0x11;
+    sof[12 + i * 3] = 0;
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8]),
+    ...segments,
+    sof,
+    Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd9]),
+    tail,
+  ]);
+}
+
+function exifSegment() {
+  const payload = Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from('Exif', 'ascii'),
+    Buffer.from([0x00, 0x00]),
+    Buffer.from('GPSLatitude=0.000', 'ascii'),
+  ]);
+  const header = Buffer.alloc(4);
+  header.writeUInt16BE(0xffe1, 0);
+  header.writeUInt16BE(payload.length + 2, 2);
+  return Buffer.concat([header, payload]);
+}
+
+function webp({ width = 1200, height = 900 } = {}) {
+  // VP8X canvas payload: flags(1) + reserved(3) + width-1(3, LE) + height-1(3, LE).
+  const payload = Buffer.alloc(10);
+  payload[0] = 0;
+  payload.writeUIntLE(width - 1, 4, 3);
+  payload.writeUIntLE(height - 1, 7, 3);
+  const chunk = Buffer.alloc(8);
+  chunk.write('VP8X', 0, 'ascii');
+  chunk.writeUInt32LE(payload.length, 4);
+  const body = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('WEBP', 'ascii'), chunk, payload]);
+  const riff = Buffer.alloc(8);
+  riff.write('RIFF', 0, 'ascii');
+  riff.writeUInt32LE(body.length, 4);
+  return Buffer.concat([riff, body]);
+}
+
+const expectRefusal = (bytes, declaredMime, pattern) => {
+  assert.throws(
+    () => inspectImageBytes(bytes, { declaredMime }),
+    error => {
+      assert.ok(error instanceof IngressError, `expected an IngressError, got ${error?.name}`);
+      assert.match(error.message, pattern);
+      return true;
+    },
+  );
+};
+
+test('refuses a file whose bytes are not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP', () => {
+  expectRefusal(Buffer.from('<html><script>alert(1)</script></html>', 'utf8'), 'image/jpeg', /not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a PNG that claims to be a JPEG', () => {
+  expectRefusal(png(), 'image/jpeg', /not the format it claims/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a JPEG that claims to be a PNG', () => {
+  expectRefusal(jpeg(), 'image/png', /not the format it claims/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a truncated container instead of forwarding a partial image', () => {
+  expectRefusal(PNG_SIGNATURE.subarray(0, 8), 'image/png', /incomplete or damaged/i);
+  expectRefusal(Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0]), 'image/jpeg', /incomplete or damaged/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a PNG with bytes appended after its end marker', () => {
+  expectRefusal(png({ tail: Buffer.from('PK\u0003\u0004zip-appended', 'binary') }), 'image/png', /extra data after the image/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a JPEG with bytes appended after its end marker', () => {
+  expectRefusal(jpeg({ tail: Buffer.from('<script>alert(1)</script>', 'utf8') }), 'image/jpeg', /extra data after the image/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a JPEG that still carries an EXIF segment', () => {
+  expectRefusal(jpeg({ segments: [exifSegment()] }), 'image/jpeg', /embedded metadata/i);
+});
+
+test('refuses a PNG that carries an eXIf chunk', () => {
+  const exifChunk = pngChunk('eXIf', Buffer.from('MM\u0000*metadata', 'binary'));
+  expectRefusal(png({ extraChunks: [exifChunk] }), 'image/png', /embedded metadata/i);
+});
+
+test('accepts a clean JPEG and reports its real dimensions', () => {
+  const intake = inspectImageBytes(jpeg({ width: 1200, height: 900 }), { declaredMime: 'image/jpeg' });
+  assert.equal(intake.mime, 'image/jpeg');
+  assert.equal(intake.width, 1200);
+  assert.equal(intake.height, 900);
+  assert.equal(intake.bytes, jpeg({ width: 1200, height: 900 }).length);
+});
+
+test('accepts a clean PNG and reports its real dimensions', () => {
+  const intake = inspectImageBytes(png({ width: 800, height: 600 }), { declaredMime: 'image/png' });
+  assert.equal(intake.mime, 'image/png');
+  assert.equal(intake.width, 800);
+  assert.equal(intake.height, 600);
+});
+
+test('accepts a clean WebP and reports its canvas dimensions', () => {
+  const intake = inspectImageBytes(webp({ width: 640, height: 480 }), { declaredMime: 'image/webp' });
+  assert.equal(intake.mime, 'image/webp');
+  assert.equal(intake.width, 640);
+  assert.equal(intake.height, 480);
+});
+
+test(`refuses an edge longer than ${MAX_EDGE} pixels even when the file is small`, () => {
+  expectRefusal(png({ width: MAX_EDGE + 1, height: 200 }), 'image/png', /too large in pixels/i);
+});
+
+test(`refuses an image above ${MAX_PIXELS} pixels when each edge fits`, () => {
+  const edge = 4096;
+  expectRefusal(jpeg({ width: edge, height: Math.ceil(MAX_PIXELS / edge) + 1 }), 'image/jpeg', /too large in pixels/i);
+});
+
+test('never repeats image bytes back to the caller in a refusal message', () => {
+  const marker = 'SECRETPIXELMARKER';
+  try {
+    inspectImageBytes(Buffer.from(`not an image ${marker}`, 'utf8'), { declaredMime: 'image/jpeg' });
+    assert.fail('expected a refusal');
+  } catch (error) {
+    assert.ok(error instanceof IngressError);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(error.message, new RegExp(marker));
+    assert.doesNotMatch(error.message, /[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}/);
+  }
+});
+
+test('refuses an empty body with a bounded message', () => {
+  expectRefusal(Buffer.alloc(0), 'image/jpeg', /empty/i);
+});

tests/ingress-capture.acceptance.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import { chromium } from 'playwright';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+// Issue #16, as a user experiences it: a file that only claims to be a photo never becomes an upload,
+// never reaches the model worker, and still leaves manual logging one tap away. The second half of
+// this suite asks the real running server to refuse the same bytes, so the browser copy and the
+// server boundary are proven in the same run.
+
+const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true });
+const context = await browser.newContext({
+  viewport: { width: 390, height: 844 },
+  deviceScaleFactor: 2,
+  serviceWorkers: 'block',
+});
+const page = await context.newPage();
+let analysisRequests = 0;
+const analyzePayloads = [];
+await page.route('**/api/vision-status', route => route.fulfill({
+  status: 200,
+  contentType: 'application/json',
+  body: JSON.stringify({ enabled: true, profile: 'selfhost', providerReady: true, modelSeen: true, model: 'synthetic-test-model' }),
+}));
+await page.route('**/api/analyze', route => {
+  analysisRequests += 1;
+  analyzePayloads.push(route.request().postData() || '');
+  return route.continue();
+});
+
+await page.goto('http://127.0.0.1:4173', { waitUntil: 'networkidle' });
+await page.locator('[data-scan]').click();
+
+const spoofed = Buffer.from('<html><script>alert(1)</script></html>', 'utf8');
+await page.locator('#gallery-photo').setInputFiles({ name: 'photo.jpg', mimeType: 'image/jpeg', buffer: spoofed });
+
+const refusal = page.locator('[data-capture-error="unreadable"]');
+await refusal.waitFor();
+const copy = await refusal.innerText();
+assert.match(copy, /isn.t a photo Timmy can read/i, 'the refusal names what is wrong with the file');
+assert.match(copy, /Nothing was uploaded/i, 'the refusal states that nothing left the device');
+assert.equal(await page.getByText(/couldn.t analyze that safely/i).count(), 0,
+  'an unreadable file must not be reported as a failed analysis');
+assert.equal(analysisRequests, 0, 'an unreadable file must never be posted to /api/analyze');
+assert.equal(await page.locator('#manual-from-scan').isVisible(), true, 'manual entry stays one tap away');
+assert.equal(await page.locator('#retake-photo').isVisible(), true, 'the picker stays reachable');
+
+// The same bytes, offered to the running server directly, are refused before any provider work.
+const serverResponse = await page.evaluate(async payload => {
+  const response = await fetch(`${document.querySelector('meta[name="timmy-base-path"]')?.content.replace(/\/$/, '') || ''}/api/analyze`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+  });
+  return { status: response.status, body: await response.json() };
+}, { consent: true, imageDataUrl: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${spoofed.toString('base64')}` });
+assert.equal(serverResponse.status, 400, `the server must refuse non-image bytes, saw ${serverResponse.status}`);
+assert.match(serverResponse.body.error, /not a JPEG, PNG, or WebP photo/i);
+// Only this deliberate probe reached the endpoint; the app itself never posted the unreadable file.
+assert.equal(analysisRequests, 1, 'only the deliberate server probe may reach /api/analyze so far');
+assert.match(analyzePayloads[0], /"consent":true/);
+
+// A real (synthetic) photo still reaches the consent step, so the gate is a boundary and not a wall.
+await page.locator('#retake-photo').click();
+await page.locator('#gallery-photo').setInputFiles('tests/fixtures/synthetic-type4.jpg');
+await page.locator('#ai-consent').waitFor();
+assert.equal(await page.locator('[data-capture-error="unreadable"]').count(), 0);
+assert.equal(analysisRequests, 1, 'a photo that is only selected is still not uploaded before consent');
+
+await context.close();
+await browser.close();
+console.log('PASS unreadable photo bytes are refused on device and at the server, with manual entry intact');

tests/metrics-endpoint.acceptance.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import net from 'node:net';
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+// Issue #19 at the real boundary: the server that ships, behind a provider stub this test owns, so
+// "the metric reflects a real request" and "the metric never contains the request" are both
+// measurable instead of asserted from a mock.
+
+const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
+const OPERATOR_TOKEN = 'test-operator-token-9f2a';
+
+function cleanJpeg({ width = 1200, height = 900 } = {}) {
+  const sof = Buffer.alloc(17);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(0xffc0, 0);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(15, 2);
+  sof[4] = 8;
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(height, 5);
+  sof.writeUInt16BE(width, 7);
+  sof[9] = 3;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
+    sof[10 + i * 3] = i + 1;
+    sof[11 + i * 3] = 0x11;
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8]), sof, Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd9])]);
+}
+
+const dataUrl = (mime, bytes) => `data:${mime};base64,${bytes.toString('base64')}`;
+
+async function freePort() {
+  const server = net.createServer();
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  const { port } = server.address();
+  server.close();
+  return port;
+}
+
+async function startProvider() {
+  const state = { calls: 0 };
+  const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
+    if (req.url === '/v1/models') {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ data: [{ id: 'metrics-test-model' }] }));
+      return;
+    }
+    state.calls += 1;
+    for await (const _ of req) { /* drain */ }
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({
+      choices: [{
+        message: {
+          content: JSON.stringify({
+            isStool: true, bristolType: 4, color: 'brown', confidence: 0.8,
+            imageQuality: 'good', observations: 'Synthetic test card.',
+          }),
+        },
+      }],
+    }));
+  });
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  return {
+    state,
+    port: server.address().port,
+    close: () => new Promise(resolve => {
+      server.closeAllConnections?.();
+      server.close(resolve);
+    }),
+  };
+}
+
+async function withServer(env, run) {
+  const provider = await startProvider();
+  const port = await freePort();
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      HOST: '127.0.0.1',
+      PORT: String(port),
+      TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED: 'true',
+      TIMMY_VISION_PROFILE: 'selfhost',
+      TIMMY_VISION_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/v1`,
+      TIMMY_VISION_MODEL: 'metrics-test-model',
+      ...env,
+    },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  });
+  const logs = [];
+  child.stdout.on('data', chunk => logs.push(chunk.toString()));
+  child.stderr.on('data', chunk => logs.push(chunk.toString()));
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  try {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
+    for (;;) {
+      try {
+        const response = await fetch(`${base}/api/healthz`);
+        if (response.ok) break;
+      } catch { /* not up yet */ }
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error(`server did not start: ${logs.join('')}`);
+      await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
+    }
+    await run({ base, provider, logs });
+  } finally {
+    child.kill('SIGKILL');
+    await provider.close();
+  }
+}
+
+const postAnalyze = (base, payload) => fetch(`${base}/api/analyze`, {
+  method: 'POST',
+  headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+  body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+});
+const getMetrics = (base, token = OPERATOR_TOKEN) => fetch(`${base}/api/metrics`, {
+  headers: token ? { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {},
+});
+
+test('the metrics snapshot reports the request the server actually analysed', async () => {
+  await withServer({ TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: OPERATOR_TOKEN }, async ({ base, provider }) => {
+    const analyzed = await postAnalyze(base, { consent: true, imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/jpeg', cleanJpeg()) });
+    assert.equal(analyzed.status, 200);
+    assert.equal(provider.state.calls, 1);
+
+    const response = await getMetrics(base);
+    const snapshot = await response.json();
+
+    assert.equal(response.status, 200);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.app.analyzeRequests, 1);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.queue.accepted, 1);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.queue.inFlight, 0, 'a finished request must release its slot');
+    assert.equal(snapshot.model.outcomes.suggestion, 1);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.model.latency.count, 1);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.model.abstentionRate, 0);
+    assert.equal(snapshot.model.readiness.ready, true, 'readiness is probed from the configured worker');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the metrics route is operator-only, and absent when no token is configured', async () => {
+  await withServer({ TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: OPERATOR_TOKEN }, async ({ base }) => {
+    const wrong = await getMetrics(base, 'not-the-operator-token');
+    assert.equal(wrong.status, 403);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(await wrong.text(), /analyzeRequests/, 'a rejected caller learns nothing about traffic');
+
+    const anonymous = await getMetrics(base, '');
+    assert.equal(anonymous.status, 403);
+  });
+
+  await withServer({}, async ({ base }) => {
+    const response = await getMetrics(base, '');
+    assert.equal(response.status, 404, 'an unconfigured deployment exposes no metrics route at all');
+  });
+});
+
+test('the snapshot proves the privacy boundary from the outside', async () => {
+  await withServer({ TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: OPERATOR_TOKEN }, async ({ base }) => {
+    // A real synthetic photo goes through the real path, so any leak would have real bytes to leak.
+    const bytes = cleanJpeg();
+    const analyzed = await postAnalyze(base, {
+      consent: true,
+      note: 'fictional note about a very private symptom',
+      imageDataUrl: dataUrl('image/jpeg', bytes),
+    });
+    assert.equal(analyzed.status, 200);
+
+    const snapshot = await getMetrics(base).then(response => response.json());
+    const serialized = JSON.stringify(snapshot);
+
+    assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /very private symptom/i, 'note text must never be a metric');
+    const base64Run = bytes.toString('base64').slice(0, 24);
+    assert.ok(base64Run.length === 24, 'sanity: the synthetic image has bytes to leak');
+    assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, new RegExp(base64Run.replace(/[+/=]/g, '\\$&')), 'image bytes must never be a metric');
+    assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /data:image/, 'no data URL may appear in the snapshot');
+    assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /127\.0\.0\.1|::1/, 'no caller address may appear in the snapshot');
+    assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /image|note|photo/i, 'no request-derived key may appear in the snapshot');
+  });
+});

tests/mobile-capture.acceptance.mjs

@@ -47,8 +47,11 @@ for (const viewport of viewports) {
     mimeType: 'image/jpeg',
     buffer: Buffer.from('not an image'),
   });
-  assert.match(await page.locator('.scan-result').innerText(), /could not be read/i);
-  await page.getByText('Try another photo', { exact: true }).click();
+  assert.match(await page.locator('.scan-result').innerText(), /isn.t a photo Timmy can read/i);
+  // Issue #16: the refusal is its own state and states plainly that nothing left the device, instead
+  // of borrowing the "couldn't analyze that safely" copy from a failed upload.
+  assert.match(await page.locator('.scan-result').innerText(), /Nothing was uploaded/i);
+  await page.getByText('Choose another photo', { exact: true }).click();
   await page.locator('#gallery-photo').setInputFiles('tests/fixtures/synthetic-type4.jpg');
   assert.equal(await page.locator('#analyze-photo').isDisabled(), true);
   assert.equal(await page.locator('#retake-photo').isVisible(), true);

tests/model-metrics-report-format.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { formatOperatorReport } from '../src/model-metrics-report.js';
+import { createModelMetrics } from '../src/model-metrics.js';
+
+function snapshot(overrides = {}) {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => Date.parse('2026-11-02T10:00:00.000Z') });
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'ready', ready: true });
+  return { ...metrics.snapshot(), ...overrides };
+}
+
+test('the report names the app, queue, and model boundaries in that order', () => {
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(snapshot());
+
+  assert.match(report, /^APP$/m);
+  assert.match(report, /^QUEUE$/m);
+  assert.match(report, /^MODEL$/m);
+  assert.ok(report.indexOf('APP') < report.indexOf('QUEUE'), 'app boundary comes before queue');
+  assert.ok(report.indexOf('QUEUE') < report.indexOf('MODEL'), 'queue boundary comes before model');
+});
+
+test('the report prints the readiness phase the worker actually reported', () => {
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(snapshot({
+    model: { ...snapshot().model, readiness: { phase: 'loading', ready: false, coldLoadMs: null } },
+  }));
+
+  assert.match(report, /readiness\s+loading/);
+  // A loading worker is not ready, and the report must not imply AI is available.
+  assert.doesNotMatch(report, /readiness\s+ready/);
+});
+
+test('an abstention rate with no answers is absence, never zero percent', () => {
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(snapshot());
+
+  assert.match(report, /abstention\s+no answers yet/i);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(report, /abstention\s+0(\.0)?%/);
+});
+
+test('an abstention rate is rendered from answers only, so failures cannot dilute it', () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => Date.parse('2026-11-02T10:00:00.000Z') });
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'ready', ready: true });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 900 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'abstained', durationMs: 1200 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'timeout', durationMs: 30_000 });
+
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(metrics.snapshot());
+
+  assert.match(report, /abstention\s+50\.0%/);
+  assert.match(report, /failure\s+timeout\s+1|timeout 1/i);
+});
+
+test('the report renders only the enumerated failure vocabulary, never a caller-supplied label', () => {
+  const base = snapshot();
+  const report = formatOperatorReport({
+    ...base,
+    model: {
+      ...base.model,
+      failureClasses: {
+        ...base.model.failureClasses,
+        'note: watery stool at 06:40': 3,
+        'user@example.com': 1,
+      },
+    },
+  });
+
+  assert.doesNotMatch(report, /watery stool/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(report, /user@example\.com/);
+  // The closed set is still fully accounted for, so the extra keys are visibly absent rather than
+  // silently folded into a bucket the operator would read as something else.
+  assert.match(report, /unexpected\s+0/);
+});
+
+test('the report shows queue occupancy against the configured ceiling', () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => Date.parse('2026-11-02T10:00:00.000Z'), limit: 3 });
+  metrics.enter();
+  metrics.enter();
+
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(metrics.snapshot());
+
+  assert.match(report, /in flight\s+2 \/ 3/);
+  assert.match(report, /at capacity\s+no/);
+});
+
+test('every row keeps a visible gap between its label and its count', () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => Date.parse('2026-11-02T10:00:00.000Z') });
+  // The longest label is the one that used to run together with its value: a column that exactly fits
+  // the text reads as `failure ingress_refused0`, one broken token instead of a metric and its count.
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'ingress_refused', durationMs: 5 });
+  const report = formatOperatorReport(metrics.snapshot());
+
+  for (const line of report.split('\n')) {
+    if (!/^ {2}\S/.test(line)) continue;
+    assert.match(line, /^ {2}\S.*?\s{2,}\S/, `row has no gap between label and value: ${JSON.stringify(line)}`);
+  }
+  assert.match(report, /failure ingress_refused\s+1/);
+  assert.match(report, /failure provider_unreachable\s+0/);
+});

tests/model-metrics-report.acceptance.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import net from 'node:net';
+import { spawn, execFile } from 'node:child_process';
+import { once } from 'node:events';
+import { promisify } from 'node:util';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL('..', import.meta.url));
+const OPERATOR_TOKEN = 'report-operator-token-4b1c';
+
+async function freePort() {
+  const server = net.createServer();
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  const { port } = server.address();
+  server.close();
+  return port;
+}
+
+async function startProvider() {
+  const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
+    if (req.url === '/v1/models') {
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ data: [{ id: 'report-model' }] }));
+      return;
+    }
+    for await (const _ of req) { /* drain */ }
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({
+      choices: [{ message: { content: JSON.stringify({
+        isStool: true, bristolType: 4, color: 'brown', confidence: 0.8,
+        imageQuality: 'good', observations: 'Synthetic test card.',
+      }) } }],
+    }));
+  });
+  server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
+  await once(server, 'listening');
+  return { port: server.address().port, close: () => new Promise(resolve => { server.closeAllConnections?.(); server.close(resolve); }) };
+}
+
+test('the operator report renders the app, queue, and model boundaries from a live snapshot', async () => {
+  const provider = await startProvider();
+  const port = await freePort();
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: {
+      ...process.env,
+      HOST: '127.0.0.1',
+      PORT: String(port),
+      TIMMY_VISION_ENABLED: 'true',
+      TIMMY_VISION_PROFILE: 'selfhost',
+      TIMMY_VISION_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${provider.port}/v1`,
+      TIMMY_VISION_MODEL: 'report-model',
+      TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: OPERATOR_TOKEN,
+    },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  });
+  const logs = [];
+  child.stdout.on('data', c => logs.push(c.toString()));
+  child.stderr.on('data', c => logs.push(c.toString()));
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  try {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
+    for (;;) {
+      try {
+        const response = await fetch(`${base}/api/healthz`);
+        if (response.ok) break;
+      } catch { /* not up yet */ }
+      if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error(`server did not start: ${logs.join('')}`);
+      await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
+    }
+
+    const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(process.execPath, ['scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs', '--url', base, '--token', OPERATOR_TOKEN], { cwd: repoRoot });
+
+    assert.match(stdout, /APP/);
+    assert.match(stdout, /QUEUE/);
+    assert.match(stdout, /MODEL/);
+    assert.match(stdout, /readiness\s+ready/, 'the report must name the readiness phase it observed');
+    assert.match(stdout, /abstention/i);
+    assert.match(stdout, /failure/i);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(stdout, /OPERATOR_TOKEN|report-operator-token/, 'the report must never print the token');
+  } finally {
+    child.kill('SIGKILL');
+    await provider.close();
+  }
+});
+
+async function startServer(env) {
+  const port = await freePort();
+  const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['server.mjs'], {
+    cwd: repoRoot,
+    env: { ...process.env, HOST: '127.0.0.1', PORT: String(port), ...env },
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  });
+  const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+  const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
+  for (;;) {
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`${base}/api/healthz`);
+      if (response.ok) break;
+    } catch { /* not up yet */ }
+    if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error('server did not start');
+    await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
+  }
+  return { base, stop: () => child.kill('SIGKILL') };
+}
+
+test('the report refuses a missing or wrong operator token without echoing it', async () => {
+  const tokenless = await startServer({ TIMMY_METRICS_ENABLED: undefined, TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: '' });
+  try {
+    await assert.rejects(
+      execFileAsync(process.execPath, ['scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs', '--url', tokenless.base, '--token', 'x'], { cwd: repoRoot }),
+      error => {
+        assert.notEqual(error.code, 0);
+        assert.match(error.stderr, /disabled/i, 'a server with no metrics route must say so, not "unauthorized"');
+        return true;
+      },
+    );
+  } finally {
+    tokenless.stop();
+  }
+
+  const guarded = await startServer({ TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN: OPERATOR_TOKEN });
+  try {
+    await assert.rejects(
+      execFileAsync(process.execPath, ['scripts/model_metrics_report.mjs', '--url', guarded.base, '--token', 'not-the-token'], { cwd: repoRoot }),
+      error => {
+        assert.notEqual(error.code, 0);
+        assert.match(error.stderr, /rejected/i);
+        assert.doesNotMatch(`${error.stderr}${error.stdout}`, /not-the-token/, 'the rejected token must never be echoed');
+        return true;
+      },
+    );
+  } finally {
+    guarded.stop();
+  }
+});

tests/model-metrics.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+import { createModelMetrics } from '../src/model-metrics.js';
+
+// Issue #19: the worker has to be operable without the metrics becoming a second copy of the
+// journal. These tests are the boundary: what a metric sample may say, and what it may never say.
+
+test('abstention rate is computed from the model answers that came back at all', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 900 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 1_100 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'abstained', durationMs: 700 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'abstained', durationMs: 800 });
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.outcomes.suggestion, 2);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.outcomes.abstained, 2);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.abstentionRate, 0.5);
+});
+
+test('a label that is not an enumerated outcome is counted, never copied into the snapshot', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  // The worst case for a metrics boundary: a caller-supplied string arrives where a label belongs.
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'Type 4, urgent, 2026-11-01, milkY4B2cQ9w==', durationMs: 900 });
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+  const serialized = JSON.stringify(snapshot);
+
+  assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(snapshot.model.outcomes).sort(), ['abstained', 'failure', 'suggestion']);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /urgent/i);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(serialized, /milkY4B2cQ9w/);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.outcomes.failure, 1, 'an unrecognised outcome is one failed answer');
+});
+
+test('a failed request is classified and kept out of the abstention denominator', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 900 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'provider_unreachable', durationMs: 2_000 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'provider_unreachable', durationMs: 2_100 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'abstained', durationMs: 800 });
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.failureClasses.provider_unreachable, 2);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.abstentionRate, 0.5, 'a failed answer is not an abstention');
+});
+
+test('a failure class outside the enumerated set collapses instead of being echoed', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'note:blood in stool, image 9f2a', durationMs: 2_000 });
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.failureClasses.unexpected, 1);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(snapshot), /blood in stool/);
+});
+
+test('analysis latency is reported as warm work, with counts and a bounded histogram', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 900 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 1_500 });
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'abstained', durationMs: 6_000 });
+  // A refused request never waited on the model, so it must not be sampled as latency.
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'ingress_refused', durationMs: 5 });
+
+  const latency = metrics.snapshot().model.latency;
+
+  assert.equal(latency.count, 3, 'latency counts model work only');
+  assert.equal(latency.maxMs, 6_000);
+  assert.equal(latency.meanMs, 2_800);
+  // Fixed bucket edges keep the snapshot a histogram of numbers, not a list of timings.
+  assert.deepEqual(latency.bucketsMs, { '1000': 1, '2000': 2, '5000': 2, '15000': 3, '60000': 3 });
+});
+
+test('queue depth is the in-flight model work, and a released slot is never counted twice', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000, limit: 2 });
+
+  const first = metrics.enter();
+  const second = metrics.enter();
+  assert.equal(metrics.snapshot().queue.inFlight, 2);
+  assert.equal(metrics.snapshot().queue.atCapacity, true);
+
+  metrics.leave(first);
+  metrics.leave(first); // a double release must not free a slot that is still in use
+  const queue = metrics.snapshot().queue;
+
+  assert.equal(queue.inFlight, 1, 'the second request still holds its slot');
+  assert.equal(queue.atCapacity, false);
+  assert.equal(queue.accepted, 2);
+
+  metrics.leave(second);
+  assert.equal(metrics.snapshot().queue.inFlight, 0);
+  assert.equal(metrics.snapshot().queue.accepted, 2, 'a completed request is still an accepted request');
+});
+
+test('readiness is reported as a phase, and the cold model load is measured once', async () => {
+  let clock = 10_000;
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => clock });
+
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'loading', ready: false });
+  clock = 74_000; // 64s of weights loading
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'ready', ready: true });
+  clock = 90_000;
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'offline', ready: false });
+
+  const readiness = metrics.snapshot().model.readiness;
+
+  assert.equal(readiness.phase, 'offline');
+  assert.equal(readiness.ready, false);
+  assert.equal(readiness.coldLoadMs, 64_000, 'the cold load is the first time the model became resident');
+});
+
+test('a readiness phase outside the enumerated set is reported as checking', async () => {
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => 1_000 });
+
+  metrics.recordReadiness({ phase: 'user says: bloody stool', ready: true });
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.readiness.phase, 'checking');
+  assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(snapshot), /bloody stool/);
+});
+
+test('the snapshot keeps the app, queue, and model boundaries separate', async () => {
+  let clock = 1_000;
+  const metrics = createModelMetrics({ now: () => clock, limit: 2 });
+
+  // One request is refused at the app boundary and never takes a model slot; the other is admitted,
+  // answered, and released. Each of the three boundaries should account for exactly that.
+  const slot = metrics.enter();
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'suggestion', durationMs: 800 });
+  metrics.leave(slot);
+  metrics.recordAnalyze({ outcome: 'failure', failureClass: 'rate_limited', durationMs: 0 });
+  clock = 41_000;
+
+  const snapshot = metrics.snapshot();
+
+  assert.deepEqual(Object.keys(snapshot).sort(), ['app', 'generatedAt', 'model', 'queue', 'schema']);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.app.uptimeMs, 40_000);
+  assert.equal(snapshot.app.analyzeRequests, 2, 'the app boundary counts every request it saw');
+  assert.equal(snapshot.app.refusedBeforeModel, 1, 'a refusal that never reached the queue is an app fact');
+  assert.equal(snapshot.queue.accepted, 1, 'the queue boundary counts what it admitted, not what it answered');
+  assert.equal(snapshot.queue.inFlight, 0, 'a released slot is not in flight');
+  assert.equal(snapshot.model.outcomes.suggestion, 1, 'the model boundary counts answers only');
+});

tests/rate-limit.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+
+import { createRateLimiter } from '../src/rate-limit.js';
+
+// A clock the test owns, so no test sleeps and every window boundary is exact.
+function manualClock(start = 1_700_000_000_000) {
+  let current = start;
+  return { now: () => current, advance: ms => { current += ms; } };
+}
+
+test('allows requests up to the limit and refuses the next one', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 3, windowMs: 60_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt += 1) {
+    const verdict = limiter.take('device-a');
+    assert.equal(verdict.allowed, true, `attempt ${attempt} must be allowed`);
+    assert.equal(verdict.remaining, 3 - attempt);
+  }
+
+  const refused = limiter.take('device-a');
+  assert.equal(refused.allowed, false);
+  assert.equal(refused.remaining, 0);
+  assert.equal(refused.retryAfterMs, 60_000);
+});
+
+test('counts each caller on its own budget', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 60_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, false);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-b').allowed, true);
+});
+
+test('lets a caller back in once its window has passed', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 60_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, false);
+  clock.advance(60_001);
+  const allowedAgain = limiter.take('device-a');
+  assert.equal(allowedAgain.allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(allowedAgain.remaining, 0);
+});
+
+test('a refused request does not extend the block', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 1, windowMs: 1_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, true);
+  clock.advance(400);
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, false);
+  clock.advance(601);
+  // The original hit is now 1001ms old, so the window has moved on even though the caller hammered
+  // the endpoint in between. A refusal must never buy a longer penalty than the caller earned.
+  assert.equal(limiter.take('device-a').allowed, true);
+});
+
+test('reports the wait from the oldest hit still inside the window', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 2, windowMs: 10_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  limiter.take('device-a');
+  clock.advance(4_000);
+  limiter.take('device-a');
+  clock.advance(1_000);
+  const refused = limiter.take('device-a');
+  assert.equal(refused.allowed, false);
+  assert.equal(refused.retryAfterMs, 5_000);
+});
+
+test('keeps its caller map bounded when many callers appear', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 5, windowMs: 60_000, maxKeys: 8, now: clock.now });
+
+  for (let index = 0; index < 50; index += 1) limiter.take(`device-${index}`);
+  assert.ok(limiter.size() <= 8, `expected at most 8 tracked callers, saw ${limiter.size()}`);
+});
+
+test('prunes expired callers instead of growing for the life of the process', () => {
+  const clock = manualClock();
+  const limiter = createRateLimiter({ limit: 5, windowMs: 1_000, now: clock.now });
+
+  for (let index = 0; index < 20; index += 1) limiter.take(`device-${index}`);
+  clock.advance(1_001);
+  limiter.take('device-fresh');
+  assert.equal(limiter.size(), 1);
+});

tests/release-demo.test.js

@@ -113,6 +113,23 @@ test('release demo visibly exercises the red-flag language coverage instead of o
   assert.match(builder, /A tarry note already saved in the journal escalates the same way, before any provider call/);
 });
 
+test('release demo shows a file that only claims to be a photo being refused before upload', async () => {
+  const demo = await readFile(demoPath, 'utf8');
+  const builder = await readFile(builderPath, 'utf8');
+
+  // Issue #16: the recording must show the device-side refusal of a non-image, prove nothing was
+  // posted, and keep manual entry reachable — all asserted in the browser, not narrated.
+  assert.match(demo, /tests\/fixtures\/not-a-photo\.jpg/);
+  assert.match(demo, /\[data-capture-error="unreadable"\]/);
+  assert.match(demo, /Nothing was uploaded/);
+  assert.match(demo, /An unreadable file was posted to \/api\/analyze/);
+  assert.match(demo, /A file that only claims to be a photo is refused on the device — nothing is uploaded/);
+  assert.match(demo, /Manual logging stays one tap away, and the photo picker is one tap back/);
+  // The caption is a required release gate, so a later release cannot drop the scene silently.
+  assert.match(builder, /A file that only claims to be a photo is refused on the device — nothing is uploaded/);
+  assert.match(builder, /"image_ingress_refusal": "passed"/);
+});
+
 test('release builder gates the sleek shell, Hermes chat, and bootstrap syntax', async () => {
   const builder = await readFile(builderPath, 'utf8');
   assert.match(builder, /"test:sleek"/);
@@ -294,8 +311,11 @@ test('release demo shows a filled-in out-of-range field failing closed even besi
   assert.match(demo, /tests\/fixtures\/vision-corpus\/blank-plus-out-of-range\.png/);
   assert.match(demo, /A filled-in field that is out of range still fails closed, even when the other field came back blank/);
   assert.match(demo, /no longer told the photo was unreadable when the model returned an impossible value/);
-  // The extra fail-closed scene is a real 503, so the demo's error budget must count it.
+  // The extra fail-closed scene is a real 503, so the demo's error budget must count it, and the
+  // deliberate ingress probe is the only 400 the recording is allowed to produce.
   assert.match(demo, /expectedFailClosed\.length !== 2/);
+  assert.match(demo, /expectedIngressRefusal\.length !== 1/);
+  assert.match(demo, /errors\.length !== 3/);
   // The caption is a required gate, so a later release cannot silently drop the scene.
   assert.match(builder, /A filled-in field that is out of range still fails closed/);
 });
@@ -520,3 +540,56 @@ test('release demo runs the operator backup and restore on synthetic records ins
   assert.match(builder, /The operator backup is a command line, not a screen in the app/);
   assert.match(builder, /A restore returns the same records, including the withdrawal tombstone a trainer must never lose/);
 });
+
+test('release demo runs the RC attack suite on camera and prints the verdict it derived', async () => {
+  const demo = await readFile(demoPath, 'utf8');
+
+  // Issue #40 turns hostile uploads into a release gate. The scene must run the real suite, not
+  // describe it, and the card must show the verdict the suite derived rather than a flattering one.
+  assert.match(demo, /scripts\/security_attack_suite\.mjs', '--json'/);
+  assert.match(demo, /SECURITY ATTACK SUITE/);
+  assert.match(demo, /Every hostile upload on screen went at the real server, and the worker behind it counted every call it received/);
+  assert.match(demo, /A failing case is a finding the release job has to see, so the card prints the verdict the suite derived/);
+  assert.match(demo, /The gate blocks RC approval on any P0 case that reached the worker/);
+  assert.match(demo, /securityReport\.verdict/);
+  assert.match(demo, /securityCardProof/);
+  // The finding must name where the fix lives instead of implying the boundary is already safe.
+  assert.match(demo, /Refusing bytes by their content is the fix in review, not a claim this video makes/);
+  // Each case row prints the fields it actually observed. A guarantee that the card never renders
+  // `http undefined` (a case with no status) or the bare status again (a case with no provider calls).
+  assert.match(demo, /'refused' in observed/);
+  assert.match(demo, /'providerTextLeaked' in observed/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(demo, /http \$\{observed\.status\} · worker \$\{observed\.providerCalls\}`/);
+});
+
+test('release demo shows the privacy-safe health counters where the app discloses them', async () => {
+  const demo = await readFile(demoPath, 'utf8');
+  const builder = await readFile(builderPath, 'utf8');
+
+  // Issue #19 added an operator surface. The recording has to show the user-facing half of it — the
+  // disclosure on the privacy screen — and the claim has to be checked in the browser first.
+  assert.match(demo, /\[data-health-disclosure\]/);
+  assert.match(demo, /the privacy screen must disclose the privacy-safe health counters/);
+  assert.match(demo, /Health counters are disclosed where you read privacy facts — they never include notes, photos, image fingerprints, or identity/);
+  // The caption is a release gate, so a later release cannot drop the scene silently.
+  assert.match(builder, /Health counters are disclosed where you read privacy facts/);
+  assert.match(builder, /"privacy_safe_health_metrics": "passed"/);
+});
+
+test('release demo runs the operator health report against its own server and shows a refused token', async () => {
+  const demo = await readFile(demoPath, 'utf8');
+  const builder = await readFile(builderPath, 'utf8');
+
+  // The disclosure alone does not demonstrate the feature. The recording must run the real CLI, show
+  // counters this recording produced, and prove the wrong-token path is refused rather than answered.
+  assert.match(demo, /scripts\/model_metrics_report\.mjs/);
+  assert.match(demo, /the operator report must read the snapshot/);
+  assert.match(demo, /a wrong operator token must be refused with a stated reason instead of answered/);
+  assert.match(demo, /the report must count this recording's own requests, not a zero/);
+  assert.match(demo, /const metricsCardProof = await evidenceCardProof\('operator-health-report'\)/);
+  // The bearer must never be printed on camera or into an error line.
+  assert.match(demo, /the operator token must never appear in the report or in an error line/);
+  // The demo server has to carry a token, or the report cannot be exercised at all.
+  assert.match(builder, /"TIMMY_METRICS_TOKEN": "demo-metrics-token-not-a-credential"/);
+  assert.match(builder, /The operator health report is a command line, not a screen in the app/);
+});

tests/release-security-gate.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { buildReport, containsImageBytes, evaluateCase, latencyPercentiles, redactImageBytes, releaseVerdict } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
+
+test('latency percentiles use nearest-rank so p95 is an observed sample, not an interpolation', () => {
+  const samples = [10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100];
+  assert.deepEqual(latencyPercentiles(samples), { count: 10, p50: 50, p95: 100, max: 100 });
+});
+
+// A case is a promise the suite makes before it runs: this input must land here, and the provider
+// must (or must not) see exactly this many calls. The verdict is derived, never typed.
+const polyglot = {
+  id: 'ingress-polyglot-html',
+  severity: 'P0',
+  expected: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
+  observed: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 },
+};
+
+test('a case whose observation matches its expectation passes', () => {
+  assert.equal(evaluateCase(polyglot).status, 'pass');
+});
+
+test('a case that reached the provider is a failure that names the field that broke', () => {
+  const result = evaluateCase({ ...polyglot, observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1 } });
+  assert.equal(result.status, 'fail');
+  assert.match(result.mismatch, /status 400 expected, observed 200/);
+  assert.match(result.mismatch, /providerCalls 0 expected, observed 1/);
+});
+
+test('a P0 failure blocks the release, and a P1 failure only holds it', () => {
+  const leaked = { ...polyglot, observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 1 } };
+  const blocked = releaseVerdict({ cases: [leaked, { ...polyglot, id: 'flood', severity: 'P1', observed: { status: 200, providerCalls: 12 } }] });
+  assert.equal(blocked.verdict, 'BLOCKED');
+  assert.deepEqual(blocked.blocking.map(item => item.id), ['ingress-polyglot-html']);
+  assert.deepEqual(blocked.holds.map(item => item.id), ['flood']);
+});
+
+test('a suite with no failures is a GO, and counts say how many cases were proven', () => {
+  const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot] });
+  assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'GO');
+  assert.deepEqual(verdict.blocking, []);
+  assert.equal(verdict.proven, 1);
+});
+
+test('a required category that no case exercised blocks the release instead of passing by omission', () => {
+  const deletion = { id: 'deletion-withdrawal', severity: 'P0', surface: 'out-of-surface', evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js', evidenceVerified: false };
+  const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot, deletion] });
+  assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'BLOCKED');
+  assert.deepEqual(verdict.unproven.map(item => item.id), ['deletion-withdrawal']);
+});
+
+test('coverage borrowed from another test file only counts once the runner verified that file exists', () => {
+  const verified = { id: 'deletion-withdrawal', severity: 'P0', surface: 'out-of-surface', evidence: 'tests/training-contribution.test.js', evidenceVerified: true };
+  const verdict = releaseVerdict({ cases: [polyglot, verified] });
+  assert.equal(verdict.verdict, 'GO');
+  assert.deepEqual(verdict.coveredElsewhere, ['deletion-withdrawal']);
+});
+
+// The report and the server log are shipped as release evidence. Neither may carry a photo.
+const JPEG_DATA_URI = '';
+
+test('a data URI or a long base64 run is recognised as image bytes', () => {
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(`posted ${JPEG_DATA_URI} to the worker`), true);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes('chunk ' + 'A'.repeat(64) + 'yQ'.repeat(200)), true);
+});
+
+test('ordinary log lines, hex digests, and short tokens are not image bytes', () => {
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes('Timmy is listening on http://127.0.0.1:4173 · vision configured · Hermes locked and ready'), false);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes('sha256 ' + 'a1b2c3d4'.repeat(8)), false);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes('case ingress-polyglot-html observed status 200'), false);
+});
+
+test('redaction removes the bytes and keeps the sentence around them honest', () => {
+  const redacted = redactImageBytes(`provider received ${JPEG_DATA_URI} at 12:01`);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(redacted), false);
+  assert.match(redacted, /\[redacted image bytes\]/);
+  assert.match(redacted, /^provider received .* at 12:01$/);
+});
+
+test('the report carries the verdict, the target it ran against, and the measured load numbers', () => {
+  const report = buildReport({
+    generatedAt: '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z',
+    target: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', provider: 'stub counting worker' },
+    cases: [polyglot],
+    load: { requests: 8, errors: 0, abstentions: 8, p50: 12, p95: 40, max: 40 },
+  });
+  assert.equal(report.schema, 'timmy-rc-security-attack/1');
+  assert.equal(report.verdict, 'GO');
+  assert.equal(report.generatedAt, '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z');
+  assert.equal(report.target.provider, 'stub counting worker');
+  assert.equal(report.load.p95, 40);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)), false);
+});
+
+test('a case that quotes a response body cannot smuggle the photo into the report', () => {
+  const report = buildReport({
+    generatedAt: '2026-10-30T10:48:00.000Z',
+    target: { baseUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:4173', provider: 'stub' },
+    cases: [{ ...polyglot, observed: { status: 400, providerCalls: 0 }, snippet: `refused ${JPEG_DATA_URI}` }],
+    load: null,
+  });
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(report)), false);
+  assert.match(JSON.stringify(report), /redacted image bytes/);
+});

tests/security-attack.acceptance.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Acceptance: the RC attack suite must drive the real server and then tell the truth about what it
+// saw. Nothing here trusts the runner's own summary line: every case status is re-derived from the
+// recorded observation with the same rule the release gate uses, and the report is scanned for photo
+// bytes. If the suite ever marks a case pass while observing a mismatch, this test fails.
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
+import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { containsImageBytes, evaluateCase, releaseVerdict } from '../src/release-security-gate.js';
+
+const repoRoot = new URL('..', import.meta.url).pathname;
+
+async function runSuite() {
+  const directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'timmy-rc-attack-'));
+  const reportPath = join(directory, 'report.json');
+  const run = await new Promise(resolve => {
+    execFile(process.execPath, ['scripts/security_attack_suite.mjs', '--json', reportPath], {
+      cwd: repoRoot,
+      timeout: 180_000,
+    }, (error, stdout, stderr) => resolve({
+      code: error?.code ?? 0,
+      stdout,
+      stderr,
+    }));
+  });
+  const report = JSON.parse(await readFile(reportPath, 'utf8'));
+  await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  return { run, report };
+}
+
+const suite = await runSuite();
+const byId = new Map(suite.report.cases.map(item => [item.id, item]));
+
+test('the suite exits non-zero exactly when its own verdict blocks the release', () => {
+  assert.ok([0, 1].includes(suite.run.code), `unexpected exit ${suite.run.code}: ${suite.run.stderr}`);
+  assert.match(suite.run.stdout, new RegExp(`VERDICT: ${suite.report.verdict}`));
+  assert.equal(suite.run.code, suite.report.verdict === 'BLOCKED' ? 1 : 0);
+});
+
+test('every reported case status is re-derivable from the observation it recorded', () => {
+  for (const item of suite.report.cases.filter(entry => entry.surface !== 'out-of-surface')) {
+    const derived = evaluateCase(item);
+    assert.equal(item.status, derived.status, `${item.id} claims ${item.status} but observed ${JSON.stringify(item.observed)} against ${JSON.stringify(item.expected)}`);
+  }
+  assert.equal(suite.report.verdict, releaseVerdict({ cases: suite.report.cases }).verdict);
+});
+
+test('the suite covers the abuse classes the ticket names, not a convenient subset', () => {
+  const required = ['oversized', 'polyglot', 'malformed', 'flood', 'log', 'deletion', 'replay'];
+  const categories = new Set(suite.report.cases.map(item => item.category));
+  for (const category of required) assert.ok(categories.has(category), `no case covers ${category}`);
+  assert.ok(suite.report.cases.length >= 8, `only ${suite.report.cases.length} cases ran`);
+});
+
+test('a request without consent is refused and the worker is never called', () => {
+  const consent = byId.get('consent-required');
+  assert.equal(consent.observed.status, 400);
+  assert.equal(consent.observed.providerCalls, 0);
+  assert.equal(consent.status, 'pass');
+});
+
+test('an oversized body is refused before any provider work', () => {
+  const oversized = byId.get('ingress-oversized-body');
+  assert.equal(oversized.observed.status, 413);
+  assert.equal(oversized.observed.providerCalls, 0);
+});
+
+test('a provider answer that breaks the schema fails closed without quoting the provider', () => {
+  const malformed = byId.get('model-output-malformed');
+  assert.equal(malformed.observed.status, 503);
+  assert.equal(malformed.observed.providerTextLeaked, false);
+  assert.ok(!JSON.stringify(malformed).includes('garbage-completion-token'), 'the report must not quote the provider');
+});
+
+test('the captured server log and the report itself carry no photo bytes', () => {
+  assert.equal(byId.get('log-leak-scan').observed.imageBytesInLog, false);
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(suite.report)), false);
+});
+
+test('the load phase recorded percentiles, errors, and abstentions without any image body', () => {
+  const load = suite.report.load;
+  assert.ok(load.requests >= 8, `only ${load.requests} load requests ran`);
+  assert.equal(typeof load.p50, 'number');
+  assert.equal(typeof load.p95, 'number');
+  assert.equal(typeof load.abstentions, 'number');
+  assert.equal(containsImageBytes(JSON.stringify(load)), false);
+});

tests/ui.acceptance.mjs

@@ -43,6 +43,19 @@ await page.waitForTimeout(500);
 assert.equal(await page.evaluate(() => window.scrollY), 0, 'reply should not push the page header/navigation out of frame');
 await page.screenshot({ path: 'artifacts/timmy-chat-mobile.png', fullPage: false });
 
+// Issue #19: the operator counters have to be disclosed where the user already looks for privacy
+// facts, and the disclosure has to name what is not collected. A settings screen that stays silent
+// about a new counter is the failure this asserts against.
+await page.locator('[data-view="calendar"]').first().click();
+await page.locator('[data-view="privacy"]').first().click();
+const disclosure = page.locator('[data-health-disclosure]');
+assert.equal(await disclosure.isVisible(), true, 'the privacy screen must disclose the health counters');
+const disclosureText = await disclosure.innerText();
+assert.match(disclosureText, /how analysis requests went/i);
+assert.match(disclosureText, /never (contain|hold|include) your notes, photos, image fingerprints, or identity/i);
+assert.match(disclosureText, /reset/i);
+await page.screenshot({ path: 'artifacts/privacy-health-disclosure.png', fullPage: true });
+
 assert.deepEqual(errors, []);
 await browser.close();
 console.log('PASS mobile home → log → red-flag → save → Timmy boundary');